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No. 78-1007 Cert to CA2 (Oakes, 
Blumenfeld[dj] & Mehrtens[dj]) 
FULLILOVE 
v. 
KREPS (Secy of Commerce) Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs seek review of the CA's affirmance of the 
d.ct's denial of their requests for i~junctive and declaratory 
relief against implementation of §103 (f) (2) of the Public Works 
Employment Act of . 1977~ 42 u.s.c. §6705(f) (2).!/ The --
!/Section 103(f) (2) provides in relevant part as follows: 
(N]o grant shall be made under this Act for any local 
public works project unless the applicant gives 
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended 
for minority business enterpreses ...• [T]he term "minority 
business enterprise" means a business at least 50 percent 
of which is owned by minority groups ...• For the purposes of 
the preceeding sentence, minority group members are 
citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, r sk' os and Aleuts. 





provision at issue conditions all local public works grants on 
an assurance that at least 10 per cent of the grant will be 
expended for "minority business enterprises," whith are defined 
in the provision. Petrs argue that the Act constitutes an 
invidious racial discrimination and as such violates the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments and Title VI of the Civil Right·s Act 
of 1964. 
2. FACTS: Petrs are various individuals and contractor 
\
groups which perform both general contracting and specialty 
subcontracting work on construction projects. They filed suit 
in d.ct for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Secy 
of Commerce and various state .agencies charged with 
implementing the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. They 
argued that the Act's 10% set-aside for minority business 
enterprises deprived them of business on the basis of their 
race in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
Title VI. 
The provision at issue was added to the general public 
works statute as a floor amendment. Thus, there is no 
discussion in any of the congressional reports accompanying the 
general statute as to why the provision was added. There were 
a couple of comments about the provision during the floor 
debates and they will be discussed below. 
After a hearing the d.ct (Werker, J.) found the provision 
constitutional. In reaching this conclusion the ct used a 
"compelling state interest" standard because the provision 
employed racial classi~ications in determining who should 




In applying the test the ct found a compelling state 
interest in Congress' desire to eliminate the vestiges of 
present and/or past discrimination. While the d.ct recognized 
that Congress did not express an intention to assist minorities 
as opposed to economically disadvantaged groups in general, · the 
ct felt that the intent was fairly inferable. 
The ct pointed to remarks by Representative Mitchell when 
he introduced the amendment. The congressman stated that 
although the present assistance programs to minority 
contractors permit them to be "viable entities" they are "cut 
off" when contracts are awarded. He added that "the only way 
that we are going to get the minority enterprises into our 
system" is by the amendment he proposed. 123 Cong. Rec. H. 1437 
(daily ed. 2/24/77). Three other remarks by various 
legislators were also cited by the d.ct: "minority contractors 
and businessmen who are trying to enter the bidding 
process •.. get the 'works' almost every time" (Rep. Conyers); 
"Nation's record with respect to providing opportunities for 
minority businesses is a sorry one" (Rep Biaggi); 
"noninvolvement of minority business exists despite 
legislation, executive orders and regulations"(paraphrase from 
a comment by Sen. Brooke). 
The d.ct conceded that these comments did not expressly 
attribute the difficulties encountered by minority businesses 
to racial discrimination, but the ct nonetheless felt that such 
a finding could be supported by reference to "available 
empirical data." It then cited some statistics from the Office 
of Minority Business Enterprise, U.S. Dept of Commerce, 
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-Minority Business Opportunity Handbook which showed that 
minority businesses received very few government contracts. 
The ct also cited general comments in a Report of the House 
Subcommittee on Small Business Administration Oversight and 
Minority Enterprise that "because of past overt social and 
economic discrimination [the present business system] is 
operating, in effect, to perpetuate these past inequities." 
The ct putting all of this material together concluded that 
"Congress could reasonably believe that prior racial 
discrimination was the cause" of the statistical disparities it 
cited and thus this must have been its purpose it passing the 
amendment. 
The d.ct then addressed the issue of whether the 10% 
set-aside was the "least restrictive means" of accomplishing 
the compelling state interest of eliminating the effects of 
past discrimination. The ct found that the amount of money 
involved in the set-aside was not too great compared with all 
monies available. Second, it concluded that less restrictive 
measures such as direct assistance to minority enterprises had 
been tried and failed. Thus, it was "necessary" for Congress 
to act as it did. 
On appeal the CA in part adopted the analysis of the d.ct 
and in part considered a different theory. TheCA, however, 
had the benefit of our decision in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (June 28, 1978), to guide 
its reasoning. It agreed with the d.ct that a "compelling 
state interest" standard was required. The CA first looked to 




of past discrimination. It also found nothing explicit to 
support that conclusion, but, like the d.ct, felt such a 
purpose was inferable. 
On the question of past discrimination, the CA noted the 
following language in Justice Powell's opn in Bakke: "We have 
previously recognized the special competence of Congress to 
make findings with respect to the effects of identified past 
discrimination and its discretionary authority to take 
appropriate remedial measures." The CA then relied upon the 
same congressional and noncongressional sources cited by the 
d.ct to establish "a 'perceived' basis for congressional action. 
The CA did not consider explicitly the issue of "least 
restrictive means." Instead, it considered whether the 
legislative remedy adopted to eliminate the social evil was 
"fundamentally fair." In this regard the CA adopted a 
balancing test. The ct did not believe that the amount of 
money set aside for minority enterprises was a sufficient sum 
to be "fundamentally unfair" to the plaintiff contractors and 
thus concluded that the provision was constitutional. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs and the Equal Employment Advisory 
Council as amicus in support of the petn first point out that 
the decision below conflicts with a decision of the D.Ct for 
the Central District of Calf. in Associated General Contractors 
of Calif. v. Secy of Commerce, decided Oct. 20, 1978, appeals 
docketed with this Ct in Nos. 78-1107, 1108 & 1114. It also 
conflicts with a District of Montana decision, Montana 
Contractors' Ass'n v. Secy of Commerce, No. CV77-62-M (Nov. 24, 
1978). Thus, petrs and amicus assert that the issue is an 
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important one that requires an immediate decision by this Ct. 
Second, petrs and amicus assert that the decision below 
conflicts with our decision in Bakke in two respects. First, 
they argue that the CA's "least restrictive means" analysis, 
i.e., whether the legislative remedy is "fundamentally fair," 
does not require any "precise tailoring" such as the Ct 
requires when dealing with racial classifications. 
Second, petrs argue that Justice Powell's opn laid great 
stress on the importance of clear legislative findings of prior 
discrimination in any analysis of whether the statute satisfies 
a "compelling state interest" test. They assert that the scant 
legislattve record in this case in no way satisfies Bakke. 
4. DISCUSSION: The analysis of the d.ct and the CA seem to 
me to be seriously flawed. While purporting to apply a 
compelling state interest test, their reasoning sounds at times 
almost like a mere "rational relationship" standard. 
First, the cts are willing to presume Congress' purpose in 
passing the statute. Second, they all but create "findings" of 
past discrimination to support the legislative remedy in this 
provision. It is clear that there are no findings of past 
discrimination in the legislative record. Justice Powell in 
Bakke said that "[w]ithout such findings of constitutional or 
statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government has 
any greater interest in helping one individual than in 
refraining from harming another. Thus the government has no 
compelling justification for inflicting such harm." 46 U.S.L.W. 
at 4906-07. I read that comment as generally requiring much 




There, however, are several problems with this whole 
issue. First, an attack on this statute was before the Ct in 
Associated General Contractors of Calif. v. Secy of Commerce, 
441 F.Supp. 955 {C.D.Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S.Ct 
3132. There the SG informed the Ct that all of the funds for 
the grants under the 1977 amendments had been distributed and 
thus the issue might be moot. On remand, the d.ct rejected the 
suggestion of mootness and reinstated its holding that the 
statute is unconstitutional. 
Presumably the issue of mootness is still a substantial one 
that might preclude deciding this case on the merits. Since 
there is no response here as yet, we do not know whether the SG 
still feels the issue is moot. 
Second, there are three appeals from the other d.ct 
decision. The time for filing a motion to dismiss or affirm 
runs until April 14. It would seem wasteful not to consider 
this case with those appeals. Thus, the best course of action 
to take on this petn is first call for a response and then to 
relist this case to be decided with the appeals from the Calif. 
d.ct decision. 
There is no response, but there is an amicus brief in 
support of the petn. 
2/21/79 Phillips CA & D.Ct opns in petn 
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MOTION TO DIVIDE ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rules 35 and 45 of the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C., 
the General Building Contractors of New York State, Inc., New 
York State Building Chapter, Associated Ge~~ial Contractors of 
America, respectfully files this request for special permission 
for the undersigned, Robert J. Hickey, to present oral argument 
on its behalf in this case. As a basis for this request, Peti-
tioner states the following: 
1. There are several Petitioners in this case. Some are 
represented, as notified to the Supreme Court on August 6, 
1979, by Mr. Robert Benisch of Berman, Paley, Goldstein & 
Berman, 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY, 10036. The above 
is represented by Mr. Robert J. Hickey. 
2. A separate brief on the merits was filed by Mr. Benisch 
on behalf of the Petitioners he represents, and a separate 
brief was filed on behalf of the above by Mr. Hickey. 
3. It is the intent of Petitioner represented by Mr. Hickey 
to file a separate Reply Brief in this matter, which is due 
three days prior to the schedule of oral arguments. 
-2-
4. The interest of Petitioners differs, which, in part, was 
the result of the original notification to the Court of the 
split in Petitioners on August 6, 1979. 
5. The undersigned has had extensive experience with the 
issues in this case since he has, in effect, either been 
"of counsel" or counsel of record in most of the cases 
raising the issue of the constitutionality of the MBE 10 
percent set aside provision instituted since the passage 
of the Act in 1977. 
Consequently, the undersigned believes, both with respect to the 
separate interest of each of the Petitioners as well as the bene-
fit to the Court of the undersign's experience in matters per-
taining to the issues in this case, that special permission 
should be granted for the undersigned to participate in oral 
arguments. The Court is respectfully requested to make an 
expedited determination of this Motion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for General Building 
Contractors of New York State, 
Inc., New York State Building 
Chapter, Associated General 
Contractors of America, Inc. 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to United States Supreme Court Rule 35, 28 U.S.C., 
the undersigned states that a copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Divide Oral Argument was served by first-class, certified return 
receipt mail, upon the following parties of record: 
Brian K. Landsberg, Esq. 
Department of Justice 
Washington, DC 20530 
Robert Abrams, Atty. General 
for the State of New York 
Two World Trade Center 
New York, NY 10047 
Robert Benisch, Esq. 
Berman, Paley, Goldstein & Berman 
500 Fifth Avenue 
New York, NY 10036 
this 5th day of November, 1979. 
• 
. ' 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Legislative History. The Public Works Employment 
1977 (the Act), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701-6736, appropriated$ 
4 billion for public works projects. The Act, designed primarily 
:.J to help alleviate nationwide unemployment in the construction 
.. $4.-~ 'H.,..~~.-&.~ .... 4....~ ~~ , 
~ (<.~!! . .;.-4 ..... ~~4"' ............... ~)  ....... ~  
A.-...........,~.f.I.... .. .,.~ ..... -.J.y,......_~~ .. 4rl..-·'1~~·- .... ~~~.4o~~ 
2. 
industry, provides federal funds to state and local governments. 
The state and loclal governments, in turn, let construction 
contracts to private businessmen. Section ~03(f)(~) of the Act 
provides: 
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines 
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this chapter 
for n cal ubl ic works chapter unless the 
applicant gives satisficatory asssurance to the 
Secretary [of Commerce] that at least 10 per centum of 
the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority 
business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, 
the term "minority business enterprise" means a 
business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by 
minority group members or, in the case of a publicly 
owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of 
which is owned by minority group members. For the 
purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group 
members are citizens of the United States who are 
VNegroes , .; Spanish-speaking, Or ie.ntals, Indians," Eskimos, 
and v[:(leuts. t 1 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(f) (2). 
vt,..'· ~ t.Jt . 
Section 103(f)(2) originated in an amendment introduced 
on the floor of the House by Representative Mitchell. 
Representative Mitchell's remarks in support of his amendment 
----
form the major legislative history behind section 103(f) (2). 
Mitchell said that his amendment provides minority businesses a 
"fair share of the action" from the public works legislation. 
He commended the Act generally but stated that it failed to 
"target" minority enterprises. Mitchell said that a great deal 
of federal money is spent strengthening minority business, yet 
the government denies those businesses contracts. He noted that 
one per cent of government contracts are minority contracts. 
His amendment provided the opportunity "to remedy this 
situation." 
3. 
Representative Mitchell anticipated possible objections 
to the amendment. He said that the set-as ide was "the only way 
we are going to get minority enterprises into the system." And 
he explained why a competitive system would not ?rovide 
sufficient access to minority businesses: 11 We are so new on the 
scene, we are so relatively small that every time we go out for 
a competitive bid, the larger, older, more established companies 
are always going to be successful in underbidding us. That is an 
absolute truism." In sum, Representative Mitchell said that 
"[t]his is the only sensible way for us to begin to develop a 
viable economic system for minorities in this country, with the 
ultimate result being that we are going to eventually be able to 
end certain programs which are merely support survival systems 
for people which do not contribute to the economy." 123 Cong. 
Rec. H 1436-37 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977). 
During subsequent debate, Representative Conyers stated 
that minority businesses attempting to navigate the intricacies 
of the construction bidding system "get the 'works' every 
time," with the result that "small businessmen through no 
fault of their own simply have not been able to get their foot 
in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H 1440 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977). 
The remainder of the House debate centered around the waiver 
provision now incorporated in the 
103(f)(2). The waiver provision was 
some representatives that funds 
first sentence of section 
added to calm the fears of 
would be denied even if 
4. 
minority business enterprises could not be found in some areas 
of the nation. The Mitchell amendment was adopted by the House. 
Senator Edward Brooke introduced a similar amendment in 
~ the Senate. The Senate debate on the merits of a set-aside 
•• _.l.AA provision consist solely of the remarks made by Senator Brooke ,.... V in support~ the ame~ent. 'Brooke sa~at the amendment was 
~ necessary "because have minority businesses received only 
percent of despite repeated the contract dollar, Federal 
legislation, Executive orders and regulations mandating 
affirmative efforts to include minority contractors in the 
Federal contracts pool." And Brooke stated that the program 
will aid minority employment "because minority business' work 
forces are principally drawn from residents of communities with 
severe and chronic unemployment. With more business, these 
firms can hire even more minority citizens." 123 Cong. Rec. S 
3910. The Brooke amendment was adopted by the Senate. 
Subsequently, the Conference Committee agreed to the 
House version, which was adopted by both houses. See H. Rep. 95-
230 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. S 6755-57 (daily ed. April 29, 1977); 
Rec. H 3920-35 (daily ed. May 3, 1977). Section 
was not mentioned either in the Conference re:gort or ..._.. <::: 
"' 
....... 
preceeding final Easssage of the Act. ----- ~ 
Petrs here, plaintiffs 
below, are several associations of construction contractors and 
a firm engaged in construction work. Petrs seek declaratory and 
5. 
injunctive relief to prevent the Secretary of Commerce and the 
State of New York from enforcing section 103(f)(2). The 
l) ~ district court rejected their claim that the section is 
~unconstitutional. In a decision handed down before this C~rt's 
~ judgment in Regents of the University of California ::!...:. Bakke 
(Bakke), 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the district court applied a 
strict scrutiny analysis to hold the section constitutional. 
First, the district court found that enactment of 
section 103(f) (2) served a compelling state purpose because it ----........ ____.... ~ 
court suggested that the brief debate prior to enactment of the 
section was a result of Congress' general awareness of the need 
for legislation to redress the effect of prior discrimination 
against minority businesses. Then, the court noted that 
minority groups account for less than one percent of the 
national gross business receipts and control about four percent 
of businesses, even though they comprise 17 percent of the 
country' population. Further, minority businesses receive less 
than one percent of federal contracts. In light of this and 
other evidence, the court concluded that there was an ample 
basis for Congress to have concluded that the present shortage 
of minority business enterprises was a result of their historic 
exclusion from the mainstream economy. Therefore, the court 
concluded that Congress could find a compelling state interest. 





employed narrowly drawn means to serve the compelling state 
interest. The court rejected the contention that the same 
purposes could be fulfilled by means of preferences given to all 
{sm~ll busin~ss.:.:_~~d by economical.lY.~r social}y disadva~taged 
~s or through cash grants. The court concluded that such 
preference programs had been inffective, and that cash grants 
failed to insure that minority enterprises gained the experience 
necessary to compete effectively. Further, the court stated 
that expansion of the section to all economically disadvanta~ed 
groups would be would not serve Congress' purposes, because in 
the present economy all construction firms are economically 
disadvantaged. 
The court concluded that the use of a ten percent 
figure was reasonable, and noted that Congress would exercise 
continuing supervision over the program. Finally, the court 
rejected the claim that Title VI mandates a different outcome 
than does the Constitution. 
CA2 affirmed. ____..___ The court noted that Congress must spend 
. :-::~J· funadts thien accordance with Constitutional guarentees, but held 
~ section passes muster even under the strict scrutiny 
~t-. f test. First, CA2 ,ass:m~he ::tlon could ~ fou~d 
~rve a compelling state interest if (a) Congress intended 
remedy past discrimination, and (b) congressional action 
based upon sufficient evidence that discrimination 
occurred. 
t P. z.,. 
7. 
stated that the standard of review of Congress is 
I 
CA2 
mo~~-n_i_e_n_t_t_h_a_n __ t~ew of-; s_!:at~ s~tute. See Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 302 n. 41 (Opinion of Powell, J.): Hampton~ M~ Sun 
Wong, 426 u.s. 88, 103 (1976). In light of the comprehensive 
legislation enacted during the last fifteen years for the 
benefit of victims of past discrimination, CA2 concluded that ~ 
lf1)- ~~any purpose Congress might have had other than to remedy the 
~ ef;E cts of past discirmination is difficult to imagine." Then, 
f./· ..-1/ court's finding that Congress acted 
sufficient evidence of past discrimination. CA2 relied 
upon the floor remarks of Representatives Mitchell and Conyers, 
the statistical evidence discussed by the district court, and 
the conclusion of a House committee adopted in 1976 that 
minorities have been traditionally excluded from the 
construe~ industry. 
C. fl. Z-~ ~~ Second, CA2 stated that it m~st apply a ~nci;Eg_t;est 
~ ~ determine whether the remedy the of 
~ ~ fundame~~-v. Bow~ Transportation Co., ·r . ~ 
vjr~ .~ 424 u.s. 747, 784-86 (1976)&f'Powell, 
·:w-;~ dissenting). CA2 found that the set-aside excluded non-minority 
~· ~~ contractors, who constituted 96% of the industry, from a 
~~ relatively minor portion of the $ 170 billion spent on 
J. , concurring and 
construction spent in the United States in 1977. Finding that ... 
the set-aside 
section is constitutional. 
8. 
3. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES. 
A. Petitioners. Petrs present arguments that are so -similar that both briefs will be treated together. 
Petrs argue that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment embodies the principle of equal protection. See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Racial quotas 
are presumptively unconstitutional and must be measured under 
the strict scrutiny standard. Redress of racial discrimination 
is a compelling state interest, but in this case legislative 
history does not demonstrate that Congress intended to enact a 
remedial statute, or that it made detailed findings of past 
discrimination. See Bakke at 302 n.41, 307 (Opinion of Powell, 
J. ) . Representative Mitchell's conclusion that minority 
business' were underutilized is not supported by evidence in the 
legislative record. CA2 therefore errred in looking outside the 
record or in speculating about the Congress' state of knowledge. 
In effect, CA2 that findings of prior 
discrimination exist. This was error, for evidence to support 
the existence of a compelling state interest has to be found 
within the legislative history of the section under review. 
Furthermore, the district court's statistical analysis 
support the section 103(f) (2). In particular, the 
court failed to note the increase in minority 
contractors (34.28%) and dollar receipts of minority owned 
businesses (84.45%) between 1969 and 1972. Also, gross receipts 
9. 
of minority firms with paid employees increased 60% during the 
same period although receipts for all construction firms 
increased only 60% from 1967-72. Moreover, the district court 
did not suggest that Congress was aware of the statistical data 
upon which it relied. Accordingly, the government has failed to 
demonstrate the existence of a compelling state interest. 
--------- ~-- ~-------~~---------------Even if a compelling state interest exists, the 
mandatory set-aside is not precisely tailored to serve the ________________ ___,-- '~----~----------~-----------------------
purpose of section 13(f) (2). See Bakke at 308 (Opinion of 
Powell, J.). The section fails to determine that each minority 
~~------------~----~----------------------
group eligible for set-aside contracts has experienced 
Indeed, the major 
problems facing minority contractors are insufficient working 
capital, a problem that be solved through direct financial 
ants, diffculty in obtaining bonding, problems with federal 
paperwork, and problems with competitive bid procedure. 
Additionally, the reality of the construction business means 
that small speciality contracters will bear a disproportionate 
burden of the set-aside. 
In lieu of the mandated quota, Congress could have used 
means for fulfilling for remedying past 
in the construction industry. Congress could 
(1) a racially neutral program whose goal is to create 
practicable opportunity for socially and 
disadvantaged persons. See 1 5 U.S.C.A. § 
' . 
' .. '• 
1 0 0 
Q) 
637(d) (providing that "it is the policy of the United States 
that small business concerns, and small business concerns owned 
and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals, shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to 
participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal 
agency."); @joint ventures between minority and non-minority 
contractors; ~ technical, financial, and educational 
assistance to minority contractors;~ a pool of trained 
workers to lend assistance to minority contractors. 
Petrs also contend that the set-aside is invalid even 
~er the more lenient standard proposed by four Justices 
1~ ~Bakke. See Bakke at 360-61 
in 
(Opinion of Brennan, J., White, J., 
yV-'~ Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.). Those Justices stated that a 
VV 1~ racial classification is proper if it is substantially related 
~~~ to the achievemant of important governmental objectives, and if 
~J fJ. 1· t does not out l' v stigmatize anl group or single those least 
~w represented in the political process. Petrs argue that 
1'.-1/ contractors who are denied work without regard to merit and *. minorities who receive work regardless of their merit are 
stigmatized by jsection 103(f) (2). Further, the program hurts 
economically and socially disadvantaged non-minority contractors 
who are isolated from the political process. 
~ Finally, petrs 
~  th Civil Rights Act 
~ reconsider its decision 
1v~ 
~ 
argue that the section violates Title VI 
of 1964. Petrs suggest that the Court 
in Bakke that the term "discrimination" 
11. 
encompasses a constitutional standard. Even if the Court does 
not reconsider that holding, petrs argue that Bakke did not 
decide the scope of the langugage that no person shall be 
"excluded from participation in, [or] be denied the benefits of" 
any program receiving federal assistance on the ground of race. 
See 42 U.S.C. ~ 2000d. Petr contend that the legislative 
history of Title VI demonstrates that Congress intended the 
provision to be color-blind. Finally, petrs contend that any ..... --
I 
conflict 
resolved in favor of Title VI. 
103(f)(2) should be between Title VI and section 
B. Respondent State of New York. The State argues that 
Congress had the power to enact section 103(f} (2) pursuant to 
~· 
~ Thirteenth Amendment. The powers of Congress are greater than 
L. ~ the power of states, adm~strative agencies, or ----;rivate 
V'1 ~ v ,. ____......, 
section 
v 
section the of 2 of the Amendment and 5 Fourteenth 
tf~yt>arties. See Hampton~ Mow Sun Wong, 426 u.s. 88, 100 (1976). 
I 4'""" cordingly, this Court should display marked restraint in its 
review of the program. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 n.41; 
Katzenbach ~Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). 
Section 103(f)(2) serves the compelling state interest 
of overcoming the effects of discrimination upon minority 
business enterprises. Congressional findings with respect to 
the set-aside requirement are implicit in the statute. Even in 
the absence of designated findings, Congress is presumed to have 
acted with full knowledge of the area affected by its actions. 
1 2. 
See Katzenbach ~Morgan, 384 U.S. at 655-56. In this instance, 
Congress can be presumed to have known of the many instances of 
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Against the 
backdrop of statistical evidence, the remarks of Representatives 
Mitchell and Conyers point out the real obstacles facing 
minority business enterprises in this country. And the fact 
that the specific cause of racial discrimination cannot be '-------· ·-~---~ 
traced to specific persons and institutions does not invalidate 
Congress' action. Accordingly, the lower courts had sufficient 
evidence to find that Congress passed section 103(f)(2) in order 
to further a compelling state interest. 
Furthermore, the ten percent set-aside is an effective 
yet narrowly drawn means to acheive the legislative purpose. 
Other methods of increasingly minority particiaption in the 
construction industry have not been effective because they do 
, ' 
not supply minority enterprises with a track record of -........ ~achei vement. Further, those minority groups designated in the -------
section have historically suffered the effect of discrimination. 
The effect of the statute, as noted by Cl\2, on non-minority 
contractors is minimal. The set-aside is thus an appropriate 
remedy of limited duration. 
The state argues that this Court should reject the 
petrs' Title VI contention because five members of the Court 
have stated that Title VI incorporates a constitutional 
standard. See Bakke, at 287 (Opinion of Powell, J.); 348-350 
..:::::. 
13. 
(Opinion of Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., & Blackmun, 
J. ) 
C. The Solicitor General. The SG first establishes the 
S V ~thority of Congress to enact the set-aside provision. Both 
~. ~ -~e spending power, and the enforcement sections of the 
s~/ Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments allow the Congress to move 
uv~ against the continuing effects of past discrimination. Indeed, 
~ ~ in the past twenty years, the Congress has enacted numerous 
~ l~ur~~nti-discrimination statutes, some of which involve the use of 
~~ ra~ially-conscious remedies. See United Jewish Organizations v. 
~ Carey, 430 U.S. 144 ( 1977), Albemarle Paper Co. ~ Moody, 422 
t ~a) U.S. 40 5, 435 ( 197 5). Congress may generalize in identifying 
~~ he victims of discrimination when individual determinations are 
1 
\ 
impossible, see Teamsters v. United States, 431 u.s. 324, 357-62 
(1977), and the impact of remedial measures need not b limited 
solely to proven dscriminators, see Franks v. Bowman 
Transportation Co., 424 u.s. 747, 774-75, 777 (1976); Griggs~ 
Duke Power Co., 401 u.s. 424, 430 (1971). In sum, Congress 
posesses the competence to identify what groups have been 
discriminated against, and what remedial measure are proper. 
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 n.41 (Opinion of Powell, J.); 
Katzenbach ~Morgan, 384 u.s. 641 (1966). 
The SG next meets the argument that Congress' adoption 
of a remedial measure cannot be sustained absent detailed 
legislative findings of a constitutional violation and the 
1 4. 
/reasons for its action. This argument misperceives the 
~ ~ ./ fundamental nature of the legislative process. Congress deals 
~~with general, not particular, problems, and it deals with them 
~ , on the basis of information acquired from innumerable sources. Z Unlike a court or an administrative agency, Congress has no 
Sf}: obligation to limit its decisions ~-----~ ~ -- - to facts appearing in a ~------------------~ nor must it create a record to withstand judicial 
considers the constitutionality 
action may look at the materials generally used 
intent the langauge of the 
its legislative history, its relationsip with other 
statutes, and other material that explain the congressional 
decision. 
The indicia of legislative intent demonstrate that the 
set-aside was designed as a remedial measure. The legislative 
history of the set-aside shows that Congress knew that minority 
unemployment was disproportionately high, and that unemployment 
among minority construction workers was particularly severe. 
See 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. March 10, 1977)(Senator 
Brooke); 123 Cong. Rec. H1423 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977)(Rep. 
Stokes) . Moreover, the congressional action was taken against 
with the 
existence of discrimination. Congress knew that minority 
enterprises received less than one percent of the federal 
contract dollar, see 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. March 10, 
IJe 
1977)(Senator Brooke), and that the past effects of racial 
discrimination continued to effect minority businesses. See 
H.R. Rep. 94-468, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975). Congress 
knew that minority businesses were excluded from opportunities 
in the construction industry by subtle, but discriminatory 
forces. The difficulty of obtaining loans and bonding, and 
their lack of experience hinder minority business enterprises in 
obtaining construction ( ;:rk_.M : c.~ )com~ee ~ 
concluded in 1977 that: ~ ~ ~ ---Currently, we •.• encounter a business system which is 
racially neutral on its face, but because of past overt 
social and economic discrimination is presently 
operating, in effect, to perpetuate these past 
inequities. Minorities, unt i 1 recently have not 
( 
participated to any measureable extent, in our total 
business system generally, or in the construction 
industry, in particular. ---------------
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th Cong .. , 2d Sess. 182-83 (1977). In 
the face of such congressional recognition of discrimination 
against minority contractors, and with consideration of the 
statements made during the debate on the set-aside, see pp. 2-4 
supra, it is obvious that section 103(f) (2) was designed as a 
remedy. 
Finally, the SG argues that the set-aside is a 
constitutionally permissible means for Congress to eliminate the 
effects of discrimination in the construction industry. 
Congress is uniquely suited to create a remedy for past 
discrimination. Its ability to gather and evaluate a wide-range 
of information, and its role as the representative branch of 
10. 
government makes it an appropriate forum for balacncing 
competing interests. Thus, a statutory racial classification 
should be sustained if Congress has reason to believe that such 
a measure is necessary to accomplish the legislative goal, and 
if the statute is designed to moderate the adverse effects of 
the classsification on persons arguably not involved in past 
discrimination. 
The implementation of a set-aside was necessary to 
ensure that the effects of dsicrimination would not be carried 
forward in projects funded under the Act. Previous legislative 
efforts had not succeeded in eliminating discrimination, and the 
public works funds were to be spent quickly. Therefore, if 
Congress was to ensure that the funds under the Act would be ---....._,_ 
distributed in a manner untainted by the continuing effects of 
past discrimination, it had little choice except to enact a set-
aside provision. The SG argues that the general nature of a -----remedy, possibily benefiting some persons who had not suffered 
~ discrimination, was an inevitable by-product of Congress' need 
~ ;ft act quickly and broadly. Further, the set-aside has only a 
~ ~~inimal adverse effect on nonminority contractors. Every remedy 
~ may have some effect on the legitimate interests of 
nonminor i ties. In this case, the burden is spread very thin, 
and implementation of the remedy, u~e the admissions program 
---- .... .--wo"".ws 
in Bakke, does not foreclose nonminori ty contractors from a -consideration for a contract. In any particular case, a prime 
~---------------------
1 7. 
contractor is free to give a contract to a nonminority 
subcontractor, so long as the total award satisfies the set-
aside requirement. Nonminorites have lost no legitimate 
expectation by virtue of the set-aside, because Congress could 
have passed no public funds act at all, or could have 
appropriated ten percent less money without a set-aside 
provision. Moreover, the presence of the waiver provision 
ensures flexibility. Thus, the short-term nature of the public 
works program, the lack of total exclusion of nonminority 
'-------cntractors from competition for any particular con!Eact, and the 
............ .._. -- ~ 
waiver provision distinguishes this case from Bakke • ------------- - .. 
~ The SG disputes the petrs' argument that less drastic 
~ Ymeasures could have been used to aid minority business. Any 
(#'__. _'{ 1.~/ program aimed at minorties would have to use racial lines of 
~~--
~ ::::e .sort~th::d p::gu:am:o:~:1:e bei n:::st i;::: :;:b~:lyfr::ca::: :::~ 
~ would deprive other people, rather than nonminority contractors, of the possbile benefit of federal funds. The SG recognizes 
v ~ that s;ction 8(d) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) 
Vt. ut,ilizes a~~ ~i:hre~';!n~al treatm_:nt by- aiding 
~~ , all disa~vantage~ou~, while presuming that blacks, 
~ispanics, and Indians are disadvantaged. The SG argues that 
section 8(d) is an acceptable long-term solution, but that 
Congress could have concluded that including all disadvantaged 
persons within the set-aside would not erase the continuing 
1 8. 
effects of discrimination from affecting contracts let in the 
short period of time that the public works program was in 
effect. 
On the Title VI issue, the SG argues that the set-aside 
preference and the non-discriminatory command of Title VI are 
not incompatible, and that, even if they were, the more 
specific, later statute would govern. 
4. ANALYSIS: Due ·Process. Pursuant to the standard 
adopted in your Bakke opinion, section 103(f) (2) is 
t . t t . 1 1 . f{E? . d <:Vd . d t cons 1 u 1ona on y 1 1t 1s a proper reme y es1gne o serve a 
---------------------compelling state interest. Application of this standard to the ... __......., 
instant case raises serious questions of separation of powers 
and the proper allocation of responsibility between the federal 
judiciary and the Congress. These issues are all raised because 
section 103(f)(2), unlike the Davis admissions plan, is an Act 
of Congress . .. --~------------~ 
A. Compelling State Interest. Your Bakke opinion 
M ~ analyzes whether any of four state interests are compelling. 
~~ Examination of the analysis of these four interests illustrates 
~ the proper analytical framework for this case. e, the use 
of a racial classifications simply to prefer members of certain 
minority groups is facially invalid. ~ the State's 
interest i~ facilitating the provision of health care to 
communities was not supported by evidence demonstrating that the 
admission program was needed or geared to promote that goal. 
1 9. 
~ the attainment of a diverse student body was a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
learning. the State had a legitimate, but 
insubstantial, interest in amerliorating the disabling effects 
SfJ;L!1 ~'--~~  . 
of past discrimination. ~  14-~ ~~
(~ ~)~pcc.,.l'.c-., S tr(  
The state interest in remedying past discrimination is 
not substantial without judicial, administrative, or 
~ findings of constitutional or statutory 
violations. Once such findings have been made, the extent of 
the injury and scope of the remedy may be defined. The Regents 
of the University of California neither made, nor were competent 
to make, findings of specific instances of racial 
discrimination. In order to make such findings, "a governmental 
body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the 
record, that the classification is responsive to identified 
discrimination." Absent justification of the racial -classification, the Regents could not impose disadvantages upon 
persons not reponsible for whatever harm the beneficiaries of 
the admissions program have suffered. "To hold otherwise would 
, be to convert a remedy heretofore reservd for violations of 
.... --- --------
legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout 
the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are 
perceived as victims of societal discrimination." 
Only the fourth interest was found not to be compelling 
because it was insubstantial. In other words, the fourth 
' : 
interest could be compelling, unlike the first interest which is 
facially invalid. Unlike the second or third interests, the 
fourth interest was rejected because the state failed to 
establish the existence of the state interest. Significantly, 
the University was not asked to proffer specific findings to 
support the conjfusion that its interest in educational 
~ ~,~ diversity actually existed, instead ~opinion assumed that, as 
~~a ~stitution o~her-learning, the~ School 
actually attempted to attain a diverse student body. 
~ 
~J 
The emphasis on substantiality, that is the requirement 
that is institution a state interest both that an prove 
legitimate and that it actually exists, was not developed in 
this Court's equal equal protection cases prior to Bakke. Yet 
the requirement is vital, for it distinguishes the existence of 
~ the fourth interest, amerliorating the disabling 
U,..f' ~ • '. d~f. d d. . . . -:.,,:---f---h--f-.--.------f-. 
effects of 
~ 1 ent1 1e lSCrlmlnatlon, rom t . e 1rst Interest, pre er1ng a 
if~ 'I wtrJ racial group. Without the requirement of substantiality any 
racial preference could be justified simply by labeling it a 
remedy for past instances of discrimination. 
Your Bakke opinion concludes that the state's interest 
in remedying past discrimination is insubstantial because the 
Regents were not competent to make, and did not made, findings 
of past discrimination. The existence of the substantiality 
requirement, therefore, demands that this Court decide whether 
congressional action in enacting section 103(f)(2) satisfies~ 
21 • 
requirements: (1) that the institution be competent to find past 
instances of discrimination, and (2) that the instutition have 
established in the record that the classificiation is responsive 
to identified discrimination. 
1. 
Two commentators have addressed the issue whether 
Congress is an appropriate body to make findings of racial 
discrimination pursuant to your Bakke opinion. One asserts that 
a "legislature that makes such a declaration and then authorizes 
a program to prefer minorities surely has made a conscious 
choice, clear on the public record and accountable to the 
political process, to favor one group at the expense of 
another." R. O'Neil, Bakke in Balance: Some Preliminary 
Thoughts, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 143, 158 (1979). Another commentator 
has asserted the more restrictive view that only Congress 
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or section 2 
of the Fifteenth Amendment can "find" a constitutional 
violation. R. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of 
Affirmative Action, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 171, 178-79 (1979). Posner 
contends that "[i] f Justice Powell intended to recognize the 
authority of any legislature or its delegate to identify and 
remedy unlawful discrimination, this would create an enormous 
loophole .•.. Since legislative factfindings are essentially 
~----------------~~----------------------
autorize reverse discirmination could subject institutions to 
22. 
ostensibly 'remedial' sction by making conclusory findings of 
culpable discrimination on their part wothou any basis in 
probative evidence." Accordingly, Posner concludes that state - --
legislatures are not an appropriate body under your Bakke 
opinion. 
1~ L)tongress J~:ti:: ::::::ia::ta:::: ::enfi::e aco::::::::ti:::: 
~!)~·violation. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 u.s. 641, 666 
~~(1966) (Harlan J., dissenting with whom Stewart J., joined). 
~stice Harlan dissented from the majority's position that 
~M. '-...- ~- ~ongress has the authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
~ 
- .~ ~Amendment to decide that a constitutional violation exists. 
~ lll" 
'~ ~.5 Although he recognized the expertise of Congress to develop 
~ legislative facts that can be helpful to a judicial 
determination, Justice Harlan argued that "it is a judicial 
question whether the condition with which Congress has thus 
sought to deal is in truth an infringement of the 
Constitution." Justice Harlan feared that the majority's 
position would allow Congress to enact statutes "so as in effect 
to dilute equal protection and due process arguments of this 
Court." Id. at 668: see Oregon~ Mitchell, 400 u.s. 112, 295 
(1970)(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ( "Katzenbach v. Morgan ... does not hold that Congress has 
the power to determine what are and what are not 'compelling 
state interests' for equal protection purposes.") The 
23. 
~atzenbach majority replied to Justice Harlan's 
~:tating that Congress may enforce, but not 
~guarentees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. 
f'O / Morgan, 384 u.s. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). 
critic ism by 
dilute, the 
~t-" ~ I believe that Congress is an appropriate institution 
to determine whether statutory or constitutional violations 
exist. Unlike the Regents of the University of California, its 
broad mission is "the formulation of. .. legislative policy." ~~ 
Bakke at 309 (Opinion of Powell, J.). This Court has upheld the I 
imposition of remedies founded on congressional determinations 
.......... ~ --=--= ,......,_ --
A~that racial 
1~ Or_g_a_n_i _z_a_t_i_o_n_s _ v- . ---.:C....._a_r _e_y .... ,--4-3- 0--U- .- s- . - 1 4 4 , 
diqcrimination exists. See United Jewish 
155-56 (1977)(plurality 
opinion); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); South 
Carolina~~ Katzenbach, 383 u.s. 307, 309 (1966). And your Bakke 
opinion cites a case in which Congress adopted a valid gender 
preference to support the proposition that a governmental body 
that identifies racial discrimination must have the capability 
to establish in the record that a classification is responsive 
to identified descrimination. See Califano v~ Webster, 430 U.S. 
313, 316-21 (1977). 
Furthermore, this Court has recognized the validity of 
congressional action 
. '"IDI 
establishing a T1tle VI standard whose 
violation will trigger race conscious remedies even without a 
showing of purposeful discrimination. See Teamsters v. United 




Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 43 -32 (1971). If Congress may enact a 
non-constitutional the violation of which allows the 
use of race-conscious remedies, then is unimportant whether 
----------~-~-~------~--------------Congress m~-- "~d" a constitutional violation. Even if -Congress could not d/ecide whether a constitutional violation 
exists, it could justify imposition of a race conscious remedy 
merely by passing a statute declaring the same practice to be 
unlawful. 
The conclusion that Congress is an appropriate body to 
assert the existence of the compelling state interest to 
ameliorate the effects of past racial discrimination does not 
mean that the judiciary is incapable of overseeing congressional 
action. Justice Harlan's fear of congressional dilution of the 
Fourteenth Amendment can be assauged by careful judicial review -
of the legitimacy of the congressional determination in order to -
enforce the principle that remedies are not merely racial 
preferences. The critical issue then becomes not whether ------
~--~ 
~- but what "findings" Congress must proffer 
~.~ion b'(a.- ~. ~
~ 2. 
Congress conclude a constitutional violation exists, can that 
to its support 
Your Bakke opinion cited three areas of congressional 
action in which sufficient findings were made to support 
imposition of a remedy based on race or gender. Congress 
considered "overwhelming" testimony demonstrating the existence 
25. 
of employment discrimination when it enacted Title VI I, see 
Bakke at 308-09 n. 44 (Opinion of Powell, J.). Similarly, when 
it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, each house of Congress 
conducted nine days of hearings, the House engaged in three full 
days of debate, and the Senate debated the measure over a 26 day 
period. The legislative history of the Act documented "in 
considerable detail" the factual support for Congress• belief 
that discriminatory practices had infringed the right to vote in 
some areas of the country. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 u.s. 301, 308-09 (1966). 
When Congress decided to adopt a lower Social Security 
retirement age for women than men, however, it moved on the 
basis of some, but not overwhelming, evidence that women had 
suffered employment discrimination. This Court's opinion in 
Califano~ Webster, 430 u.s. 314, 319-20 (1977) relies on only 
two pieces of legislative history to establish the proposition 
that Congress deliberately acted to compensa~e for particular 
economic disabilities sufered by women. The first was a House 
committee report that relied upon a Labor Department study 
showing that age limits were applied more frequently to job 
openings for women and that the age 1 imi ts were lower. The 
second was a statement made by a congressman after the 
eligibility distinction had been passed to the effect that women 
have less employment opportunities than men and live longer. It 
is possible to distinguish Califano v~ Webster, however, on the 
26. 
basis that classifications on the basis of gender are subject to 
less strict scrutiny than classifications on the basis of race. 
See Bakke at 302. But your citation of Califano ~ Webster in 
support of the proposition that a governmental body must have 
the capability and authority to establish in the record that a 
classification is responsive to identified d iscr imi nation, see 
Bakke at 309, suggests approval of the congressional action in 
that case. 
Assuming that the action of Congress in the above 
situations illustrates sufficient proof of a constitutional 
l
violation, the question becomes whether the minimum quantum of 
proof is present in this case. A subsidiary question is - . ·~ -
( 
whether the proof must appear in legislative history or whether 
courts may presume that Congress is acquainted with a field of 
social activity. 
The CA2 opinion relies heavily a presumption of 
C (.t ~ :J.. legislative knowledge in establishing both the purpose behind 
~- the enactment of section 103(f) (2) and the factual basis upon 
rests. In finding that Congress intended to adopt a fly 
rrv .... ,_...- . r h ....- remed1al measure, CA2 believed that it is "'enough that t e 
~~· ('\ J-1"- " . t] perceive a 
that'" the section 
basis upon which Congress might predicate a 
past discrimination. remedied 
(quoting Katzenbach ~ Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656.). CA2 decided ----that, given the comprehensive legislation enacted by Congress to 
-----------------~----------'-------------------------------~ benefit victims of past discrimination, it was difficult to 
27. 
imagine that Congress had any purpose other than to remedy past 
'------------'-~----~, ~ ----------------------discrimination. CA2 relied upon the remarks of Representatives 
_____, 
Mitchell and Conyers, and statistical evidence not explicitly 
considered by Congress, to uphold the district judge's finding 
"that Congress acted upon sufficient evidence of past 
discrimination." 
\ 
I believe that CA2 misunderstood the command of 
Katzenbach ~ Morgan. That case involved § 4(e) of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 which provides that no person who has 
successfully completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rico shall be 
denied the right to vote in any stateside election because of 
his inability to understand English. The Court engaged in a two 
step process to uphold the standard. First, the Court 
determined that § 4 (e) was enacted under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In determining whether Congress properly 
,. 
exercised its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court stated that it is enough that a court might 
perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment 
that its actions would move against unconstitutional activity. 
384 U.S. at 652-56. Second, the Court determined whether § 4(e) 
itself constituted a violation of equal protection by failing to 
extend the protections of the Voting Rights Act to non-English 
speaking persons not educated in Puerto Rican schools. The 
Court did not apply strict scrutiny because "the distinction 




reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the 
exercise of the franchise." Applying the familiar principle that 
reform may take place one step at a time, the Court held that 
the classification formed by § 4(e) did not violate equal 
protection. Id. at 356-57. Thus, the Katzenbach Court first 
concluded that Congress had the power to enact a classification, 
then concluded that the classification was constitutional. 
CA2 employed the standard appropriate for resolving the 
first issue, whether the Congress has power to act, to resolve 
the second issue, whether the congressional action violates 
equal protection. The first issue is not present in this case, 
for no party has argued that Congress lacks the power to enact 
section 103(f)(2). The sole issue is whether that enactment 
violates the Constitution. Even under Katzenbach, therefore, 
CA2 should have applied traditional standards to determine 
whether Congress intended to enact a remedial statute and 
whether prior discrimination existed in fact. 
In applying the rational basis standard of review in 
equal protection cases, this Court will uphold a classification ....... - --
if there is a conceivable basis upon which a legislature could 
have acted constitutionally. See Allied Stores ~ Bowers, 358 
u.s. 522, 530 ( 1961). But application of the strict scrutiny 
test demands a more searching look at the actual basis upon 
which Congress acted. See generally Califano v. Webster, 4 30 












~h-.f.-w~~ ~ ..&-t_ ~k 
basis for congressional action, else the difference 
impermissible racial preferences and permissible 
conscious remedies lie completely within the abilities .. ...., 
litigants to imagine reasons for legislative action. 
At the outset, however, I believe that it is important 
recognize actions implicates 
same concept of "recordness" appropriate to a court. 
~ . 
Congress is presumed to ~orm expertise in a field 
legislation. These principles suggest that the Court should 
remain mindful of the traditional methods that Congress 
operates. If, for example, Congress has legislated repeatedly in 
--~-----------~---------------
one area of legislation, its members may form an expertise that 
~-----------------
obviates the need for extensive debate when the matter 
reappears. Consequently, I believe that courts should not look -
s~ to legislative history of the particular act under - ---------------~--------------------------review. Rather, courts may examine the history of similar 
congressional action. Courts should not, however, examine 
materials that were never contained in the record of any 
~~congressional action, nor should they search for rationales that 
~~e never mentione~he halls of Congress. In this manner, 
~ · courts can review /\apply the strict scrutiny test while 
' ' .~ 
30. 
recognizing "the special competence of Congress to make findings 
with regard to the effects of identified past discrimination and 
its discretionary authority to take appropriate remedial 
measures." Bakke at 302 n.41. 
!:";~&) 
vr ~ 103{f){2) 
It is legislative history of section clear that the 
sheds 1 it tle 1 igh t on its purpose or factual basis. 
~~ 
Nonetheless, there are some allusions to the difficulties that 
minorites face competing in the construction industry, and there 
is explicit recognition that only 1% of federal contracts are 
. . 
enterprises. Moreover, a house -( l-~o F C,-., .. ,. •• ll6::; ¢; if:,.... 
~ t= ~ )t;PW:If>i;C <: ) 
over the years, there has developed a business system 
which has traditionally excluded measureable minority 
participation. In the past more than the present, this 
system of conducting business transactions overtly 
precluded miniori ty input. Currently, we more often 
face a business system which is racially neutral on its 
face, but because of past overt social and economic 
discrimination is presently operating, in effect, tp 
perpetuate these past inequities. Minorities, until 
recently have not participated to any measurable 
extent, in our total business sytem generally, or in 
the con~truction industry, in particular. However, 
inroads are now oe1ng %ade and minority contractros are 
attempting to "break-into" a mode of doing things, a 
system, with which they are empirically unfamiliar and 
which is historically unfamiliar with them. 





Based on this evidence existing solely within the 
records of congressional action, I believe that this Court could 
.._....~-----------------
a principled conclusion that Congress enacted section 
--in order to remedy past discrimination against 
--------""'C:: ----------'-----------------~-------in the construction industry, and that Congress -that statutory and constitutional violations had 
to the small percentage of federal contracts awarded 
to minority contractors. In sum, I believe that a compelling 
~ - - L-state interest exists to remedy the continuing effects of past ~ ........._.,_,., ~ ... 
B~ Justification of the 10% Set~Aside. 
The second part of the strict scrutiny test employed in 
~1 
Bakke demands that a racial cl~sification,be necessary to the 
ac~ievement of 
I 
-the compelling state interest in order 
This requirement was applied 
to 
to ~~stand judicial review. 
( ~ ·· .J&JStrike down the Davis program in spite of the compelling state 
!_ '~- interest in diversity of student bodies. Instead, your Bakke 
v-~- opinion held that a less restrictive means to achieve the same 
~ end was available Accordingly, the Davis program could not 
~ . a..~~~~~ 
~l .~~ ~~/$#~~ 
~ ~r-· A novel difficult arises, however,~ the compelling 
~~state interest sought to be advanced is the amelioration of past .......... . 
~,discrimination. According to your Bakke opinion the remedy 
cannot stand unless it is necessary to the accomplishment of the 
interest. At the same time, your opinion recognized the ability 
32. 
of the federal courts to fashion various types of racial 
as remedies for constitutional or statutory prejerence 
violations. Bakke at 301. And, as CA2 noted, your opinion in 
) 
Franks ~ Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 794 (1976) emphasized that the 
selection of remedies ~1:.!,!1~ "is a balancing process 
..... _-----...__-
left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to 
the sound discretion of the trial court." See also Swann v. 
Mcklenburg County, 402 u.s. 1, 25 (1971). Although federal 
courts may not order remedies that exceed the scope of the 
constitutional violation, ~ Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 
(1977); Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 
(Powell, J., concurring), their discretion has not I 
been limited solely to remedies that are the least restrictive 
~- ~ 
means of redressing a constitutional or statutory violation. A 
u.s. 990, 991 
serious tension arises if Congress can give district courts more 
fexibility in remedying staututory or constitutional violations 
then it can exercise itself. 
Consideration of separation of powers suggests that 
Congress should have at least as much discretion to choose a 
remedy as does a federal district judge. It is possible, 
therefore, that the "necessary" test should only be applied to 
compelling state interests other than remedy of a constitutional 
or statutory violation. Thus, in Bakke the "necessary" test was 
appropriately used to measure the validity of an admissions 
program designed to insure diversity of the student body. Once 
~ W{..;t-~ ~...., ___ _, ~ « ~~...-~ ~ 
~~ ~~--~~~ ~ "? (~t~?j 
33. 
a constitutional or statutory violation has been established, 
however, some appropriate remedy is necessary, and the remaining 
inquiry becomes simply whether, under normal judicial doctrine, 
the chosen remedy is appropriate. 
If the "necessary" test is applied, use of a ten 
note, Congress ~ percent set-aside would fail. As the petrs 
( ~;; ~}o:;ld just as easily--:::t a program similar to 15 U. S.C. !!:ft.t 
·~· . ~~ 637(d), which instructs contractors to set goals for the~ 
~· r -~c ........ 
empl~yment of the soc~lly and economically disadvantaged. ~~ 
·~ It~ a closer question whether the 10% plan ~~ 
~ equitable. The set-aside does serve directly to remedy an .n 
t::.. ~ I b -r-o 
~ ~knowledged difficulty for minority contractors--their lack o~ 
experience. The insurance of certain contracts for minori t~ 
~ 
contractors enables them to build a track record that will al~ 
them to compete in the future without need of fed~ 
1-e.J-? 
assistance. But the impact on non-minority contractors must 
also be noted. Although the impact on contractors generally is 
minimal, the impact on any particular non-minority contractor, 
_________ .....-----.., ...._. ......,. ..._..._.,---. ........ tw== 
deprived of an opportunity to bid on a job without refere ce to 
his race, may be substantial. 
I ~ ~equitable remedies ~emands recognition of the burdens placed on innocent parties. Franks v. 
As you have noted, imposition of 





Your Bakke opinion cites a series of lower court cases 
to illustrate the type of racial preferences that have been used 
to remedy identified race-based injuries. See 438 U.S. at 301-
02. A review of these cases offers insight into the charted 
bounds of remedial action. In all four cases circuit courts 
I I "'" upheld the imposition of a race conscious hiring uota as a 
.....__ -------~ --remedy for past discrimination. See Associated General 
Contractors of Massachusetts Inc; v; Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9~ 
1 9 7 3 ) c e r L den i e d 4 1 6 U • s . 9 57 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; B r i d g e port GWJr d ian s 
Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333 ~Cir. 1973); 
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 327 ~ Cir. 1972)(en bane); 
Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania ~ Secretary of 
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 @cir.) cert; denied 404 u.s. 854 (1971). 
The Associated General Contractors case is particularly 
interesting. The First Circuit considered the constitutionality 
of a state-imposed condition in certain building contracts that 
- """""'\ --:? 
contractors working in an area of with a large minority 
population employ at least 20% minority workers. The court ~ .... ___ _...... __ 
noted reasons to allow the use of racial criteria only where a 
compelling need for remedial action can be shown: (1) government 
preferences may be inherently divisive and reinforce prejudice, 
(2) "benign" preferences may become malevolent preferences, and 
(3) racial preference for one minority group may result in 
discrimination other minorities who are disproportionately over-
represented. 
3 5. 
The court found a compelling state interest to remedy 
serious imbalance in areas where minorities were 
underrepresented in the construction trades and where there was 
a long history of racial discrimination. Havinq found a 
compelling state interest, the court stated that the means 
-- -chosen must be reasonably related to the desired end. In 
... ~-- .... 
particular, the court noted that hiring goals would be too high 
if they could not be filled, or if they could be filled only by 
hiring unqualified workers. Largely because contractors were 
given a constitutionally adequate opportunity to show that 
insuff iciE!nt minority workers were available, the court upheld 
the choice of a 20% quota. 
lt 
~1 four cases sugge.st ~at a race conscious remedy c~ 
be imposed by the judiciary without use of the "necessar~' test, - --- ..... : 
and all four support Congress' choice of a remedy in this case. 
First, mathematics may be properly used as a starting point for 
a remedy. See Swann v~ Mecklenburg County, 402 u.s. at 25. 
Second, the choice of a ten percent goal is below the 17% 
percent of minorites in our population. Third, section 103(f)(a) 
expressly provides for a wavier of its requirement if sufficient 
minority contractors are not available. Fourth, a guarentee 
that 10% of federal contracts under the Act go to minorities 
will provide minority contractors with the practical experience 
and track record of performance that will allow them to gain 
experience in the bidding process, to obtain more working 
36. 
capital, and to be bonded. Fifth, the set-aside provision was 
effective only for contracts let during a short period of time. 
Thus, section 103(f) (2) does not threaten to become a permanent 
preference and Congress has an ample opportunity to oversee the 
effects of the program. 
5. ANALYSIS: Title · VI. Because this Court has held 
that Title VI incorporates a constitutional standard, resolution 
of the constitutional question is both necessary and conclusive 
of this issue. 
6. SUMMARY. The issue is the constitutionality of a 
10% minority set-aside in an Act granting funds for public 
construction projects. The set-aside is constitutional if it is 
a proper means of serving a compelling state interest. When the 
asserted state interest is the redress of d iscr imina tion, the -----interest is le(t,timate, but it must also be substantial. 
this case, the 1nterest is substantial because (a) Congress is 
In ...... 
c-----
an appropriate body to determine that constitutional and 
statutory violations exist, and (b) the history of congressional 
action directed at the eradication of discrimination 
demonstrates contrastors have suffered 
discrimination. 
that minority 
Th~emedy is proper. Although it is not 
necessary to attainment of the compelling state interest, some 
remedy for past discrimination is proper. Applying the analysis 
of remedial cases cited in Bakke, choice of this particular 
remedy would be within the discretion of a lower federal judge, 
and thus is within the discretion of Congress. 
)~ 
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Kreps 
I. The Legislative Record 
In my Bench Memorandum at 29-31, I suggested that the 
CA2 judgment should be upheld if sufficient evidence existed in 
the history of congressional debate on PWEA and other measures 
to support the proposition that the set-aside was enacted to 
remedy past constitutional violations affecting minority 
contractors. This Supplemental Bench Memorandum will sketch more 
fully three specific areas of congressional action which support 
the belief that minority contractors suffered the effects of 
discriminatory action. 
2. 
A. Congressional Oversight of the Small Business 
Administration 
When Senator Brooke introduced the Senate version of 
the set-aside, he noted that the concept of set-asides had been 
used under section 8(a) of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a). Section 8(a) provides that the 
SBA may enter into contracts with the federal government and 
sub-contract them out to small-business concerns. By 1972, the 
SBA was administering section 8(a) to aid minority business 
enterprises. That term was defined to include the minority 
groups included with the PWEA set-aside. 
The operation of section 8(a) was specifically reviewed 
by congressional committees between 1975 and 1977. In 1975, the 
Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the 
Committee on Small Business conducted hearings and issued a 
report reviewinq the operation of section 8(a). At the outset 
of the hearings Subcommittee Chairman Addabbo stated that "we 
must pledge ouselve to the ideal of assuring that effective 
remedial action will be taken to guarentee opportunities for 
full economic participation to those members of society who have 
traditionally encountered impediments and obstacles to entering 
the mainstream of business resulting from discrimination or 
similar circumstances." H.R. Rep. No. 94-468 at 1 (1975). The 
Subcommittee heard the testimony of Representative Parren 
Mitchell, sponsor of the PWEA set-aside, that both the federal 
3. 
government and private industry resisted implementation of 
section 8(a). And the Subcommittee considered a report of the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights that suggested that 
minority groups were having difficulty in obtaining contracts 
both at the federal and state level. See Minorities and Women as 
Government Contractors (May 1975). The Subcommittee heard 
testimony from a series of other witnesses who stated that the 
section 8(a) program had been ineffective in increasinq the 
economic partici?ation of minority business enterprises. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-468 at 11-16. After considering this 
testimony, the Subcommittee concluded that the low level of 
minority participation was "not the result of random chance. 
The presumption must be made that past discriminatory systems 
have resulted in present economic inequities." Id. at 2. The 
Subcommittee stated that Congress had enacted remedial programs 
designed to allow disadvantaged persons to participate "in the 
business mainstream of our economy." Id. 
In 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business 
held a hearing on section 8(a). Senator Javits noted that 
minority businesses received less than 1% of federal contracts, 
and that section 8 (a) was designed to aid the development of 
minority business enterprises. Senator Javits stated that the 
goal of that program was to ensure "equal opprtunity and access 
for all citizens to our free enterprise system." 
In 1977, the full House Committee on Small Business 
4. 
reviewed the section 8(a) program. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1791 (1977). 
The Committee repeated the Subcommittee's conclusion that the 
low percentage of business done by minority businesses was an 
effect of societal discrimination. Id. at 124. The Commit tee 
further concluded that 
over the years, there has developed a business system 
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority 
participation. In the past more than the present, this 
system of conducting business transactions overtly 
precluded minority input. Currently, we more often 
enounter a business system which is racially neutral on 
its face, but because of past overt social and economic 
discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to 
perpetuate these past inequities. Minorities, until 
recently, have not participated to any measureable 
extent in our total business system generally, or in 
the construction industry in particular. However, 
inroads are now being made and minority contractors are 
attempting to "break-into" a mode of doing things, a 
system, with which they are empirically unfamiliar and 
which is historically unfamiliar with them. 
Id. at 182-83. This report was issued on January 3, 1977, less 
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced the 
PWEA set-aside provision into the House. 
B. The Railroad Revitalization Act 
In his statement introducing the PWEA set-aside in the 
Senate, Senator Brooke also referred to the use of the set-aside 
concept under the Railroad Revitalization Act. 45 U.S.C. ~ 803 
prohibits discrimination in any activity funded by the Railroad 
Revitalization Act, and 49 U.S.C. ~ 1657a establishes a Minority 
Resource Center to assist minority businessmen to obtain 
contracts and other business opportunities related to the 
maintenance and rehabilitiation of the nation's railroads. In 
5. 
January, 1977, the Department of Transportation issued 
regulations pursuant to § 803 that required contractors under 
the Railroad Revitalization Act to formulate affirmative action 
programs to ensure that minority businesses would receive a fair 
proportion of contractual opportunities. 42 Fed. Reg. 4290-91. 
These provisions were enacted by a Congress that 
recognized the "established national policy, since at least the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to encourage and assist 
in the development of minority business enterprise." s. Rep. No 
94-499 (Commerce Commitee), 1976 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News at 58. 
Recognizing that minorities included "socially or economically 
disadvantaged persons," the Commerce Committee concluded that 
"encouragement for the participation of minority business was 
appropriate." Id. at 58-59. 
C. Congressional Review of the Philadelphia Plan 
In 1969, the Department of Labor promulgated the 
Philadelphia Plan pursuant to Executive Order No. 11246, which 
required that all federal contractors take affirmative action to 
ensure that applicants for employment and employees were not 
discrimination against on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin. The Philadelphia Plan ordered that past 
exclusionary practices towards minorities be remedied by the 
implementation of specific hiring goals by federal contractors. 
Later that year, the Senate passed an amendment to an 
appropriations bill that would have had the effect of overruling 
6. 
the Philadelphia Plan. After the House refused to accept the 
amendment, 115 Cong. Rec. 40921, the Senate voted to recede from 
its position. 115 Cong. Rec. 40749. In the course of that 
debate, several Senators supported implementation of the 
Philadelphia Plan as necessary to ensure equal opportunity. See 
115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (Sen. Scott); id. at 40741 (Sen. Griffith): 
id. at 40744 (Sen. Bayh). Senator Percy argued that the Plan was 
needed to redress discrimination against blacks in the 
construction industry, 115 Cong. Rec. at 40742-43. The day 
following the Senate 
"exceptionally blatant" 






construction trades and commended the Senate • s decision that 
"the Philadephia Plan should be a useful and necessary tool for 
insuring equitable employment of minorities." 115 Cong. Rec. 
41072. 
D. Conclusion 
I believe that these three areas of legislative action 
considered by themselves and in conjunction with the broad anti-
discrimination legislation of the past two decades demonstrates 
that Congress had sufficient reason to conclude that minority 
contractors were suffering the continued effects of 
discrimination. The congressional review of the section B(a) 
program focused on the effects of discrimination on minority 
business enterprises, and noted the specific difficulties of 
minority contractors. In the Railroad Revitalization Act, 
7. 
Congress moved expressly to remedy past discrimination against 
minority businesses. And in rejecting efforts to overturn the 
Philadephia Plan, Conqress recognized the legacy of 
discrimination in the construction industry. Accordingly, I 
believe that the history of congressional action supplies the 
"findings" necessary to uphold the PWEA set-aside as a remedy 
for past discrimination. 
II. Petitioners' Reply Briefs. 
Petrs have filed reply briefs that add little to their 
opening statements. In its brief, the General Building 
Contractors of New York State argue that Congress lacks the 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I to enact the 
set-aside. Because this argument is based solely upon the 
contention that the set-aside is not a proper remedial measure, 
petr's contention is answered by resolution of the 
constitutional issue. 
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To: Jon Date: January 28, 1980 
From: L. F. P. , Jr. 
No. 78-1007 Fullilove v. Kreps 
I have now reviewed with care the January 18 draft 
of a concurring opinion. It is an excellent working draft. 
Although I have not reread Bakke, I believe the draft 
conforms in structure and basic analysis with my Bakke 
opinion. In addition, you have developed some helpful 
supplemental analysis. 
As you will see, I have done a good deal of editing 
that should be considered in preparing the next draft. I 
will now comment briefly on the various Parts. 
I have rewritten, as Rider A, the introductory 
paragraph. 
Part I (pp. 2-5) 
This is excellent, and summarizes the basic 
analysis as follows: 
1. Racial classification is invalid unless 
necessary to serve a compelling interest. 
2. Government has a compelling interest in 
ameliorating the effect of ' identified discrimination. 
2. 
3. Such discrimination must be established by 
judicial, administrative or legislative findings. A 
legislative interst is not compelling absent such a finding. 
4. Thus, two requirements must be met to insure 
that the interst is compelling: (i) the governmental body 
must be authorized to make findings, and (ii) appropriate 
findings must be made. 
5. The means selected must be reasonably necessary 
to fulfill the governmental purpose. 
Apart from my editing, I think Part I is in good 
shape. 
Part II (pp. 5-19) 
Sub-Part A (pp. 5-8) makes clear that Congress is a 
competent body, and appropriately emphasizes the Civil War 
amendments (p. 7). 
Sub-Part B (pp. 9-13) meets the argument that we 
may not look beyond the specific legislative history of thP. 
Public Works Act. But the draft over-argues this point, at 
l e ast unless it is emphasized effectively in the dissenting 
opinion. I view the argument as almost frivolous with 
3 • 
respect to Congressional action. Accordingly, at least until 
we see the dissent, I would end Sub-Part B at the bottom of 
page 10. The points made on pages 11-13 could be left out 
entirel y , o r summarized and added to footnotes. 
Sub-Part C (pp. 13-19). Here, the draft lays out 
the legislative history in a most persuasive manner. YP.t, I 
think we can be reasonably confident that the Chief Justice's 
opinion will do pretty much the same thing. The SG's brief, 
and other documentation, afford substantial guidance. I will 
not wish to duplicate the Chief's opinion in this respect if 
it is reasonably adequate. 
Therefore, I suggest that you redraft Sub-Part c 
stating that the opinion of the Court (or by the Chief 
Justice) establishes convincingly that Congress, after 
extensive consideration, concluded that private and 
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible 
percentage of public contracts that were awarded minority 
contractors. Then include a paragraph that effects a 
transition from Part II to Part III. Much of the language 
you now have from the middle of page 18 to the top of page 19 
will be useful in this respect. 
As a precaution, I suggest that we prepare 
Sub-Part C for use as an Appendix to my opinion. If the 
opinion of the CJ should not be entirely adequate on the 
4. 
legislative history and findings, I had rather deal with this 
in detail in an Appendix than interrupt the textual flow of 
my opinion. We should go ahead and have the Appendix printed 
in Chambers Draft form to have it available if needed. 
Part III (pp. 19-27) 
Generally, and subject to my editing, I think this 
is close to being satisfactory. In this Part, having found 
that Congress established a compelling interest, we address 
the n~xt inquiry: whether the 10% set aside is a necessary 
means of furthering that interest. 
Part IV 
The essence of IV is satisfactory, but I hope that 
between the five of us we can make this an eloquent ending. 
* * * 
I emphasize, Jon, the importance of consistency and 
precision in the language used in describing the various 
elements of our analysis. To the extent feasible, we should 
use the same language of my Bakke opinion - although refining 
it, where necessary, is desirable. 
We also need a footnote dealing with the sticky 
problem of Chinese and other "minorities" being bracketed 
indiscriminately with Negroes. 
Finally, I would like to cite a few of the better 
Law Review articles. 
5. 
This case will be one of the most important the 
Court has handed down in years. It is desirable, therefore, 
for all five of us in our Chambers to consider with care both 
the substance and form of my concurrence. In doing so, we 
must also think in terms of an analysis that can be applied 
consistently in future cases. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
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78Al887 · Fullilove · v; · Kreps 
(Pre-Conference Notes) 
On basis of my Bakke opinion, I analyze this case 
as follows: 
The 10% set-aside is a racial classification. It is, 
therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. To survive strict 
scrutiny, the set-aside must (i) serve a legitimate and 
substantial state interest and (ii) must be necessary to 
further that state interest. 
The federal government has a legitimate and 
substantial interest in ameliorating or eliminating the 
effects of identifiable racial discrimination. Thus to 
establish a substantial (or compelling) state interest, 
Congress must have acted upon reasonably clear evidence that 
the groups to be benefited have, in fact, suffered 
discrimination. In short, there must be a showing of a 
constitutional violation. 
In deciding whether Congress has presented a 
sufficient record to support its finding of racial 
discrimination, we must take into account the nature of 
congressional action. Unlike a court or administrative body, 
Congress does not require explicit findings in order to enact 
legislation. Therefore, it is proper to look to the 
legislative history of congressional actions other than 
enactment of the set-aside. And Congress has specific 
constitutional power to enforce the guarentees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, Congress is permitted 
more leeway to generalize than other governmental bodies. 
Although Congress could have made a more explicit record of 
its finding of discimination, I conclude that the record of 
congressional action viewed as a whole is adequate. 
2. 
The question remains whether the 10% set-aside is 
necessary to further the state interest. Courts owe great 
deference to congressional judgment as to the necessity of a 
particular remedy. On this record, we should accept the 
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JUST IC E P OTT E R ST EWART 
June 2, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief, 
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June 5, 1980 
Personal 
Re: No. 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Lewis: 
I have your memo re the above. 
Would it not be better to try for a "united front" instead 
of a cluster of concurring opinions -- a practice of which I 
increasingly receive complaints from judges all over the 
country! 
With all deference to your right to express views 
separately in any way you wish, may I suggest that we may 
accomplish a good deal by exchange of memos -- one-on-one 
rather than by concurring opinions which tend to get people 
"locked in"? After consultation on the points of your concern, 
I may well be able to embrace them ! 
R,egards, 
I 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
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June 2, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief, 
I shall in due course circulate a 
dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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Re: No. 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Lewis: 
I have your memo re the above. 
would it not be better to try for a "united front" instead 
of a cluster of concurring opinions -- a practice of which I 
increasingly receive complaints from judges all over the 
country! 
With all deference to your right to express views 
separately in any way you wish, may I suggest that we may 
accomplish a good deal by exchange of memos -- one-on-one 
rather than by concurring opinions which tend to get people 
"locked in"? After consultation on the points of your concern, 
I may well be able to embrace them ! 
R,egards, 
I 
Mr. Justice Powell 
. ' 
tr j) 
Re: No. 78-1007 - FullilovG v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief: 
We have had an opportunity to give a preliminary reading ~o 
your careful opinion in this case. We are troubled that the 
opinion does not explicitly identify what we think you agree 
are the two major questions to be decided. The first is 
whether Congress has the enumerated or implied power to enact 
the cemedial statute in question. Your opinion fully answers 
this question by finding congressional authority in the 
Spending Power and in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We 
agree. Since Congress has general authority to enact the 
statute, the crucial question then becomes whether the 
enactment is nonetheless unlawful under any constitutional 
prohibition. In this case, of course, petitioners argue tha 
the statute violates equal protection. 
We agree with the opinion's implicit recognition that 
remedying the present effects of prior discrimination is an 
important governmental interest that would justify the limited 
and carefully tailored use of racial or ethnic criteria to 
accomplish that objective. But we think that the opinion 
should make this more explicit. What we find especially 
troubling is the absence of any express declaration that the 
' enumerated powers of Congress, · such as the Spending Power, are 
nonetheless limited by the prohibitions of the equal protGcti n 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
These views are certainly implicit in your present draft; 
therefore, no major revisions would be necessary to satisfy our 
fundamental concerns. For example, much of our difficulty 
could be taken care of by deleting the sentence following the 
quote from Justice Jackson on the ninth line of the first full 
paragraph of page 28, and substituting the following: 
"At the same time, Congress may employ racial or ethnic 
classifications in exercising its Spending Power or its 
enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
only if those classifications do not violate the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. We recognize the need for careful judicial 
inquiry to assure that governmental programs that employ 
racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the important 
objective of remedying past discrimination must be narrowly 




There are other parts of the opinion that also concern us. 
For example, in order to avoid any implication that the 
Spending Power is not subject to constitutional restraints, we 
suggest (1) on page 22, lines 7-8, deleting the phrase "ple nary 
within its sphere and"; and (2) on page 23, deleting the first 
sentence of the first full paragraph. In addition, because we 
are troubled by reference to the MBE provision as an 
"experimental project," we suggest (1) on page 34, line 20, 
deleting the word "experimental"; and (2) on page 37, changing 
lines 8-16 to read as follows: 
"the congressional judgment that this limited program is a 
necessary step to effectuate the mand a te for equality of 
economic opportunity. The MBE program is limited in extent 
. and duration; this relatively short-te rm remedial measure 
will be ...• " 
It may be that after giving the opinion a more 
comp~ehensive reading, other aspects of the draft will prove 
troublesome. At present, however, the failure to include 
explicit mention of the equal protection problem is the major 
obstacle to our joining the opinion. If you can make the 
chunges that would permit us to join, we will be happy to do 
so, although perhaps adding a few words of our own. 
The Chief Justice 




June 5, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik 
Dear Chief: 
At Conference I said that I would apply my Bakke 
analysis to this case. Accordingly, I have prepared a 
p .,·--~-6-4.( 
concurring opinion thatAwill ~e circulated Friday or Monday. 
~this poi~ peroeiwe tAe ~ame flew ifi~our 
opinion t:ft.ii.t is notee in the Jetter from Bill aud 'f'hur€fooa_____ 
$at;'~#-~~~ 
('(,R'Bvi w of this case involves two distinct inquiries: (i) Does 
Congress have the authority to enact§ 103(f)(2), and (ii) Do 
the terms of§ 103(f)(2) violate the eaual protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. You have answered the first 
9 ~ l-td, 4A-/ ~ 
q~estion fully. But lr4o~e~l~rn·e~~~·e~~~fi~~ the second question~ 
~~ ~.~~- . t::2..L~~ ~ ~ 
be a9gx:es.se..c3 expl.ig.l.tl~ II' 
u-~J 
~§ 103(f)(2) · · · equal protection# tAer 
~~~.H )'fJ._; c lA/ ~ ;c t 4a ~ 
prop~f -;t~ndard ~f reviewl:~eiAe re- ~ eete.elisb~d. Perhaps 
f\~'t ~~ 
, 
you are now content;~t'o accept / the intermediate standard of 
.! 
p ·r i ... ~,,,..--.- """ '> 
review for rae i¥1 class if iccyt ions suggested by Bi_!l, ..• -a'ri'Cl ) 
I l ,,,.,., .. /" ~ ,.,,.P 
Thurgood in /~akke. Of cour$e, adoption...,,c •'f' this standard would 
.l"' ~ ,/' I ,., ___ ___.,........,... 





rac~al quotas without strict scrutiny. 
My own view is that strict scrutiny must be applied 
to all racial_ c~a-ss,:-fi_c_a:ions : _That is J a racial 
.trr"''"'"o< 
dl<'f'~"*"' 
c1assification is constitutional only if it is a permissible 
means to achieve a compelling state interest. In this case, 
' "' 
the legislative history behind§ 103(f)(2), as explained in 
your opinion, establishes the compelling state interest in 
redressing the continuing effects of discrimination. I regard 
the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 





~~~ ... ,.J 
and reasonably necessary means of d . d' I . . re ress1ng 1scr1mlnat1on. 
"" 
In this case, I believe that the set-aside does pass 
constitutional scrutiny. But, because of my conclusion that 
~J,~o~~-~t.·~ 
ongre~.s. has be~n special powers to fiqht'\discrimination, my 
WJ<-;,J..-~rl.. 
opinion in this case ~ not give all governmental bodies a 
,J:; "+ ~'if k~ 
carte blanche to estjrblish racial classifications. 
( ~ recogn~ze that this case ~~is~i!difflc'~lt 
' I f hope to be able to join as much of your opinion as 
, I 
possible. This is certainly a case in which the Court w~: , 
r c~O 
pe well served by a united front. Of course, I have not 
spoken with either Harry or Byron, so I do not know what view 
\they would adopt. -...... _-
\ --· 
Sincerely, 
June 5, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik 
Dear Chief: 
At Conference I said that I would apply my Bakke 
analysis to this case. Accordingly, I have prepared a 
concurring opinion that probably will be circulated Friday or 
Monday. 
I write now primarily because of the memorandum to 
you from Bill Brennan and Thurgood. I aqree that review of 
this case involves two distinct inquiries: (i) Does Conqress 
have the authority to enact§ 103(f)(2), and (ii) Do the 
terms of§ 103(f)(2) violate the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment. You have answered the first question 
fully. But I view the second question as the critical issue 
in this case. Although you answer it qenerally, I would think 
it necessary to address the question in terms of established 
2. 
equal protection analysis. 
The fir~t step in this analysis is identification 
of the proper standard of review. § 103(f)(2) establishes a 
racial classification. Prior to Bakke, I had understood -
and I~ read all of the prior decisio~hat the 
appropriate standard for a racial classification is strict 
scrutiny. In Bakke, of the five of us who reached the 
constitutional question, I was the only Justice who adhered 
to strict scrutiny analysis. 
Although not so characterized, it is my view that 
the opinion joined by Bill and Thurgood in Bakke essentially 
applied the intermediate standard that Thurgood had ur9ed in 
his dissent in Rodriguez. Although I respect their views, I 
could not agree with them in Bakke and do not now. Apart 
from turning our back on prior precedents establishing strict 
scrutiny as the proper standard for review of racial 
3. 
classifications, see !E ~Griffiths, 413 u.s. 717, 721-722 
(1973); Loving v. Virqinia, 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967); McLauqhlin - . 
~Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 1'9f! (1964), the intermediate 
standard inevitably becomes a subjective judgment. In any 
event, there have never been five votes (to my knowledge) for 
an intermediate standard where the classification is racial. 
What concerns me most is that adoption of this 
standard presumably would allow all governmental bodies 
(including state universi~ies), not just Conqress, to impose 
racial quotas without strict scrutiny. 
As my concurring opinion will say, a racial 
classification is constitutional only if it is a permissible 
means to achieve a compelling state interest. In this case, 
the legislative history behind§ 103(f)(2), as explained in 
your opinion, establishes the compelling state interest in 
redressing the continuing effects of discrimination. I regard 
.. f' f ' : 
4. 
the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendment as giving Congress the power to choose an equitable 
and reasonably necessary means of redressing identified 
discrimination. In this case , I believe that the set-aside 
does pass constitutional scrutiny. But, because of my 
conclusion that Congress has been granted special powers to 
fight racial discrimination, my opinion iA Lhi z:eas-e would 
not give all governmental bodies a carte blanche to 
estasblish racial classifications of any kind. 
As my opinion may not be circulated before you 
reply to Bill and Thurgood, I want you to know - in general 
terms - the substance of my views . I voted with you at 
Conference. But I stated the basis for my vote as requirin~ 
J.M_~~~~ M4-~~~ 
~the classical standard -.ppli&Q e., "&&:l~eieioll~ to 
~ 
A 
liiii. eerimil"let4e~ on ra.ce. Still, I hope to be 
able to join as much of your opinion as possible. Tb4e is 
s. 




lfp/ss 6/5/80 Fullilove letter (Rider 3) 
As perhaps my opinion will not be circulated before 
you reply to Bill and Thurgood, I want you to know - in 
~~ 
general terms - the substance of my Btlbstance. I voted with 
you at Conference. But I stated the basis for my vote as 
requiring the classical standard applied by our decisions to 
discriminations based solely on race. 
Sincerely, 
lfp/ss 6/5/80 Fullilove Letter (rider A, P. 2) 
In this analysis - as we all agree - the first step 
is identification of the proper standard of review. We are 
dealing here with a racial classification. Prior to Bakke, I 
had understood - and I so read all of the prior decisions -
the appropriate standard for a racial classification is 
strict scrutiny. In Bakke, of the five of us who reached the 
constitutional question, I was the only Justice who adhered 
to strict scrutiny analysis. 
Although nJ-so characterized, it is my view - and I 
believe also the view of many commentators - that the opinion 
joined by Bill and Thurgood applied in essence the 
intermediate sta.ndard tha.t Thurgood had urqed in his dissent 
in Rodri~~ 
~ ~ ~!though I respect their views, I could not agree 
with them in Bakke and do not now. Apart from turninq our 
back on prior ?recedents (here, Jon, cite the cases we rely 
a- 'few-
on), the intermediate standard inevitably becomes more ef a , 
subjective judgment thal'l" '1iG".;'m\al bcis?~f' m: "strict 
scrutiny". In any event, there have never been five votes 
(to my knowledge) for an intermediate standard where the 
classification is racial. 
What concerns me most is that adoption of this 
~ { lA•4~uJI44"-f ~/., 
standard would allow all qovernmental bodiesA not J'ust 
i\ --- ,, . 
Congress, to impose racial auotas without strict scrutiny. 
2. 
June 5, 1980 
78-1007, Fullilove 
Dear Chief,: 
At Conference I said that I would apply my Pa~k~ 
analysis to this case. Accordingly, I have prepared a 
concurring opinion that probably will be circulated Friday or 
Monday. 
I write now primarily because of the memorandu~ to 
you from Bill Brennan and Thurgood. I aqree that review of 
this case involves two distinct inquiries: (i) Does Conqress 
have the authority to enact f> 103(f)(2), and {ii) Do the 
terms of§ 103(f)(2) violate the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amend~ent. You have answered the first auestion 
fully. But I view the second question as the critical issue 
in this case. Although you answer it generally, I would think 
it necessary to address the question in terms of establi~hed 
equal protection analysis. 
The first step in equal protection analysis is 
identification of the proper standard of review. ~ 103(f)(2) 
establishes a racial classification. Prior to Bakke, I had 
understood - and I read all of the prior decisions to say -
that the appropriate standard for a racial classification is 
strict scrutiny. In Bakke, of the five of us who reached the ,. 
constitutional question, I was the only Justice who adhered 
to strict scrutiny analysis. 
Althouqh not so characterized, it is my view that 
the opinion joined by Bill and Thurgood in Bakke essentially 
applied the intermediate standard that Thurqood had urged in 
his dissent in Rodriguez. Although I respect their views, I 
could not agree with the~ in Bakke and do not now. I believe 
that our prior precedents establish strict scrutiny as the 
proper standard for review of racial clessifications. See In 
re Griffiths, 413 u.s. 717, 721-722 (1973h Lovinq v. -
Virginia, 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967)J Mci.auqhlin v. FlorTaa, 379 
u.s. 184, 192 (1964). In any event, t~ere have never been 






intermediate standard where the classification is racial. 
What concerns me most is that adoption of this 
standard presumably would allow all qovernmental bodies 
(including state universities), not just, Conqress, to impose 
racial quotas without strict scrutiny. 
As my concurrina opinion will say, a racial 
classification is constitutional only if it is a permissible ~ 
means to achieve a compelling state interest. In this case, 
the legislative history behindS 103(f)(2), as explained in 
your opinion, establishes the compelling state interest in 
redressinq the continuing effects of discrimination. I reqard 
the enforcement clauses of the ~hirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendment as qiving Conqress the power t.o choose an eauit,able 
and reasonably necessary means of redressina identified 
discrimination. In this case, I believe that the set-aside 
does pass constitutional scrutiny. But, because of my 
conclusi.on that Conqr~ss has been qranted special powers to 
fiaht racial dincrimination, my opinion would not qive all 
aovernrnental bodies a carte blanche to establish racial 
classifications on the basis of an intermediate standard of 
review •• 
I do not read your draft as intending to qo so far. 
But as my opinion ~ay not be circulated b~fore you reply to 
Bill and Thurqood, r want you to know - in a~neral terms -
,, 
the substance of mv views. I voted with you at Conference. '·, 
But I stated the basis for my vote as reauirinq, in 
accordance with preced~nt, that we apply the classical 
standard to this classification based solely on race. ~till, 
I hope to be able to 1oin as much of your opinion as 
possible. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§utrrrntt <!fou:rl of t~t ~niftb ~taft5 
~asfrbtgton. ~. C!J. 2D.?J!.$ 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
June 6, 1980 
Re: 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Bill and Thurgood: 
I do not consider the points you raise as 
presenting any insoluble problems. However, I will 
wait other reactions before spending more time on 
this case. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmu~ 
Mr. Justice Powell~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.:§u.pr ttttr <!Jmtrlllf u1t 1JUtili b jstltftg 
'JllliUl frin gtcn, ~. QJ. 2 0 ~.)! .;J 
June 9, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
/ 
I will defer response to the several memos until the "dust 
settles." 
I do not share the passion expressed by some for stating 
"tests." The test is the Constitution. Harry once observed, 
accurately, that tests are often announced by us to fit the 





CHAMBERS 0 F" 
.;§u:p-rtmt <!Jo-u:rlo-f tlrt ~ j;tlrlt.s' 
~fringtttn, ~. <q. 20'bl~~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE June 9, 1980 
,1• 1 
Re: 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief, 
I would favor changes in your cir-
culating draft along the lines suggested 
by Bill and Thurgood. I hope not to 
write separately. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
D ar Cl ief: 
.i'~tnu (!fottd d tl}t' ~tti.U~ j;tattg 
Jhti\~ott, ~. QJ. 211~~$ 
/ 
June 9, 1990 
I have now ha_d an oppn;:' un: ty ,~o ha:.:"'l lilY firot re dh~g of 
y~1ur propose opi.ni.on aG circuJat:.ed .fn printtJ'1 form on. .• _ay o ... 
1!'hia i'":' a c·re.Lct and det.a .U.od opinitHlr ani!, <:.'lbviousJy, you, 
attempt b.> ~1alk car<.tfully hat.wecn the opposing cotu;lch:raticmt-:t 
~:hn.:. are suomitt(';d to us hy tho partic:s. 
In line it. 1hat I a~;a 1mo is the !;;Ugge~;t · ~n cont:ai~!!Hl in 
y. :r: note of June <• to f~ill .... r.nna antl T1·urgoi.J~1, I gl·ve yr)u 
th fe-1llow g s ~· t: c .. 'ons: 
L. I am som~w 1 ... t hCJl.lblod by hat st::~;•. ~3 t.c t Q :to bf~ t.he I 
'tl)scm e J n the ~;,pill. on of any emmc i.atior: of •. o ~anrard o! ~ 
r. ~., hlW to ~ c app'U.n1 tf-l- ~n;-m ~r,;'i.ial r ttCHl1 quota ... r ~v~n t.houg:1 of I 
a: .U.mlt(~d k.lntl SliC.h e~~ ic 1?t$sont in this cace, endct~d b~· 
Cong-res:s. ! l·hit"!lt H<~ Cli:H1t:.('"' ercape the fact that this ts a 
quat~ case ,o rar ~a it go~s, alt1ough, as your orinton 
·tr sees, thee. are llmi_s a~d ~xccptionc. Ne sug~astcl 
· at .rial prop'- se by '.JB ar,!('1 .~,'t-1 a . th bot•·om of th • ire.t 
age ~f the· r let~,. :.r of ~Tur-e r.: dor:_a attc pt to .nuncit.te a 
"'tanaar • 
2. 1 am not. bl , as you appar .. ntly at·e, b;-. a. void , nd fa l.l 
to cite the B:lk · e case. l CAi"~ v~otc +:<::) af f 11· in 'E\tl11J .. ove t:.Hi 
t 1e ground "tn.a:r- the cbaJ.J.·enged t;>to·gr!:U!l passes -1he~-·t:est I 
ru: o po s ~(~ l n §!.!:d~n. 
_. I m in gem:xa'l agree ont wii:h oth~r c<::-mrnente Bill 
r ·nna. ~u1d -! urgood hav · mt i.n thnJ.r joint lr:!tt £ of Jtlfl- 5. 
y ngreemen· , f cc 1-: ~~ 1 is ot ..,.urpr ~sing bc~:au ,£> o · the fact, 
that ! was wit! t' c. an<i By!: on in t e jo nt O! ir ion in ?a_s._ 
Je~i ,ning at page 324 of 4 B u.s. 
Sln.c·~re l y .. 
<1(~ : 'f.l;:; • JJSticc Brer"tniw 
.r: • Justic ·. Ihi ... e 
.lr • JU .ticc ti rsha:. "! 
Mr. Juotice Po e1 / 
JS 6/10/80 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik 
Richard Friedman, the Chief's clerk on this case, 
called this morning to "reassure" me that the Chief would take 
no further action until he sees your concurrence. I told Richard 
that your views would be circulated in a day or so, and be 
entitled a "Memorandum" in deference to the Chief's reauest. I 
said that you may wish to show a copy to the Chief prior to 
general circulation. 
Richard says that the Chief is not 
major overhaul his opinion, but that he will 
paragraphs. He will not, however, put a "test" 
going to make a 
redraft several 
in the opinion. 
His hope is that, by avoiding labels, he can get everyone on the 
opinion. The impression I received is that he would very much 
1 ike to get your vote, presumably so that he can demonstrate 
broad-based support. 
As near as I can tell, the Chief's hope is to speak for 
everyone by saying nothing. This is unlikely to be successful, 
but I do think that you should at least wait to see his 
modifications before you state your unwillingness to join his 
opinion. At least so lonq as you have not voted definitively, 
the Chief will apparently fight off the Brennan bloc's attempt 
to characterize his opinion as an affirmation of their Bakke 
approach. This would be a good thing. 
June 11, 19AO 
No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik 
PERSONAL 
Dear Chief: 
Enclosed is a memorandum of my views in this case. 
As I indicated in my letter of June sixth, I h~ve applied 
in accord with mv Conference vote - the principles of my 
Bakke opjnion to the facts of this case. 
It is settled by our cases that racial 
classifications should be judged under strict scrutiny 
analysis (seep. , memo). Since the formulation of a .. -
multi-tier model of equ~l protection, racial classifications 
uniformly have been judged under this most searching standard 
of iudicial review. This review is appropriate because of the 
strong constitutional presumption aqainst the use of racial 
•.' 
classifications. Where the prohability of illicit 
classification i.s less, as in review of strictly economic 
requlation, the Court has adopted the far less searchino 
"rational basis" standard of review. See !..!.S.:.r McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 u.s. 420, 425-426 (1961 ). S~e ~' Craio v. 
Boren, 429 u.s. 190, 210-211 n.* (1976)(Powell, J., 
concurrino). Apart from the foreoqoino, I know of no 
analytical framework for iudqinq equal protection cases. 
2. 
I vlew it as es~ential to have such a frarne\o7ork. If 
this Court could decide every eaual protection case brouqht 
in the federal system, perhaps we could rely simply on our 
overall judqment as to when a clarification is fair. I miqht 
be inclined to aqree. But the value of carefully formulated 
standards of review lies in the quidance they offer to 
federal and state iudqes who are required to apply our 
constitutional precedents. Fy emphaeizinq the he~vy burden 
3. 
that a government must bear to demonstrate the leqitimacv of 
a racial classification, this Court can insure that racial 
distinctions, so odious to a free society, are not casually 
imposed upon our citizens. 
I do not think I can join a Court opinion that 
endorses - or can be read reasonahly t .o endorse - some 
intermediate level of scrutiny for racial classifications. 
This is where I departed analytically from the "Brennan 
aroup" view in Bakke. For me at least, this is not a 
semantic distinction. Unless I misconceive the "Brennan 
qroup's" view as expressed and applied in their several Bakke 
opinions, it is some aeneral intermediate standard similar to 
that applied in sex discrimination cases. I recognize -
indeed admire - their qenuine concern to compensate for the 
ill effects of past discrimination. I simply disagree as to 
the proper constitutional standard, and the showina it will 
' ~ . 
4. 
reauire to 1ustifv preferenti~l treatment in our 
societv.Pressures for preferences can come from ~ aroup. 
Indeed, the very statute before us in this case includes 
orientals - many of whom have enjoyed fantastic success in 
competition with all other seaments of our uniouely 
pluralistic society. I find it difficult to accord them 
preferential treatment. 
r appreciate vour willinaness to trv to meet 
sugaestions for chanaes in your opinion. It would indeed be 
fine to have a full Court opinion. Yet, I cannot in qood 
conscience ab~ndon an analvtical aPproach that I view as 
reauired by our prior precedents, and as essential to 
preserve the essence of the American ideal of eauality before 
the law. 
I will, of course, await your final chanqes before 
makina a decision as to what I can join in your opinion. In 
5. 
view, however, of the lateness of the hour, I am inclined to 
go ahead and circulat~ my memorandum so that other members of 
the Court - includinq perhaps the Brothers from whom we have 
not heard - will have it before them. 
Sincerely, 
June 11, 1980 
No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik 
PERSONAL 
Dear Chief: 
Enclosed is a memorandum of my views in this case. 
As I indicated in my letter of June 6, I have applied - in 
accord with my Conference vot~ - the principles of my Bakke 
opinion to the facts of this case. 
It is settled by our cases that racial 
classifications should be iudged under strict scrutiny 
analysis (se~ p. 2-3,13, memo). Since the formulation of a 
multi-tiPr model of equal protection, racial classifications 
uniformly have been iudqed under this most searchinq standard 
of judicial review. This review is appropriate because of the 
strong constitutional presumption aaainst the use of racial 
classifications. Where the probabil it.v of illicit 
classification iR less, as in review of strictly economic 
regulation, the Court has adopted the far less searchinq 
"rational basis" standard of review. See e.q., McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 u.s. 420, 425-426 (1961). Ai11Tl-defined level 
of scrutiny has been applied in some of our sex 
discrimination cases. See e.q., Craia v. Boren, 
190, 210-211 n.* (1976)(Poweif; J., concurring). 
the foregoing, I know of no analytical framework 




I view it as essential to have such a framework. If 
this Court could decide every equal protection case brouaht 
in the federal system, perhaps we could rely simply on our 
overall judgment as to when a classification is fair. But the 
value of carefully formulated standards of review lies in the 
guidance they offer to federal and state judqes who are 
reauired to apply our constitutional precedents. By 
emphasizing the heavy burden that a qovernment must bear to 




Court can insure that racial distinctions, so odious to a 
free society, are not casually imposed upon our citizens. 
2. 
I do not think I can join a Court opinion that 
endorses - or can be read reasonably to endorse - some 
intermediate level of scrutiny for racial classifications. 
This is where I departed analyt.ical ly from the "Brennan 
group" view in Bakke. For me at least, this is not a 
semantic distinction. Unless I misconceive the "Brennan 
group's" view as expressed and applied in their several Bakke 
opinions, it is some qeneral intermediate standard similar to 
that applied in sex discrimination cases. I recognize -
indeed admire - their genuine concern to compensate for the 
ill effects of past discrimination. I simply diPaqree as to 
t~e proper constitutional standard, and the showing it will 
reauire to justify preferential treatment in our society. 
I appreciate your willinqness to try to meet 
suggestions for chanqes in your opinion. It would indeed be 
fine to have a full Court opinion. Yet, I cannot in aood 
conscience abandon an analytical approach that I view as 
reauired by our prior precedents, and as essential to 
preserve the essence of the ~merica~ ideal of eauality before 
the law. 
I will, of course, await vour final changes before 
makina a decision as to what I can join in your opinion. In 
view, however, of the latPness of the hour, I am inclined to 
go aheRd and circulate my memorandum so that other members of 
the Court - includinq perhaps the Brothers from whom we have 
not heard - will have it before them. 


















THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
J;u.prtutt <!Jourt of tqt ~ltb J;tattg 
Jfagfringhttt. ~. <!J. 211~'!~ 
June 12, 1980 
PERSONAL 
Re: 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Lewis: 
Of course there is much in your memorandum with which I 
agree. In fact, each of the arguments you make as to why this 
program is constitutional is made in my opinion. My draft 
demonstrates that "strict scrutiny" has been given, although I 
avoid articulating our action in those words because I fear we 
are going astray with all sorts of "tiers of tests." I do not 
agree that it is essential to use any ritual of words to 
describe the standard of review employed -- so long as it is 
clear that the 5th and 14th Amendments are satisfied. These 
"tests" assume a talismanic quality that in my view is becoming 
increasingly unhelpful. I prefer to decide only this case, 
which deals with a Congressional program, strictly hedged in 
every respect indicated by the opinion. 
I have attached "for your eyes" a draft of changes that I 
am willing to make in the opinion. My hope is that you will be 
satisfied that, as revised, the opinion is "not inconsistent" 
with the views you expressed in Bakke. I will await your 
comments on the attached before I circulate any proposed 
changes to the Conference. 
I intend to stay with the limits expressed by this opinion, 
not stray from the narrow holding as some have done in the 
past. (Compare the "straying" from Swann in Milliken I.) 






To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
The substantive changes in the Chief's draft recognize 
the applicability of the Due Process Clause to this case, but do 
not expressly adopt the strict scrutiny test. 
I 
The changes on pages 5, 9, 30, 31, 35 are stylistic. 
On page 22, the Chief has described legislative 
"authority" under the General Welfare Clause. He no longer 
refers to plenary power. This change removes slightly the 
implication that the mere grant of power is sufficient to uphold 
the program. 
On page 23, he has removed a sentence that describes 
the program as "voluntary" and discusses the ~ad federal power 
to condition receipt of funds. This is a good change. He has not 
changed the sentence on page 22 also describing the program as a 
,, 
.. 
"technique to induce" voluntary action. You explicitly criticize 
this latter sentence in your Memorandum. Note 13 at 21. 
On page 26, the Chief has added a sentence adopting 
your view of Congress' ability to reach judgments without 
formulating a formal "record." 
The major change in the opinion is on page 28. The 
~----------------
Chief recognizes that the case raises an equal protection 
question. He recognizes the need for "careful judicial 
evaluation" to assure that remedial programs are "narrowly 
tailored" to meet their goal. The language appears to split the 
difference between strict scrutiny and and intermediate review. 
The Chief cites no cases that might illuminate the "standard" 
for a lower court. 
On page 34, the Chief has removed a reference to this 
program as "experimental." Similarly, on page 37, the Chief has 
deleted a passage emphasizing the "experimental" aspects of the 
program. The new langauge echoes some passages from your 
Memorandum, but emphasizes the deference due congressional 
beliefs that a statute is constitutional. Although you stress 
some deference to Congress, you do not say that constitutional (7 
"doubts must be resolved in support of the congressional 
judgment." 
On page 38, the Chief has repaired the Jackson 
quotation so that he no longer appears to adopt a rational basis 
test . 
II 
The Chief's changes do not adopt the strict scrutiny 
test; nor does the opinion cite any previous equal protection 
cases. Nor has he lessened reliance on Lau v. Nichols, which you 
criticize in the Memorandum. 
On the plus side, the Chief has recognized the 
existence of the Due Process Clause. 
As you said, the Chief may be attempting to get you 
aboard quickly in the thief that the Brennan Four will be more 
" 
amenable than you to joining a standardless opinion. I believe 
that the best course would be to circulate the Memorandum 
tommorow morning, then tell the Chief privately later in the day 
that you are studying the his changes, and that you will be 
interested in seeing how they are received by other members of 
the majority. 
There is probably a substantial advantage in ~ing 
for the Brennan group to make the next move. If they ioin, and 
~claim the Chief has adopted an intermediate standard, then you 
~ will have leverage to force the Chief to disclaim that 
~~suggestion. If they do not join the Chief, then you will not be 
under any pressure to give the Chief a second vote. The only 
danger in delay is that you let others take the momentum of 
asking the Chief for changes. But since you have already told 
the Chief your views, and will be the only other member of the 
majority to circulate a written opinion for the next few days, I 
~ . 
think that there's not a lot further to push the Chief. 




Thank you for your letter of June 12. 
I agree that there is a fair amount of duplication 
in your opinion and my memorandum. Differences do remain, 
including the major one of my reliance on an articulated, 
familiar standard of analysis. I continue to be concerned 
that your opinion - even though we come out the same way -
will be viewed as providing no analytical guide for the 
future and thus subject to application according to the "eye 
of the beholder". 
I suppose it is fair to say that, to some extent, 
at least, you are in the "middle" position. We know from 
Bakke that four of our Brothers will sustain the most 
explicit type of quota system that can be devised, if it is 
2. 
perceived to benefit a "minority". I fought this battle with 
them in Bakke when you and three other Justices remained on 
the sidelines in the constitutional debate. 
At least until there is a Court for what I call the 
"Brennan/Marshall" view, I must remain with my Bakke 
analysis. I believe it is strictly in accord with our 
precedents, affords a clear cup framework for the resolution 
of the future cases that are certain to come, and will serve 
the country well - and indeed my Bakke opinion did. Whatever 
anyone thinks of my rationale, the country at large - and 
particularly the universities - have been able to live with 
Bakke. It also substantially allayed both the apprehensions 
of the white and minority populations. In short, for reasons 
I am sure you will understand, I will remain with a position 
that I took only after many weeks of careful thought and 
study as far back as the summer of 1977. 
3. 
Accordingly, I am circulating today my memorandum, 
deleting - at least for this circulation - my original 
comments on your opinion. I understand, of course, that the 
Brennan/Marshall group will not accept my analysis today any 
more than they did in 1978. I have no idea how the three 
dissenting Justices in this case, will analyze the issue 
before us. Potter has never accepted the "tier" precedents 
of the Court, relying istead his case-by-case perception of 
what constitues invidious discrimination. As I have said to 
Potter this has the advantage of simplicity, but it also has 
the disadvantage - as I view it - of affording little 
guidance in this nebulous area of eoual protection. I 
believe that WHR and JPS have accepted the "strict scrutiny" 
test, and if they should apply it is this case - and you were 
also to agree - there would be at least four of us together 
on a position supported by the precedents. One may differ as 
\ 
4. 
to the outcome of a case and still apply the appropriate 
analysis. I view the present case as quite close, as it is 
certainly a quota system classification. I can understand 
therefore how one can come out with a judgment of invalidity. 
I suppose the essence of what I am thinking is that 
you have, in effect, three choices: (i) you could join, 
explicitly or implicity the Brennan/Marshall quartet; (ii) 
you could accept an apply traditional strict scrutiny 
analysis, leaving you with only my vote but with a Court for 
the judgment; or (iii) you could remain clearly and 
uncommitted "in the middle". I view your present opinion as 
being somewhere between my view and that of the 
Brennan/Marshall view. 
The latter has the attraction of resulting in a 
"Court opinion". Yet, I think it is reasonable to expect 
Marshall/Brennan to requested changes in your opinion that 
5. 
will enable them to argue - in future cases - that you have 
joined them in abandoning strict scrutiny where the 
classification is "benign". 
I certainly do not wish to add to the pressures on 
you. I think your opinion essentially is auite good. I am 
trying to identify what portions of it I can join Possibly 




MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I circulate herewith a draft memorandum in which I 
have applied, consistent with my Conference vote the strict 
scrutiny analysis required by our precedents with respect to 
racial classifications. It brings me out in this case, as it 
did in Bakke to sustain the constitutionality of the "set 
aside". This is another quota system case. Yet, it differs 
from Bakke in that the congressional record makes clear - at 
least for me - that appropriate findings of racial 
discrimination against minority contractors were duly made. 
Moreover, as the opinion of the Chief Justice properly 
emphasizes, Congress has a unique responsibility under §5 of 
the 14th Amendment. 
I view the Chief's opinion favorably, although 
·~ 
2. 
differences between us remain. I hope to be able to join 
much of his opinion, probably retaining my memorandum and 
concurring either in whole or in part. 
In view of the shortness of time remaining for 
concluding the work of this Term, I am circulating my views 
now. 
I4. F. P. , Jr. 
ss 
Thank you for your letter of June 12. 
I aqree that there is a fair amount of duplication 
in your opinion and my memorandum. Differences do remain, 
most notably my reliance on an articulated, familiar standard 
of analysis. I continue to be concerned that your opinion -
even thouqh we come out the same way - will be viewed as 
prov id inq no analytical guide for the future and thus subject 
to application according to the •eye of the beholder•. 
I suppose it is fair to say that, to some extent at 
least, you are in the •middle• position. We know from Bakke 
that four of our Brothers will sustain the most explicit type 
of quota system that ca.n be devised, if it is perceived to 
benefit a •minority•. I fouqht this battle with them in 
Bakke when you and three other Justices remained on the 
sidelines in the constitutional debate. 
At least unt.il there is a Court for what I call 
•erennan/MarshalJ• view, I must remain with my Bakke 
analysis. I believe it is strictly in accord with our 
precedents, affords a clear framework for the resolution of 
the future cases and will serve the country well - as indeed 
my Bakke opinion did. Whatever anyone thinks of my 
rationale, the country at large - and particularly the 
universities - have been able to live with Bakke. It also 
substantially allayed the apprehensions of both the white and 
minority populations. In short, for reasons I am sure you 
will understand, I must remain with a position that I took 
only after many weeks of careful thought and personal study 
as far back as the summer of 1977. 
Accordingly, I am circulatinq today my memorandum, 
deletinq - at least for this circulation - my original 
comments on your opinion. I understand, of course, that the 
Brennan/Marshall qroup will not accept my analysis today any 
more than they did in 1978. 
I have no idea how the three dissentinq Justices in 
case, will analyze the issue before us. Potter has 
2. 
never accepted the •tier• precedents of the Court, relyinq 
instea.d on his case-by-case perception of what constitues 
invidious discrimination. As I have said to Potter, this has 
the advantaqe of simplicity, but it also has the disadvantaqe 
- as I view it - of affording little guidance in this 
nebulous area of equal protection. 
I believe that WHR and JPS have accepted the 
•strict scrutiny• test, and if they should apply it in this 
case - and you were also to agree - there would be at least 
four of us together on a position supported by the 
precedents. One may differ as to the outcome of a case and 
still apply the appropriate ~nalysis. I view the present 
case as quite close, as it involves review of a quota system. 
I can understand therefore how one can conclu"e that the 
statute is invalid. 
You have, in effect, three choices: (i) you could 
join, explicitly or implicity, the Brennan/Marshall quartetJ 
(ii) you could accept and apply traditional strict scrutiny 
analysis, leaving you with only my vote but with a Court for 
the judqmentJ or (iii) you could remain ambiguously 
uncommitted •in the middle•. 
The latter has the attraction of resulting in a 
•court opinion•. Yet, r think it is reasonable to expect 
Marshall/Brennan to request changes in your opinion that will 
enable them to araue - either in concurrence or in future 
cases - that you have joined them in abandoninq strict 
scrutiny where a racial classification is viewed as •beniqn•. 
I do not imply criticism of them. I am suqqestinq what I 
would do if I were in their place. 
I think your opinion essentially is auite qood. I 
am tryinq to identify what port ion.s of it I can join, 
possibly with some changes. I will qet back to you ~arly 
next week. 
Sincerely, 









, MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I circulate herewith a draft memorandum in which I 
have applied, consistent with my Conference vote the strict 
scrutiny analysis to the racial classification incorporated 
in S103(f)(2). Like Bakke this is a ouota system case. Yet, ~ 
it differs from Bakke in that the congressional record makes , ' 
clear - at least for me - that Congress made appropriate 
findinas of racial discrimination aqainst minority 
contractors. Moreover, as the opinion of the Chief Justice 
properly emphasizes, Congress has a unJaue responsibility 
under SS of the 14th Amendment. Accordinqly, I conclude that 
the set-aside is constitutional. 
I 
differences 
much of his 
concurrence 
view the Chief's opinion favorably, althouqh 
between us remain. I hope to be able to join 
opinion, probably retaining my memorandum as a 
in whole or in part. 
In view of the shortness of time remaining for 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
I have reviewed the Chief's opinion with an eye towards 
identifying sections that you could join. 
Parts I & II set forth the history of this litigation, 
the legislative history of the set-aside, some history of the 
SBA set-aside, and a description of the administrative 
regulations governing operation of§ 103(f}(2). You could join 
both parts I & II. - -·-· --
Part III begins with four introductory paragraphs. 
There may be two problems with this introductory section. First, ------- -----------------------------




may find disquieting. On the whole, I think such langauge on pp. 
20-21 is not objectionale because the Chief also says that the 
Court would not "hesitate to invoke the Constitution should we 
determine that Congress has overstepped the bounds of its 
constitutional power." p. 21. The second problem is more grave. 
At the bot~ 21, the Chief states that the analysis in 
this case proceeds by two steps: "At the outset, we must inqure -whether the objectives of this legislation are within the power 
of Congress. If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited 
use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is 
a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the 
congressional objectives." I do not see how you can join this 1 
two-step test unless it explicitly mentions the Due Process 
~ause of the Fifth Amendment. 
~~VV{' Part IIIA(1) discusses Congress' power under the 
~ Spending Cl~bably, this section is acceptable. I am --
still bothered by the implict description of the MBE program as 
voluntary, but the Chief has removed one offensive sentence on 
page 23, and he no longer describes congressional power as 
plenary. See p.22. 
Part I IIA( 2) discusses the Commerce Power. The Chief 
concludes that Congress under the Commerce Power can remedy the 
continuing effects of private discrimination even if pre-
existing discrimination is not shown. I think that the Chief's 




continue to burden interstate commerce. Of course, the 
congressional power to prohibit private action under Commerce 
Clause does not answer the separate question whether the 
imposition on innocent individuals of remedial obligations 
violates the Fifth Amendment. 
Part IIIA(3) analyzes congressional power under § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The discussion is slightly different 
than your own. You use § 5 to make two points. First, Congress 
has the power to find discrimination. Second, Congress may 
exercise some discretion is choosing a remedy. 
The Chief approaches the question sightly differently. 
After discussing Katzenbach ~ Morgan and Oregon v. Mitchell, 
the Chief concludes that "congressional authority extends beyond 
the prohibition of purposeful discrimination to encompass state 
action that has discriminatory impact perpetuating the effects 
of past discrimination. City of Rome supra, South Carol ina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 u.s. 301 (1966)." pp. 25-26. 
It appears that the Chief's use of City of Rome is not ~ 
contrary to your views. In the Rome dissent you concluded that 
"[u] nder ~ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may impose 
such constitutional deprivations only if it is acting to remedy 
violations of voting rights." slip op. at 8. But you did not 
reject the contention that Congress' power extends to providing 
remedies as well as prohibiting unconstitutional action. Of 




I am, however, uncomfortable, with the Chief's 
discussion of Katzenbach v. Morgan. As we have discussed, some 
people have read Morgan to give Congress to power to define the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as to give Congress 
to power to enforce those provisions. The Chief cites to a few 
) pages in the Morgan opinion that I fear can be read to support 
~that view. Although your concurrence also relies upon Morgan, 
you do not cite to the pages in which the Court concludes that 
Congress could conclude that a literacy requirement may be 
discrimnate in voting even though the Court has previously 
declared that a literacy requirement is not facially 
unconstitutional. With some minor change or clarification, 
however, I think you could join this portion of the Chief's 
opinion. 
Part IIIA(4) discusses Lau v. Nichols and its 
similarity to this case. In Bakke you specifically argued that 
did not provide support for the use of racial quotas that 
deprive some persons of governmental benefits. 




graphs. In the - 2 r 
would not join this section. 
first paragraph, the Chief mentions the Due but 
fails to specifically employ the strict scrutiny standard. The -------- .. -second paragraph emphasizes the remedial aspects of the set-
aside. If you joined this section, you could argue that the 
~. 
Chief's formulation the first paragraph is "not 
inconsistent" with strict But I would not join this ~ 
.~ section, at least until it that the Brennan group Wlll ~, 
not claim that the same orporates their test. 
~· 
Part IIIB( 1) rejects the ontention that Congress may 
act in a wholly color-blind manner. generally compatible 
with your view that Congress may exercise equitable discretion 
in choosing a remedy except for one sentence on pages 31-32. The 
Chief states that "It is fundamental that in no organ of f;? 1 
government does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power 
than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with 
competence and authority to advance the general welfare as well 
as to enforce equal protection guarentees." Unlike the Chief, 
you do not suggest that Congress • power to act in the general 
welfare gives Congress extra discretion. I think the difference 
is important, because every state legislature will presumably 
have the authority to act in the general welfare of its 
population. To keep this decision narrow, only the enforcement 
clauses should be mentioned. I believe you could join this 
section if the Chief would delete the phrase referring to the 
general welfare. 
Part IIIB(2) discusses the effect of the set-aside on 
innocent parties. The first paragraph suggests that "no one has 
a constitutional right to be awarded a construction contract." 
That is true but, ~ you specifically reject the argument that a 
6. 
~~~ 
~ tJp benefit may be conditioned criteria. The 
.. 
" second paragraph recognizes that remedies may impose extra 
burdens on innocent parties and finds that the burden in this 
case is "relatively light" for the same reasons explained in you 
concurrence. The last sentence of the second paragraph suggests 
that Congress may act on the assumption that nonminority 
businesses may have reaped competitive benefits over the years 
because of the exclusion of minorities. I believe you could join 
this second paragraph, but I do not think you should join this 
section so long as the first paragraph appears to rely upon a 
rights/priveleges distinction. 
Part IIIB( 3) addresses the contention that the set-
aside is underinclusive. The Chief says that Congress may take 
o~me in solving social problems. And there has 
been no showing that Congress has excluded a minority group that 
has suffered as much discrimination as those groups included 
within the set-aside. Although underinclusiveness is generally 
not a constitutional defect, it may be in some instances. See 
Erznoznik v. of Jacksonville, 422 u.s. at 215. 
Underinclusiveness is not an issue mentioned in your 
concurrence. I fear that the Chief's treatment of this issue may 
be a bit superficial. I would not join unless a dissent 
~
specifically attacks the set-aside on this basis and it then 
appears that the Chief has articulated the best possible 
response . 
I • 
Part IIIB(4) deals with the contention that the set-
aside is overinclusive because it includes some persons who are 
not disadvanaged. I find the Chief's discussion a bit confusing. 
At one point, he appears to suggest that the set-aside need not 
be applied to aid any minority business enterprise that is 
charging a price not attributable to the present effects of past 
discrimination. I am not at all sure that this is a fair reading 
of the statute. 
At one point, you responded to this point by stating 
that the classification of qroups had not been at tacked in the 
lower courts. I have read the constitutional arguments made by 
the petitioners in CA2. They do not attack the inclusion or 
....-----__ 
exlcusion of specific groups within the set-aside. I believe the 
best course to take on this issue is to wait to see if a dissent 
attacks the selection of minority groups, then re-insert the 
footnote that appeared in earlier Chambers Drafts of your 
concurrence. 
Part I IIB ( 5) is the Chief • s conclusion. It contains 
some vague language that could be viewed as inconsistent with 
strict scrutiny. I would not join. 
In sum, I believe that you can safely join Parts I, II 
and IIIA ( 1) & ( 2) ) • With some changes you may be able to join 
IIIA (3) and IIIB(1) & (2). I do not believe you should commit 
yourself irrevocably to join any portion of the opinion, 7 
however, until the Chief has circulated all of his changes and 
8. 
the Brennan group has circulated their concurrence. 
JS 6/16/80 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Kreps 
The Chief's formal re-circulation has arrived this 
afternoon. This memo will note substantive changes made since 
his private circulation to you. 
P.21. To meet your objections, the Chief has re-phrased 
the two-part step by adding an explicit reference to the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause. 
P.25. The Chief has changed the citation to Mor9an so 
that the reference does not include those pages on which the 
Morgan Court suggested that Congress could determine the scope 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. 
P. 26. As you suggested, the Chief now cites £l.!:y of 
Rome with a "cf." signal. 
P.31. The Chief has altered the last paragraph to 
emphasize the unique position of Congress, but has not deleted 
reference to Congress' power to advance the general welfare. 
P. 32. The Chief has stricken the sentence denying that 
any person has a constitutional right to a public works 
contract. 
P. 39. The Chief has added a new end inq that quotes 
Brandeis on the need for experimentation. More importantly, he 
now confronts the lack of a "test" in his opinion and describes 
as essential the need to sub~ect the set-aside to "probinq 
examination." 
Each of these changes appears des iqned to make the 
Chief's opinion more palatable to you. I believe that some of 
the chanqes will make it possible for you to joi.n additional 
sections of the Chief's opinion. I believe, however, that you 
should make no formal commitment until we see what the Brennan 
group does. In the meantime, I will compose a short memorandum 
conpar ing the changes you requested with the changes the Chief 
made. And I will recommend which portions of the Chief's opinion 










circulated draft of~a~ 
Dear Chief: 
The changes in your 
are indicated in pen (in the draft your sent only to me) are 
helpful. I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to 
comment. My hope is to be able to join most if not all of 
your opinion if I can view it fairly as not incompatible with 
the analysis to which I am committed. 
I will now go over your draft (assuming that the 
changes indicated in pen will be made). I will indicate my 
tentative view as to each part and subpart, with changes that 
you may consider: 
I and II. I can join. 
III. [Introduction to the analysis (pp. 21,22)]. 
Make clear in the last paragraph at the bottom of page 21 
2 0 
that the legislation is being challenged under the eaual 
protection component of the Due Process Clause. You say this 
in the language you will add on page 28. Although not 
necessary, it would help to make this clear at the outset. I 
could join the introductory portion of III. 
III-A(l) (p. 22). Join. 
III-A(2) (p. 23). Join. 
III-A(3) (p. 24). I am in accord except for some 
of the language you quote from Katzenbach v. Morgan that I 
always have thought was erroneous. I am asking my clerk Jon 
Sallet to discuss this with your clerk. In my view, the 
decision in City Qf Rome is a total miscarriage of justice. 
I am not sure I can go along with citing it except on a "cf." 
basis. Subject to eliminating some of the Moraan language, I 
think I can join. 
III-A(4) (p. 27). You rely on :r;.au y. Nichols. I 
... 
3. 
rejected ~ as an authority primarily because the 
remedy did not affect adversely Englist speaking students. 
It therefore is materially different from a ouota. I cannot 
join this subpart. 
III-B (introduction) (p. 28). You are adding 
language that describes the applicable standard as "careful 
judicial evaluation", and require: that the means be "narrowly 
tailored". As you know, I feel strongly that we should 
adhere to the precedential standard of "strict scrutiny". 
Depending upon any further changes that you may think 
necessary to accommodate other Justices, I may be able to 
accept your formulation by saying in my concurring opinion 
that I take it to mean - as our precedents would require -
strict scrutiny. 
!II-B(l) (p. 30). You rely here on the 
desegregation cases to say that in an appropriate context 
. ·.~· . 
4. 
remedies need not be "color blind", but must be tailored to 
the violation. The sentence at the bottom of page 31 
overstates, as I view it, the power of Congress as contrasted 
with that of administrative agencies to whom congressional 
power has been delegated and to the courts. My primary 
concern, however, is that this sentence may be construed to 
include the authority of state legislatures as well. If you 
are disposed to eliminate the sentence, I could join this 
subpart. 
III-B(4) (p. 34-37). Here you discuss "over 
inclusiveness" at some length. I have been worried from the 
outset by the inclusion of Orientals. Yet, I have thought 
that this claim was not addressed (and may not have been 
urged) in the Court of Appeals. I would have preferred to 
see what the dissenting opinions say about over-
inclusiveness. But I will join this subpart. 
··, 
5. 
III-B(5) (p. 37-39). As my own summary and 
conclusion tracks my Bakke analysis, and as this is at least 
substantially different in form from your summary, I cannot 
join you. 
My difficulties with your concluding subsection 
(III-B(5)) are several. The second sentence (p. 37) can be 
read as a rather open invitation to Congress "to try new 
techniques, such as the limited use of racial and ethnic 
criteria to accomplish remedial objectives". I could approve 
such criteria only where they serve a compelling state 
interest. The next sentence refers to "voluntary 
cooperation". If you have Weber in mind, this would be 
appropriate. But I do not view this case as involving such 
cooperation. 
On page 38, just before the quotation from Justice 
Jackson, the reference to "reasonable assurance that the 
' '' 
6. 
program will function within constitutional limitations 
sounds too much like the "rational basis" test for me. Nor 
do I like the Jackson reference to what must be done to 
prevent "domestic disorder and violence". This sort of talk 
can be read - as it has recently in Miami - as inviting 
~ 
resort to the streets rather than to the processA of the law. 
See TM's dissent in Mobile. I am sure you could not have had 
this in mind. Yet, I am afraid the language might be viewed 
in this light by some readers. 
* * * 
In sum, with relatively minor changes as indicated 
above, I believe I can join substantially all of your opinion 
with the exception of your concluding paragraphs. I would 
say in my concurrence that I write separately to apply my 
Bakke view, and that I do not understand your opinion -
though structured somewhat differently - is inconsistent. 
As I indicated in my last letter, you are being 
"solicited" from both sides. I recognize, of course, that 
reasonable minds may differ and my comments above are merely 
"suggestions". If you should find them acceptable, and can 
resist the anticipated "suggestions" from our Brothers, I 
will join as above indicated. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
June 16, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEPENCF 
78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
In due course, I shall circulate a Second Draft of 
my memorandum in this case. The followinq lanquaqe will be 
substituted for the first paraqraph of the First nraft: 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurrinq in part and 
concurrinq in the judgment. 
The auestion in this case is whether 
Congress constitutionally may enact the reauirement 
inS 103(f)(f) of the Public Works Employment Act of 
1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal orants for local 
public works projects funded by the Act be set aside 
for minority business enterprises. For the reasons 
stated in Part III-A of the Court's opinion, r aoree 
that Conqress has the leqislative authoritv to enact 
the set-aside. Because I aqree that enactment of the 
set-aside does not violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, I also join all but subsections 
(1) & (4) of Part III-B of the Court's opinion. 
This is the first case since University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (197~), to present 
the Issue whether a government may establish a 
racial classification favoring members of minority 
groups. I believe that S 103(f)(2) is justifiable as 
a remedy that serves the compellinq state interest 
in eradicatinq the continuinq effects of the past 
discrimination identified by Conqress. Although the 
Court's opinion does not explicitly adopt a standard 
for judicial review of racial classifications, I am 
satisfied that its analysis is essentially 
consistent with the traditional standard discussed 
in my Bakke opinion. It is on this understandina 
that I join the Court's opinion as noted above. I 
write separately to apply the traditional analysis 









THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prtlllt <!Jo-url cf t4t 1JUrilib .§taus 
~aslyingto-n. l6. <!J. 20,?'!~ 
June 16, 1980 
RE: 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Enclosed is "one last try" which I am prepared to 
stay with-provided four or more join . 
v 
T.he chanqes in your circulated draft of r.tay 30 
are indicated in pen (in the draft sent only to me) arP 
helpful. I appreciate your givinq me the opportunity to 
comment. My hope is to join most, if not all, of your 
opinion if I fairly can view it as not incompatible with 
analysis to which I am committed. 
I will now go over your draft (assuming that the 
changes indicated in pen will be made). I will indicate my 
tentative view as to each part and subpart, with chanqes that 
you may wish to consider: 
I and II. I can join. 
III. [Introduction to the analysis (pp. 21,22)]. 
State in t~last paragraph at the bottom of page 21 that the 
legislation is beinq challengpd under the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause. You say this in the 
language you will add on page 28. With such a change, I 
could join the introductory portion of III. 
III-A(l) (p. 22). Join. 
III-A(2) (p. 23). Join. 
III-A(3) (p. 24). I am in accord except for some 
of the language you quote from Katzenbach v. Morgan that I 
always have thought was erroneous. I am asking my clerk Jon 
Sallet to discuss this with your clerk. In my view, the 
decision in City of Rome is a total miscarriage of justice. 
I am not sure I can go along with citing it except on a "cf." 
basis. Subject to some changes, I think I can join. 
_f. ... • 
.... -, 
III-A(4) (p. 27). You rely on Lau v. Nichols. I 
rejected Lau as an authority in Rakke primar1ly because the 
remedy did not affect adversely Enqllsh spealdnq students. 
It therefore is materially different from a quota. I cannot 
join this subpart. · 
III-B (introduction) (p. 28). You are add in~ . 
lanquaqe that describes the applicable standard as "careful 
judicial evaluation", reauirinq that the means be •narrowly 
tailored". As you know, I feel stronalv that we should 
adhere to the precedential standard of "strict scrutiny•. 
Dependinq upon any further chanqes that you may think: 
necessary to accommodate other Justices, I may be able to 
accept your formulation by sayinq in my concurrinq opinion 
that I take it to mean - as our precedents would require -
strict scrutiny. 
TII-B(l) (p. 30). You rely here on the 
desegregation cases to say that in an appropriate context 
remedies need not be "color blind", but must bP tailored to 
the violation. ThP sentence at the bottom of paae 31 
overstates, as I view it, the power of Conqress by referrinq 
to its authority to advance the aeneral welfare as well as 
its power to enforce the post-Civil rJar Amendments. My 
primary concern, however, is that this sentence m~v be 
construed to include the authority of state leaislatures as 
well. If you are disposed to revise the sentence, I could 
join this subpart. 
III-B(2) (p.32). In qeneral, I view this discussion 
as cowpatible with the ~nalysis on paaes ~0-21 of my 
concurrence. I am bothered by the sentence statina that "no 
one has a constitutional riqht to be awarded a public works 
contract." Al thouqh the statement is clear! y correct a.s a 
matter of due process, I do not think Conaress way condition 
receipt of a benefit upon unconstitutional considerations. 
See n.13, p.21 of my concurrence. With deletion of this 
sentence, I can ioin this subpart. 
III-B(3) (p.33). I am slightly concerned about the 
suggestion that "one step at a time" analysis always defeats 
challenaes of underinclusiveness. In some circumstances, 
under-inclusiveness may be relevant to a determination that 
qovernmental action is unconstitutional. f:ee Erzoznik .Y..:. City 
of Jacksonville, 4~2 u.s., at 215. But, because I do not r~ad 
your discussion of under-inclusiveness as a holdinq, I could 





ITJ-R(4) (p. 34-37). Here you ~iscuss "over 
inclusiveness" at some 1enqt.h. I have been worried froll' the 
outset by the inclusion of Orientals. Yet, I have thought 
that this claim was not addressed (and may not have been 
urqed) in the Court of Appeals. I prefer to see what the 
dissenting opinions say about over-inclusiveness. But I may 
be willinq to join this subpart. 
III-B(5) (p. 37-39). As my own summary and 
conclusion tracks my Bakke analysi.s, and as this is at least 
substantially different 1n form from your summary, I cannot 
join you. 
Jllly difficulti.es with your concluc:Hnq subsection 
(IJI-B(5)) are several. The second sentence (p. 37) can be 
read as a rather open invitation to Conqress "to try new 
techniques, such as the 1 imj ted use ·of racial and ethnic 
criteria to a~co~plish remedial objectives". I could approve 
such criteria only whf"re they se-rve a compE>llinq state 
interest. The next sentence rPfers to •voluntary 
cooperation". If you have WE'ber in mind, this would be 
appropriate. Put I do not view this case as involvinq such 
cooperation. 
On page 38, just before the ouotati.on from ,Justice 
Jackson, the reference to "reasonable assurance that the 
proqram will function within constitutional limitations 
sounds too much like the •rational basis" test for me. Nor 
do I 1 ike the Jackson rf'ference to '"~That must he done to 
prevent "domPstic Clisorder and violence". This sort of talk 
can be read as invitinq resort to the streets, as recently 
happened in Miami, rather than to the process of the law. 
See TM's dissent in Mobile. I am sure you could not have had 
this in mind. Yet, I am afraid the lanquage miqht be viewed 
in this liqht by some readers. 
* * * 
In sum, with relatively minor changes as indicated 
above, I believe I can join substant.ially all of your opinion 
with the exception of your concluding paragraphs. I would 
say in my concurrence that I write separately to apply my 
Bakke view, and that I Clo not understand your opinion -
t.houqh structured somewhat differently - is inconsistent. 
As r ini!icated in my last letter, you are beinq 
"solicited" from both sjdes. I recognize, of course, that 
reasonable minds may differ and my comments above are merely 
"sugqestions". If you should find them acceptable, and can 
<: 
... . , ... 
... 
resist the anticipated "suqqestions" from our Brothers, I 
will join as above indicated. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
4. 
June 17, 1980 
Fullilove 
Dear 
The changes you have made are very helpful, and they 
will enable me to join your opinion with the exception only 
of Parts III-B(1) and III-B(4). Some of the lanquage in 
these gives me trouble. 
I will recirculate my concurrence accordingly, and 
will make clear that I view the opinion of the Court as 
essentially consistent with my Bakke position. I think the 
combination of our two opinions will afford reasonably clear 
guidance for the lower courts. 
Of course, my decision to join your opinion is on 
the assumption that your draft will remain in its present 
state, without substantial chanqe. 
Sincerely, 

















~nvrtnit OJ curt of tfrt 'Jn:i.ttb ~tzrltll' 
~£rhtghtn, ~. OJ. 2l.l~~~ 
Re: No. 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief: 
/ 
June 17, 1980 
We have read your recirculation of June 16 in this case, 
and we appreciate your revising the initial draft in response 
to the comments and suggestions of Byron, Harry, Lewis, and 
ourselves. For our own part, although your second draft goes a 
long way towards satisfying our concerns, we are troubled by 
the addition of the concluding paragraph, particularly the 
second and third sentences, commencing with "Some have 
characterized ••• " and ending with "probing examination." As 
we indicated in our original memorandum, we believe that some 
standard of review is necessary, and we intend to circulate a 
concurring opinion that articulates our view of the correct 
standard and explains how that standard is implicit in the 
analysis you apply to this case. Would you be willing to 
delete these sentences in order to avoid any inconsistency 
between your opinion and our concurrence? We do not think 
these sentences are necessary to your decision. If you find it 
possible to delete them, and two others agree, we would be 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§u.prtntt C!Jaurl af t~t 'J!Utit.cb .:§tws 
'JIDaslrhtgtan.lO. C!J. 20~Jl.~ 
June 18, 1980 
Re: No. 79-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE 
I will try to respond, but only preliminarily, to Bill's 
and Thurgood's June 18 memo and to Lewis' June 17 memo. 
At the outset, it seems to me there is a "tempest in a 
saucer" aspect as to terms. I frankly believe that adopting a 
magic "word-test" is a serious error and I will neither write 
nor join in these "litmus" approaches. However, we are 
supposed to be proficient with words and I will keep trying as 
soon as I see the direction of the dissent or dissents. 
Of course, each of us. is free to write anything, but I am 
not prepared to subscribe to a Court opinion that is undermined 
by concurring opinions which undertake to say that the author 
of the Court opinion adopts a particular test; I would prefer 







As was predictable, the concurrinq opinion Thurqood 
has circulated and that probably will be joined by those who 
agreed with him in Bakke - devotes a self conscious ~mount of 
effort to a demonstration that your opinion rejects the 
strict scrutiny standard heretofore applied to racial 
classifications. 
I do not fault him for tryinq to brino your into 
that orbit. It does make it necessary, however, for me to be 
somewhat more explicit in makinq cle~r that I read vour 
opinion - as I think you have intended it - to confirm to the 
hi9hest level of critical examination that we ever apply. 
I therefore plan, subject to any comments you care 




I will not circulate until I hear from you, as it 
would be much more preferable - if you couln see your way 
clear to do so - if you disassociated yourself from the 
interpretation that Thurqood has placed on your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
lfp/ss 6/19/80 Fullilove 
Add a footnote, keyed to page 1, along the following lines: 
____ ! The several opinions that, together, 
constitute a Court for upholding the set-aside, present an 
interesting situation. The lead opinion, written by the 
Chief Justice, does not identify in conventional the standard 
of scrutiny it applies to this legislation. The opinion of 
Mr. Justice Marshall joins the Court opinion only on the 
understanding - several times repeated - that it applies the 
intermediate level of "scrutiny" adopted in the separate 
opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun in 
Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 324-379. Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion 
takes pains to insist that the Court "does not evaluate the 
set-aside provision under the conventional 'strict scrutiny' 
standard". ~' at Indeed, a significant portion of 
,, 
2. 
his concurrence is devoted to the thesis that the Court's 
opinion harmonizes with the Bak§e opinion of which Mr. 
Justice Marshall was a co-author. 
As indicated above, I read the opinion of the Court 
quite differently. To be sure, it eschews use of 
conventional analysis and does not identify in familiar terms 
any particular standard. I join the Court's opinion only 
because it is clear both from its reasoning and language that 
it does subject the set-aside provision to the exacting 
examination that - in case after case - this Court uniformly 
has held to be necessary in reviewing a racial 
classification. There has never been a majority of the Court 
that applied the intermediate standard that Mr. Juustice 
Marshall, would read into the opinion that I also join. 
While one may have preferred, as that the Court 
speak in the traditional terms, it reviewed the set-aside in 
3. 
language undistinguishable from that of strict scrutiny: "We 
recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure" 
that the racial classification is "narrowly tailored" to 
remedy "the present effects of past discrimination." Ante, 
at 28; and in the final paragraph of the Court's opinion: 
any "preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must 
necessarily receive a more searching examination ••• " and 
further, it is essential that any "enactment of Congress 
which employs racial or ethnic criteria receive[s] probing 
examination." 
I suggest that no opinion of this Court applying 
anything less than · strict scrutiny has ever employed such 
unequivocal language. 
It may be regretted that this important case comes 
down in a posture that may puzzle federal and state courts 
confronted with racial classifications. But, in the 
' ' . . . 
4. 
tradition of this tribunal, each of us must decide and write 




June 19, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief: 
As I feared would happen, Thurgood and Bill Brennan 
claim that your opinion embraces their intermeoiat~ standard 
and reiects the strict scrutiny test. 
I understand that you would prefer not to 
characterize your analysis as embodying one test or another. 
But I cannot join an opinion that rejects strict scrutiny 
analysis. Of course, I do have the opportunity to state in my 
own concurring opinion that the Court has acted consistent~ 
with strict scrutiny. But such a contention, especially in 
the face of four concurring Members of the Court who 
disagree, will be of little value if the Court's opinion 
itself remains silent. 
In essence, I do not believe we disagree about this 
2. 
case. As stated in your letter of 12 June, your "draft 
demonstrates that 'strict scrutiny' has been given" to the 
set-aside. We must correct the error of our Brothers who have 
not so read your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
..§u.pri'ltlt ~ourl of i~t Jfutiitb .§itait.tT 
'JlDaslrmgton. ~. ~· 2ngtn,g 
June 20, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
I propose to modify the final paragraph of the opinion 
circulated June 16 to read substantially as follows: 
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching 
examination to make sure that it does not conflict · 
with constitutional guarantees. This case is one 
which requires, and which has received, that kind of 
examination. This opinion does not adopt, either 
expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis 
articulated in such cases as University of California 
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). However, our 
analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision would 
survive judicial review under either "test" 
articulated in the several Bakke opinions cited 
above. The MBE provision of the Public Works 
Employment Act of 1977 does not violate the 
Constitution.76/n 
I suggest that it is possible to achieve the benefits 
of a majority opinion on this important question without 






June 23, 1980 
78-1007 Fullilove 
Chief: 
In accord with our conversation this afternoon, 
have reviewed my separate concurrence for the purpose of 
identifyin~ ways that will enable me to join your opinion 
full, while still filing my separate opinion. 
The sentence running from page 31 to page 32 of 
your opinion still refers to the "general welfare" power. 
Aqreeinq with this would give me a great deal of difficulty. 
Nor do I think it adds anythinq to your reliance upon t.he 
Commerce Clause and S5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I hope 
you can simply strike this r~ference. 
On pages 34-37 (III(B)(4)) you discuss the argument 
that Congress has included some groups who may not ha.ve 
suffered discrimination. John's dissenting opinion, "'· 
circulated this afternoon, makes a big issue of this. In a 
draft opinion that I did not circulate, I included a footnote 
&6 that answers John's argument to a considerable extent. I 
enclose a copy of my footnote. I would be happy if you 
wished to add it to your opinion. If not, I will include it 
in mine. 
Finally, I enclose a revision of the opening pages 
opinion. 
I fully understand that we differ as to the need to 
identify a specific standard. Although you prefer, in this 
case, not to identify a standard, I must do so in view of my 
Bakke opinion. Also, I have no doubt that your opinion will 
be read as requiring the highest level of judicial 
examination. 
If the foregoing is acceptable to you, I 
you. 
Sincerely, 





6 Section 103 (f) (2), 42 U. S. C. A. § 6705 (f) (2) (1978 Supp.) classi-
fies as :l minority business enterprise any "business at least 50 per centum 
of which is owned by minority group members or, in the case of a publicly 
owned business, at least 51 percentum of the stock of which is owned by 
minority group members." Minority group members are defined as 
"citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, 
Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." These groups also are classified as 
minorities in the regulations implementing the nondiscrimination require~ 
ments of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 
45 U.S. C.§ 803, see 42 Feel. Reg. 4285, 4288 (1977), on which Congress 
relied as precedent for § 103 (f) (2). The House Subcommittee on SBA 
Oversight and Minority Enterprise, whose activities played a significant 
part in the legislative history of § 103 (f) (2), also recognized that these 
·groups were included within the Federal Government's definition of 
"minority business enterprise." H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 20-21 ( 1975). The specific inclusion of these group in § 103 (f) (2) 
demonstrate that Congress believed they were victims of discrimination. 
Because the petitioners failed to attack Congress' classification groups in 
the courts below, there is no reason for this Court to pass upon the issue 
for the first time . 
No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
Although I would place greater emphasis than the Chief 
Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review 
in conventional terms, I view his opinion as substantially in 
accord with my own views. Accordingly, I join the Chief 
Justice's opinion and write separately to apply the analysis set 
forth in my opinion in University of California v. Bakke, 438 
u.s. 265 (1978)(hereinafter Bakke)~ 
The question in this case is whether Congress may enact 
the requirement in § 103(f}(2) of the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public 
work projects funded by the Act be set aside for minority 
business enterprises. Section 103(f)(2) employs a racial 
classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is 
a necessary means of advancing a compelling state interest. 
Bakke at 299, 305; see In ~ Griffths, 413 u.s. 717, 721-722 
( 1 9 7 3 ) ; Loving v • Vir g in i a , 3 8 8 U • S • 1 , 1 1 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; M c Laugh 1 in v • 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). For the reasons stated in my 
Bakke opinion, I consider adherence to this standard as 
important and consistent with precedent. 
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
demand that any classification among groups must be justifiable. 
Different standards of review applied to different sorts of 
classifications simply illustrate the principle that some 
classifications are less 1 ikely to be legitimate than others. 
Racial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent 
level of review because immutable characteristics, which bear no 
relation to individual merit or need, are irrelevant to almost 
every legitimate governmental decision. See e.g., Anderson 2:._ 
Martin, 375 u.s. 399, 402-404 (1964). In this case, however, I 
believe that§ 103(f)(2) is justifiable as a remedy that serves 
the compelling state interest in eradicating the continuing 
effects of the past discrimination identified by Congress.1 
FOOTNOTE 





do not agree 
classification. 
recognizes the principle that I believe 
our Constitution, any official action 
differently on account of his race 
that the Constitution 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
is applicable: "Under 
that treats a person 
or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2. But, 
in narrowly defined circumstances, that presumption may be 
rebutted. Cf. Lee~ Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)(Black, 
Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring). 
.. ... -·~ 
C H AMBERS O F 
.$)u:prttttt cqourt ttf t11c 2fut:itcb .$)tatcs-
~I:Uflri:ngtttn, ~. <!J. 2 0,?J~~ 
JU S TI CE B Y RO N R . W HI T E June 23, 1980 
Re: 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief, 
I join your June 16 circulation 
as modified by your memorandum of June 20. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 







JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~up-um.t ·~iflirt c tttt ~mu~ ~tattll 
~lUlft'in:gtc:tt. ~. <!J. 21l,?Jl." 
~ne 23, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick, Secretary 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your opinion, circulated June 23, 
concurring in the judgment. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
~~ 
Although I would place greater emphasis than the ~f 
J~~ on the need to articulate judicial 
~Jv..t' a.-) \.,~ 
in conventional terms, I view · opinion 
standards of review 
as substantially in 
accord with my own views. Accordingly, I join thaAt44@f 
·~A I'• opinion and write separately to apply the analysis set 
forth in my opinion in University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978)(hereinafter Bakke). 
The question in this case is whether Congress may enact 
the requirement in § 103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public 
work projects funded by the Act be set aside for minority 
business enterprises. Section 103(f)(2) employs a racial 
classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is 
a necessary means of advancing a compelling state interest. 
Bakke at 299, 305; see In ~ Griffths, 413 u.s. 717, 721-722 
( 1 9 7 3 ) ; Lo v in g v • Vir g in i a , 3 8 8 U • S • 1 , 1 1 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; M c Laugh 1 in v • 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). For the reasons stated in my 
Bakke opinion, I consider adherence to this standard as 
important and consistent with precedent. 
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
demand that any classification among groups must be 
-
2. 
justifiable. Different standards of review applied to different 
sorts of classifications simply illustrate the principle that 
some classifications are less likely to be legitimate than 
others. Racial classifications must be assessed under the most 
stringent level of review because immutable characteristics, 
which bear no relation to individual merit or need, are 
irrelevant to almost every legitimate governmental decision. See 
e.g., Anderson~ Martin, 375 u.s. 399, 402-404 (1964). In this 
case, however, I believe that § 103(f)(2) is justifiable as a 
remedy that serves the compelling state interest in eradicating 
the continuing effects of the past discrimination identified by 
Congress.1 
. ' . 
-
FOOTNOTE 
1. Although racial classifications require strict 
judicial scrutiny, I do not agree that the Constitution 
prohibits all racial classification. Mr. Justice Stewart 
recognizes the principle that I believe is applicable: "Under 
our Constitution, any official action that treats a person 
differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2. But, 
in narrowly defined circumstances, that presumption may be 
rebutted. Cf. Lee~ Washington, 390 u.s. 333, 334 (1968)(Black, 
Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring). 
:.. 
~S--lOD7-0PJ!\JON 
FULLJLOYE t•. KLliTZNJCK 3J 
In these school desPgregation cases we dealt with . the 
authority of a federal court 1o formulate a remcc..ly for uncon-
st.i1 .utiona1 ra('.illl discrimination. However, the authority of 
a court. to incorporate racial criteria into a remedial uecree 
also e:xf.~n cJs t.o sts t.u t.ory violations. "'here fed rra l anti-
discrimin~tiop laws ha\'e been Yiolated, sm equibble r<:'medy 
may in the appropriate case inc:ludt> a r~cial or (.>f.Jmic f::Jctor. 
Franks. v. Bowman Tra71Spurlntion Co., 424 1...1. S. 747 (1976); 
see lnf.erno.Uonnl Brotlt.erhnod of Te.<Jmst~rs Y. Unit c:d St.ates, 
431 U. S. 324 (1 977); A lbemorl.e Pap~r Co. Y. }if oody, 422 
U. S. 405 (Hl75). In anoOJer sett.ing, we have held that. a 
state may e.mpJo:r racial criteria that are reasonably nece~sary 
1.o assure compliance with ftderal voting rights legi~Jation, 
even though the state a.ction doe~ not entail the remedy of a 
consWutiona1 violation. United Jewish Oryonizo.tions of 
Trillio.msburyh, Inc. v. Co~ey, 430 U. S. ] 44, J47-J 65 (1 977) 
(opinion of \YHJTE, J., joined by BHEKN'AJ\\ BLAC:KMVN, and 
STEn.::>\'s, JJ.); 1-d., at JSO-JS7 (Bl~RGER, C. J., dissenting on 
other grounds). 
V?hen we ])ave cJisc.ussed the remedial powers of a federal 
court, we have been alert to the limit.at.ion that "[t]he power 
of the federal courts to re~truct.ure the operation of Joca] and 
5taie go\'emment.al ent.ities js not. plenary. . . . '[A] federal 
court js requjred to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the 
nature and ext.ent of the ... violation." Dayton Board of 
Erlu.wtiol1 Y. Brink.1oa.n, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quot-
jng _Uilliken Y. Bro.dley, 4]8 U.S. 717, 73S (1974)~ and Swann 
v. · ClwrloU.e-}if ecklenburq Board o Education_. supra, 402 
U. S., at J G). ,~o...s we. ~o ~ 
Here we deal not ·with the Jimit.ed remedial powers of a 
feoeral court. but. with the broad remedial .powers of Congress. -
It js fundamental that. in no organ of goYE•rnment. ocs 
ihere repose a more comprelwnsive rc>meclial power ihan 
jn t.he Congress, expressly charged by the C-onstitution with 
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S2 FULLJLO\'E v. :KLUTZJ\'lCK 
~ to enforc-e c>qunl proledion guarantees. Congress not 
only may induce voluntary ad.)on to assure compliance 'dt.h 
exisOng federal statutory or constH.ut.ionnl antidisc·.rimination 
])rOYisions, Lut nlso, where Collgrcss llRS nufJJOrify 1o cl1·t'h.rc 
certain conduct. unlawful, it may, :1s here, m1fhodze :md A. · · · 
jnduce st.atc ar.tion to aYoid ~l)(:h conduct. Supra, atfJii 2"':l._ ---,?.J.--.J_V. J 
'(2) 
A more specific cllallenge to 1.he J\1BE program js the 
charge that if. jmpermissibly deprives nonminority busines~es 
of ~ccess to at least some portion of the govemment con-
tracting opportunities generated by the Act. It. must. be eon-
ceded that by its objective of remedying 1he ]list.orical )mpair-
ment of acc:P.ss, the J\1BE provision can have the effect. of' 
a"·arding some con1rar.1s to J\1BEs which 'otherwise might. be 
a"·arupu t.o o1her busine~ses, ·who may themselves be jnnoC'ent 
of any p6or di~criminafory adions. B~f iH3 ' '" e 1' :::1( c t c,)~ 
~: 1 p1jgngl r;rH 1o ho ..,,, .?rrlpF} a w:b?:e- 11€ . L., , · L·s~Fail-
ure of nonminorit.y firms to re(·.eiYe cerf.ain ('.Onf racfs )s, of 
course, an incid<"ni.al c.on~quc>nce of the program .. not part 
of its objective; similarly, pa.st jmpairnwnt. of minority-firm 
a<.:c·.ess to public contracting opportunities may have b(·P.n :m 
incidc>ntal r.onsequc>nr.e of "businc~s- a.s-u~ual" by ])Ublic con-
1ract.ing agencies and among prime (·.ont.racfors. 
It is not a. constitutional defect in this program that 
it may disappoint t.he expect.at.ions of 110nminority firms. 
\Vhen effectuat-ing a. hmit.ed and properly tailored remedy 
to cure t.he effects of prior discrimination) suc.h "a shadng· 
of the burr1en" by innocent part.ies is not jm])crmi~sible. 
F1·anks, svpra_. at. 77; see A lur:m(J.rle Paper Co., .<mpra.; U11ited 
Je1uish Oru(lniz.n.Uon, !>upra. The ac.tuaJ "burden" shouldered· 
by nonminority firms is relatin~)y . light .. in this connection .. 
when we consider t.he ~cope of O)is public works prog1:a.m as· 
com]Jared with 0\'erall construction contract.ing opport.uni-: 
' .. 
.. . . 
·. 
-- · - ·- r 
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: ' 
r . .. 
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·This cloC's not. mc>ll.ll tl1at Lhc> dnim of on·dllr:lusi\'C'Ilt'S! 
Ss 1•n1 ifli'U tu no con~irle>r,qf .ion · in the> )"'l'SI'lll t·:\se. 'J'J1c 
history of gon·mnH.'llf.'l] 1 olt>rnnc·.(_' of prHrtic:r~ using J'a.cial or 
etJmi1: lTilt:ris for the piu·po~e or with the r•ffect of imposillg 
::1n im·iriious cii~rTilllinntion must slt•rt. tiS t.o the clc!lctcrious 
f'lfrc.l~ of <'Yl'll lwnign r:H·iu] ur l'tllllit l'lR!-=!'ifit'lli·ionE= when 
tht·y ~!ray frolll n:1rro"· renwrlial ju!'1ifit:~t.ions. EYr'll )n the· 
<·on1r·xt of ll. f:tl'inl cl•:.JJl,·nge s11c11 ns i~ pn•:st•n1•·d in this tnse, 
the :\J BE pro,·ision 1';1lJilOt p::1s::: )I)U!'kr unlc!-:~. with due ac-
<·ou••f for if .c ~tlminiqJ·ntin~ p1 ·ugr~m. )1 proYirir·s n J 'P.P.~OlJ<lb]c 
:l~~11r:nwe th.Rt :~pplic ·nfion of nwinl or ethnir· eri1r·J·is will be 
JimitJ·cl to arc·ompli~hing t.he remeclill.l ubjec:tin•s uf Col•gress 
:md fklt misapplications of f .)Jl• pro{!r:lm wiJJ he prL'lllptl:r 
:llld :tdt'CJIL'ltdy rcJilt:rlie<l tlnmilli:..;tn:lfin~Jy. 
I1 )-:: ':'ignifit':mt ih!.tt 1lw ~r1milli~1rat .ive ~c-llPllH' ·proYiues for 
"·njq~r :HH] e.:-.:cmption. T\\'o funclaJllt'Jlf.a) c·oJJgwssiunal as-
!:'•n•lJII i•liiS lllldr•rlir· tlH' .:\fBE prugl'Blll: ( 1) 1 hR f. f)JI• )Jl 'f'SI"Ilt 
c·lf•·l'f:-: uf p:1st. di~cTilllitlafiun )J:l\'1' imp:tin·d 1ht' c·ompPtit.iYP 
j)11~itio11 of 1Jil~ill<•S.<:!' .c;. CJWllt'd ~llcl C'tllltro]Jr•d 1Jy llH'llll><~I'S of 
minod1y g1·oups; alld (2) tha1 :.lfnrJll:Jtin' Pffurts to t>Jiminate 
h:1rric•n.: 1n· minority-:finn ac:c:C'SS. and io t>Yalu-Hf.c ),ids \\'ith 
: "l .in~11JH'IJ1 . for fhC' pr<'~r·nf. Pflc•c : t~ of 1:1~1 di~c.rirllilJStiun 
''oulrl :t,.:,..:urt> that ()~,1,. of 1.ht> f<•dPral fund~ gTatlfc•d lllltlt:r 
the Public: \Yorks EmpJoymP.nt. Ac't of l !1/7 " ·ould Ut' ne-
e•llllll•·d for by c·ontrilds \\'ith :n·ail11hlt--. qufllifit•tl. htma ficle 
mi11orit.r · lmsines~ ~llt.(~rprist~s. Each of tlH·se ~SSIJJllptinlls 
)II:J,Y ),. l't'lllll f,f'd lll thC' 3dmini:::.f rRtin' })I'~HTSS. 
ThL' :tcllltinistr<ltive prng1·Rm c·un1ains JIW~~Ilrt'):: to effec:tuate 
t11e t·n,,gr•·.~· -.iollal ob,it·c.:th·e of :lssu,·ing Jcgitim:ile p:..~.rtit:ipa­
ti•Jll by di~:Hh·anf_;jgf..d ]\JBEs. Administrative dt~finit.ion 
ha::: f ~ghll·•wd ~ome 1<~::;~ definit<~ ::l~pN:1.'3 of tlif' s1 B1utury iclen-
~n of 1Jw minodty groups f'nc-.ompas:-c·n by 1he pro-
f__!_:!....J gn1111.~·n~~·n· i~ ~ihninisf1 ·ati\ ·P ' )::(Tufilly 1u idt'lltify twcl 
elillliJJ:·IIr: fn.llJl p::~r·ti<:ip~ tiuu in the )lrogn~lll :\1 BE~ " ·ho m·e 
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73/ The MBE provision, 42 u.s.c. § 6705(f) (2) 
(1976 ed. Supp. I), classifies as a minority business 
enterprise any "business at least 50 per centum of 
which is owned by minority group members or, in the 
case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per 
centum of the stock of which is owned by minority 
group members." Minority group me~bers aie defined 
as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and 
Aleuts." The administrative definitions are set out 
in the Appendix to this opinion, , 3. These 
categories also are classified as minorities in the 
regulations implementing the nondiscrimination 
requirements of the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 45 U.S.C. § 803, see 
42 Fed. Reg. 4285, 4288 (1977), on which Congress 
relied as precedent for the MBE provision. See 123 
Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). The House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and 
Minority Enterprise, whose activities played a 
significant part in the legislative history of the 
MBE provision, also recognized that these categories 
were included within the Federal Government's 
definition of "minority business enterprise." H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 20-21 (1975). The specific 
inclusion of these groups in the MBE provision 
demonstrates that Congress concluded they were 
victims of discrimination. Petitioners did not press 
any challenge to Congress' classification categories 
in the Court of Appeals; there is no reason for this 










June 24, 1980 
78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
I will revise my concurrence in this case to include 
the attached introduction in which I now join the Chief. 
In addition, I shall be making some minor changes. 
In view of the burden on the Print Shop, I do not know when I 
will be able to circulate my concurrence with these changes 
added. I view them as purely stylistic and conforming 
language changes. Clerks from other Chambers will be free to 
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CHAMB E RS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR. 
June 24, 1980 
78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
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THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
..§u.pumt ·QiltUrl of tqt ~b ..§taltg 
~ufringhtn. ~. "f. 21lpJl.~ 
June 24, 1980 
PERSONAL 
RE: 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Lewis: 
I have no problems with your memo of June 23. 
Reference to the General Welfare Clause on page 31 ' 
is deleted. Your suggested footnote as adapted is 
attached. 
I also suggest references in your concurring 
opinion will be stronger if you substitute "plurality" 
for "Chief Justice's" opinion since Byron is with us. 
See copy. 
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June 24, 1980 
PERSONAL 
RE: 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Dear Lewis: 
I have no problems with your memo of June 23. 
Reference to the General Welfare Clause on page 31 
is deleted. Your suggested footnote as adapted is 
attached. 
I also suggest references in your concurring 
opinion will be stronger if you substitute "plurality" 
for "Chief Justice's" opinion since Byron is with us. 
See copy. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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[May -, 1980] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to consider a facial constrtutwnal 
challenge to a requirement in a congressional spending pro-
gram that, absent an administrative waiver, 10% of the fed-
eral funds granted for local public works projects must be used 
by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies 
from businesses owned and controlled by members of stat,-
utorily identified minority groups. 441 U. S. 960. 
I 
In May 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, which amended 
the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999. The 1977 amend~ 
ments authorized an additional $4 billion appropriation for 
federal grants to be made by the Secretary of Commerce, 
acting through the Economic Development Administration 
(EDA), to state and local govemmental entitres for use in 
local public works projects. Among the changes made was 
the addition of the provision that has become the focus of this 
litigation. Section 103 (f) (2) of the 1977 Act, referred to 
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as the "minority business enterprise" or "MBE" provision» 
~equires that: 1 
"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines 
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any 
local public works project unless the applicant gives 
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended 
for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this 
paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means 
a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by 
minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned 
business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which 
is owned by minority group members. For the pur· 
poses of the preceding sentence, minority group mem. 
bers are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskomos, and 
Aleuts." 
In late May 1977, the Secretary promulgated regulations 
governing administration of the grant program which were 
amended two months later.2 In August 1977, the EDA 
issued guidelines supplementing the statute and regulations 
with respect to minority business participation in local public 
works grants,3 and in October 1977, the EDA issued a tech· 
nical bulletin promulgating detailed instructions and infor· 
mation to assist grantees and their contractors in meeting the 
10% MBE requirement.4 
t 91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed., Supp. I) ~ 6705 (f) (2) . 
2 42 Fed. Reg. 27432 (1977), as amended by 42 FeeL Reg. 35822 (1977); 
13 CFR part 317 (1978) . 
3 U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administra-
tion, Local Public Works Program, Round II, Guidelines For 10% Minority 
Business Participation In LPW Grants (1977); App. 156a-167a. 
4 U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Admini~tra­
tion, EDA Minority Enterprise (MBE) Technical Bulletin (Additional 
Assistance and Information Available to Grantees and Their Contractors 
In Meet.ing The 10% MBE Requirement) (1977) ; App. 129a-155a. 
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On November 30, 1977, petitioners filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin 
enforcement of the MBE provision. Named as defendants 
were the Secretary of Commerce, as the program administra-
tor, and the State and City of New York, as actual and poten-
tial project grantees. Petitioners are several associations of 
construction contractors and subcontractors, and a firm en-
gaged in heating, ventilation and air conditioning work. 
Their complaint alleged that they had sustained economic 
injury due to enforcement of the 10% MBE requirement and 
that the MBE provision on its face violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, aud various statutory antidiscrimination 
provisions.G 
After a hearing held the day the complaint was filed, the 
District Court denied a requested temporary restraining order 
and scheduled the matter for an expedited hearing on the 
merits. On December 19, 1977, the District Court issued a 
memorandum opinion upholding the validity of the MBE pro-
gram and denying the injunctive relief sought. Fullilove . 
Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (SDNY 1977) . 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed. 584 F. 2d 600 (CA2 1978). holding that "even 
under the most exacting standard of review the MBE pro-
vision passes constitutional muster." !d., at 603. Consid-
ered in the context of mauy years of governmental efforts 
to remedy past racial and ethnic discriminat1011, the court 
found it "difficult to imagine" any purpose for the program 
other than to remedy such discrimination. !d., at 605. Iu 
5 16 Stat. 144, 42 U. S. C. § 1981; 17 Stat. 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ; 
12 Stnt. 284, 17 Stat . 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1985; title VI, § 601 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d ; tit!<' VII , § 701 et 
seq. of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S C. 
§ 2000e et seq. 
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its view, a llUlllber of factors contributed to the legitimacy 
of the MBE provision, most significant of which was the 
narrowed focus and limited extent of the statutory and 
administrative program, in size, impact aud duration, id., 
at 607-608; the court looked also to the holdings of other 
courts of appeals and district courts that the MBE program 
was constitutional, id., at 608-609.6 It expressly rejected 
petitioners' contention that the 10% MBE requirement vio-
lated the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution .' 
584 . 9. 
II 
A 
The MBE proviSIOn was enacted as part of the Public 
Works Employrnent Act of 1977, which made various amend-
ments to title I of the Local Public Works Capital Develop-
ment and Investment Act of 1976. The 1976 Act was m-
tended as a short-term measure to alleviate the problem 
of national unemployment and to stimulate the national 
economy by assisting state and local governments to build 
6 Ohio Contractors Association v. Economic Development Administra-
tion, 580 F. 2d 213 (CA6 1978); Constructors Association v. Kreps, 573 
F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978); Rhode Island Chapter, Associated General Con-
tractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (DRI 1978); Associated General Con-
tractors v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-4218 (Kan. Dec. 19, 1977) ~ 
Carolinas Branch, Associated General Contractors v. Kreps, 442 F. Supp. 
392 (SC 1977); Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. Economic Development Admin-
istmtion, 452 F . Supp. 1013 (SD Ohio 1977); Montana Contractors Asso-
ciation v. Secretary of Commerce, 439 F. Supp. 1331 (Mont. 1977), 
Florida East Coast Cha7Jter v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-8351 (SD 
Fla. Nov. 3, 1977); but see Associated General Contmctors v. Secretary 
of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (CD Cal. 1977), vacated and rcmandrcf 
for consideratiou of mootne::>s, 438 U. S. 90<J (1978), on remand 459 F 
SttiJp. 766 (CD Cal.), appeal docketed sub 1wrn. Armistead v. Assocwtea 
General Contractors of California, No. 78-1107. 
• 7 Both the Court of Appeals and the Di~trict Court rejected petitioners• 
various statutory argument~ without extended di::;cu::;::;ion 584 F . 2d, at 
608, n. 15 ; 443 F. Supp., at 262. · 
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needed public facilities.8 To accomplish these objectives, 
the Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce, acting 
through the Economic Development Administration, to make 
grants to state and local governments for construction, reno-
vatioll, repair or other improvement of local public works 
projects.0 The 1976 Act placed a nurnber of restrictions 
on project eligibilty designed to assure the federal monies 
were targeted to accomplish the legislative purposes.10 It 
established criteria to determine grant priorities and to ap-
portion federal funds among political jurisdictions.11 Those 
criteria directed grant funds toward areas of high unemploy-
ment.12 The statute authorized the appropriation of up to 
$2 billion for a period ending in September 1977; 1 3 this ap-
propriation was soon consumed by grants made under the 
program. 
Early in 1977, Congress began consideration of expanded 
appropriations and amendments to the grant program. 
Under administration of the 1976 appropriation, referred to 
as "Round I" of the local public works program, applicants 
seeking some $25 billion in grants had competed for the $2 
billion in available funds; of nearly 25,000 applications, less 
than 2,000 were granted.H The results provoked widespread 
concern for the fairness of the allocation process.15 Because 
s H. R. Rep. No. 94-1077, p. 2 (1976) . The bill discussed in this report 
was accepted by the Conference Committee in preference to the Senate 
version . S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-939, p. 1 (HJ76) ; H . R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 94-1:260, p. 1 (HJ76) . 
o 90 Stat. 999, 42 U. S. C. § 6702. 
1o 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S. C. § 6705. 
11 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S. C. § 6707. 
12 90 St<tt. 1001, 42 U.S. C.§ 6707 (c). 
1s 90 Stat. 1002, 42 U. S. C. § 6710. The actual appropriatjon of the 
full amount aut.horized was made several week::; later. Pub. L. No. 94-447, 
90 Stat. 1497. 
14 123 Co11g. Ilec. 81355 (Jan. 25, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph) . 
15 See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 11 and related bills before the Subcom~ 
mittee on Economic Development of the House Committee on Public 
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the 1977 Act would authorize the appropriation of an addi~ 
tiona} $4 billion to fund "Round II" of the grant program/6 
the congressional hearings and debates concerning the amend-
ments focused primarily on the politically sensitive problems 
of priority and geographic distribution of grants under the 
supplemental appropriation.17 The result of this attention 
was inclusion in the 1977 Act of provisions revising the alloca-
tion criteria of the 1976 legislation. Those provisions, how-
ever, retained the underlying objective to direct funds into 
areas of high unemployment.18 The 1977 Act also added new 
restrictions on applicants seeking to qualify for federal 
grants; 1" among these was the MBE provision. 
The origin of the provision was an amendment to the House 
version of the 1977 Act, H. R. 11, offered on the floor of the 
House on Feb. 23, 1977 by Representative Mitchell of Mary-
land.20 As offered, the amendment provided : 21 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant 
shall be made under this Act for any local public works 
project unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, 
materials, and supplies which will be used in such project 
are procured from minority business enterprises. For 
purposes of this paragraph, the term 'minority business 
enterprise' means a business at least 50 percent of which 
is owned by minority group members or, in case or 
publicly owned businesses, at least 51 percent of the stock 
Works ami Tran~portation, 95th Cong., ht SeJ::J. (1977) ; H R. Rep. 
No. 95-20 (1977) ; S. Rep. No. 95-38 (1977) . 
1o 91 Stat. 119, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed., Supp I) § 6710. The actual 
appropriation of the full authorized amount was made the same day. 91 
Stat. 123. 
17 E. g., Hearings, cited, at n. 14, supra; 123 Cong. Rec. fi1401- l:I146:t 
(Feb. 24, 1977) ; 123 Cong. Rec. S3851-S3927 (Mar. 10, 1977). 
1s 91 Stat. 117, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6707. 
1 0 91 Stat 116, 42 U. S. C. (1H76 ed. Supp.l) § 6705. 
20 123 Cong. Rec. H1388 (Feb. 23~ 1977) (remarks of Rep Mitchell) .. 
21fd., at Hlggg·,. 
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of which is owned by minority group members. For the 
purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group mem-
bers are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and 
Aleuts." 
The sponsor stated that the objective of the amendment 
was to direct funds into the minority business community, a 
sector of the economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but 
which, on the basis of past experience with government pro-
curement programs, could not be expected to benefit signifi-
cantly from the public works program as then formulated. 22 
He cited the marked statistical disparity that in fiscal year 
1976 less than 1% of all federal procurement was concluded 
with minority business enterprises, although minorities com-
prised 15-18% of the population.2a When the amendment 
was put forward during debate on H. R. 11,21 Rep. Mitchell 
reiterated the need to ensure that minority firms would 
obtain a fair opportunity to share in the benefits of tlm; 
government program.25 
The amendment was put forward not as a new concept, 
but rather one building upon prior administrative practice. 
In his introductory remarks, the sponsor rested his proposal 
squarely on the ongoing program under § 8 (a) of the Small 
~2 !d., at H1388-H1389. Representative Mitchell's principal remarks 
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ~· 1. 
2s !d., at H1389. 
24 123 Cong. Rec. H1436 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rt>p. Mitchell) . 
As reintrodueed, the first sentence of the amendment wm; modified to 
provide: 
"Notwith~tanding any other provision of law, no grant shall be made under 
this Act for any local public works project unles::; at least 10 per centum 
of the dollar volume of each contract shall be set aside for minority busi-
ness enterprise and, or, unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, 
materials, and supplies which will be used in such project are procured 
from minority business enterprises." 
25 !d., at H1436-Hl437. Repre;:;enta.tive Mitchell 's remark::, are set out, 
in part, in the Arpendix to this opinion, , 2. 
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Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2 (8), 72 Stat. 389) 
which, as will become evident, served as a model for the 
administrative program developed to enforce the MBE 
provision : 26 
"The first point in opposition will be that you cannot 
have a set-aside. Well, Madam Chairman, we have been 
doing this for the last 10 years in Government. The 8-A 
set-aside under SBA has been tested in the courts more 
than 30 times and has been found to be legitimate and 
bona fide. We are doing it in this bill." 
Although the proposed MBE provision on its face ap-
peared mandatory, requiring compliance with the 10%· mi-
nority participation requirement "[n] otwithstanding auy 
other provision of law," its sponsor gave assurances that 
existing administrative practice would ensure flexibility in 
administration if, with respect to a particular project, com-
pliance with the 10o/r requirement proved infeasible.27 
Representative Roe of New Jersey then suggested a change 
of language expressing the twin intentions ( 1) that the federal 
administrator would have discretion to wa.ive the 10% require-
ment where its application was not feasible, and (2) that the, 
grantee would be mandated to achieve at !east 10% participa--
tion by minority businesses unless infeasibility was demon-
strated.28 He proposed as a substitute for the first sentence 
of the amendment the language that eventually was enacted: 2&-
"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines 
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any 
local public works project unless the applicant gives satis-
factory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per-
2o 123 Cong. Rec. H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell ). 
27 !d., at H1437-Hl438. A revealing colloquy between Representative-
Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas is set out in the Appendix 
to this opinion, ~ 3. 
28 123 Cong. Rec. Hl438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remark8 of Rep. Roe). 
%9. ·Jbid~ 
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cent of the amount of each grant shall be expended for 
minority business enterprises." 
The sponsor fully accepted the suggested clarification be-
cause it retained the directive that the initial burden of com-
pliance would fall on the grantee. That allocation of burden 
was necessary because, as he put it. "every agency of the 
Government has tried to figure out a way to avoid doing this 
very thing. Believe me, these bureaucracies can come up 
with 10,000 ways to avoid doing it." 80 
Other supporters of the MBE amendment echoed the spon-
sor's concern that a number of faJ.l..t,ors, difficult to isolate or 
quantify, seemed to Impair access b minorit buswesses 
to public con racting opportunities. Representative Con-
yers of New York spoke of the frustration of the existing situa-
tion, in which, due to the intricacies of the bidding process 
and through no fault of their own, minonty contractors and d:.~4--""~~'""'"'oCA-IL6ol_,.,.. ......... "" 
businessmen were unable to gain access to government con~ 
tracting opportunities.81 
Representative Biaggi of New York then spoke to the need 
for the amendment to "promote a e of economic e uality 
in the Nation." He expresse the view t at without the 
amenament, "this legislation may be potentially inequitable 
to minority businesses and workers" in that it would per-
petuate the historic practices that have precluded minority 
businesses from effective participation in public contracting 
opportunities.32 The amendment was accepted by the House.88 
Two weeks later, the Senate considered S. 427. its package 
of amendments to the Local Public Works Capital Develop-
:~o !d. {remark, of Rep. Mitchell ). 
31/d., at Hl440 (remarks of Rep. Conyer.;) . Represenatiw Con ers 
remarks arc ~et out , in part, in the Appendix t.o thi:; opinion, ~ 4. 
B2 123 Cong. R e< ~ . H1440-H1441 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. 
Biaggi) . Rcprcsc11ta1ive Biaggi's remarks are 1-id out, in part, iu the 
Appendix to th i. opinion, 1[ 5. 
es !d., at H l441. 
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ment and I11Vestment Act of 1976. At that time Senator-
Brooke of Massachusetts introduced an MBE amendment, 
worded somewhat differently than the House version, but 
aimed at achieving the same objectives.34 His statement 
in support of the 10% requirement reiterated and summarized 
the various expressions on the House side that the amend-
ment was necessary to ensure that minority businesses were 
not deprived of access to the government contracting oppor-
tunities generated by the public works program.~5 
The Senate adopted the amendment without tlebate.30 The 
Conference Committee, called to resolve differences between 
the House and Senate versions of the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977, adopted the language approved by the 
House for the MBE provision.37 The Conference Reports 
added only the comment, "This provision shall be dependent 
on the availability of minority business enterprises located 
in the project area." 88 
34 123 Cong. Rec. S3909-S3910 (Ma.r. 10, 1H77) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). The first paragraph of Senator Brooke'~ formulation was iden-
tical to the ver,..ion originally offered by Rcpre~entative ~1tchell, quoted 
in the t.ext at pp. 6-7, supra. A ~Second paragraph of Senator Brooke's 
amendment provided : 
"This section :;hall not be interpreted to defund projects with less than 10 
percent minority participation in areas with minority population of less 
than 5 percent. In that event, the correct level of minority participation 
will be predetermined by the Secretary in consultation with EDA and 
based upon its lists of qualified minority contractors and its solicitation 
of competitive bidi:l from all minority firms on tho~e h~t:> " 120 Coug. 
Rec . S3910 (:\lar. 10, 1977). 
35 /d., at S3910. Senator Brooke'i:l principal remarks are :;et out in the 
Appendix to this opinion,~ 6. 
~6 ld., at 83910 
87 S. Conf. Rep . No. 95-110, p. 11 (1977), H . R. Conf Rep No 95-
230, p. 11 (1977) . 
38 Ibid. The Conference Committee bill wa~ agreed to by the Senate, 
123 Cong Hec. S6755-86757 (Apr. 29, 1977), and by the Hou~e , 123 
Cong Hec. H3920-H3935 (May 3, 1977), and wa:o ~igned into law on 
May 3, 1977. 
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The device of a 10% MBE participation requirement, sub-
ject to administrative waiver, was thought to be required 
t at to assure minority business participation ; otherwise 1t 
was t ought repetition of the prior experience could be ex-
pected, with participation by minority business accounting 
for an inordinately small percentage of government contract-
ing. The causes of this disparity were perceived as mvolving 
the longstandmg existence and maintenance of barriers im-
pairing access by minority enterprises to public contracting 
opportunities, or sometimes as involving more direct dis-
crimination, but not as relating to ac -as Senator Brooke 
put 1tr==r'of capable and qualified minority enterprises who 
are ready and willing to work." ao In the words of its spon-
sor, the MBE provision was "designed to b~gin to redress 
this grievauce that has been extant for so long." 40 ------v 
B 
The legislative objectives of the MBE provision must be 
considered against the background of ongoiug eft"orts directed I 
toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of 
eco~unity. 
The sponsors of the MBE provision in the House and the 
Senate expressly linked the provision to the existing adminis-
trative programs promoting minority opportunity in govern-
ment procurement, particularly those related to § 8 (a) of the 
Small Business Act of 1958.-11 Section 8 (a) delegates to the 
SBA an authority and an obligation "whenever it determines 
such action is necessary" to enter into contracts with any 
procurement agency of the Federal Government to furnish 
required goods or services, and, in tum , to enter into sub-
contracts with small businesses for the performauce of such 
80 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen Brooke) . 
40 123 Cong. Rec. Hl440 (Feb 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep Mitchell) . 
41 123 Cong. Rec. H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell ); 
123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke}. 
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contracts. This authority lay dormant for a decade. Com~ 
menciug in 1968, however, the SBA was directed by the Presi~ 
dent 42 to develop a program pursuant to its § 8 (a) au-
thority to assist small business concerns owned and controlled 
by "socially or economically disadvantaged" persons to achieve 
a competitive position in the economy, 
At the time the MBE provision was enacted, the regula-
tions governing the § 8 (a) program defined "social or eco-
nomic disadvantage" as follows: 43 
uAn applicant concern must be owned and controlled 
by one or more persons who have been deprived of the 
opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive posi-
tion in the economy because of social or economic disad-
vantage. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, 
social, chronic economic circumstances or background, or 
other similar cause. Such persons include, but are not 
limited to, black Americans, American Indians, Spanish-
Americans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts. , . /~ 
The guidelines accompanying these regulations provided that 
a minority business could not be maintained in the program, 
even when owned and controlled by members of the identified 
minority groups, if it appeared that the business had not been 
deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a com-
petitive position in the economy because of social or economic 
disadvantage.u 
42 Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.) ; Exec. Order 
No. 11518, 3 CFR 907 (1966-1970 Comp.). 
4313 CFR § 124.8-1 (c)(1) (1977) . 
44 U. S. Small Business Administration, Office of Business Development, 
Section 8 (a) Program, Small Business Administration Standard Operat-
in Procedure 15-16 (1976) ; see H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975) (" [T]he 
relevant rules and regulations require such applicant to identify with the 
disadvantages of his or her racial group generally, and that such dis-
advantages must have personally affected the applicant's ability to enter 
into the mainstret~m of the business community."); U. S. Small Busi· 
ness Administration, Office of Minority Small Business and Capital Own-
,, 
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As the Congress began consideration of the Public Works 
Employment Act of 1977, the House Committee on Small 
Business issued a lengthy report summarizing its activities, 
including its evaluation of the ongoing § 8 (a) program.45 
One chapter of the report, entitled "Minority Enterprise and 
Allied Problems of Small Business," summarized a 1975 com-
mittee report of the same title dealing with this subject 
matter.46 The original report, prepared by the House Sub-
committee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise, 
observed: 47 
"The subcommittee is acutely awa.re that the economic 
policies of this Nation must function within and be 
guided by our constitutional system which guarantees 
'equal protection of the laws.' The effects of past inequi-
ties stemming from racial prejudice have not remained 
in the past. The Congress luLs recognized the reality toot 
past discriminatory practices have, to some degree, 
adversely affected our present economic system. 
"While minority persons comprise about 16 percent of 
the Nation's population, of the 13 million businesses in 
the United States, only 382,000, or approximately 3.0 
percent, are owned by minority individuals. The most 
recent data from the Department of Commerce also indi-
cates that the gross receipts of all businesses in this coun-
try totals about $2,540.8 billion, and of this amount only 
'16.6 billion, or about 0.65 percent was realized by minor-
ity business concerns. 
ership Developm£>nt, MSB & COD Programs, Small Busine:s:; Administra-
tion Standard Operating Procedure 20 (1979) ("[T]he social disadvantage 
of individuals, including tl10~e within the above-named [racial and ethnic] 
groups, shall be determined by SBA on a case-by-case bask Member-
~hip alone in any group is not conclusive that an individual is socially 
disadvantaged.") . 
45 H . R. Rep. No. 94-1791 (1977). 
46 !d., at 124-149. 
47 H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 1-2 (1975). 
14 
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"These statistics are not the result of random chance. 
The presumption must be made that past discriminatory 
systems have resulted in present economic inequities. In 
order to right this situation, the Congress has formulated 
certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially 
or economically disadvantaged persons to a level where 
they may effectively participate in the business main~ 
stream of our economy.* 
"*For the purposes of this report the term 'minority' shal l include 
only such minority individuals as are considered to be economically 
or socially disadvantaged." .ts (Emphasis added.) 
The 1975 report gave particular attention to the§ 8 (a) pro-
gram, expressing disappointment with its limited effective-
ness.49 With specific reference to govemment construction 
contracting, the report concluded, "there are substantial § 8 (a) 
opportunities in the area of Federal construction, but .. 0 the 
practices of some agencies preclude the realization of that 
potential." 5~ The subcommittee took "full notice o • o as 
evidence for its consideration" of reports submitted to the 
Congress by the General Accounting Office and by the Uo So 
48 Another chapter of the 1977 Report of the House Committee on 
Small Business summarized a review of the SBA's Security Bond Guar-
antee Program, making specific reference to minority busine~s participa-
tion in tho construction indu;,;try : 
"The very basic problem disclosed by the t1estimony is tha t, over the 
years, t here has developed a business system which has t raditionally ex-
cluded measurable minority participation. In the past more than the 
present, this sy:;1:em of conduc ting business transactions bvertly precluded 
minority input.. {;urrently, we more often encounter a busine>~s system 
which is racially neutral on it::; face, but because of past overt, social and 
economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate 
these past inequities. Minorities, until recently, have not participated 
to any measurable extent, in our total business sy~tem generally, or in the 
construction industry, in particular." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791, p . 182 
(1977), quot ing from H. R. Rep. No. 94-840, p. 17 (l \J76) o 
49 H . R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 28-30 (1975) . The subcommittee 's corn~ 
ments are set out, in part, in the Appendix to this opinion, ,r 7. 
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Commission on Civil Rights, which reflected a similar dissatis~ 
faction with the effectiveness of the § 8 (a) program."1 The 
Civil Rights Commission report discussed at some length the 
barriers encountered by minority businesses in gaining access 
to government contracting opportunities at the federal, state 
and local levels. 52 Among the major difficulties confronting 
minority businesses were deficiencies in working capital, inabil-
ity to meet bonding requirements, disabilities caused by an 
inadequate "track record," lack of awareness of bidding oppor-
tunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, preselection 
before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of dis-
cretion by government procurement officers to disfavor 
minority businesses.58 
The subcommittee report also gave consideration to the 
operations of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise 
(OMBE), an agency of the Department of Commerce orga-
nized pursuant to Executive Orders 54 to formulate and co-
ordinate federal efforts to assist the development of minority 
businesses. The report concluded that OMBE efforts were 
"totally inadequate" to achieve its policy of increasing op-
portunities for subcontracting by minority businesses on 
public contracts. OMBE efforts were hampered by a "glaring 
lack of specific objectives which each prime contractor should 
be required to achieve," by a "lack of enforcement provisions/ 1 
and by a "lack of any meaningful monitoring system." 65 
IH !d., at 11; U. S. General Accounting Office, "Questionable Effective-
ness of the § 8 (a) Procurement Program" (1975) ; U. S. Commission on 
Civil Rights, "Minorities and Women as Government Contractors" (1975) . 
ii2 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, "Minorities and Women as Gov~ 
ernment Contractors" 16-28, 8&--88 (1975). 
sa Ibid . 
.?4 Exec. Order No. 11458, 3 CFR 779 (1966-1970 Comp.) ; Exec. Order 
No. 11625, 3 CFR 616 (1971-1975 Comp.) . 
.or. H . R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 32 (1975) . For other congressional ob-
servations with rcspecL to the effecL of past discrimination on current bu~i­
IJess opportuniti!"s for minorities, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, p. 3 
(1972); H. R. Rep. No. 95-949, p . 8 (1978) ; S. Rep. No. 95-1070, pp. 14-
78-1007-0PINION .. 
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Against this backdrop of legislative and administrative pro~ 
grams, it is inconceivable that Members of both Houses were 
not fully aware of the objectives of the MBE provision and 
of the reasons prompting its enactment. 
c 
Although the statutory MBE provision itself outlines only 
the bare bones of the federal program, it makes a number of 
critical determinations: the decision to initiate a limited ra.cial 
and ethnic preference; the specification of a minimum l(;el 
for mmor1ty 'D'USiiiess participation; the identification of the 
minority groups that are to be encompassed by the program; 
and the provision for an administrative wa.iver where appli-
cation of the program is not feasible. Congress relied on the 
administrative agency to flesh out this skeleton, pursuant 
to delegated rulemaking authority, and to develop an admin-
istrative operation consistent with legislative intentions and 
objectives. 
As required by the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 
the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations to set into 
motion "Round II" of the federal grant program.56 The 
regulations require that construction projects funded under 
the legislation must be performed under contracts awarded by 
competitive bidding, unless the federal administrator has 
made a determination that in the circumstances relating to a 
particular project some other method is in the public interest. 
Where competitive bidding is employed, the regulations echo 
the statute's requirement that contracts are to be awarded· 
on the basis of the "lowest responsive bid submitted by a 
bidder meeting established criteria of responsibility," and they 
also restate the MBE requirement. 57 
15, (1978) ; S. Rep. No. 96-31, pp. 107, 123- 124 (1979) ; see a.lbo, e. g., 
H. R. Doc. No. 92- 169, p. 4 (1971) ; H. R. Doc. No. 92- 194, p. 1 (1972) . 
56 91 Stat . 117, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6706 ; 13 CFR part 317 
(1978) . 
57 91 Sta t. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 cd. Supp. I) § 6705 (e) (1 ) ; 13 CFR 
§ 317.19 (1978) . 
,, 
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EDA also has published guidelines devoted entirely to the 
administration of the MBE provision. The guidelines out~ 
line the obligations of the grantee to seek out all available, 
qualified, bona fide MBEs, to provide technical assistance 
as needed, to lower or waive bonding requiremellts where 
feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business 
Enterprise, the Small Business Administration or other sources 
for assisting MBEs in obtaining required working capital, 
and to give guidance through the intricacies of the bidding 
process:58 
EDA regulations contemplate that, as anticipated by Con-
gress, most local public works projects will entail the award 
of a predominant prime contract, with the prime contractor 
assuming the above grantee obligations for fulfilling the 10% 
MBE requirement."9 The EDA guidelines specify that when 
prime contractors are selected through competitve bidding, 
bids for the prime contract "shall be considered by the Grantee 
to be responsive only if at least 10 percent of the contract 
funds are to be expended for MBE's [sic l." uo The adminis-
trative program envisions that competitive incentive will 
motivate aspirant prime contractors to perform their obliga-
tions under the MBE provision so as to qualify as "responsive" 
bidders. And, since the contract is to be awarded to the 
lowest responsive bidder, the same h1centive i.s expected to 
motivate prime contractors to seek out the most competitive 
of the available, qualified, bona fide minority firms. This 
too is consistent with the legislative intention.'11 
The EDA guidelines also outline the projected admin-
istration of applications for waiver of the 10% MBE require~ 
58 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 2-7; App. 157a-l60a. The relevant portJons 
of t.he guidelines are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ,f 8. 
59 Id ., at 2 ; App. 157a ; see 12:1 Cong. Rec. Hl4:17-Hl438 (Feb. 24·, 
1977) (rema,rks of Rep. Mitchell and Rep. Roe) . 
60 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 8; App. 161a. 
61 See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl437-H1438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep, 
Mitchell and Rep. Roe) . 
. ' 
78-1007-0PINION 
18 FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK 
ment, which may be sought by the grantee either before or 
during the bidding process.62 The technica.I bulletin issued 
by EDA discusses in greater detail the processing of waiver 
requests, clarifying certain issues left open by the guidelines. 
It specifies that waivers may be total or partial, depending on 
the circumstances,63 and it illustrates the projected operation 
of the waiver procedure by posing hypothetical questions with 
projected administrative responses. One such hypothetical 
is of particular interest, for it indicates the limitations on the 
scope of the racial or ethnic preference contemplated by the 
federal program when a grantee or its prime contractor is 
confronted with an available, qualified, bona fide minority 
business enterprise who is not the lowest competitive bidder, 
The hypothetical provides: 64 
uQuestion: Should a request for waiver of the 10% re-
quirement based on an unreasonable price asked by an 
MBE ever be granted? 
uAnswer.' It is possible to imagine situations where an 
MBE might ask a price for its product or services that is 
unreasonable and where, therefore, a waiver is justified. 
However, before a waiver request will be honored, the 
following determinations will be made : 
"a) The MBE's quote is unreasonably priced. This 
determination should be based on the nature of the prod-
uct or service of the subcontractor, the geographic loca-
tion of the site and of the subcontractor, prices of similar 
products or services in the relevant market a.rea, and gen-
eral business conditions in the market area. Further-
more, a subcontractor's price should not be considered 
unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs 
because the price results from disadvantage which affects 
62 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 13-16 ; App. 165a-167a. The relevant por-
tions of the guidelines are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 9. 
63 Technical Bulletin, n. 4, supra, at 5; App. 136a. 
o4 I d., at 9-10; App. 143a. 
...l;i. 
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the MBE's cost of doing business or results from 
discrimination. 
"b) The contractor has contacted other MBEs and has 
no meaningful choice but to accept an unreasonably high 
price." 
This announced policy makes clear the administrative under-
standing that a waiver or partial waiver is justified (and will 
be granted) to avoid subcontracting with a minority business 
enterprise at an "unreasonable" price, i. e., a price above com-
petitive levels which cannot be attributed to the minority 
firm's attempt to cover costs inflated by the present effects of 
disadvantage or discrimination. 
This administrative approach is consistent with the legisla-
tive intention. It will be recalled that in the report of the 
House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enter-
prise the subcommittee took special care to note that when 
using the term "minority" it intended to include "only such 
minority individuals as are considered to be economically or 
socially disadvantaged." 65 The subcommittee also was cog-
nizant of existing administrative regulations designed to ensure 
that firms maintained on the lists of bona fide minority 
business enterprises be those whose ·competitive position is 
impaired by the effects of disadvantage and discrimination. 
In its report, the subcommittee expressed its intention that 
these criteria continue to govern administration of the SBA's 
§ 8 (a) program.06 The sponsors of the MBE provision, in 
their reliance on prior administrative practice, intended that 
the term "minority business enterprise" would be given that 
same limited application; this even found expression in the 
legislative debates, where Representative Roe made the 
point: 67 
when we are talking about companies held by 
~5 Text acromprmying n. 48, supra. 
G6 H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975) . 
41 7 123 Cong. Rec. H1439 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remark~ of Rep. Roe). 
20 
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minority groups . .. [c]erta.inly people of a variety of 
backgrounds are included in that. That is not really a 
measurement. They are talking about people in the 
minority and deprived." 
The EDA technical bulletin provides other elaboration of 
the MBE provision. It clarifies the definition of "minority 
group members." 68 It also indicates EDA's intention "to 
allow credit for utilization of MBEs only for those contracts 
in which involvement constitutes a basis for strengthening 
the long-term and continuing participation of the MBE in the 
construction and related industries." 69 Finally, the bulletin 
outlines a procedure for the processing of complaints of 
"unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the 
MBE program," or of improper administration of the MBE 
requirement.70 
III 
When we are required to pass on the constitutionality 
of an Act of Congress, we assume "the gravest and most 
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform." 
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of 
Holmes, J.) . A program that employs racial or ethnic cri-
teria, even in a remedliiT colrtext,cills for ClOse examination ; 
yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate 
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by 
the Constitution with the power to "provide for the . .. 
general Welfare of the United States" and "to enforce by 
appropriate legislation" the equal protection guarantees of 
~Fourteenth Amendment. Art. I , § 8, cl. 1, Amdt. 14, 
~ In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v Democratic 
68 T~·chnical Bulletin , n. 4, supra, at 1; App. 131a-132a. These defini-
tions are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ,f 10. 
H9 fd ., at 3; App. 135ct. 
16 ld ., at 19 ; App. 155a. The relevant portion::; of the technical bulletin 
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ,f 11. 
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National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973), we accorded 
"great weight to the decisions of Congress" even though 
the legislation implicated fundamental constitutional rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The rule is not dif-
ferent when a congressional program raises ~n 
concerns. See, e. (]., Cleland v. National Colle(Je of Bus-mess, 
4351J.-s. 213 (1978); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 
(1976). 
Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a 
schoo~but onaCoii"s!a&ea_ decision of the Co.n.gress 
an sident. Howev er, in no sense does that render it 
imn~ne from j udicial scrutiny and it "is not to say we 'defer' 
to the judgment of the Congress ... on a constitutional ques-
tion," or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution 
should we determine that Congress has overstepped the 
bounds of its constitutional power. Columbia Broadcastin(J, 
supra, 412 U. S., at 103. 
The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by 
our necessarily extended review of its legislative and adminis-
trative background. The program was designed to ensure 
that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the 
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, grantees who elect 
to participate would not employ procurement practices that 
Congress had decided might result in perpetuation of the 
effects of prior discrimination which had imprureo or fore-
closed a~ by minority businesses to public contracting 
opportunities. The MBE program does not mandate the 
allocation of federal funds according to inflexible percentages 
solely based on race or ethnicity. /A 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. At the outse~e 
mustli1qmre whe'tlier tfie objectiv~f this legislation are 
within the power of Congress. If ~ must go on to decide 
wlietlier=tr1elmrnea u se of racial and ethnic criteria, in the 
JL,~ • context presented, is a constitut~nally _Eerm~means 
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A 
(1) 
In enacting the MBE provision, it is clear that Congress 
employed an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers. 
The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, by its very na-
ture, is prima.rily an exercise of the S Jendin Power. U. S. 
Const., r . , 8, c . . This Court has recognized that the 
power to "provide for the . . . general Welfare" is an inde-
pendent grant of legislative prerogative,-Pienary within its 
sphere and distinct from other broad congressional powers. 
Buckley v. Yaleo, 424 U.S. 1, 9G-91 (1976); United States v. 
Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Congress has frequently 
employed the fu~!~!)d~g Power to further broad policy 
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal monies upou 
compliance by the recipient with f€deral statutory and a.d-
ministrative directives.. This Court has repeatedly upheld 
against constitutional challenge the use of this technique to 
induce governments and private parties to cooperate volun-
tarily with federal policy. E. g., California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 
(1974); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 
330 U. S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 
(1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937) . 
The MBE program is structured within this familiar legis-
lative pattern. The program conditions receipt of public 
works grants upon agreement by the state or local govern-
mental grantee that at least 10% of the federal funds will be 
devoted to contracts with minority businesses, to the extent 
this can be accomplished by overcoming barriers to access 
and by awarding contracts to bona fide MBEs. It is further 
conditioned to require that MBE bids on these contracts are 
competitively priced, or might have been competitively priced 
but for the present effects of prior discrimination. Admit-
tedly, the problems of administering this program with re-
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primary responsibility for ensuring minority participation 
falls upon the grantee, when the procurement practices of 
the grantee involve the award of a prime contract to a gen-
eral or prime contractor, the obligations to assure minority 
participation devolve upon the private contracting party; 
this is a contractual condition of eligibility for award of the 
prime contract. 
The power to condition federal expenditures to induce 
J volunta.ry a~ion of the least encu~1bered of all 
legislative powers. Here we need not explore the outermost 
limitations on the objectives attainable through such an ap-
plication of the Spending Power. The reach of the Spending 
Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory 
powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its regulatory powers, 
Congress could have achieved the objectives of the MBE 
program, then it may do so under the Speuding Power. And 
we have no difficulty perceiving a basis for accomplishing the 
objectives of the MBE program through the Commerce 
~ insofar as achievement of the program "()1)jectiv;s 
pertain to the action of private contracting parties, and 
through the power to enforce the equal protection guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as the program objec-
tives pertain to the action of state and local grantees. 
(2) 
We turn first to the C{!!!lmerce P~er. U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3. Had Congress chosen to do so, it could have drawn 
on the Commerce Clause to regulate the practices of prime 
contractors on federa.Ily funded public works projects.. Kat-
zenbach v. McClu·ng, 379 U. S. '294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964). The 
legislative history of the MBE provision shows that there 
was a rational basis for Congress to conclude that the sub-
contracting practices of prime contractors could perpetuate 
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public contracting opportunities, and that this inequity has 
an effect on interstate commerce. Thus Congress could take 
necessary and proper action to remedy the situa,tion. Ibid. 
It is not essary that these rime contractors be shown 
res onsible for an vio ation of antidiscrimination aws. Our 
cases cleahng w1th app ication of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, express no doubt of 
the congressional authority to prohibit practices "challenged 
as perpetuating the effects of [not unlawful] discrimination 
occurring prior to the effective date of the Act." Franks v. 
Bowman Transporation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 761 (1976) ; see 
California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, -- U. S. -, No. 78-
1548 (Feb. 20, 1980); International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971). Insofar as the MBE program pertains 
to the actions of private prime contractors, the Congress could 
have achieved its objectives under the Commerce Clause. 
''rhus, we 'Conclude that the objectives of the MBE provision 
are within the scope of the Spending Power. 
(3) 
In certain contexts, there are limitations on the reach of 
the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state and 
local governments. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426, 
U. S. 833 (1976). To avoid such complications, we look to 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the power to regulate 
the procurement practices of state and local grantees of fed-
eral funds. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976) . A 
review of our cases persuades us that the objectives of the 
MBE program are within the power of Congress under § 5 
"to enforce by appropriate legislati on,, tfie equal protection 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Katzenba!d._h J.:.. M o_rgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), we equated 
the scope of thisauthonty with the broad powers expressed 
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d. 18. "Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive·gra1it otlegislative 
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether and what legislation is needed to secure 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 384 U. S , 
at 651. In Katzenbach, the Court upheld § 74 (e) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, which prohibited ap-
plication of state English-language literacy requirements to 
otherwise qualified voters who had completed the sixth graile 
in an accredited American school in which a language other 
than English was the predominant medium of instruction. 
To uphold this exercise of congressional authority, the Court 
found no prerequisite that application of a literacy require-
ment violate the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U.S., at 648-
649. It was enough that the Court could perceive a basis 
upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a judgment 
that application of literacy qualifications within the compass 
of § 4 (e) would discriminate in terms of a{!cess to the ballot 
and consequently in terms of access to the provision or 
administration of governmental programs. !d. , at 652- 656. 
Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U .. S. 112 
(1970). we upheld § 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1970, 84 Stat. 315, which imposed a five-year nation-
wide prohibition on the use of various voter-qualification 
tests and devices in federal, state and local elections. The 
Court was unanimous, albeit in separate opinions, in conclud-
ing that Congress was within its authority to prohibit the 
use of such voter qualifications; Congress could reasonably 
determine that its legislation was an appropriate method of 
attacking the perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimina-
tion, even though the use of these tests or devices might have 
discriminatory effects only. See yitY_!!l_ Ro!!!.e v. United 
States,- U. S. -, No. 78-1840, slip op., at 18-19 (Apr. 
22, 1980). Our cases reviewing the parallel power of Con-
gress to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
U. S. Const., Arndt. 15, § 2, confirm that congressional au~ 
thority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful di - · 
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crimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory 
impact perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. City 
of Rorne, supra; South Carol'ina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. s:-301 
(1966).' 
With respect to the MBE provision, Congress had abundant 
evidence from which it could conclude that minority busi~ 
nesses have been denied effective participation in public 
contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpe~ 
uated the effects of prior discrimination. Congress had be-
fore it, among other data, evidence of a long history of marked 
disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to 
minority business enterprises. This disparity was considered 
to result not from any lack of capable and qualified minority 
businesses, but from the existence and maintenance of barriers 
to competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic 
discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any 
intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct. Al-
though much of this history related to the experience of 
minority businesses in the area of federal procurement, there 
was direct evidence before the Congress that this pattern of 
disadvantage and discrimination existed with respect to state 
and local construction contracting as well. In relation to the 
MBE provision, Congress acted within its competence to 
determine that the problem was national in scope. 
Although the Act recites no preambulary ~<findings" on the 
subject, we are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical 
basis from which it could conclude that traditional procure-
ment practices, when applied to minority businesses, could 
perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. Accordingly, 
Congress reasonably determined that the prospective elimina-
tion of these barriers to minority firm access to public con-
tracting opportunities generated by the Act was appropriate 
to ensure that those businesses were not denied equal op-
portunity to participate in federal grants to state and local 
governments, which is one aspect of the equal protectio11 of 
the laws. Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the actio11s 
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of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its 
objectives by use of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We conclude that in this respect the objectives 
· of the MBE provision are within the scope of the Spending 
Power. 
(4) 
There are revelant similarities between the MBE pro-
gram and the federal spending program reviewed in .L!!:J!:.. v. 
Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). In Lau, a language barrier 
"-effectively foreclosed" non-English-speaking Chinese pupils 
from access to the educational opportunities offered by the 
San Francisco public school system. ld., at 564-566. It had 
not been sho-w11 that this had resulted from any discrimina-
tion, purposeful or otherwise, or from other unlawful acts. 
Nevertheless, we upheld the constitutionality of a federal 
regulation applicable to public school systems receiving federal 
funds that prohibited the utilization of "criteria or methods 
of administration which have the effect ... of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of 
the [educational] program as respect individuals of a partic-
ular race, color, or national origin." !d., at 568 (emphasis 
added). Moreover, we upheld application to the San Fran-
cisco school system, as a recipient of federal funds, of a re-
quiremeu t that " [ w] here inability to speak and understand 
the English language excludes national origin-minority group 
children from eft'ective participation in t,he educational pro-
gram oft'cred by a school district, the district must take affirm-
ative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open 
its instructional program to these students." lbtd. 
It is true that the MBE provision dift'ers from the program 
approved in Lau in that the MBE program directly employs 
racial and ethnic criteria as a means to accomplish congres-
sional objectives; however, these objectives are essentially the 
same as those approved in Lau. Our holding in Lau is 
instructive on the exercise of congressional authority by way 
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of the MBE provision. The MBE program, like the federal 
regulations reviewed in Lau, primarily regulates state action 
in the use of federal funds voluntarily sought and accepterl 
by the grantees subject to statutory and admiuistrative con-
ditions. The MBE participation requirement is directed at 
the utilization of criteria, methods or practices thought by 
Congress to have the effect of defeating, or substantially 
impairing, access by the minority busilless community to 
public funds made available by congressional appropriations. 
B 
We now turu to the question whether, as a means to 
accomplish these plainly constitutional objectives, Congress 
may use racial and ethnic criteria, in this limited way, as a 
condition attached to a federal grant. We are mindful that 
"[i]n no matter should we pay more deference to the opinion 
of Congress than in its choice of instrumentalities to perform a 
function that is within its power," National Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 603 (1949) 
(opinion of Jackson, J.). At the same time, we recognize 
the need for careful judicial inquiry as to governmental pro-
grams that employ" racial or etfinic criteria to accomplish 
even constitutional objectives. Again, we stress the limited 
scope of our inquiry. Petitioners challenge the constitu-
tionality of the MBE provision on its face; they have not 
sought damages or other specific relief for injury allegedly 
flowing from specific applications of the program; nor have 
they attempted to show that as applied in identified situa-
tions the MBE provision violated the constitutional or stat-
utory rights of any party to this case.71 In these circum-
71 In their complaint, in order to est~bli:sh :;tanding to challenge the 
validity of the program, petitioner:; alleged as "I s]pecific example:;" of 
economic injury three in~tance;:; where one of t.heir number a:<:;ertedly 
would have been awarded a public work:; contract but for enforcement. ot 
.. 
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stances, given a reasonable construction and in light of its 
projected administration, if we find the MBE program on its 
f~ to b~ree of constj!;utional defects, it must be uph~ld as 
within congressional pom Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 
(1974); Fortson v. Secretary of State of Georgia, 379 U. S. 
433, 438-439 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 
U. S. 500, 515 (1964); see United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 
17, 20-24 (1960). 
Our review of the regulations and guidelines governing ad-
ministration of the MBE provision reveals that Congress 
enacted the program as a strictly remedial measure; more-
over, it is a remedy that functions prospectively, in the 
manner of an injunctive decree. Pursuant to the administra-
tive program, grantees and their prime contractors are re-
quired to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBEs; 
they are required to provide technical assistance as needed, to 
lower or waive bonding requirements where feasible, to so-
licit the aid of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, 
the Small Business Administration or other sources for as-
sisting MBEs to obtain required working capital, and to give 
guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process. Supra, 
at 16--17. The program assumes that grantees who undertake 
these efforts in good faith will obtain at least 10% participa-
tion by minority business enterprises. It is recognized that, 
to achieve this target, contracts will be awarded to available, 
qualified, bona fide MBEs even though they are not the low-
est competitive bidders, so long as their higher bids, when 
challenged, are found to reflect merely attempts to cover costs 
inflated by the present effects of prior disadvantage and dis-
crimination. Supra, at 18- 19. There is available to the 
grantee a provision authorized by Congress for administrative 
the MBE provbion. Petitioners requested only de<'laratory !md injunctive 
relief again:;t. continued enforcement of the MBE provi.sion; they did not 
seek any remedy for the,.:e .specific instance::; of ws.sertedly unalwful dis-
crimination. App. 12a-13a, 17a-19a . 
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waiver on a case-by-case basis should there be a demonstratiod 
that, despite affirmative efforts, this level of participation can-
not be achieved without departing from the objectives of the 
program. Supra, at 17-18. There is also an administrative 
mechanism, including a complaint procedure, to ensure that 
only bona fide MBEs are encompassed by the remedial pro-
gram, and to prevent unjust participation in the program by 
those minority firms whose access to public contracting op-
portunities is not impaired by the effects of pdor discrimi-
nation. Supra, at 19-20. 
(1) 
As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in 
the remedial context the must act in a wholly 
"color-blind" fashion. Swann v. Charlotte-Mec~g 
Board of Education, 402 , 18-21 1971), we rejected 
this argument in considering a court-formulated school de-: 
segration remedy on the basis that examination of the racial 
composition of student bodies was an unavoidable startmg 
point and that racially based attendance assignments were 
permissible so long as no absolute racial balance of each 
school was required. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 4i 
(1971), citing Stpann, we observed that "[i]n this remediai 
process, steps will almost invariably require that students be 
assigned 'differently because of their race.' . . . Any other 
approach would freeze the status quo tha.t is the very target 
of all desegregation processes." (Citations omitted.) And 
in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43 
(1971), we invalidated a state law that forbade assignment 
of any student on account of race because it foreclosed imple-
mentation of desegregation plans that were designed to rem· 
edy constitutional violations. We held that "[j]ust as the 
tace of students must be considered in determining whether a 
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be 
considered in formulating a remedy." 402 u. s., at 46. 
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In these school desegregation C.!!,.seS we dealt with the 
authority of a fi<ieral court to formulate a remedy for uncon-
stitutional racial discrimination. However, the authority of 
a court to incorporate racial criteria into a remedial decree 
also extends to statutory violations. Where federal anti-
discrimination laws have been violated, an equitable remedy 
may in the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic factor. 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) ; 
see International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U. S. 405 (1975). In another setting, we have held that a 
state may employ racial criteria that are reasonably necessary 
to assure compliance with federal voting rights legislation, 
even though the state action does not entail the remedy of a 
constitutional violation. United Jewish Organizations of 
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 147- 165 (1977) 
(opinion of WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and 
STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 180-187 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting on 
other grounds). 
When we have discussed the remedial powers of a federal 
court, we have been alert to the limitation that "[t]he power 
of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and 
state governmental entities is not plenary. . . . [A] federal 
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the 
nature and extent of the ... violation." Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quot-
ing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974), and Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed·ucation, supra, 402 
U. S., at 16). 
Here we deal not wi h he limited remedial powers of 
fe~leral .£_ourt, ut with the broad rem 1a powers o Con ress. 
It is fundamental tha m no organ overnment does 
there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than 
in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with 
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well as to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not 
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with 
existing federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination 
provisions, but also, where Congress has authority to declare 
certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, authorize and A 
induce state action to avoid such conduct. Supra, at 23- 27. 
(2) 
A more specific challenge to the MBE program is the 
charge that it impermissibly deprives nonminority businesses 
of access to at least some portion of the government con-
tracting opportunities generated by the Act. It must be con-
ceded that by its objective of remedying the historical impair-
ment of access, the MBE provision can have the effect of' 
awarding some contracts to MBEs which otherwise might be 
awarded to other businesses, who may themselves be innocent 
of any prior discriminatory actions. But no one has a con-
stitutional right to be awarded a public works contract. Fail-
ure of nonminority firms to receive certain contracts is, of 
course, an incidental consequence of the program, not part 
of its objective; similarly, past impairment of minority-firm 
access to public contracting opportunities may have been an 
incidental consequence of "business-as-usual" by public con-
tracting agencies and among prime contractors. 
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that 
it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms. 
When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy 
to cure the effects of prior discrimination , such "a sharing 
of the urden" by innocent parties is not impermissible. 
Franks, supra, a '17; see Albemarle Paper Co. , supra; United 
Je'wish Organization, supra. The actual "burden" shouldered· 
by nomninority firms is relatively light in this connection 
when we consider the scope of this public works program as' 
compared with overall construction contracting opportuni-
.. 
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ties.72 Moreover, although we may assume that the com-
plaining parties are innocent of any discriminatory conduct, 
it was within congressional power to act on the assump-
tion that in the past some nonminority businesses may 
have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the 
virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting 
opportunities. 
.(3) 
:Another challenge to the validity of the MBE program 
is the assertion that it is underinclusive--that it limits its 
benefit to specified minority groups rather than extending its 
remedial objectives to all businesses whose access to govern-
ment contracting is impaired by the effects of disadvantage 
or discrimination. Such an extention would, of course, be 
appropriate for Congress to provide; it is not a function for 
the courts. 
Even in this context, the well-established concept that a. 
legislature may take one step at a time to remedy only part 
of a broader problem is not without relevance. See Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). We are not reviewing a 
federal program that seeks to confer a prefetTed status upon a 
nondisadvantaged minority or to give special assistance to 
only one of several groups established to be similarly disad-
vantaged minorities. Even in such a setting, the Congress is 
not without a certain authority. See, e. g., Personnel Admin-
istrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979) ; 
12 The Court of Appeals relied upon Department of Commerce sta--
tistics to calculate that the $4.2 billion in federal grants conditioned upon 
complinnce with the MBE provision amounted to about 2.5% of the tok'll 
of nearly $170 billion spent on construction m the Unitro St.a.tes during 
1977. Thus, the 10% minimum minority business participation contem-
plated by this program would account for only 0.25% of the a.nnua.l 
expenditure for construction work in the United States. Fullilove v. 
Kreps, 584 F . 2d 600, 607 (CA2 1978) • 
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Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
The Congress has not sought to give select minority groups 
a preferred standing in the construction industry, but has 
embarked on a remedial program to place them on a more 
equitable footing with respect to public contracting opportuni-
ties. There has been no showing in this case that Congress has 
inadvertently effected an invidious discrimination by ex-
cluding from coverage an identifiable minority group that 
has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimi-
nation equal to or greater than that suffered by the groups 
encompassed by the MBE program. It is not inconceivable 
that on very special facts a case might be made to challenge 
the congressional decision to limit MBE eligibility to the 
particular minority groups identified in the Act. See Vance 
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109-112 (1979); Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112, 240 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and 
MARSHALL, JJ.). But on this record we find no basis to hold 
that Congress is without authority to undertake the kind of 
limited experimental remedial effort represented by the MBE 
program. Congress, not the courts, has the heavy burden 
of dealing with a host of intractable economic and social 
problems. 
(4) 
It is also contended that the MBE program is overin-
clusive-that it bestows a benefit on businesses identified by 
racial or ethnic criteria which cannot be justified on the basis 
of competitive criteria or as a remedy for the present effects of 
identified prior discrimination. It is conceivable that a par-
ticular application of the program may have this effect; how-
ever, the peculiarities of specific applications are not before 
us in this case. We are not presented here with a challenge 
involving a specific award of a construction contract or the 
denial of a waiver request; such questions of specific appli-
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This does not mean that the claim of overinclusiveness 
is entitled to no consideration in the present case. The 
history of governmental tolerance of practices using racial or 
ethnic criteria for the purpose or with the effect of imposing 
an invidious discrimination must alert us to the deleterious 
effects of even benign racial or ethnic classifications when 
they stray from narrow remedial justifications.. Even in the 
context of a facial challenge such as is presented in this case, 
the MBE provision cannot pass muster unless, with due ac-
count for its administrative program, it provides a reasonable 
assurance that application of racial or ethnic criteria will be 
limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives of Congress 
and that misapplications of the program will be promptly 
and adequately remedied administratively. 
It. is significant that the administrative scheme provides for 
waiver and exemption. Two fundamental congressional as-
SUinptions underlie the MBE program: (1) that the present 
efff'<'ts of past discrimination have impaired the competitive 
position of businesses owned and controlled by members of 
minority groups; and (2) that affirmative efforts to eliminate 
barriers to minority-firm access, and to evaluate bids with 
adjustm<'llt for the present effects of past discrimination, 
would n.f'sure that 10% of the federal funds granted under 
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 would be ac-
coullt<'d for by contracts with available, qualified, bona fide 
minority business enterprises. Each of these assumptions 
may It<' rE'butted in the administrative process. 
The administrative program contains measures to effectuate 
the congrP:ssional objective of assuring legitimate participa-
tion by disadvantaged MBEs. Administrative definition 
has tightem·d some less definite aspects of the statutory iden-
tification of the minority groups encompassed by the pro-
gram. Then' is administrative scrutiny to identify and 
eliminate from participation in the program MBEs who are 
not "bona-fide" within the regulations and guidelines ; for 
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example, spurious minority-front entities can be exposed. A 
significant aspect of this surveillallCe is the complaint proce-
dure available for reporting "unjust participation by an enter-
prise or individuals in the MBE program." Supra, at 20. 
And even as to specific contract awards, waiver is available to 
avoid dealing with an MBE who is attempting to exploit the 
remedial aspects of the program by charging an unreasonable 
price, i. e., a price not attributable to the present effects of 
past discrimination. Supra, at 17-19. We must assume that 
Congress intended close scrutiny of false claims and prompt 
action on them. 
Grantees are given the opportunity to demonstrate that 
their best efforts will not succeed or have not succeeded in 
achieving the statutory 10%· target for minority firm partici-
pation within the limitations of the program's remedial ob-
jectives. In these circu.mstances a waiver or partial waiver is 
available once compliance has been demonstrated. A waiver 
may be sought and granted at any time during the contract-
ing process, or even prior to letting contracts if the facts 
warrant. 
Nor is the program defective because a 'vaiver may be 
sought only by the grantee and not by prime contractors 
who may experience difficulty in fulfilling contract obligations 
to assure minority participation. It may be administratively 
cumbersome, but the wisdom of concentrating responsibility 
at the grantee level is not for us to evaluate; the purpose is 
to allow the Economic Development Administration to main-
tain close supervision of the operation of the MBE provision. 
The administrative complaint mechanism allows for griev-
ances of prime contractors who assert that a grantee has failed 
to seek a waiver in an appropriate case. Finally, we note 
that where private parties, as opposed to governmeutal en-
tities, transgress the limitations inherent in the MBE pro-
gram, the possibility of constitutional violation is more re-
moved. See United Steelworkers of America v~ 443 
u.s. 193, 200 (1979). L/ 
78-1007-0PINION 
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK 37 
That the use of racial and ethnic criteria is premised 
on assumptions rebuttable in the administrative process gives 
reasonable assurance that application of the MBE program 
will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives con-
templated by Congress and that misapplications of the racial 
and ethnic criteria can be remedied. In relation to this facial 
challenge to the statute, doubts must be resolved in favor of 
the congressional judgment that this limited experiment is a 
necessary step to effectuate the mandate for equality of 
economic opportunity. As is appropriate for a pilot or ex-
perimental project, the MBE program is limited in extent and 
duration. This is significant in the sense that the jus-
tification for any remedial program lapses when it has ac-
complished its objectives, has proved unsuccessful, or has 
exhausted its appropriation; there is also the consideration 
that this relatively short-term remedial measure will be 
subject to reassessment and reevaluation by the Congress 
prior to any extension or reenactment.78 Miscarriages of ad-
ministration could have only a transitory economic impact on 
businesses not encompasssed by the program, and would not be 
irremediable. 
(5) 
Congress, after due consideration, perceived a pressing need 
to move forward with new approaches in the continuing effort 
to achieve the goal of equality of economic opportunity. In 
this effort, Congress has necessary latitude to try new tech-
niques such as the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria 
to accomplish remedial objectives; this especially so in pro-
grams where voluntary cooperation with remedial measures 
is induced by placing conditions on federal expenditures. 
73 Cf. GAO Report to the Congress, Minority Firms on Local Public 
Works Projects-Mixed Results, CED-79-9 (Jan. 16, 1979) ; U. S. Dept. 
of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Local Public Works 
Program Interim Report on 10 Percent Minority Business Enterprise 
Requirement (Sept. 1978). 
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rrhat the program may press the outer limits of congressional 
authority affords no basis for striking it down. 
Petitioners have mounted a facial challenge to a program 
developed by the politically responsive branches of Govern-
ment . For its part, the Congress must proceed only with 
programs narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives, subject 
to coutinuing evaluation and reassessment; administration 
of the programs must be vigiliant and flexible ; and, when 
such a program comes under judicial review, courts must be 
satisfied that the legislative objectives and projected adminis-
tration give reasonable assurance that the program will func-
tion within constitutional limitations. But as Justice Jack-
son observed in 1941: 74 
"The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed in 
its tasks only if the counsels of self-restraint urged most 
earnestly by members of the Court itself are humbly and 
faithfully heeded. After the forces of conservatism and 
liberalism, of radicalism and reaction , of emotion and of 
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process 
and averaged and come to rest in some compromise 
measure ... a decision striking it down closes an area 
of compromise in which conflicts have actually, if only 
temporarily, been composed. Each such decision takes 
away from our democratic federalism another of its 
defenses against domestic disorder and violence. The 
vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted for ninety years 
in the field of policy, has been its progressive closing of 
the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of 
our social and economic conflicts." 
Justice Jackson reiterated these thoughts shortly before his 
death in what was to be the last of his Godkin Lectures : 75 
"I have said that in these matters the Court must re-
74 R. H . Jack::;on, The Struggle for Judicial Suprcmi\C) 321 (1941 ). 
7 ~ R. H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American Sy::;tcm of 
Government (il-62 (1955). 
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spect the limitations on its own powers because judicial 
usurpation is to me no more justifiable and no more 
promising of permanent good to the country than any 
other kind. So I presuppose a Court that will not depart 
from the judicial process, will not go beyond resolving 
cases a11d controversies brought to it in conventional 
form, and will not consciously encroach upon the func-
tions of its coordinate branches." 
Because we are satisfied that the MBE porvision of the 
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 satisfies constitutional 
criteria, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.' 0 
Affirmed. 
76 Although the complaint aliPgrd ihat the MRE program violated sev-
eral fedrral ,.;latutCI', supra, n. 5, the only statutory argument urged upon 
ns is that tho :MBE provi:;ion is inconsist<'nt with title VI of the Civil 
Righs Act of 1964. We perceiv<' no inconsistency between the requirements 
of title VI and those of the MBE provision. To the extent any statu-
tory inconsistencirs might be asserted, the MBE provision-the later, 
more specific enactment-mwst be deemed to control. See, e. g., Morton 
v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Preise1· v. Rod1iguez, 411 
U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 
753, 758 (1961); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188-189 (1939). 
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APPENDIX 
,-r 1. Representative Mitchell's principal remarks, 123 Cong. 
Rec. Hl388-H1389 (Feb. 23, 1977), were as follows : 
"The history of public works projects, as a counter-
cyclical device, reveals that local government expenditures 
for projects create direct jobs and stimulate complemen-
tary expenditures in the material and supply market . ... 
"If public works projects are to have optimum effect 
on both the economy and the labor force, we must both 
trigger and target the public works bill. Estimates reveal 
that there is currently 35 percent unemployment in the 
minority construction sector and an estimated 20 percent 
of the complementary construction industries that are 
minority owned have dissolved in the midst of a depres-
sion in the minority business sector . ... 
"The Federal Government has not played its role in 
the quest for economic parity .... 
" ... In the process to parity the minority business sector 
should receive from 15-18 percent of the contract receipts, 
however, in fiscal year 1976 the minority business sector 
received less than 1 percent of the contract receipts of the 
Federal Government .... 
"I urge my colleagues to support my amendment and 
promote growth in the minority business community. I 
appeal to the consciousness of parity and not the vote of 
disparity in requesting that Members of this legislative 
body support my amendment to insure minority business 
participa.tion in the construction industry." 
~ 2. Representative Mitchell's introductory remarks, 123 
Cong. Rec. H1436-H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977), included the 
following: 
"Let me tell the Members how ridiculous it is not to· 
target for minority enterprises. We spend a great deal 
of Federal money under the SBA program creating, 
strengthening and supporting minority businesses and 
" 
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yet when it comes down to giving those minority busi· 
nesses a piece of the action, the Federal Government is 
absolutely remiss. All it does is say that, 'We will create 
you on the one hand and, on the other hand, we will deny 
you.' That denial is made absolutely clear when one 
looks at the amount of contracts let in any given fiscal 
year and then one looks at the percentage of minority 
contracts. The average percentage of minority contracts, 
of all Government contracts, in any given fiscal year is 
1 percent--1 percent .... 
"In the present legislation before us it seems to me 
that we have an excellent opportunity to begin to remedy 
this situation." 
' 3. The following colloquy occurred between Representative 
Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas, 123 Cong. Rec. 
H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977): 
"Rep. KAZEN: All right. What happens in the rural 
areas where there are no minority enterprises? Will the 
10 percent be held up in order to bring minority enter-
prises from somewhere else where there is no unemploy-
ment into a place where there is unemployment and there 
is no minority enterprise? 
"Rep. MITCHELL: In response to the gentleman's 
question, the answer is 'No.' 
"Rep. KAZEN: ... [W]here there are no minority 
enterprise contractors then this provision would not be 
in effect; am I correct? 
"Rep. MITCHELL: That is absolutely correct, and 
that is done by administrative action already on the books 
with all of the agencies. 
"Rep. KAZEN: Does the gentleman's amendment 
leave room for that type of discretion in the Secretary? 
"Rep. MITCHELL: I assume that it does. It would 
be my intent that it would because that is existing admin· 
istrative law." 
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tautly to promote a sense of economic equality in thi& 
Nation." 
~ 6. Senator Brooke's principal remarks, 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 
(Mar. 10, 1977), were as follows: 
"It is proper that we target this $4 billion on areas of 
greatest need: the inner city, our depressed rural com-
munities, and other areas where unemployment has been 
particula.rly severe and prolonged. And it is important 
that we focus on the unemployment experiences of dif-
ferent ethnic and racial groups in designing a sensitive 
and responsive jobs program. For example, among 
minority citizens, the average rate of unemployment runs 
double that among white citizens ... . 
"Of course, EDA will refine its funding procedures 
based on its experiences with the last public works jobs 
program. But another way to insure that the moneys 
are properly targeted is to set aside a reasonable percent-
age of the public works jobs funds to go to qualified 
minority contractors. 
"This is entirely proper, appropriate and necessary. 
It is necessary because minority businesses have received 
only 1 percent of the Federal contract dollar, despite 
repeated legislation, Executive orders and regulations· 
mandating affirmative efforts to include minority con-
tractors in the Federal contracts pool. 
"It is a proper concept. . . . [T]he Federal Govern-
ment, for the last 10 years in programs like SBA's 8 (a) 
set-asides, and the Railroad Revitalization Act's minority 
resources centers, to name a few, has accepted the set-
aside concept as a legitimate tool to insure participation 
by hitherto excluded or unrepresented groups. 
"It is an appropriate concept, because minority busi-
nesses' work forces are principally drawn from residents 
of communities with severe and chronic unemployment. 
44 
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With more business, these firms can hire even more 
minority citizens ...• 
"Many have expressed concern about the impact of this 
amendment as a limitation on contracting in areas where 
there are few minorities. But this amendment is not a 
limitation. Rather, it is designed to facilitate greater 
equality in contracting. This amendment provides a 
rule-of-thumb which requires much more than the vague 
"good-faith efforts" language which currently hampers 
our efforts to insure minority participation. 
"One final objection to this set-aside may be that it 
will cause undue delays in beginning these vital public 
works projects. In fact, EDA already maintains a roster 
for each State of capable and qualified minority enter-
prises who are ready and willing to work. These firms. 
are capable of competitive bidding, and need the financiaL 
support which this potential level of Federal contracting. 
will guarantee." 
~ 7.. The Subcommittee stated in part, H. R. Rep. No. 94-468~ 
p. 28 (1975): 
"According to the testimony received from Federal pro-
curing agencies, the subcommittee is of the opinion that 
there has been inadequate effort to identify minority 
businesses and match their capabilities with Federal pro-
curement requirements. There has been a lack of 'out-
reach' to the minority business community to locate 
potential minority contractors and yet some agencies have 
informed the subcommittee that there are very few 
minority businesses which can perform the specialized 
work required by those agencies in the performance of 
their contracts. The subcommittee wonders how such 
statements can be honestly made when there has not 
.been a sufficient effort to identify minority businesses in 
the first instance." 
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~ 8. The EDA guidelines, at 2-7, provide in relevant part : 
"The primary obligation for carrying out the 10% MBE 
participation requirement rests with EDA Grantees ...• 
The Grantee and those of its contractors which will make 
subcontracts or purchase substantial supplies from other 
firms (hereinafter referred to as 'prime contractors') must 
seek out all available bona fide MBE's [sic] and make 
every effort to use as many of them as possible on the 
project. 
"An MBE is bona fide if the minority group ownership 
interests are real and continuing and not created solely 
to meet 10%· MBE requirements. For example, the 
minority group owners or stockholders should possess 
control over management, interest in capital and interest 
in earnings commensurate with the percentage of owner-
ship on which the claim of minority ownership status is 
based .... 
"An MBE is available if the project is located in the 
market area of the MBE and the MBE can perform 
project services or supply project materials at the time 
they are needed. The relevant market area depends on 
the kind of services or supplies which are needed. . . . 
EDA will require that Grantees and prime contractors 
engage MBE's [sic] from as wide a market area as is eco-
nomically feasible. 
"An MBE is qualified if it can perform the services or 
supply the materials that are needed. Grantees and prime 
contractors will be expected to use MBE's [sic] with 
less experience than available nonminority enterprises 
and should expect to provide technical assistance to 
MBE's [sic] as needed. Inability to obtain bonding will 
ordinarily 11ot disqualify an MBE. Grantees and prime 
contractors are expected to help MBE's [sic] obtain bond-
ing, to include MBE's [sic] in any overall bond or to 
waive bonding where feasible. The Small Business Ad-
46 
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ministration (SBA) is prepared to provide a 90% guaran-
tee for the bond of any MBE participating in an LPW 
[local public works] project. Lack of working capital 
will not ordinarily disqualify an MBE. SBA is prepared 
to provide working capital assistance to any MBE par-
ticipating in an LPW project. Grantees and prime con-
tractors are expected to assist MBE's [sic] in obtaining 
working capital through SBA or otherwise. 
" ... [E]very Grantee should make sure that it knows 
the names, addresses and qualifications of all relevant 
MBE's [sic] which would include the project location 
in their market areas. . . . Grantees should also hold 
prebid conferences to which they invite interested 
contractors and representatives of ... MBE support 
organizations. 
"Arrangements have been made through the Office of 
Minority Business Enterprise . . . to provide assistance 
to Grantees and prime contractors in fulfilling the 10% 
MBE requirement .... 
"Grantees and prime contractors should also be aware 
of other support which is available from the Small Busi-
ness Administration .... 
" ... [T]he Grantee must monitor the performance of 
its prime contractors to make sure that their commitments 
to expend funds for MBE's [sic] are being fulfilled . .. . 
Grantees should administer every project tightly .... " 
1T 9. The EDA guidelines, at 13-15, provide in relevant part: 
"Although a provision for waiver is included under 
this section of the Act, EDA will only approve a waiver 
under exceptional circumstances. The Grantee must 
demonstrate that there are not sufficient, relevant, quali-
fied minority business enterprises whose market areas 
include the project location to justify a waiver. The 
Grantee must detail in its waiver request the efforts the 
Grantee and potential co~tractors have exerted to locate 
• 
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'and enlist MBE's [sic]. The request must indicate the 
specific MBE's [8ic] which were contacted and the reason 
·each MBE was not used. . . • 
"Only the Grantee can request a waiver. . . . Such a 
waiver request would ordinarily be made after the initial 
'bidding or negotiation procedures proved unsuccessful. ... 
"[A] Grantee situated in an area where the minority 
·population is very small may apply for a waiver before 
·requesting bids on its project or projects .... " 
1f 10 .. The EDA ·technical bulletin, at 1, provides the following 
aefinitions: 
"a) Negro-An individual of the black race of African 
origin. 
'"b) ·spanish•speaking-An individual of a Spanish-
speaking culture and origin or parentage. 
'"c) Oriental-An individual of a culture, origin or par-
entage traceable to the areas south of the Soviet Union, 
East of Iran, inclusive of islands adjacent thereto, and 
out to the Pacific including but not limited to Indonesia, 
Indochina, Malaysia, Hawaii and the Philippines. 
"d) Indian-An individual having origins in any of the 
original people of North America and who is recognized as 
an Indian by either a tribe, tribal organization or a suita-
ble authority in the community. (A suitable authority in 
the community may be: educational institutions, religious 
organizations, or state agencies.) 
"e) Eskimo-An indivdiual having orgins in any of the 
original peoples of Alaska. 
"f) Aleut-An individual having orgins in any of the 
original peoples of the Aleutian Islands." 
1f 11. The EDA technical bulletin, at 19, provides in relevant 
part: 
"Any person or organization with information indicat-
ing unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals 
48 
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in the MBE program or who believes that the MBE par-
ticipation requirement is being improperly applied should 
contact the appropriate EDA grantee and provide a 
detailed statement of the basis for the complaint. 
"Upon receipt of a complaint, the grantee should 
attempt to resolve the issues in dispute. In the event 
the grantee requires assistance in reaching a determina-
tion, the grantee should contact the Civil Rights Specialist 
in the appropriate Regional Office. 
"If the complainant believes that the grantee has not 
satisfactorily resolved the issues raised in his complaint, 
he may personally contact the EDA Regional Office." 
·.f. . 
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Mr. Justice White 
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No. 78-1007 4~ 
W-~-4/-~ H. Earl Fullilove et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary 
of Commerce of the United 
States, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. 
[May -, 1980] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opm1on of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to consider a facial constitutional 
challenge to a requirement in a congressional spending pro-
gram that, absent an administrative waiver, 10% of the fed-
eral funds granted for local public works projects must be used 
by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies 
from businesses O\med and controlled by members of stat-
utorily identified minority groups. 441 U.S. 960. 
I 
In May 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, which amended 
the Local Public 'Vorks Capital Development and Investment 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94- 369, 90 Stat. 999. The 1977 amend-
ments authorized an additional $4 billion appropriation for 
federal grants to be made by the Secretary of Commerce, 
acting through the Economic Development Administration 
(EDA), to state and local governmental entities for use in 
local public works projects. Among the changes made was 
· the addition of the provision that has become the focus of this 
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as the "min6rity business enterprise" or "MBE" provision. 
requires that: 1 
"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines 
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any 
local public works project unless the applicant gives 
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended 
for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this 
paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means 
a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by 
minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned 
business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which 
- is owned by minority group members. For the pur-
poses of the preceding sentence, minority group mem-
bers are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskomos, and 
Aleuts." 
In late May 1977, the Secretary promulgated regulations 
governing administration of the grant program which were 
amended two months later.2 In August 1977, the EDA 
issued guidelines supplementing the statute and regulations 
with respect to minority business participation in local public 
works grants,8 and in October 1977, the EDA issued a tech-
nical bulletin promulgating detailed instructions and infor-
mation to assist grantees and their contractors in meeting the 
10% MBE requirement.4 
1 91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed., Supp. I) ~ 6705 (f) (2) . 
2 42 Fed. Reg. 27432 (1977), as amended by 42 Fed . R eg. 35822 (1977) ; 
13 CFR part 317 (1978). 
8 U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic D evelopment Administra-
tion, Local Public Works Program, Round II, Guidelines For 10% Minority 
Businrss Participation In LPW Gmnt s (1977) ; App. 156a-167a .. 
4 U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Adminil:> tra-
tion, EDA l'vlinority Enterprise (MBE) Technical Bulletin (Additional 
Assistance and Information Available to Grantees and Their Contractors 
In Meetjng The 10% MBE Requirement) (1977); App. 129a-155a. 
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On November 30, 1977, petitioners filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin 
enforcement of the MBE provision. Named as defendants 
were the Secretary of Commerce, as the program administra-
tor, and the State and City of New York, as actual and pot-en-
tial project grantees. Petitioners are several associations of 
construction contractors and subcontractors, and a firm en-
gaged in heating, ventilation and air conditioning work. 
Their complaint alleged that they had sustained economic 
injury due to enforcement of the 10% MBE requirement and 
that the MBE provision on its face violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thr equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, and various statutory antidiscrimination 
pro,·isions.~ 
Aft-er a hearing held the day the complaint was filed, the 
District Court denied a requested temporary restraining order 
and scheduled the matter for an expedited hearing on the 
merits. On December 19. 1977, the District Court issued a 
memorandum opinion upholding the validity of the MBE pro-
gram and denying the injunctive relief sought. Fullilove v. 
Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (SDNY 1977) . 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed. 584 F. 2d GOO (CA2 1978). holding that "even 
under the most exacting standard of review the MBE pro-
vision passes constitutional muster." Id., at 603. Consid-
ered in the context of many years of govemmental efforts 
to remedy past racial and ethnic discrimination. the court 
found it "difficult to imagine" any purpose for the program 
other than to remedy such discrimination. Id., at 605. In 
5 16 Stat. 144, 42 U. S. C. § 1981; 17 Stat. 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1983; 
12 S1at. 284, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U. S. C.§ 1985; title VI , § 601 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stnt. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d; title VII , § 701 et 
seq. of the Civil R.ights Act of 1964, 78 Stnt. 253, ns nmended, 42 U.S. C. 
§ 2000e et seq. 
' ' 
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its view, a number of factors contributed to the legitimacy 
of the MBE provision, most sig11ificant of which was the 
narrowed focus and limited extent of the statutory and 
administrative program, in size, ill1pact and duration, id., 
at 607-608; the court looked also to the holdings of other 
courts of appeals and district courts that the MBE program 
was constitutional, id., at 608-609.6 It expressly rejected 
petitioners' contention that the 10% MBE requirement vio-
lated the equal protection guaralltees of the Constitution.7 
584 F. 2d, at 609. 
II 
A 
The MBE provJSIOil was enacted as part of the Public 
Works Employment Act 9f 1977, which made variol!S amend-
ments to title I of the Local Public '~Torks Capita] Develop-
ment and Investment Act of 1976. The 1976 Act was in-
tended as a short-term measure to alleviate the problem 
of national unemployment and to stimulate the national 
economy by assisting state and local governments to build 
6 Ohio C011tractors Asliociatio-n v. Economic Development Administra-
tion, 580 F. 2d 213 (CA6 1978); Constructors Association v. Kreps, 573 
F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978); Rhode Island Chapter, Associated General Con-
tractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (DRI 1978); Associated General Con-
·tractors v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-4218 (Kan. Dec. 19, 1977) ; 
Carolinas Branch, Associated General Contractors Y. Kreps, 442 F. Supp. 
392 (SC 1977); Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. Economic Developrnent Admin-
istration, 452 F. Supp. 1013 (SD Ohio 1977) ; Montaua Co11tractors Asso-
ciation v. Secretary of Contmerce, 439 F. Supp. 1331 (Mont. 1977); 
Florida East Coast Chapter v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-8351 (SD 
Fla. Nov. 3, 1977); but see Associated General Contractors v. Secrr•tary 
of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (CD Cal. 1977), Yacated nnd remanrlrd 
for consideration of mootne~:o, 438 U. S. 909 (1978), on rPmand 459 Y . 
Supp. 766 (CD Cal.), appeal docketed su.b nom. Armilitead "· A~sociated 
General Contractors of California, No. 78-1107. 
• 7 Both the Court of Appeals and the Di~trict Comt n·jcdcrl petitioners• 
nrious statutory argument~ without extended dbcu:;:;ion. 584 F. 2d, at 
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needed public facilities. 8 To accomplish these objectives, 
the Congress authorizPd th<-> Secretary of Commerce, acting 
through the Economic Development Administration. to make 
grants to state and local govPrnments for construction, reno-
vation, repair or other improvement of local puulic works 
projects.9 The 1076 Act placed a number of restrictions 
on project eligibilty designed to assure ~ federal momes 
were targeted to accomplish the legislative purposes.' 0 1 t 
establi shed criteria to determine grant priorities and to ap-
portion federal funds among political jurisclictions. 11 Those 
criteria directed grant. funds toward areas of high unemploy-
ment.12 The statute authorized the appropriation of up to 
$2 billion for a period ending in September 1977; 1 3 this ap-
propriation was soon consumed by grants made under the 
program. 
Early in 1977, Congress began consideration of expanded 
a.ppropriations and amendments to the grant program. 
Under administration of the 1976 appropriation , referred to 
as "Round I" of the local public works program, applicants 
seeking some $25 billion in grants had competed for the $2 ___r- ) 
billion in available funds; of nearly 25,000 applications,.(kSijoN/y ,So.mot:.. 
~2,000 were granted.11 The results provoked widespread 
concern for the fairness of the allocation process.15 Because 
s H. R. Rep. No. 94-1077, p. 2 (1976) . The bill di;:;cussed in this report 
was accepted by the Conft•rence Committee in pr€'fl:'rence to the Senate 
version . S. Conf. Hep. No. 94-939, p. 1 (1!:176); H. R. Conf. Hep . 
No. 94-1260, p. 1 (1976). 
9 90 Stat. 999, 42 U . S. C. § 6702. 
10 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S.C. § 6705. 
11 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U.S. C. § 6707. 
12 90 Stat. 1001, 421i . S.C.§ 6707 (c). 
u 90 Stat. 1002, 42 U. S. C. § G710. The actual appropriation of the 
full amount. aut.l10rizcd wa,; made seYeral week:; later. Pub. L. No. 94-447, 
90 Stat. 1497. 
14 123 Co11g. Rec. 81355 (Jan. 25, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph) . 
1 5 See, e. g., Hearing::: on H. R. 11 and related bilb before the Subcom-
mittee on Economic Development of the House Committee on Public 
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the 1977 Act would authorize the appropriation of an addi-
tional $4 billion to fund "Round II" of the grant program, 16 
the congressional hearings and debates concerning the amend-
ments focused primarily on the politically sensitive problems 
of priority and geographic distribution of grants under the 
supplemental appropriation.17 The result of this attention 
was inclusion in the 1977 Act of provisions revising the alloca-
tion criteria of the 1976 legislation. Those provisions, how-
ever, retained the underlying objective to direct funds into 
areas of high unemployment.18 The 1977 Act also added new 
restrictions on applicants seeking to qualify for federal 
grants; 19 among these was the MBE provision . 
The origin of the provision was an amendment to the House 
version of the 1977 Act, H. R. 11, offered on the floor of the 
House on Feb. 23, 1977 by Representative Mitchell of Mary-
land.20 As offered, the amendment provided: 21 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant 
shall be made under this Act for any local public works 
project unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, 
materials, and supplies which will be used in such project 
are procured from minority business enterprises. For 
purposes of this paragraph, the term 'minority business 
enterprise' means a business at least 50 percent of which 
is owned by minority group members or, in case or 
publicly owned businesses, at Ieast 51 percent of the stock 
Works aud Tran:;portation, 95th Cong., bt Ses::;. (1977) ; H . n:. Rep. 
No. 95-20 (Hl77); S. Rep. No. 95-38 (1977) . 
1o 91 Stat. 119, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed., Supp. I) § 6710. The actual 
appropriation of the full authorized amount was made the l;'ame day. 91 
Stat. 123. 
17 E. g., Hearings, cited, at n. 14, supra; 123 Cong. Rec. Bl401- Hl462' 
(Feb. 24, 1977); 123 Cong. Rec . 83851- 83927 (l\1ar . 10, 1977). 
1 ~ 91 Stat . 117, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed. Supp.l) § 6707. 
1 9 91 Stat .. 116, 42 U. S. C. (Hl76 ed. Supp. I) § 6705. 
20 123 Con g. Rec. H1388 (Feb. 23~ 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell) .. 
:u Fd., at H1389' .. 
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of which is owned by minority group members. For the 
purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group mem-
bers are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and 
Aleuts." 
The sponsor stated that the objective of the amendment 
was to direct funds into the minority business community, a 
sector of the economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but 
which, on the basis of past experience with government pro-
curement programs, could not be expected to benefit signifi-
cantly from the public works program as then formulated.~~ 
He cited the marked statistical disparity that in fiscal year 
1976 less than I % of all federal procurement was concluded 
with minority business enterprises, although minorities com-
prised 15-18% of the population. 28 When the amendment 
was put forward during debate on H. R. 11,21 Rep. Mitchell 
reiterated the need to ensure that minority firms would 
obtain a fair opportunity to share in the benefits of this 
government program.25 
The amendment was put forward not as a new concept, 
but rather one building upon prior administrative practice. 
In his introductory remarks, the sponsor rested his proposal 
squarely on the ongoing program under § 8 (a) of the Small 
22 !d., at Hl388-Hl389. Represent:ltive J\'litchell's principal remarks 
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, , 1. 
23 !d., at H1389. 
24 123 Cong. Rec. H1435 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. J\fitchell). 
As reintroduced, the first ::;entence of the nmendment. was modified to 
provide: 
"Not"·ith:::tanding any other provision of Jaw, no grant <;hall be made under 
this Act. for any local public works project unless at least 10 per centum 
of the dollar volume of each contract :shall be :set aside for minority busi-
ness enterprise and, or, unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, 
materials, and supplies which wilJ be used in such project are procured 
from minority business enterprises." 
25 !d., a.t. H1435-H1437. Repreo;entMive l\Jitchell's remarks are set out, 
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Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2 (8), 72 Stat. 389, 
which, as will become evident, served as a model for the 
administrative program developed to enforce the MBE 
provision: 26 
"The first point in opposition will be that you canuot 
have a set-aside. ·wen, Madam Chairman, we have been 
doing this for the last 10 years in Government. The 8-A 
set-aside under SBA has been tested in the courts more 
than 30 times and has been found to be legitimate and 
bona fide. We are doing it in this bilL" 
Although the proposed MBE provision on its face ap-
peared maudatory, requiring compliance with the 10 o/c· mi-
nority participation requirement "[n]otwithstamling auy 
other provision of law," its sponsor gave assurances that 
existing administrative practice would ensure flexibility in 
admi11istration if, with respect to a particular project, com-
pliance with the 10%- requirement proved illfeasible. 27 
Representative Roe of New Jersey then suggested a change 
of language expressing the twin intentions (1) that the federal 
administrator would have discretion to waive the 10% require-
ment where its application was not feasible. and (2) that the· 
grantee would be mandated to achieve at least 10% participa-. 
tion by minority businesses unless infeasibility was demon-
strated.28 He proposed as a substitute for the first sentence 
of the amendment the language that eventually was enacted: 2~ 
"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines 
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any 
local public works project unless the applicant gives satis-
factory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per-
2G 123 Cong. Ree. H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of RPp . 1\fit ehell) . 
27 !d., nt, Hl437- HI438. A reYea ling colloquy between R epresent ative 
Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas is set. out in the Appendix 
to this opinion, ~ 3. 
28 123 Cong. Rec. Hl438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Roe). 
2 ~ ·lhid: 
,;. . 
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cent of the amount of each grant shall be expended for 
minority business enterprises." 
The sponsor fully accepted the suggested clarification be-
cause it retained the directive that the initial burden of com-
pliance v,;ould fall on the grantee. That allocation of burden 
was necessary because, as he put it, "every agency of the 
Government has tried to figure out a way to avoid doing this 
very thing. Believe me, these bureaucracies can come up 
with 10,000 ways to avoid doing it." so 
Other supporters of the MBE amendment echoed the spon-
sor's concern that a number of factors, difficult to isolate or 
quantify, seemed to impair access by minority businesses 
to public contracting opportunities. Representative Con-
yers of T spoke of the frustration of the existing situa-
tion, in which, due to the intricacies of the bidding process 
and through no fault of their own, minority contractors and 
businessmen were unable to gain access to government con-
tracting opportunities.31 
Representative Biaggi of New York then spoke to the need 
for the amendment to "promote a sense of economic equality 
in the Nation." He expressed the view that without the 
amendment, "this legislation may be potentially inequitable 
to minority businesses and workers" in that it would per-
petuate the historic practices that have precluded minority 
businesses from effective participation in public contracting 
opportunities.8 2 The amendment was accepted by the House.8 8 
Two weeks later, the Senate considered S. 427. its package 
of amendments to the Local Public Works Capital Develop-
llO !d. (remarks of Rep. Mitchell). 
lll !d., at H14-10 (remnrks of Rep . Conyers) . Represenative Conyers 
remarks are set out, in part, in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 4. 
az 123 Cong. Rec. H1440-H1441 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. 
Biaggi). Reprf'sentative Biaggi's remarks are set out, in part, in the 
Appendix to this opinion, , 5. 
88 !d., at H1441. 
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ment and Investment Act of 1976. At that time Senator 
Brooke of Massachusetts introuuced an MBE amendment, 
worded somewhat differently than the House version, but 
aimed at achieving the same objectives.34 His statement 
in support of the 10ro requirement reiterated and summarized 
the various expressions on the House side that the amend-
ment was necessary to ensure that minority bush1esses were 
not deprived of access to the government contracting oppor-
tunities generated by the public works program.M5 
The Senate adopted the amendment without uebate.80 The 
Conference Committee, called to resolve differences between 
the House and Senate versions of the Public \Vorks Employ-
ment Act of 1977, adopted the language approved by the 
House for the MBE provision.37 The Conference Reports 
added only the comment, 11This provision shall be dependent 
on the availability of minority business enterprises located 
in the project area." ss 
34 123 Cong. Rec. S3909-S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). The first par;Jgraph of Senator Brooke'~ formulntion wns iden-
tical to the Yer~ion originally offered by Repre::;entath·e Mitchell, quoted 
in the te:\i. at pp. 6--7, supra. A second paragraph of Senator Brooke's 
amendment. prO\·ided: 
"This section shall not be interpreted to defund projects with less than 10 
percent minority participation in areas with minority population of less 
than 5 percent. In that event, the correct level of minority participation 
will be predetermined by the Secretary in ronsultation with EDA and 
based upon its lists of qualified minority contractors and its solicitation 
of competitive bid::; from all minority firms on tho::;e lists." 123 Coug. 
Hec. S3910 (~Ja.r. 10, 1977). 
85 I d. , at S3910. Senator Brooke's principal remarks are set out in the 
Appendix to this opinion, ~ 6. 
aG !d., at. S3910. 
87 S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-110, p. 11 (1977); H. R Conf. Rep. No. 95-
230, p. 11 (1977) 0 
88 Ibid. The Conferenee Committee bill was agre<:'d to by the Senate, 
123 Cm1g. Rec. S6755-S6757 (Apr. 29, 1977), and by the House, 123 
Con g. Rec. H3920--H3935 (l\iay 3, 1977), and wa:s :;igned into hlw on 
May 3, 1977. 
. -~ 
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The uevice of a 10% MBE participation requirement, sub-
ject to administrative waiver, was thought to be required 
that to assure minority business participation; otherwise it 
was thought repetition of the prior experience could be ex-
pected, with participation by minority business accounting 
for an inordinately small percentage of government contract-
ing. The causes of this disparity were perceived as involving 
the longstanding existence and maintenauce of barriers im-
pairing access by minority enterprises to public coutracting 
opportunities, or sometimes as involving more direct dis-
crimination, but not as relating to lack- as Senator Brooke 
put it-"of capable and qualified minority enterprises who 
are ready and willing to work." sP In the words of its spon-
sor, the MBE provision was "designed to begin to redress 
this grievance that has been extant for so long." 40 
B 
The legislative objectives of the MBE prov1s10n must be 
considered against the background of ongoillg efforts directed 
toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of 
economic opportunity. 
The sponsors of the MBE provision in the House and the 
Senate expressly linked the provision to the existing adminis-
trative programs promoting minority opportunity in govern-
ment procurement, particularly those related to § 8 (a) of the 
Small Business Act. of 1958.41 Section 8 (a) delegates to the 
SBA an authority and an obligation "whenever it determines 
such action is necessary" to enter into contracts with any 
procurement agency of the Feueral Government to furnish 
required goods or services, and, in turn, to enter into sub-
contracts with small businesses for the performance of such 
~ 9 123 Cong. Rec. 83910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remark of Sen. Brooke) . 
~ 0 123 Cong. Rec. H1440 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remark~ of Rep. Mit.chell) . 
41 123 Cong. Rec. Hl437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell); 
123 Cong. Rec. 83910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen . Brooke) . 
.. , ... · 
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contracts. This authority lay dormant for a decade. Com-
mencing in 1968, however, the SBA was directed by the Presi-
dent ~ 2 to develop a program pursuant to its ~ 8 (a) au-
thority to assist small business concerns owned and controlled 
by "socially or economically disadvantaged" persons to achieve 
a competitive position in the economy. 
At the time the MBE provision was enacted, the regula-
tions governing the § 8 (a) program defined "social or eco-
nomic disadvantage" as follows: 48 
"An applicant concern must be owned and controlled 
by one or more persons who have been deprived of the 
opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive posi-
tion in the economy because of social or economic disad-
vantage. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, 
social, chronic economic circumstances or background, or 
other similar cause. Such persons include, but are not 
limited to, black Americans, American Indians, Spanish-
Americans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts .... '~ 
The guidelines accompanying these regulations provided that 
a minority business could not be maintained in the program, 
even when owned and controlled by members of the identified 
minority groups, if it appeared that the business had not been 
deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a com-
petitive position in the economy because of social or economic 
disadvantage.u 
42 Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order 
No. 11518, 3 CFR 907 (1966-1970 Comp.). 
4813 CFR § 124.8-1 {c)(1) (1977). 
H U. S. Small Business Administration, Office of Business Development, 
Section 8 (a) Program, Small Business Administration Standard Operat-
in Procedure 15- 16 (1976); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975) ("[T]he 
relevant rules and regulations require such applicant to identify with the 
disadvantages of his or her racial group generally, and that such dis-
advantages must have personally affected the applicant's ability to enter 
into the mainstream of the business community."); U. S. Small Busi-
ness Administration, Office of Minority Small Business and Capital Own-
• r. 
"18-IOO'l-OPINION 
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK 13 
As the Congress began consideration of the Public 1Vorks 
Employment Act of 1977, the House Committee on Small 
Business issued a lengthy report summarizing its activities) 
including its evaluation of the ongoing § 8 (a) program.45 
One chapter of the report, entitled "Minority Enterprise and 
Allied .Problems of Small Business," summarized a 1975 com-
mittee report of the same title dealing with this subject 
matter.46 The original report, prepared by the House Sub-
committee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise, 
observed: H 
16The subcommittee is acutely aware that the economic 
policies of this Nation must function within and be 
guided by our constitutional system which guarantees 
'equal protection of the laws.' The effects of past inequi-
ties stem,ming from racial prejudice have not remained 
in the past. The Congress has recognized the reality that 
past discriminatory practices have, to some degree, 
adversely affected our present ecmwmic system. 
"\Vhile minority persons comprise about 16 percent of 
the Nation's population, of the 13 million businesses in 
the United States, only 382,000, or approximately 3.0 
percent, are owned by minority individuals. The most 
recent data from the Department of Commerce also indi-
cates that the gross receipts of all businesses in this coun-
try totals about $2,540.8 billion, and of this amount only 
$16.6 billion, or about 0.65 percent was realized by minor-
ity business concerns. 
ership Development, MSB & COD Programs, Small Business Administra-
tion Standard Operating Procedure 20 (1979) ("[T]he social disadvantage 
of individuals, including those within the above-named [racial and ethnic] 
groups, shall be determined by SBA on a. case-by-c1-1se basis. 1\Jember-
ship alone in any group is not conclusive that an individual is socially 
disadvantaged."). 
45 H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791 (1977). 
46 !d., at 124-149. 
47 H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 1-2 (1975) • 
14 
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"These statistics are not the result of random chance. 
The presumption must be made that past discriminatory 
systems have resulted in present economic inequities. In 
order to dght this situation, the Congress has formulated 
certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially 
or economically disadvantaged persons to a level where 
they may effectively participate in the business main-
stream of our economy.* 
"*For the purposes of this report. the term 'minority' shall include 
only such minority indi,·iduals as are con,.;idered to be economically 
or socially di ::;n dnmtnged." ~s (Emphasis rt ddrcl .) 
The 1975 report gave particular attention to the§ 8 (a) pro-
gram, expressing disappointment with its limited effective~ 
ness.40 \Vith specific reference to government construction 
contracting, the report concluded, "there are substantial § 8 (a) 
opportunities in the area of Federal construction, but ... the 
practices of some agencies preclude the realization of that 
potential." "0 The subcommittee took "full notice .. , as 
evidence for its consideration" of reports submitted to the 
Congress by the General Accounting Office and by the U. S, 
48 Another chapter of the 1977 R eport of the Honse Committee on 
Small Businr:ss Slllllmarized a review of the SEA's Seeurity Boud Guar-
antee Progrmn, making specific reference to minority lm~ine~ participa-
tion in the construction industry: 
"The wry basic problem disclosed by the testimony is that., over the 
years, there has den·loped a business system which has traditionally ex-
cluded measurable minority pa.rticipation. In the past. more than the 
present, this tlYSfem of conducting business transaction~ overtly precluded 
minority input. (;urrently, we more often encounter a business system 
which is racially neutral on its face, but becau:;e of past overt. social and 
economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, 10 perpetuate 
these past inequities. Minorities, until recent!~·, have not. participated 
t.o any measurable ext1'nt, in our total bu::;ine,;::: 8~·;.tem generally, or in the 
const.ruction industry, in particular." H. R. RE'p. No. 94-1791, p . 182 
(1977), quoting from H. R. Hep. No. 94-840, p . 17 (1976). 
49 H. R. Hep. No. 94-468, pp. 28-30 (1975). The subcommittee's com-
ments are set. out, in part, in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 7. 
50 !d., at 29. 
" ~ .• 
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Commission on Civil Rights, which reflected a similar dissatis-
faction with the effectiveness of the § 8 (a) program.61 The 
Civil Rights Commission report discussed at some length the 
barriers encountered by mjnority businesses in gaining access 
to government eontracting opportunities at the federal, state 
and local levels. 52 Among the major difficulties confronting 
minority businesses were deficiencies in working capital, inabil-
ity to meet bonding requirements, disabilities caused by an 
inadequate "track record," lack of awareness of bidding oppor-
tunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, preselection 
before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of dis-
cretion by government procurement officers to disfavor 
minority businesses.53 
The subcommittee report also gave consideration to the 
operations of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise 
(OMBE), aJ1 agency of the Department of Commerce orga-
nized pursuant to Executive Orders fi4 to formulate and co-
ordinate federal efforts to assist the development of mi11ority 
businesses. The report concluded that OMBE efforts were 
"totally inadequate" to achieve its policy of increasing op-
portunities for subcontracting by minority businesses on 
public contracts. OMBE efforts were hampered by a "glaring 
lack of specific objectives which each prime contractor should 
be required to achieve," by a "lack of enforcement provisions,'Y 
and by a "lack of any meaningful monitoring system." 55 
Ll !d., at 11: U. S. General Acc01mt.ing Office, "Questionnble Effective-
ness of the § 8 (a) Pror11rement Program" (1975); U. S. Commission on 
Civil Rights, "Minorities and Women as Government Contractors" (1975). 
52 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, "l\Iinorities and Women aE Gov-
ernment Contra.ctors" 16-28, 8G-88 (1975). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Exec. Orclrr No. 11458, 3 CFR 779 (1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order 
No. 11625, 3 CFR. 616 (1971- 1975 Comp.). 
55 H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 32 (1975). For other congrc;;sionnl ob-
servntions with respect to the effe(·t of past di.~crimin~ltion on current. busi-
ness opportunities for minorities, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, p. 3 
(1972); H. R. Rep. No. 95-949, p. 8 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-1070, pp. 14-
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Against this backdrop of legislative ru1d administrative pro~ 
grams, it is inconceivable that Members of both Houses were 
not fully aware of the objectives of the MBE provision and 
of the reasons prompting its enactment. 
c 
Although the statutory MBE provision itself outlines only 
the bare bones of the federal program, it makes a 11umber of 
critical determinations: the decision to initiate a limited racial 
and ethnic preference; the specifieation of a minimum level 
for minority business participation; the identification of the 
minority groups that are to be encompassed by the program; 
and the provisim: for an administrative waiver where appli-
cation of the program is not feasible. Congress relied on the 
administrative agency to flesh out this skeleton, pursuant 
to delegated rulemaking authority, and to develop an admin-
istrative operation consistent with legislative intentions and 
objectives. 
As required by the Public ·works Employment Act of 1977, 
the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations to set into 
motion "Round II" of the federal grant program."0 The 
regulations require that construction projects funded under 
the legislation must be performed under contracts awarded by 
competitive bidding, unless the federal administrator has 
made a determination that in the circumstances relating to a 
particular project some other method is in the public interest. 
·where competitive bidding is employed, the regulations echo 
the statute's requirement that contracts are to be awarded 
on the basis of the "lowest responsive bid submitted by a 
bidder meeting established criteria of responsibility," and they 
also restate the MBE requirement. 57 
15, (1978); S. Rep. No. 96-31, pp. 107, 123-124 (1979) ; see al:>o, e. g., 
H. R. Doc. J\'o. 92-169, p. 4 (HJ71); H. R. Doc. J\'o. 92-194, p . 1 (1972) . 
5 u 91 Stat. 117, 42 U.S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6706; 13 CFR part 317 
(1978). 
57 91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6705 (e) (1); 13 CFR 
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EDA also has published guidelines devoted entirely to the 
administration of the MBE provision. The guidelines out-
line the obligations of the grantee to seek out all available, 
qualified, bona fide MBEs, to provide technical assistance 
as needed, to lower or waive bonding requirements where 
feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business 
Enterprise, the Small Business Administration or other sources 
for assisting MBEs in obtaining required working capital, 
and to give guidance through the intricacies of the bidding 
process.:;s 
EDA regulations contemplate that, as anticipated by Con-
gress, most local public ·works projects will entail the award 
of a predGminant prime contract, with the prime contractor 
assuming the above grantee obligations for fulfilling the 107o 
MBE requirement.n9 The EDA guidelines specify that when 
prime contractors are selected through competitve bidding, 
bids for the prime contract "shall be considered by the Grantee 
to be responsive only if at lf'ast 10 percent of the contract 
funds are to be expended for MBE's [sic]." 00 The adminis-
trative program euvisions that competitive incentive will 
motivate aspirant prime contractors to perform their obliga-
tions under the MBE provision so as to qualify as "rf'sponsive" 
bidders. And, since the contract is to be awarded to the 
lowest responsive bidder, the same incentive is expected to 
motivate prime contractors to seek out the most competitive 
of the available, qualified, bona fide minority firms. This 
too is consistent with the legislative intcntion.r.1 
The EDA guidelines also outline the projected admin-
istration of applications for waiver of the 10% MBE require-
58 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 2-7; App. 157n-160a. The relevant portjons 
of the guidrlines are ~et . out in t.he Appendix t.o thi,.; opinion, ,j 8. 
suJd., at 2; App. 157a; :-:ee 123 Cong. Rrc. HH3i-Hl438 (Feb. 24, 
1977) (remarks of Hep. :\Iitchell and Rep. Hoe). 
u<J Guidelines, n. 3, supra. at 8; App. 161:1. 
61 See 123 Coug. Rec. H1437-H1438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. 
Mitchell and Rep. Roe) . 
•. 
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ment, which may be sought by the grantee either before or 
during the bidding process.02 The technical bulletin issued 
by EDA discusses in greater detail the processing of waiver 
requests, clarifying certain issues left open by the guidelines. 
It specifies that waivers may be total or partial, depending on 
the circumstances,68 and it illustrates the projected operation 
of the waiver procedure by posing hypothetical questions with 
projected administrative responses. One such hypothetical 
is of particular interest, for it indicates the limitations on the 
scope of the racial or ethnic preference contemplated by the 
federal program when a grantee or its prime contractor is 
confronted with an available, qualified , bona fide minority 
business enterprise who is not the lowest competitive bidder. 
The hypothetical provides: 64 
"Question: Should a request for waiver of the 10% re-
quirement based on an unreasonable price asked by an 
MBE ever be granted? 
"Answer: It is possible to imagine situations where an 
MBE might ask a price for its product or services that is 
unreasonable and where, therefore, a waiver is justified. 
However, before a waiver request will be honored, the 
following determinations will be made: 
"a) The MBE's quote is unreasonably priced. This 
determination should be based on the nature of the prod-
uct or service of the subcontractor, the geographic loca-
tion of the site and of the subcontractor, prices of similar 
products or services in the relevant market area, and gen-
eral business conditions in the market area. Further-
more, a subcontractor's price should not be considered 
unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs 
because the price results from disadvantage which affects 
62 Guidelines, n. 3, supra. at 13-16; App. 165n-167a. The reJe,·nnt. por-
tions of the guidelines are set out in the Apprndix to this opinion, ~ 9. 
63 Technical Bulletin, n. 4, supra, at 5; App. 136a. 
64 /d., at 9-10; App. 143a. 
. ;; . 
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the MBE's cost of doing business or results from 
discrimination. 
"b) The contractor ha.s contacted other MBEs and ha.s 
no meaningful choice but to accept an unreasonably high 
price." 
This announced policy makes clear the administrative under-
standing that a waiver or partial waiver is justified (and will 
be granted) to avoid subcontracting with a minority business 
enterprise at an "unreasonable" price, i. e., a price above com-
petitive levels which cannot be attributed to the minority 
firm's attempt to cover costs inflated by the present effects of 
disadvantage or discrimination. 
This administrative approach is consistent with the legisla-
tive intention. It will be reca.Iled that in the report of the 
House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enter-
prise the subcommittee took special care to note that when 
using the term "minority" it intended to include "only such 
minority individuals as are considered to be economically or 
socially disadvantaged." 65 The subcommittee also was cog-
nizant of existing administrative regulations designed to ensure 
that firms maintained on the lists of bona fide minority 
business enterprises be those whose competitive position is 
impaired by the effects of disadvantage and discrimination. 
In its report, the subcommittee expressed its intention that 
these criteria continue to govern administration of the SBA's 
§ 8 (a) program.66 The sponsors of the MBE provision, in 
their reliance on prior administrative practice, intended that 
the term "minority business enterprise" would be given that 
same limited application; this even found expression in the 
legislative debates, where Representative Roe made the 
point: 67 
when we are talking about companies held by 
es Text accomp:mying n . 48, supm. 
;;G H. R. Rep. 1\o. 94-408; p. 30 (1975). 
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minority groups . . . [ c] ertainly people of a variety of 
backgrounds are included in that. That is not really a 
measurement. They are talking about people in the 
minority and deprived." 
The EDA technical bulletin provides other elaboration of 
the MBE provision. It clarifies the definition of "minority 
group members." 68 It also indicates EDA's intention "to 
allow credit for utilization of MBEs only for those contracts 
in whic'h involvement constitutes a basis for strengthening 
the long-term and continuing participation of the MBE in the 
construction and related industries." 69 Finally, the bulletin 
outlines a procedure for the processing of complaints of 
"unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the 
MBE program," or of improper administration of the MBE 
requirement.70 
III 
When we are required to pass on the constitutiona1ity 
of an Act of Congress, we assume ''the gravest and most 
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform." 
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of 
Holmes, J.). A program that employs racial or ethnic cri-
teria, even in a remedial context, calls for close examination; 
yet we are bound to approach our t~k ·with appropriate 
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by 
the Constitution with the power to "provide for the ... 
general 'V{ elf are of the United States" and "to enforce by 
appropriate legislation" the equal protection guarantees of 
the Fourte~nth Amendment. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Amdt. 14, 
§ 5. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic 
68 Technical Bulletin , n. 4, supra, at 1; App. 131a-132a. Tl1e8e defini-
tion;; are ;;et out in the Appeudix to thi:; opinion, ,I 10. 
tiu !d., at 3; App. 135a. 
70 !d., at 19; App. 155a. The relevant portions of the t€clmical bulletin 
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ,r 11. 
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l{at'i,onal Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973), we accorded 
"great weight to the decisions of Congress" even though 
the legislation implicated fundamental constitutional rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The rule is not dif-
ferent when a congressional program raises equal protection 
concerns. See, e. g., Cleland v. National College of Business, 
435 U. S. 213 (1978); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 
(1976). 
Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a 
school board but on a considered decision of the Congress 
and the President. However, in no sense does that render it 
immune from judicial sc..:rutiny and it "is not to say we 'defer' 
to the judgment of the Congress ... on a constitutional ques-
tion," or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution 
should v,;e determine that Congress has overstepped the 
bounds of its constitutional power. Columbia Broa.dcasting, 
supra, 412 U. S., at 103. 
The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by 
our 11ecessarily extended review of its legislative and adminis-
trative background. The program was designed to ensure 
that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the 
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, grantees who elect 
to participate would not employ procurement practices tha.t 
Congress had decided might result in perpetuation of the 
effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or fore-
closed access by minority businesses to public contracting 
opportunities. The MBE program does not manda.te the 
allocation of federal funds according to inflexible percentages 
solely based on ra.ce or ethnicity. 
Our a.na.lysis proceeds in two steps. At the outset, we 
must inquire whether the objectives of this legislation are 
within the power of Congress. If so, we must go on to decide 
whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the 
context presented, is a con·stitutionally permissible means 
for achieving the congressional objectives. 
22 
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A 
(1) 
In enacting the MBE provision, it is clear that Congress 
employed an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers. 
The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, by its very na-
ture, is primarily an exercise of the Spending Power. U. S. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This Court has recognized that the 
power to "provide for the . . . general Welfare" is an inde- t?..vf)ori-f)', 
pendent grant of legislative }"11€1 ogative, plenaFy within its.,__ 
sphere an4 distinct from other broad congressional powers. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-~H (1976); United States v. 
Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Congress ha.s frequently 
employed the Spending Power to further broad policy 
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal monies upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and ad-
ministrative directives.. This Court has repeatedly upheld 
against constitutional chal1enge the use of this technique to 
induce governments and private parties to cooperate volun-
tarily with federal policy. E. g., California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 (1974); Lau v. 1-lichols, 414 U. S. 563 
(1974); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comrn'n, 
330 U. S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 
(1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
The MBE program is structured within this familiar legis-
lative pattern. The program conditions receipt of public 
works grants upon agreement by the state or local govern-
mental grantee that at least 10%) of the federal funds wi11 be 
devoted to contracts with minority businesses, to the extent 
this can be accomplished by overcoming barriers to access 
and by awarding contracts to bona fide l\1BEs. It is further 
conditioned to require that MBE bids on these contracts are 
competitively priced, or might have been competitively priced 
but for the preseut effects of prior discrimi11ation. Admit-
tedly, the problems of administering this program with re-
spect to these conditions may be formidable. Although the 
.. 
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primary responsibility for ensuring minority participation 
falls upon the grantee, when the procurement practices of 
the grantee involve the award of a prime contract to a gen-
eral or prime contractor, the obligations to assure minority 
participation devolve upon the priva tc contracting party; 
this is a contractual condition of eligibility for award of the 
prime contract. 
The pevrer to eondition federal expenditures to induce 0 
voluntary action is pet ha:ps o11e of the lea-st encumbered of all _Q_ 
legisl&ii v e powers.. Here we need not explore the outermost 
limitations on the objectives attainable through such an ap-
plication of the Spending Power. The reach of the Spending 
Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory 
powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its regulatory powers, 
Congress could have achieved the objectives of the MBE 
program, then it may do so under the Spending Power. And 
we have no difficulty perceiving a basis for accomplishing the 
objectives of the MBE program through the Commerce 
Power insofar as achievement efthe program objectives 
pertain to the action of private contracting parties, and 
through the power to enforce the equal protection guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as the program objec-
tives pertain to the action of state and local grantees. 
(2) 
We turn first to the Commerce Power. U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3. Had Congress chosen to do so, it could have drawn 
on the Commerce Clause to regulate the practices of prime 
contractors on federally funded public works projects.. Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964). The 
legislative history of the MBE provision shows that ..the!"e ~ 
· · Congress -te ~concTirde a t 1e su -
contrac't:i;g J)ractices of prime contractors could perpetuate 
the prevailing impa.ired access by minority businesses t-o 
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public contracting opportunities, and that this inequity has 
an effect on interstate commerce. Thus Congress could take 
necessary and proper action to remedy the situation. Ibid. 
It is not necessary that these prime contractors be shown 
responsible for any violation of a.ntidiscrimination Jaws. Our 
cases dealing with application of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, express no doubt of 
the congressional authority to prohibit practices "cha11enged 
as prrpetuati11g the effects of [not unlawful] discrimination 
occurring prior to the effective date of the Act." Franks v. 
Bowman Transporation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 761 (1976); see 
California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, - U. S. -, No. 78-
1548 (Feb. 20. 1980); l11ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albe-marle Paper Co. 
v. :Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971). Insofar as the MBE program pertains 
to the actions of private prime contractors. the Congress could 
have achieved its objectives under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, "·e conclude that the objectives of the MBE provision 
are withiu the scope of the Speucliug Po\\·er. 
(3) 
In certain contexts, there are limitations on the reach of 
the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state and 
local governments. National Lea.gue of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U. S. 833 (1976). To avoid such complications, we look to 
~ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the power to regulate 
the procurement practices of state and local grantees of fed-
eral funds. Fitzpatrick v. Bitze-r, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). A 
review of our cases persuades us that the objectives of the 
MBE program are within the power of Congress under § 5 
"to enforce by appropriate legislation" the equal protection 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Katzenbach v. }.forgan, 384 U.S. 641 (196G), we equated 
the scope of this authority with the broad powers expressed 
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, 
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d. 18. "Correctly viewed~ § 5 is a positive ·gra1it o(Jegislative 
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether and what legislation is needed to secure 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 384 U. S., 
at 651. In Katzen bach, the Court upheld ~ ~ (e) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, " ;hich prohibited ap-
plication of state English-language literacy requi1~ements to 
otherwise qualified voters who had completed the sixth grade 
in an accredited American school in which a language other 
than English was the predominant meclium of instruction. 
To uphold this exercise of congressional authority, the Court 
found no prerequisite that application of a literacy require-
ment violate the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U. S., at 648-
649. It was enough that the Court could perceive a basis 
upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a judgment 
that application of literacy qualifications within the compass 
of § 4 (e) would discriminate in terms of access to the ballot 
and consequently in terms of access to the provision or 
administration of governmental programs. !d., at 652-656. 
Four years later, in Oregon v . . Mitchell, 400 U .. S. 112 
(1970)~ we upheld § 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1970, 84 Stat. 315, which imposed a five-year nation-
wide prohibition on the use of various voter-qualification 
tests and devices in federal, state and local elections. The 
Court was unanimous, albeit in separate opinions, in conclud-
ing that Congress was within its authority to prohibit the 
use of such voter qualifications; Congress could reasonably 
determine that its legislation was an appropriate method of 
attacking the perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimina-
tion, even though the use of these tests or devices might have 
discriminatory effects only. See ~e v. United 
States, - U. S. -, No. 78-1840, slip op., at 18- 19 (Apr. 
22, 1980). Our cases reviewing the parallel power of Con-
gress to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, § 2, confirm that congressional au-
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crimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory 
impact perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. City 
of Rome, supra; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 
(1966). 
'Vith respect to the MBE provision, Congress had abundant 
evidence from which it could conclude that minority busi-
nesses have been denied effective participation in public 
contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpet-
uated the effects of prior discrimination. ,(Congress had be-
fore it, among other data, evidence of a long history of marked 
disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to 
minority business enterprises. This disparity was considered 
to result not from any lack of capable alld qualified minority 
businesses, but from the existence and maintenance of barriers 
to competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic 
discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any 
intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct. Al-
though much of this history related to the experience of 
minority businesses in the area of federal procurement. there 
was direct evidence before the Congress that this pattern of 
disadvantage and discrimination existed with respect to state 
and local construction contracting as well. In relation to the 
MBE provision, Congress acted within its competence to 
determine that the problem was national in scope. 
Although the Act recites no preambulary "findings" on the 
subject. we are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical 
basis from which it could conclude that traditional procure-
ment practices, when applied to minority businesses, could 
perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. Accordingly, 
Congress reasonably determined that the prospective elimina-
tion of these barriers to minority firm access to )Ublic con-
tracting opportunities generated by the Act was appropriate 
to ensure that those businesses were not denied equal op-
portunity to participate in federal grants to state and local 
governments. \vhich is one aspect of the equal protection of 
the laws. Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the actions 
' .. 
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of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its 
objectives by use of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We conclude that in this respect the objectives 
of the MBE provision are within the scope of the Spending 
Power. 
(4) 
There are revelant similarities between the MBE pro-
gram and the federaCspendi~program reviewed in .!:!!:J: v. 
Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). In Lau, a language barrier 
"effectively foreclosed" non-English-speaking Chinese pupils 
from access to the educational opportunities offered by the 
San Francisco public school system. !d., at 564-566. It had 
not been shown that this had resulted from any discrimina-
tion, purposeful or otherwise, or from other unlawful acts. 
Nevertheless, we upheld the constitutionality of a federal 
regulation applicable to public school systems receiving federal 
funds that prohibited the utilization of "criteria or methods 
of administration which have the effect ... of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of 
the [educational] program as respect individuals of a partic-
ular race, color, or national origin." !d., at 568 (emphasis 
added). Moreover, we upheld application to the San Fran-
cisco school system, as a recipient of federal funds, of a re-
quirement that "[w]here inability to speak and understand 
the English language excludes national origin-minority group 
children from effective participation in the educational pro-
gram offered by a school district, the district must take affirm-
ative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open 
its instructional program to these students." Ibid. 
It is true that the MBE 0:_ovision ..sllifers from the l)f.9.4ram 
approved in Lau in that the MBE program directly employs 7 
rac~c criteria as a means to accomplish congres-
sional objectives; however, these objectives are ess<:>ntially the 
same as those approved in Lau. Our holding in Lau is 
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of the MBE provision. The MBE program. like the federal 
regulations revieweu in Lau, primarily regulates state action 
in the use of federal funds voluntarily sought and aecepted 
by the grant.ees subject to statutory and administr·ative con-
clitions. The MBE participation requirement is din~ct.ed at 
the utilization of criteria, metl1ods or practices thought by 
Congress to have tl1e effect of defeating. or substantially 
impairing. access by the minority business community to 
public funds made ayailable by congressional appropriations. 
B 
\Ve now turn to the question whether. as a means to 
accomplish these plainly constitutional objectives, ~ress 
may use racial and ethnic criteria, in this limited way, as a 
condition attached to a federal grant. \Ve are mindful that 
"[i]n no matter should we Jay more clef renee to the opinion 
of Congress than m 1ts choice of instrumentalities to perform a 
function that is ·within its power," .ll..otional Afutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 603 (1949) 
(opinion of Jackson, J.). ~t,. -the same time, wg recogniee 
tbe need for careful judicial inql-liry as to governmental prG-
gr&ms that en:~play racial or ethnic crit eria to accomplish 
even conc:::tit.ntional objective~ Agsin, we stress the limited 
scope of our inq"Yiry Petitiongre-ehalleng€ the constitu-
tionality of the MBE provision on its face; they have not 
sought damages or other specific relief for injury allegedly 
flowing from specific applications of the program; nor have 
tl1ey attempted to show that as applied in identified situa-
tions the MBE provision violated the constitutional or stat-
utory rights of any party to this case. 71 In these circum-
71 In 1ht>ir eompbint, in ordl'r to <'~1<1bli!:'h !:'1:mding to challenge the 
validity of the program, pet-itioner>< <IIIeged as "[t:]pecifir examples" of 
economic injury three in~t:mtes where one of t.heir number a:;;;ertedly 
would h<Ive been awarded a public work:; contract but for enforcement oi 
----------------------------------------------------~  
However, Congress may employ racial or ethnic classifications 
in exercising its Spending or other legislative Powers only if \ 
those classifications do not violate the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We 
recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure 
that any congressional program tfiat employs racial or ethnic 
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present 
effects of past discrimination is narrowlL t2ilored to the 
achievement of that goal. 
Again, we stress the limited scope of our inquiry. Here we 
are not dealing with a remedial decree of a court but with the 
legislative authority of Congress. Furthermore, petitioners 
have challenged 
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stances, given a reasonable construction and in light of its 
projected administration, if we find the MBE program on its 
face to be free of constitutional defects, it must be upheld as 
within congressional power. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 
(1974); Fortson v. Secretary of State of Georgia, 379 U. S. 
433, 438-439 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 
U. S. 500, 515 (1964); see United States"· Ra·ines, 362 U.S. 
17, 20-24 (1960). 
Our review of the regulations and guidelines governing ad-
ministration of the MBE provision reveals that Congress 
enacted the program as a strictly remedial measure; more-
over, it is a remedy that functions prospectively, in the 
manner of an injunctive decree. Pursuant to the administra-
tive program, grantees and their prime contractors are re-
quired to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBEs; 
they are required to provide technical assistance as needed, to 
lov,:er or waive bonding requirements where feasible, to so-
licit the aid of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, 
the Small Business Administration or other sources for as-
sisting MBEs to obtain required working capital, and to give 
guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process. Supra, 
at 16- 17. The program assumes that grantees who undertake 
these efforts in good faith will obtain at least 10% participa-
tion by minority business enterprises. It is recognized that, 
to achieve this target, contracts will be awarded to available, 
qualified, bona fide MBEs even though they are not the low-
est competitive bidders, so long as their higher bids, when 
challenged, are found to reflect merely attempts to cover costs 
inflated by the present effects of prior disadvantage and dis-
crimination. Supra, at 18- 19. There is available to the 
grantee a provision authorized by Congress for administrative 
the MBE provi,.ion. Petitioners requested on!~· deC'laratory and injunctive 
relief against- continued enforcement of tlw l\IBE provi~ion; they did not 
seek any remedy for t he."e spC:>cific insta.nce:; of a.::;::;ertedly unalwful dis-
crimination. App. 12a.-13a, l'ia-19a. 
' I 
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waiver on a case-by-case basis should there be a demonstratiori-
that, despite affirmative efforts, this level of participation can-
not be achieved without departing from the objectives of the 
jJrogram. Supra, at 17-18. There is also an admillistrative 
mechanism, including a complaint procedure, to ensure that 
only bona fide MBEs are encompassed by the remedial pro-
g'ram, and to prevent unjust participation in the program by 
those minority firms whose access to public contracting op-
portunities is not impaired by the effects of prior discrimi-
nation. Supra, at 19-20. 
(1) 
As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in 
the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 
"color-blind" fashion. In Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklenberg 
Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 18-21 1971), we rejected 
this argument in considering a court-formulated school de-
segration remedy on the basis that examination of the racial 
composition of student bodies was an unavoidable starting 
point and that racially based attendauce assignments were 
permissible so long as no absolute racial balance of eac~ 
school was required. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 41 
( 1971), citing S~ann, we observed that "[i] n this remedia.i 
process, stBps will almost invariably require that students be 
assigned 'differently because of their race.' . . . Any other 
a,pixoach would freeze the status quo that is the very target 
of all desegregation processes." (Citations omitted.) And 
in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 
(1971), we invalidated a state law that or ade assignment 
of any student on account of race because it foreclosed imple-
mentation of desegregation plans that w·ere designed to rem-
edy constitutional violations. We held that "[j]ust as the' 
tace of students must be considered in determining whether a 
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be~ 
considered in formulating a remedy." 402 u. s., at 46. 
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In these school desegregation cases we dealt with the 
authority of a federal court to formulate a remedy for uncon-
stitutional racial discrimination. However, the authority of 
a court to incorpora.te racial criteria into a remedial decree 
also extends to statutory violations. Where federal anti-
discrimination laws have been violated, an equitable remedy 
may in the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic factor. 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976); 
see International Brotherhood of Teamsters Y. United States, 
431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U. S. 405 (1975). In another setting, we have held that a 
state may employ racial criteria that are reasonably necessary 
to assure compliance with federal voting rights legislation, 
even though the state action does not entail the remedy of a 
constitutional violation. United Jewish Organizations of 
Williarnsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 147-165 (1977) 
(opinion of .WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and 
STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 180-187 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting on 
other grounds). 
When we have discussed the remedial powers of a federal 
court, we have been alert to the limitation that (([t]he power 
of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and 
stat-e governmental entities is not plenary. . . . [A] federal 
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the 
nature and extent of the ... violation." Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkuwn, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quot-
ing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717.738 (1974), and Swann 
v. Charlotte-Jv[ecklenburg Board of Education, supra, 402 
U.S., a.t 16). 
Here we deal not with the limited remedial powers of a 
federal court, but 'vith the broad remedial powers of Congress. 
is fundamental that in no organ of government does 
ere repose a more comprehensive remedial power than 
the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with 
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well as to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not 
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with 
existing federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination 
provisions, but also, where Congress has authority to declare 
certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, a11thorize and A 
induce state action to avoid such conduct. Supra, at 23-27. 
(2) 
A more specific cl1a1Jenge to the MBE program is the 
charge that it impermissibly deprives nbnminority businesses 
of access to at least some portion of the government con-
tracting opportunities generated by the Act. It must be con-
ceded that by its objective of remedying the historical impair-
ment of access, the MBE provision can have the effect of' 
awarding some contracts to MBEs which otherwise might be 
awarded to other businesses, who may themselves be innoc~t -~A._ 
of any prior discriminatory actions. "An+filO one has a con- /_ 
1 
., 
stitut~onal right to be awarded a public~:~-~s~ contract,_./ ,1ui- - .ttd ~~
ure oTl.loJDTiinority firms to receive certain contracts is, of ~  
course, an incidental consequence of the program, not part  ' , 
of its ~)jective; similarly, past impairment of minority-firm ~:::;;:~- ~, ··/-
11 
access to public contracting opportunities may have been an 
incidental consequence of 11business-as-usual" by public con- · . . tl ~ · · · ---, 
traeting agencies and among prime contmctors. ~ 
1 
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that C'-, 
it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms. 
When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy 
to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such "a sharing· 
of the burden" by innocent pa.rties is not impermissible. 
Franks, supra, at 77; see Albemarle Paper Co. , suwa; U'nited 
Jewish Organizat?:on, supra. The actual 11burdcn" shouldered· 
by nonminority firms is relatively light in this connection 
·when we consider the scope of this public works progTaJn as· 
compared with overall construction contracting opportuni-
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ties.72 1\Ioreovcr, although we may assume thnt the com-
plaining partie's are innocent of any discriminatory conduct, 
it was within congressional power to act on the assump-
tion that in the past some nonminority businesses may 
have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the 
virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contra.cting 
opportunities. 
{3) 
J\'nother ehallcnge to the validity of the MBE program 
is the assertion that it is underinclusive-that it limits its 
benefit. to specified minority ~her than extRnding its 
remedial objectives to all businesses whose access to govern-
ment contracting is impaired by the effects of disadvantage 
or discrimination. Such an extcntion would, of course, be 
appropriate for Congress to provide; it is not a function for 
the courts. 
Even in this context, the well-established eoncept that a 
legislature may take onr step at a time to remedy only part 
of a broader problem is not without relevance. See Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 3~)7 P. 8. 471 (1970); Will?:am.son v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1055). \Ye are not reviewing a 
federal program that seeks to confer a preferred status upon a 
nondisa(h·antagcd minority or to give special assistance to 
only one of seve>ral groups cstaulished to be similarly disad-
vantagrcl minorities. Even in such a setting. the Congress is 
not " ·ithout a certain authority. Sre, e. g., Personnel Adm.i?~­
ish·ator of Massadwsetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 25G (197P); 
72 The Court. of Appe::~.ls relied upon Dep[lrtmcnt. of Commerce sta-
tistics to rillcul:ttc thnt the S4.2 billion in frd(·r:ll grnnts conditioned upon 
compli[lm·c with the l\IBE prO\· i ~ion [)mounted to :1bout 2.&% of the totnl 
of ncarl~· Sl/0 billion flpc·nt on const.nl(·tion m the Unit{'d Stntcs clming 
1977. Thus, the 10% minimum minority hu ;,:ine::;s p:ut ieipation c.:ontem-
plated by this program would ilccount. for only 0.25% of the annual 
expcmliture for cou::;truction work in the United States. Fullilove v. 
Kreps, 584 F. 2d 600, 607 (CAZ 1978). 
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Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Morton v. Man.cari, 
417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
The Congress has not sought to give select minority groups J 
a preferred standing in the construction industry, but has 
embarked on a remedial program to place them on a more 
equitable footing with respect to public contracting opportuni-
ties. There has been no showing in this case that Congress has 
inadvertently effected an invidious discrimination by ex-
cluding from coverage an identifiable minority group that 
has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimi-
nation equal to or greater than that suffered by the groups 
encompassed by the MBE program. It is not inconceivable 
that on very special facts a case might be made to challenge 
the congressional decision to limit MBE eligibility to the 
particular minority groups identified in the Act. See T1 ance 
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109-112 (1979); Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U. S. 112, 240 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and 
MARSHALL, JJ.). But on this record we find no basis to hold 
that Congress is without authority to undertake the kind of 
limited ~~erimentaYremedial effort represented by the MBE 
program. Congress, not the courts, has the heavy burden 
of dealing with a host of intractable economic and social 
problems. 
(4) 
It is also contended that the MBE program is overin-
clusive-that it bestows a benefit on businesses identified t:iy 
-r-adiil or ethnic criteria which cannot be justified on the basis 
of competitive criteria or as a remedy for the present effects of 
identified prior discrimination. It is conceivable that a par-
ticular application of the program may have this effect; how-
ever, the pEC_uliarities of specific applications are not before 
us in this case. We are not presenteanerew}th 'iCi1al1enge 
i1i'Vo vmg a specific award of a construction contract or the 
denial of a \Yaiver request; such questions of specific appli-
cation must a"·ait future cases. 
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This docs not mran that thr rlnim of owrittc~lusivcness 
is e:>ntitk<.l to no con~irlf•rat.ion in thf' JH'CS<'IIt ease. The -----history of gowrnmen tal tolerntwe of prar.tiers using racial or 
Aethnie crikria. for the puq>OSl' or with the c>ffpct of imposing 
an invirlious di seriminatioJJ must alert 11s to the deleterious -rtl'ccb of CH.'tL.J.wnigtJ racial or ethnie ela~sifieat.ions when 
tlwy ~tray from tU\.JTO\\' n•mc>rlial justificat.ions. E'Yf:'ll in the 
con tc·xt -of a facial ehalh•ng<:' such a~ i~ prPs<:'ntt•tl in this case, 
the ).!BE proYisioll ennttot pass must<•r unless, with due ac-
CO\ltlt for its arlmini~trativc program. it proYidc·s n reasonable 
nsst trnn<·.(> that application of raf·ia.l or Pthnic· eritcJria will be 
limit~ ·d to acc·omplishing tlw n•mc•dial objectives of Congress 
and that misapplications of the program will be prolllptly 
and nrl equatcly rclltcdicd administratiye]y. 
It i:-- ,;; ignifieant that thP admiuistrative sehemP J)I'OYides for 
\\'flin·r :md exemption. Two fundanl<'ntal c·oJtgressional as-
~~ tl l JII ions u~krli<' tlw .\1BE progra111: (1) that the' prest>nt 
l'il<·d~ 11f past cli sc'rilllination haw impairc'd thl con1pditiYe 
po~it io11 of husitH'RE'<'S O\\·'IJf'd ancl C'ontrollt'cl h~· JlWJIIbers of 
min(lrit~· groups; and (2) that affirmatin rffurts to eliminate 
l>nrric·r~ 10 minority-firm accPss. and to t'Yaluat.e ],ids with 
:HI,iw-tttH·IJt. for thf' prc>sc•nt. effc>et!; of >ast discritnin ation 
IU>uld !t""llrf' that. 0 /{ of the fC'c!Pral fund~ gratll<'d llllder 
tlte Pul,Jie 'YorkR EmploymPnt Act of l!J/7 would IJp ae-
Clllltdt·d for by eontrnds "·ith nvailahlt- . CJW-llifil'd . bona ficle 
mi 11mi ty husi ness Pll tc~rprises. Each of these asstu11ptions 
Jltny ],(. rt 'hlttt.Pcl in thr adntinistrative pn>tess. 
Tl11: adtllillistratiYe program contains mPasurt:'S to effe<:tuute 
t!Je c·oJJgr•· :-: -.ional objPctive of assuring legitimate participa-
tiun b~· di ~nrlYantagPd MBEs. :\rlministrativf' tl1Jfinition 
has tight<·lwd sonw lPss drfinite aspeets of thP statutory iden-
tification of the ·mi11ority groups Pncompasserl by the pro-
gratll. Tll<'n' is adtltinistrati\·e scrutiny to ickntify and 
elilllittatc· front partif'ipation in the program YIBEs wlto are 
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example, spurious minority-front entities can be exposed. A 
significant aspect of this survcillauce is the complaint proce-
dure available for reporting "unjust participation by an enter-
prise or individuals in the MBE program." Supra, at 20. 
And even as to specific contract awards, waiver is available to 
avoid dealing with an MBE who is attempting to exploit the 
remedial aspects of the program by charging an unreasonable 
price, i. e., a price not attributable to the present effects of 
past discrimination. Supra, at 17-19. \Ye must assume that 
CoJJgress intended close scrutiny of false claims and prompt 
action on them. 
Grantees are given the opportunity to demonstrate that 
their best efforts \\·ill not succeed or have not succeeded in 
achieving the statutory 10% target for minority firm partici-
pation within the limitations of the program's remedial ob-
jectives. In these circu.mstances a waiver or partial waiver is 
available once compiiance ·l1aSbeen oemons rated. A waiver 
m~y be sought and granted at any time during the contract-
ing process, or even prior to letting contracts if the facts 
warrant. 
Nor is the program defective because a waiver may be 
sought only by the grantee and not by prime contractors 
who may experience difficulty in fulfilling contract obligations 
to assure niinority participation. It may be administratively 
cumbersome, but the wisdom of concentrating responsibility 
at the grantee level is not for us to evaluate; the purpose is 
to allow the Economic Development Administration to main-
tain close supervision of the operation of the MBE provision. 
The administrative complaint mechanism allows for griev-
ances of prime contractors who assert that a grantee has failed 
to seek a waiver in an appropriate case. Finally, we note 
that ·where private parties, as opposed to governmental en-
tities, transgress the limitations inherent in the MBE pro-
gram, the possibility of constitutional violation is more re-
moved. See United SteelwoTkers of America v. Tfl eber, 443 
u.s. 193, 200 (1979). 
··' 
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That the use of racial and ethnic criteria is premised 
on assumptions rebuttable in the admillistrative process gives 
reasonable assurance that application of the MBE program 
will be limiteo t.o accomplishing the remedial objectives con-
tem 1lated b · Congress and that misapplications of tJ1e ra.cial 
and ethnic criteria can be remedie . ffi relation to thi~ faeia]..JL. 
cl!allet1ge to the statute, doubts mast be 1 Psol ced in favor of _A._ 
the congr~~>~ional judgment that this Jimit.td- experilJJcJJt is a -t.. 
~1ecessary step to effPctuat@ the mttndate for equality of ...._ 
economic opporitH+ity. l~s is appropriate for a pilot or e~ 
perimental project, the MBE-pFBgr-am is limited in extent. and c:. 
cl-tlration. This is significant in the sense that the -j-tls---->2-
trneation for any remedi-al program lapses when it has ae .Q__ 
eomplished its object],zeso, bas proved nm,;uccessful, or has ..Q_ 
m<hausted its appropriation; there is also the comside1 ation SL 
that this relatively short-te!ln 1 ellledial measm e will be .-'L 
subject to reassessment and reevaluation by the Congress 
prior to any extension or reenactment.~ 3 ]\fiscarriages of ad-
ministration could have only a transitory economic impact on 
businesses not encompasssed by the program, and would not be 
irremediable. 
(5) 
Congress, after due consideration, perceived a pressing need 
to move forward with new approaches in the continuing effort 
to achieve the goal of equality of economic opportunity. In 
this effort, C',ongress has necessary latitude to tr.x: new tech- ~ 
ni~es such as the limited use of racial amlethnic crite"ria 
to accomplish remedil,ll objectives; this especially so in pro-
g;ams where voluntary) cooperation with remedial measures 
is induced by- j:)l'fl-cinf conoitions on federal expenditures. -----
73 Cf. GAO Report. io ihe Congre.s:::, J\1inority Firms on Llral Public 
'''orks Projrrt ~-:\Jixe·d Re.~ul1::;, CED-79-9 (J:m . 16, Hl79); U. S. Dept. 
of Conunerre, E<·onomie Den·lopment. Aclmini~tration, Lo<"al Publir. Works 
Program In1erim Report on 10 Percent J\Jinority Bu:;ines.~ Enterprise 
Requirement (Sept. 1978). 
In dealing with this facial challenge to th: s at~te, ~oubts 
must be resolved in · support of the congress1o al JUdgment ttret 
this limited program is a necessary step to ffectuate t~e 
constitutional mandate for equality o portun1ty. 
The MBE provision may be viewed as ~~t~--~ 
appropriately limited in extent and 
/1) 
( ' · I 
\ ' 
\ \ \ ·, 
\ 
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That the program may press the out0r limits of congressional 
authority affords no basis for striking it down. 
Petitiouers have mounted a facial challenge to a program 
developed by the politically responsive branches of Govern-
ment. For its part, the Congr0ss must proceNl only with 
programs narrowly tailored to achieve its objectiv0s, subject 
to continuing evaluation · and rrasscssmcnt; administration 
of the programs p1ust he vi&:iliant ami fl0xible; and, when 
such a program comps under judicial review, courts must be 
satisfied that the legislative objectives and projected adminis-
' J • tration give reason hle assurance}that the J1rogTam will func-~o,.J/S~ ,,.J~ .~ 
J,f'fd~.Jf t:.r>,J/~x ~___, .... ·o~n within co~oilaJ lumtations. But as Justice Jack-
son ebser,~in 1941: a 
"The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed in 
its tasks only if the counsels of self-restraint urged most 
earnestly by members of the Court itSf'lf are humbly and 
faithfully heeded. After the forces of conservatism and 
libPralism, of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of 
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process 
and averaged and come to rest in some compromise 
nwasure ~a. decision striking it down closes an area 
of compr01mse in which conflicts have actually, if only 
temporarily, been composed. Each such decision takes 
away from our democratic federalism another of its 
defenses against omestic disorder and violence. The 
vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted for ninety years 
in the field of policy, has been its progressive closing of 
the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of 
our social ru1d economic conflicts." 
Justice Jackson reiterated these thoughts shortly before his 
death in what was to be the last of his Godkin Lectures: 75 
"I have said that in these matters the Court must re-
74 R. H. Jnck,:;on, The Struggle for Jurlicinl Supremacy 321 (1941). 
76 R. H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the Americ~1n Sy:otem of 
Government 61-62 (1955). 
~· 
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spect the limitations on its own powers because judicial 
usurpation is to me no more justifiable and no more 
promising of permanent good to the country than any 
other kind. So I presuppose a Court that will not depart 
from the judicial process, will not go beyond resolving 
cases and controversies brought to it in conventional 
form, and ,.,·ill not consciously encroach upon the func-
tions of its coordinate branches." 
Because we are satisfied that the MBE porvision of the 
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 satisfies constitutional 
criteria, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affinned. 7{; 
Affirmed. 
76 Although the complaint nl lt>ged th::1t. the ~·IRE program violatt>d sev. 
eral fr>deral sintute;.:, supra., n. 5, the only statutory argument urged upon 
us is that the :MBE provi~ion is incon:;i;;tent with title VI of the Civil 
Righf:' Act of 1964. We perceivE' no incon~:;i:<tency betwePn the requirements 
of title VI and t.ho~e of the 1\lBE provision. To the extent. any statu-
tory irwonsi:;tencies might be asserted, the ::UBE proYi~ion-the later, 
more ;;pecific enactment-must be depmed to control. See, e. g., Morton 
v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 475, 489-490 (1973); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 
753, 758 (1961); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188-189 (1939), 
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APPENDIX 
~ 1. Representative Mitchell's principal remarks, 123 Cong. 
Rec. HI388-HI389 (Feb. 23, 1977), were as follows: 
"The history of public works projects, as a counter-
cyclical device, reveals that local government expenditures 
for projects create direct jobs and stimulate complemen-
tary expenditures in the material and supply market .... 
Hlf public works projects are to have optimum effect 
on both the economy and the labor force, we must both 
trigger and target the public works bill. Estimates reveal 
that there is currently 35 percent unemployment in the 
minority construction sector and an estimated 20 percent 
of the complementary construction industries that are 
minority owned have dissolved in the midst of a depres-
sion in the minority business sector .... 
tiThe Federal Government has not played its role in 
the quest for economic parity .... 
H ••• In the process to parity the minority business sector 
should receive from 15-18 percent of the contract receipts, 
however, in fiscal year 1976 the minority business sector 
received less than I percent of the contract receipts of the 
Federal Government .... 
"I urge my colleagues to support my amendment and 
promote growth in the minority business community. I 
appeal to the consciousness of parity and not the vote of 
disparity in requesting that Members of this legislative 
body support my amendment to insure minority business 
participation in the construction indus try." 
~ 2. Representative Mitchell's introductory remarks, 123 
Cong. Rec. HI436-HI437 (Feb. 24, 1977), included the 
following: 
"Let me tell the Members how ridiculous it is not to 
target for minority enterprises. ·we spend a great deal 
of Federal money under the SBA program creating, 
strengthening and supporting minority businesses and 
'. 
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yet when it comes down to giving those minority busi~ 
nesses a piece of the action, the Federal Government is 
absolutely remiss. All it does is say that, 'We will create 
you on the one hand and, on the other hand, we will deny 
you.' That denial is made absolutely clear when one 
looks at the amount of contracts let in any given fiscal 
year and then one looks at the percentage of minority 
contracts. The average percentage of minority contracts, 
of all Government contracts, in any given fiscal year is 
1 percent---1 percent .... 
"In the present legislation before us it seems to me 
that we have an excellent opportunity to begin to remedy 
this situation." 
1f 3. The following colloquy occurred between Representative 
Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas, 123 Cong. Rec. 
H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977): 
"Rep. KAZEN: AlJ right. What happens in the rural 
areas where there are no minority enterprises? \VilJ the 
10 percent be held up in order to bring minority enter-
prises from somewhere else where there is no unemploy-
ment into a place where there is unemployment and there 
is no minority enterprise? 
"Rep. MITCHELL: In response to the gentleman's 
question, the answer is 'No.' 
"Rep. KAZE~: ... [W]herP there a.rp no minority 
enterprise contractors then this provision would not be 
in effect; am I correct? 
"Rep. l\HTCHELL: That is absolutely correct, and 
that is done by administrative action already on the books 
with all of the agencies. 
"Rep. KAZEN: Does the gentleman's amendment 
leave room for that type of discretion in the Secretary? 
"Rep. MITCHELL: I assume that it does. It would 
be my intei1t that it would because that is existing admin-
istrative law." 
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U 4. Representative Conyers' remarks, 123 Cong. Rec. H1440 
(Feb. 24, 1977), included the following: 
"First of all, minority contractors and businessmen 
who are trying to enter in on the bidding process-
and my office is replete with examples of this-get the 
'works' almost everytime. The bidding process is one 
whose intricacies defy the imaginations of most of us 
here. The sad fact of the matter is that minority enter-
prises usually lose out, and subsequently end up in a con-
gressional office or some other unlikely place complaining 
bitterly. . . . [M]any other Members have had the same 
dismaying experience of trying to give solace to small 
businessmen who through no fault of their own simply 
have not been able to get their foot in the door." 
U 5. Representative Biaggi's remarks. 123 Cong. Rec. H1440 
(Feb. 24, 1977), included the following: 
"This Nation's record with respect to providing oppor-
tunities for minority businesses is a sorry one .... 
"What the amendment seeks to do is guarantee that 
a.t least 10 percent of all funds in this legislation will go 
to contracts which will be awarded to minority business 
enterprises. This is not an unreasonable demand-in 
fact it is quite modest. If implemented however it could 
have great benefits to the entire minority community. 
Fiscal year 1976 figures indicate that less than 1 percent 
of all Federal procurement contracts went to minority 
business enterprises. This is a situation which must be 
[r] emedied. 
"The objectives of this legislation are both necessary 
and admirable. Yet without adoption of this amend-
ment, this legislation may be potentially inequitable to 
minority businesses and workers. It is time that the 
thousands of minority businessmen enjoyed a sense of 
economic parity. This amendment will go a long way 
toward helping to achieve this parity and more impor· 
; ,.;. · lllt17- tll'l'\1< t.\ .\I'J'J-:\'Itf.\ 
.Fl Ll.l L(t\ E 11 . J\:L l'TZ?\ I CK 
t.1.mtly to promote a sen~e of econo111ic rqunlity in thif! 
::\'ation.'' 
~ li. Senntor Brooke'::' prill{'ip:tl n·m1nks, 123 Cong. Hcc. S3~HO 
(J\far. 10, 1977), werP n:;: follo,\'S: 
" It i:-: proper thof we targPt thiE $4 billion on :nea :3 of 
gre11te::;t ueed: thP illlwr eity. our dcprc·:-:-ccd rmal c·oJn-
munitit'~. nnrl otltcr area~ 'd1en· uncmpluynwnt ltn~ lweu 
p:u·tittthtrlr ::;P\'c' n• nnd prolongc' rl. .\nd it i:! imporfaut 
that " ·c fcwu~ on 1 hP tJtwmploymPttt experiPtH't ·~ of rlif-
fcrpnl ethnic: nnd rtwial g:ruttps itt 1k:-:i;;nin;.r :1 :-:c' tl,.:itin• 
und rl'spun:-:in• .iub!' pro~ram. For t•>-.:;lt ttpk , :lllH!llg 
mittctrity <·iti%t•ll!-;, thP !1\'Nage ratt' of UIH 'InJlloyllwnl run::: 
double tlw t among white c·i t izPn::; .. . . 
"Of (:Oilr:-:'1'. FD:\ "·ill rcfitte it!-; ftturling ~w0c·c·dmc:::; 
hasrd 011 it::; c•xpnic•tt<·c·::; " ·ith tltP bst J'ltiitlil' ,·,orb jolt.~ 
program . Bnt :llltd h<'l' wny tn in,.:urc> tlu.l! tit<' lltOIH')'~ 
nre properly targ<'ft·d i~ to H,t n~id<' n rc:t,..on ~ti,Je JH'n·<·nt-
nge of t.lw public· \Yorks job~ fund~ to go to qnulified 
mitlorit~· <·otl!rndorl'. 
"Thi~ i~ c>tdird.v propf'r. appropriate• }tnd llt' r·P~:::Ill'~'­
It is nccc::;~ary 1>('1':111:-:f' lllinorif~' hu:::inP:::-:l'" lt:'tn• n~c·cin·d 
0111~· 1 pPH'(•Jlt of thf' FNTeral eunlrad dnlLr. dC':-:pite 
reprntPd kgi~btion. Exf'eutiYe orrkr~ :1nd rr·~.!;ubticlllS 
mandnfing ;t{finn:ltin~ pffort:-:: to indude llliJtnrity eon-
tractors in thr FN!t·r :!1 eontr:wts pool. 
''It is a proper f'Oilt<'pt. . . . lT]he Fl·dt·rul Gowrn-
nwnt. for thr la~t 10 yt':ll's in prn~rant::; Jik(· 813..\'::: S (a) 
set-asides, and thf' Hailroad HPvitalization :\c·t '::,: minority 
resource~ <~Prtkrl'. to nunw :.1 few, ha::; H(·<:t"Jd<'d tlw set-
aside cOll<'Cpt as a lq!,itimate tool to in:'tJrP part il'ip:1tiou 
by hitlwrto C'Xduckd or umepre."'t ' ntcd g;roup::::. 
"It is n n n ppropria te tonc<'pt. be<· a UH~ mi nori t~· husi-
ne:::"es' work forces nrc prin\:ipaliy drawn from rc~idcnts 
t1f c:omnnmities " ·ith ~evcre and chronic tlllc'lnploylnPnt. 
44 
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With more business, these firms can hire even more 
minority citizens ...• 
"Many have expressed concern about the impact of this 
amendment as a limitation on contracting in areas where 
there are few minorities. But this amendment is not a 
!,imitation. Rather, it is designed to facilitate greater 
equality in contracting. This amendment provides a 
rule-of-thumb which requires much more than the vague 
"good-faith efforts" language which currently hampers 
our efforts to insure minority participation. 
"One final objection to this set-aside may be that it 
will cause undue delays in beginning these vital public 
works projects. In fact, EDA already maintains a roster 
for each State of capable and qualified minority enter-
prises who are ready and willing to work. These firms 
are capable of competitive bidding, and need the financial 
support which this potential level of Federal contracting 
will guarantee." 
-n-7.. The Subcommittee stated in part, H. R. Rep. No. 94-468;. 
p. 28 (1975): 
"According to the testimony received from Federal pro-
curing agencies, the subcommittee is of the opinion that 
there has been inadequate effort to identify minority 
businesses and match their capabilities with Federal pro-
curement requirements. There has been a lack of 'out-
reach' to the minority business community to locate 
potential minority contractors and yet some agencies have 
informed the subcommittee that there are very few 
minority businesses which can perform the specialized 
work required by those agencies in the performance of 
their contracts. The subcommittee wonders how such 
statements can be honestly made when there has not 
.been a sufficient effort to identify minority businesses in 
the first instance." 
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1f 8. The EDA guidelines, at 2-7, provide in relevant part: 
"The primary obligation for carrying out the 10% MBE 
participation requirement rests with EDA Grantees ...• 
The Grantee and those of its contractors which will make 
subcontracts or purchase substantial supplies from other 
firms (hereinafter referred to as 'prime contractors') must 
seek out all available bona fide MBE's [sic] and make 
every effort to use as many of them as possible on the 
project. 
"An MBE is bona fide if the minority group ownership 
interests are real and continuing and not created solely 
to meet 10%· MBE requirements. For example, the 
minority group owners or stockholders should possess 
control over management, interest in capital and interest 
in earnings commensurate with the percentage of owner-
ship on which the claim of minority ownership status is 
based .... 
"An MBE is available if the project is located in the 
market area of the MBE and the MBE can perform 
project services or supply project materials at the time 
they are needed. The relevant market area depends on 
the kind of services or supplies which are needed .... 
EDA will require that Grantees and prime contractors 
engage MBE's [sic] from as wide a market area as is eco-
nomically feasible. 
"An MBE is qualified if it can perform the services or 
supply the materials that are needed. Grantees and prime 
contractors will be expected to use MBE's [sic] with 
less experience than available nonminority enterprises 
and should expect to provide technical assistance to 
MBE's [s1:c] as needed. Inability to obtain bonding will 
ordinarily not disqualify an MBE. Grantees and prime 
contractors are expected to help MBE's [sic] obtain bond-
ing, to include MBE's [sic] in any overall bond or to 
waive bonding where feasible. The Small Business Ad-
•"£ • "' • 
.46 
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ministration (SBA) is prepared to provide a 90% guaran-
tee for the bond of any MBE participating in an LPW 
[local public works] project. Lack of working capital 
will not ordinarily disqualify an MBE. SBA is prepared 
to provide working capital assistance to any MBE par-
tieipating in an LP'V project. Grantees and prime con-
traetors are expected to assist MBE's [s-ic] in obtaining 
working capital through SBA or otherwise. 
" ... [E) very Grantee should make sure that it knows 
the names, arldresses and qualifications of all relevant 
MBE's [sic] which would include the project location 
in their market areas. . . . Grantees should also hold 
prebid conferences to which they invite interested 
contractors and representatives of ... MBE support 
organizations. 
"Arrangements have been made through the Office of 
Minority Business Enterprise ... to provide assistance 
to Grantees and prime contractors in fulfilling the 10% 
MBE requirement .... 
"Grantees and prime contractors should also be aware 
of other support which is available from the Small Busi-
ness Administration .... 
" ... [T]he Grantee must monitor the performance of 
its prime contractors to make sure that their commitments 
to expend funds for MBE's [sic] are being fulfilled ... . 
Grantees should administer every project tightly .... " 
~ 9. The EDA guidelines, at 13-15, provide in relevant part: 
"Although a provision for waiver is included under 
this section of the Act, EDA will only approve a waiver 
under exceptional circumstances. The Grantee must 
demonstrate that there are not sufficient, relevant, quali-
fied minority business enterprises whose market areas 
include the project location to justify a waiver. The 
Grantee must detail in its waiver request the efforts the 
Grantee and potential co:~ tractors have exerted to locate 
, . 
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'and enlist MBE's [sic]. The request must indicate the 
specific MBE's [sic] which were contacted and the reason 
·each MBE was not used .... 
"Only the Grantee can request a waiver. . . . Such a 
waiver request would ordinarily be made after the initial 
'bidding or negotiation procedures proved unsuccessful. ... 
"[A] Grantee situated in an area where the minority 
population is very small may apply for a waiver before 
·requesting bids on its project or projects .... " 
1T 10. The EDA 'technicaJ bulletin, at 1, provides the following 
definitions: 
"a) Negro-An individual of the black race of African 
origin. 
'"b) ·spanish-spea.king-An individual of a Spanish-
speaking culture and origin or parentage. 
·tic) Oriental-An individual of a culture, origin or par-
entage traceab1e to the areas south of the Soviet Union, 
East of Iran, inclusive of islands adjacent thereto, and 
out to the Pacific including but not limited to Indonesia, 
Indochina, Malaysia, Hawaii and the Philippines. 
"d) Indian-An individual having origins in any of the 
original people of North America and who is recognized as 
an Indian by either a tribe, tribal organization or a suita-
ble authority in the community. (A suitable authority in 
the community may be: educational institutions, religious 
organizations, or state agencies.) 
"e) Eskimo-An indivdiual having orgins in any of the 
original peoples of Alaska. 
"f) Aleut-An individual having orgins in any of the 
original peoples of the Aleutian Islands." 
1T 11. The EDA technical bulletin, at 19, provides in relevant 
part: 
"Any person or organization with information indicat-
ing unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals 
,. \ , . 
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in the MBE program or'who believes that the MBE par-
ticipation requirement is being improperly applied should 
contact the appropriate EDA grantee and provide a 
detailed statement of the basis for the complaint. 
"Upon receipt of a complaint, the grantee should 
attempt to resolve the issues in dispute. In the event 
the grsmtee requires assistance in reaching a determina-
tion, the grantee should contact the Civil Rights Specialist 
in the appropriate Regional Office. 
"If the complainant believes that the grantee has not 
satisfactorily resolved the issues raised in his complaint, 
he may personally contact the EDA Regional Office." 
.. 
•' 
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting 
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens ...• The .law regards man as 
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his 
color .••• " Those words were written by a Member of this Court 
eighty-four years ago. Rl0ssy v. Ferguson,. 16 3 U.S. 5 37, 5 59 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). His colleagues disagreed with him, 
and held thr.l t a sta t:u te that required the separ. a tion of people 
on the basis of their race was constitutionally valid because 
it was a "reasonable" exercise of the police pm'ler that had 
been "enacted in good faith for the promotion [of] the public 
........ ..... 
good •..• " rq_~ , at 550 • . Today, the Court upholos a statute 
that accords a preference to citizens who are "Negroes , 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts", 
because the statute is reasonable and was enacted in good faith 
for the promotion of the public gdod. I think today's decis5on 
is wrong for the same reason that _!>lessy v. ¥..<~rgus~E!: was wrong, 




The equal protection standard of the Constitution has one 
clear and central meaning -~ it absolutely prohibits racial 
discrimination by government. It is a standard that must be 
met by every State under the .Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S~ 1, 10; Hill 
v. Texas, 316 u.s. 400; Strauder v. west Virginia, 100 u.s. 
303, 307-308; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71-72. And 
it is a standard that must be met by the United States itself 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229, 239; Bolling v. Sharp~, 347 
U.S. 497.1/ Under our Constitution, any official action that 
treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic 
origin is inherently suspect and presumptively invalid. --- ~~ 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192; Bolling v. Sharpe, 
~ 
~ supra, at 499; Korematsu v. United States, 323 u.s. 214, 216.~/ ~ 7 _ 
The hostility of the Constitution to racial 
classifications by government has been manifested in many cases 
decided by this Court. See, ~' Loving v. Virginia, supra; 
Mclaughlin v. Florida, supra; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 ' 
u.s. 483; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Cana~~, 305 U.S. 337. · And 
our cases have made clear that the Constitution is wholly 
neutral in forbidding such racial discrimination, whatever the 
race may be of those who are its victims. In Anderson v. 
Martin, 375 u.s. 399, for instance, the Cour~ dealt with a 
state l~w that required that the race of each candidate for 
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election to public office be designated on the nomination 
papers and ballots. Although the law applied equally to 
candidates of whatever race, the Court held that it nonetheless 
violated the constitutional standard of equal protection. "We 
see no relevance", the Court said, "in . the State's pointing up 
the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications 
for office." Id., at 403 (emphasis added). Similarly, in 
~IJoving v. Virginia, supra, and McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, 
the Court held that statutes outlawing miscegenation and 
interracial cohabitation were constitutionally invalid, even 
though the laws penalized all violators equally. The laws were 
unconstitutional for the simple reason that they penalized 
individuals solely because of their race, whatever their race 
might be • See also Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683; 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60.1/ 
This history contains one clear lesson. Under our 
Constitution, the government may never act to the detriment of 
a person solely because of that person's race.!/ The color of 
a person's skin or the country of his origin is an immutable 
fact that bears no relation to ability, disadvantage, moral 
~
culpability, or any other char~cteristics of ~onstitutionally 
permissible interest to government. "Distinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi .v. United States, 




U.S. , . at 11. .?/ 
The rule cannot be any different when the persons 
disadvantaged by a racially biased law are not members of a 
racial minority. The guarantee of equal protecti6n is 
"universal in [its] application, to all persons .•• without 
regard to any difference of race, of color, or of 
nationality." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369. See In 
/ 
~re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717; Hernandez v. !exas, 347 U.S. 475; 
Truax v. Raic.Q., 239 u.s. 33, 39-43; Strauder v. West Virginia, 
SUE£~, 100 u.s., at 308. The command of the equal protection 
guarantee is simple but unequivocal: In the words of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "No state shall ... deny to .?!.!2Y person 
•.. the equal protection of the laws." Nothing in this 
language singles out some "persons" for more "equal" treatment 
than others. Rather, as the Court made clear in Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22, the guarantees afforded by the Equal 
Protection Clause "are, by its terms, guaranteed to the 
individual. [They] are personal rights." From the perspective 
of a person detrimentally affected by a racially discriminatory 
law, the "arbitrariness and unfairness is entirely the same, 
whatever his skin color and whatever the law's purpose, be it 
purportedly "for the promotion of the public good" or 
otherwise. 
No one disputes the self-evident proposition that Congress 
has broad discretion under its Spending Power to disburse the 
revenues of the United States as it deems best and to set 
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conditions on the receipt of the funds disbursed. No one 
disputes that Congress has the authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate contracting practices on federally funded 
public works projects, or that it enjoys broad powers under §5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce by appropriate 
legislation" the provisions of that Amendment. But these 
self-evident truisms do not begin to answer the question before 
us in this case. For in the exercise of its powers, Congress 
must obey the Constitution just as the legislatures of all the 
States must obey the Constitution in the exercise of their 
authorized powers. If a law is unconstitutional, it is nd less 
unconstitutional just because it is a product of the Congress 
of the United States. 
B 
On its face, the MBE provision at issue in this case 
denies the equal protection of the law. The Public Works 
Employment Act of 1977 directs that all project construction 
shall be performed by those private contractors who submit the 
lowest competitive bids and who meet established criteria of 
responsibility. 42 u.s.c. §6705 (e) (1) (1976 ed. Supp. I). See 
13 CFR part 317 (1978). One class of contracting firms --
defined solely according to the racial and ethnic attributes of 
their owners -- is, however, excepted from the full rigor of 
these requirements with respect to a percentage of each federal 
grant. The statute, on its face and in effect, thus bars a 
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class to which the petitioners belong from having the 
opportunity to receive a government benefit, and bars the 
members of that class solely on the basis of their race or 
ethnic background. This is precisely the kind of law that the 
guarantee of equal protection forbids. 
The Court's attempt to characterize the law as a proper ~~ 
remedial measure to counteract the effects of ~t ~r ~ent ~ 
branch of government is not a court of equity. 
'l'he legislative ~ 
It has neither~~ 
~rf 
~ 
the dispassionate objectivity nor the flexibility that are 
needed to mold a race-conscious r.emedy around the single 
objective of eliminating the effects of past or present 
discrimination.~/ 
But even assuming that Congress has power, under §5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or some other c_ons_~itutional provision, to 
remedy previous illegal racial discrimination, there was no }/5 ~ 
evidence that Congress has in the past engaged in racial ~
discrimination in its disbursement of federal contractin~ 
funds. The MBE provision thus pushes the limits of any such 
justification far beyond lhe equal protection standard of the 
Constitution. Certainly, nothing in the Constitution gives 
Congress any greater authority to impose detriments on the 
basis of race than is afforded the judicial branch.l/ And a 
judicial decree that imposes burdens on the basis of race can 
be upheld only Where its sole purpose is to eradicate the 
actual effedts of illegal race discrimination. See Pasadena 
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City Board of Education v. ~Eangler, 427 U.S. 424. 
The provision at issue here does not satisfy this 
condition. Its legislative history suggests that it had at 
least two other objectives in addition to that of counteracting 
the effects of past or present racial discrimination in the 
public works construction industry.~/ One such purpose appears 
to have been to assure to minority contractors a certain 
·percentage of federally-funded public ·works contracts.2_/ But, 
since the guarantee of equal protection immunizes from 
capricious governmental treatment "persons"-- not "races", it 
can never countenance laws that seek racial balance as a goal 
in and of itself. "Preferring members of any one group for no -
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for 
its own sake. This the Constitution forbids." Regents of the 
University of California v. ~akke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (Opinion 
of Powell, J.). Second, there are indications that the MBE 
provision may have been enacted to compensate for the effects 
of social, educational, and economic "disadvantage".lO/ No 
race, however, has a monopoly on social, educational, or 
economic disadvantage,ll/ and any law that indulges in such a 
presumption clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection. Since the MDE provision was in whole or in 
part designed to effectuate . objectives other than the - ~
elimination of the effects of racial discrimination, it cannot 
stand as a remedy that comports with the strictures of equal 




The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to ensure that every 
person must be treated equally by each State regardless of the 
color of his skin. The Amendment promised to carry to its 
necessary conclusion a fundamental principle upon which this 
nation had been founded -- that the law would honor no 
preference based on lineage.l}/ Tragically, the promise of 
·1868 was not immediately fulfilled , and decades passed before 
the States and the Federal Government were finally directed to 
eliminate detrimental classifications based on race. Today, 
the Court derails this achievement and places its imprimatur on 
the creation once again by government of privileges based on 
birth. 
The Court, mor~over, takes this drastic step without, in 
my opinion, seriously cons ic1er :i. ng th_e r~mi f ications of its 
decision. Laws that operate on the basis of race require 
definitions of race. Because of the Court's decision today, 
our statute books will once again have to contain laws that 
reflect the odious practice of delineating the qualities that 
make one person a Negro and make another white.l4/ Moreover, 
racial discrimination, even "good faith" racial discrimination, 
is inevitably a two-edged sword. "[P]referential programs may 
only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups 
are unable to achieve success without special protection based 
on a factor having no relationship to individual· worth." 
University of California R~ents v. ~akke, su~, 438 U.S., at 
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298 (Opinion of Powell, J.). Most importantly, by making race 
a relevant criterion once again in its own affairs, the 
Government implicitly teaches the public that the apportionment 
of rewards and penalties can legitimately be made according to 
race -- rather than according to merit or ability -- and that 
people can, and perhaps should, view themselves and others in 
terms of their racial characteristics. Notions of "racial 
·entitlement" will be fostered, and private discrimination will 
necessarily be encouraged.l5/ See Hughes v. Superior Court, 
339 u.s. 460, 463-464; T. Eastland & W. Bennett, Counting by 
Race 139-170 (1979); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the 
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 775 (1979). 
There are those who think that v1e need a nev1 Constitution, 
and their views may someday prevail. But under the 
Constitution we have, one practice i_n wJ]ich government may 
never indulge -- not even "temporarily" or as an "experiment" 
is the practice of racism. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
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FOOTNOTES 
! / "Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is 
the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment." Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 93. 
- 11 -
ll By contrast, nothing in the Constitution prohibits a 
private person from discriminating on the basis of race in his 
personal or business affairs. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193. The Fourteenth Amendment limits only the actions of 
the States~ the Fifth Amendment limits only the actions of the 
national government. 
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11 University of California Regents v. ~akke, 438 U.S. 265, 
and United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, do not 
suggest a different rule. The Court in Bakke invalidated the 
racially preferential admissions program that had deprived 
Bakke of equal access to a place in the medical school of a 
state university. In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, a 
state legislature had apportioned certain voting districts with 
an awareness of their racial composition. Since the plaintiffs 
there had "failed to show that the legislative reapportionment 
plan had either the purpose or the effect of discriminating 
against them on the basis of their race", no constitutional 
violation had occured. 430 U.S. 179-180 {concurring opinion). 
No person in that case was deprived of his electoral franchise. 
More than thirty-five years ago, during the Second World 
'var, this Court did find constitutional a governmental program 
imposing injury on the basis of race. See Korematsu v. United 
State~, 323 U.S. 214~ Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 
81. Significantly, those cases were decided not only in time 
of war, but in an era before the Court had held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the same equal 
protection standard upon the federal governmerit that the 
Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the States. See Bolling_ v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497. 
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!/ A court of equity may, of course, take race into account in 
devising a remedial decree to undo a viol ation of a law 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race. See Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324; Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 u.s. 747; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 18-25; North Carolina Board of Education 
v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43. But such a judicial decree, following 
litigation in which a violation of law has been determined, is 
wholly different from generalized legislation that awards 
benefits and imposes detriments dependent upon the race of the 
recipients. See text in Part B, infra. 
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2.1 As Mr. Justice Murphy t.Hote in dissenting from the Court's 
opinion and judgment in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 242: 
Racial discrimination in any form and in any 
degree has no justifiable part whatever in our 
democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any 
setting but it is utterly revolting among a free 
people who have embraced the principles set forth in 
the Constitution of the United States. 
See also Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 u.s. 312, 331-344 (Douglas, 
J. , dissenting)i A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 132-133 
(1975 ) . 
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~/ See n. 4, ~upra. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, the 
Court approved a county's voluntary race-conscious redrafting 
of its public school pupil assignment system in order to 
eliminate the effects of past unconstitutional racial 
segregation of the pupils. But no pupil was deprived of a 
public school education as a result. 
' ' 
- 16 -
11 Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the 
authority to "enforce'' the provisions of Section 1 of the same 
Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article." Neither section 
grants to Congress the authority to require the States to flout 
their obligation under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
afford "the equal protection of the laws" or the power to enact 
legislation that itself violates the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
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~/ The legislative history of the MBE provision itself 
contains not one mention of racial discrimination or the need 
to provide a mechanism to correct the effects of such 
discrimination. From the context of the Act, however, it is 
reasonable to infer that the program wa$ enacted, at least in 
part, to remedy perceived past and present racial 
discrimination. In 1977, Congress knew that many minority 
business enterprises had historically suffered racial 
discrimination in the economy as a whole and in the 
construction industry in particular. See H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1791, pp. 182-183 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 1-2 
(1975); To Amend and Extend the Local Public Works CaEital 
Development and Investment Act: Hearing_~- before the Subcomm. 
on Economic Dev~_loprnent of the House Comm. on Public Works and 
Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 939 (1977) (statement of 
Rep. Conyers). Some of this discrimination may well, in fact, 




2.1 See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl436 (Feb. 24, 1977) (Rep. Mitchell) 
("all [the MBE provision] attempts to do is to provide that 
those who are in minority businesses get a fair share of the 
.action from this public works legislation") (emphasis supplied); 
123 Cong. Rec. Hl440 (Feb. 24, 1977) (Rep. Biaggi) ("It is time 
that the thousands of minority businessme n enjoyed a sense of 
economic ~ri ty") (empha sis supplied). Moreover, sponsors of 
the legislation repeatedly referred to the low participation 
rate of minority businesses in federal procu r ement programs. 
See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl440 (Feb. 24, 1977) (Rep. Biaggi) ~ 123 
Cong. Rec. Hl436 - Hl437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (Rep. Mitchell); 123 
Cong. Rec. Hl388- Hl389 (Feb. 23, 1977) (Rep. Mitchell); 123 
Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977} (Sen. Brooke). 
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10/ See 123 Cong. Rec .. Hl440 (Feb. 24, 1977) (Rep. Conyers) 
("minority contractors and businessmen who are trying to enter 
in on the bidding process ... get the 'works' almost every 
time. The bidding process is one whose intricacies defy the 
imaginations of most of us here.") That the elimination of 
"disadvantage 11 is one of the program's objectives is an 
inference that finds support in the agency's own interpretation 
of the statute. See u.s. Department of Commerce, Economic 
Development Administration, EDA Minority Business Enterprise 
Technical Bulletin (Additional Assistance and Information 
Available to Grantees and Their Contractors In Meeting The 10% 
MBE Requirement) 9-10 (Oct . 11, 19'77) (Technical Bulletin) ("a 
[minority] subcontractor's price should not be considered 
unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs because 
the price results from disadvantage which affects the MBE's 
costs of doing business or results from discrimination" 
(emphasis added)). 
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11/ For instance, in 1978, 83.4%. of persons over the age of 25 
who had not completed high school were "white", see U.S. Dept. 
of Commerce Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 145 (1979), and, in 1977, 79.9% of households 
with annual incomes less than $5,000 were "white", see id., at 
458. 
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12/ Moreover, even a properly based judicial decree will be 
struck down if the scope of the remedy it provides is not 
carefully tailored to fit the nature and extent of the 
violation. See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 
4 0 6 , 419- 4 2 0 ; M i 1 1 i ken v . B r ad 1 e_y, 418 U . S • 7 1 7 . Her e , 
assuming that the MBE provision was intended solely to remedy 
for past and present racial discrimination, it sweeps far too 
broadly. It directs every state and local government covered 
by the program to set aside 10% : of its grant for minority 
business enterprises. Waivers from that requirement are 
permitted, but only where insufficient numbers of minority 
businesses capable of doing the work at non-exorbitant prices 
are located in the relevant contracting area. No waiver is 
provided for any governmental entity that can prove a history 
free of racial discrimination. Nor .is ~ny exemption permitted 
for nonminority contractors that are able to demonstrate that 
they have not engaged in racially discriminatory behavior. 
Finally, the statute makes no attempt to direct the aid it 
provides solely toward those minority contracting firms that 
arguably still suffer from the effects of past or present 
discrmination. 
These are not the characteristics of a racially-conscious 
remedial decree that is cl6sely tailored to the evil to be 
corrected. In today's society, it constitutes far too gross an 
oversimplification to assume that every single Negro, 
Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo and Aleut 
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potentially interested .in construction contracting currently 
suffers from the effects of past or present racial 
discrimination. Since the MBE set-aside must be viewed as 
resting upon such an assumption, it necessarily paints with too 
broad a brush. Except to make whole the identified victims of 
racial discrimination, the guarantee of equal protection 
prohibits the government from taking detrimental action against 
innocent people on the basis of the sins of others of their own 
race. 
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13/ The Framers of our Constitution lived at a time \>'hen the 
Old World still operated in the shadow of ancient feudal 
traditions. As products of the Age of Enlightenment, they set 
out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions 
among white men on account of their birth. See U.S. 
Constitution, Article I, §9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall 
be granted by the United States"). The words Thomas Jefferson 
· wrote in 1776 in the Declaration of Independence, however, 
contained the seeds of a far broader principle: "We hold these 
truths to be self-evident: all men are created equal ...• " 
I' 
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14/ See Technical Bulletin, SUP£~, at 1. Cf., Ala. Code tit. 
1, §2 (19 40); Tex. Penal Code Art. 493 (1947). 
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15/ "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. 
For· good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example." Olmstead v. United States, 277 u.s. 438, 485 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
' .  
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MR. JUS'l'ICE MARSH Z'. IJL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins , 
concurring in the judgment. - ---
My resolution of the constitutional issue in this cas e is 
governed by the separate opinion I coauthored in University of 
Californi a Regen t s v . Bakke, 438 U. S . 265, 324-379 (1978). In 
my v iew, the 10% minority set-aside provision of the Public 
Work s Employment Act of 1977 passes constitutional muste r under 
J the standard announced in that opinion. _II 
I 
I n Bakke , I j oined my Brothers BRENNAN, WHITE, and BLACKMON 
in articu l ating the view th a t "racial classifications are not 
12er ~ invalid under [the Equal Protection Clause o f ] the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 356 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, 
MARSHALL, and BLACKMON, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (hereinafter cited as joint s epa rate 
op i nion ) . -.l:_l We acknowledged that "a government practice or 
statute which .. . contains 'suspect classifications' is to be 
subjected to ' st r ict scrutiny' and c nn be jus tified only if it 
furthers a compe lling gove r nmental purpose and, even then, only 
.. 
-l-
if no less restrictive alternative is available." .!.9_.:.., at 
357. Thus, we reiterated the traditional view that racial 
classifications are prohibited if they are irrelevant. Id.:.., at 
357. In addition, we firmly adhered to "the cardinal 
principle that racial classifications that stigmatize~-because 
they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to 
another or because they put the weight of government behind 
racial hatred and separatism--are invalid without more." Id., 
at 357-358. 
We recognized, however, that these principles outlawing the 
irrelevant or pernicious use of race were inapposite to racial 
classifications that provide benefits to minorities for the 
purpose of remedying the present effects of past racial 
discrimination. _l/ Such classifications may disadvantage some 
whites, but whites as a class lack the "'traditional indicia of 
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, 
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political procesS. 1 11 Id., at 357 (quoting San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 u.s. 1, 28 
(1973) ). See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
u.s. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938 ) . Because the consideration of race 
is relevant to remedying the continuing effects of past racial 
discrimination, and because governmental programs employing 
racial classifications for remedial purposes can be crafted to 
avoid stigmatizaUon, we concluded that such programs should 
not be subjected to conventional 11 strict scrutiny"--scrutiny 
·- 5-- /c:~~~'1'.· 
fatal in fact .. Id.,.at 362. ~ ~ that is strict in theory, but 
~,.,...._ 
Nor did we determine that such programs should be analyzed 
under the minimally rigorous rational-basis standard of 
review. Id., at 358. We recognized that race has often been 
used to stigmatize politically powerless segments of society, 
and that efforts to ameliorate the effects of past 
· discrimination could be based on paternalistic stereotyping, 
not on a careful consideration of modern social conditions. In 
addition, lt!e acknowledged that governmental classification on 
the immutable characteristic of race runs counter to the deep 
nationa l belief that State-sanctioned ben~fits and burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual merit and 
responsibility. Id., a t 360-361. 
We concluded , therefore, that because a racial 
classifi cation ostensibly designed for remedial purposes is 
susceptibl e t o misuse , it c~d ~ by showing "an I !;~ 
important and articulated purpose for its use . " Id., at 361. ~
" In add i tion, any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any -1 1 group o r tha t si ngles out those least well represented i n the 
pol itical process to bear the brunt of a benign program." 
I b id . In our v iew, then , t he proper inquiry is whether racia l ~ 
classifications designed to furt her remed i al purposes serve  
impor t ant governmental objectives and are substantially rela~ 
to achievement of those objectives. Id. , a t 359. 
II 
J udged under this standard, t he 10% minority set-aside 
provision at i ssue in this case i s plainly cons~itutional. 
I ndeed, the question is not even a close one. 
~·-
.. 
As the Court demonstrutes, see ante, at 6-16, it is 
~
indisputable that Congress' articulated purpose for enacting 
the set-aside provision was to remedy the present effects of 
past racial discrimination. See also the separate opinion of 
My Brother POWELL, post, at 9-12. Congress had a sound basis 
for concluding that minority-owned construction enterprises, 
though capable, qualified, and ready and willing to work, have 
received a disproportionately small amount of public 
contracting business because of the continuing effects of past 
discrimination. Here, as in Bakke, supra, at 362 (joint 
separate opinion), "minority underrepresentation is substantial 
and chronic, and ... the handicap of past discrimination is 
impeding access of minorities to" the benefits of the 
governmental program. In these circumstances, remedying these 
present effects of past racial discrimination is a sufficiently 
important governmental interest to justify the use of raci al 
classifications. Ibid. See generally id., at 362-373. __!/ 
Because t osen by Congress to implement the 
substantially related to the ~ 
----- - -- ~u~1-'l 
remedial purpose, the provision also meets---achievement of its 
the second prong of our Bakke test. Congress reasonably 
determined that race-conscious means were necessary_ to break 
down the barriers confronting participation by minority 
enterprises in federally funded public works projects. That~ 
the set-aside creates a-~in favor of qualified and /.A JA . • C7" '* ,pt;;..,~ 
available minority business enterprises does not necessurily ~~ 
~;~., 
indicate that it stigmatizes. As our opinion stated in Bakke, 0 
"[f]or purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no 
·-j-
difference between" setting aside "a predetermined number of 
places for qualified minority applicants rather than using 
minority status as a positive factor to be considered in 
evaluating the applications of disadvantaged minority 
applicants." Id., at 378. The set-aside, as enacted by 
Congress and implemented by the Secretary of Commerce, is 
ca refully tailored to remedy racial discrimination while at the 
~- "'7 
same tm1e avoiding stigmatization and penalizing those least 
able to protect themselves in the political process. See ante, 
at 28-36. Cf. the separate opinion of My Brother POWELL, post, 
,.-.J 
V"'-
at 14-21. Since under the set-aside provision a contract may 
be awarded to a minority enterprise only if it is qualified to 
do the work, the provision stigmatizes as inferior neither a 
minorjty firm that benefits from it nor a nonminority firm that 
is burdened by it. Nor does the set-aside "establish a quota 
in the invidious sense of a ceiling," Bakke, supra, at 375 
(joint separate opinion), on the number of minority firms that 
can be awarded public works contracts. In addition, the 
set-aside affects only a miniscule amount of the funds annually 
expended in the United States for construction work. See ante, 
j at 33, n. 72. 
In sum, it is clear to me that the racial classlfications 
employed in the set-aside provision are substantially related 
to the achievement of the important and congressionally 
articulated goal of remedying the present effects of past 
racial discrimination. The provision, therefore, passes muster 





In my separate opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-396, I 
recounted the "ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination 
against the Negro" long condoned under the Constitution and 
concluded that "[t)he position of the Negro today in America is 
the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal 
treatment." Id., at 387, 395. I there stated: 
"It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we · 
now must permit the institutions of this society to give 
consideration to race in making decisions about who will 
hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige in 
America. For far too long, the doors to those positions 
have been shut to Negroes. If we are ever to become a 
fully integrated society, one in which the color of a 
person's skin will not determine the opportunities 
available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps 
to open those doors . " I d., at 401. 
Those doors cannot be fully opened without the acceptance of 
race-conscious remedies. As my Brother BLACKMUN observed in ---Bakke, "[i] n order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race. There is no other way." Id., at 407 
(separate opinion ) . 
Congress recognized these realities when it enacted the 
minority set-aside provision at issue in this case. Today, by 
upholding this race-conscious remedy , the Court accords 
Congress the authority necessary to undertake the task of 
moving our society toward a state of meaningful equality of 
opportunity, not an abstract version of equality in which the 
effects of past discrimination would be forever frozen into our 
-7-
social fabric. I applaud this result. Accordingly, I concur 





1. On the authority of Bakke, it is also clear to me 
that the set-aside provision does not violate Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. In Bakke five 
members of the Court were of the view that the prohibitions of 
Title VI--which outlaws racial discrimination in any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance--are 
coextensive with the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See 438 u.s., at 328 (Opinion of 
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.) ~· id., at 287 
(Opinion of POWELL, J.). 
2. In Bakke, the issue was whether a special minority 
admissions program of a state medical school violated the Equal 
Protection Clau se of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the present 
case, the issue is whether the minority set-aside provision 
violate s the equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As noted in Bakke, " 1 [e]qual 
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 " 438 u.s., at 367, n. 43 
(joint separate opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 
93 (1976) (per curiam)). 
3. In Bakke, the Medical School of the University of 
California at Davis had adopted a special admissions program in 
which 16 out of the 100 places in each entering class were 
reserved for disadvantaged minorities. A major purpose of this 
progrrun was to ameliorate the present effects of past racial 
discrimination. See 438 U.S., at 362 (joint separate opinion); 
id., at 306 {Opinion of POWELL, J). 
4. Petitioners argue that the set-aside is invalid 
because Congress did not create a sufficient legislative record 
to support its conclusion that racial classifications were 
required to ameliorate the present effects of· past racial 
discrimination. In petitioners' view, Congress must make 
particularized findings that past violations of the Equal 
Protection Clause and antidiscrimination statutes have a 
current effect on the construction industry. 
This approach is fund~entally misguided. Unlike the 
courts, Congress is engaged in the broad mission of framing 
general social rules, not adjudicating individual disputes. 
Our prior decisions recognize Congress' authority to 
"require or authorize preferential trea~ent for those 
likely disadvantaged by societal racial 
discrimination. Such legislation has been sustained 
even without a requirement of findings of intentional 
racial discrimination by those required or authorized 
to accord preferential trearnent, or a case-by-case 
determination that those to be benefited suffered from 
racial discrimination.'' Bakke, 438 u.s., at 366 
(joint separate opinion). 
I 
' . 
See also ante, at 26; the separate opinion of My Brother 
POWELL, post, at 8-9. 
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
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Recirculated: ____________ _ 
The 10% set-aside contained in t~e Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 11.6 ("the Act") creates monopoly 
privileges in a $400,000,000 market for a class of investors ~J 
defined solely by racial characteristics. The oirect 
beneficiaries of these monopoly privileges are the relatively 
small number of persons wit~jn the racial classification who 
borrow, working capital. 
History teaches us that the costs associated wit~ a 
sovereign's grant of exclusive privileges often encompass mor~ 
than the high prices and shoddy workmanship that are Familiar 
hand maidens of monopoly: they engender animositv and 
discontent as well. The economic consequences of using noble 
birth as a basis for classification in eighteenth century 
France, though disastrous, were nothing as compared with the 
terror that was engendered in the name of "egalite" and 
"fraternite." Grants of privilege on the bas-is of -4.. 





Our historic aversion to titles of nobility~/ is only one 
aspect df our commitment to the proposition that thP sovereign 
has a fundamental duty to govern impartially.~/ When 
government accords different treatment to different persons, 
there must be a reason for the difference.l/ Because racial 
1/ "Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a 
'legitimate purpose' for our Fe0eral Government, which 
should be especially sensitive to ~iscrimination on grounds 
of birth. 'Distinctions between citizens solely because oF 
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality .' Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 u.s. 81, 
100. From its inception, the Feneral Government has been 
directed to treat all its citizens as having been 'cr eated 
equal' in the eyes of the law. ~he Declaration oF 
Independence states: 
"'We hold these truths to be self-evident , that all 
men are created equal , that they are en~owe0 by the ir 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.' 
"And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant 
of any title of nobility by the United States, see u.s. 
Canst., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, equally would prohibit the 
United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a 
citizen at birth. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, S?0-521 
n. 3 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
~/ "The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern 
impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is 
served by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process, 
as well as by the Equal Protection ~lause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100. 
See a!.so Harris v. McRae, u.s. , (S~EVENS, ,J., 
dissenting); rraig v. Boren,-429 u.~lq~2ll fSTEVENS, J., 
concurring) . 
ll "As a matter of principle and in view of mY attitude 
toward the equal protection clause, I do not think 
differences of treatment under law should be approved on 
classification because of di fferences _.uorelated i;..Q"_the 
legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to 
assure either equaltty or protection if it is avoi~e~ by 
any conceivable difference that can be pointed out between 
those bound and those left free. This rourt has often 
announced the principle that the differentiation must have 
an appropriate relation to the obiect of the legislation or 
ordinance." Railway Express v. New York, 336 u.s. 106, 11s 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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characteristics so seldom provide a ~elevant basis for 
disparate treatment,i/ and because classifications based on 
race are potentially so harmful to the entire body po1itic,21 
it is especially important that the reasons for any such 
classification be clearly identified and unqufU=itionab1y 
legitimate. -
il "Habit, rather than analysis, makeR it seem acceptable 
and natural to distinguish between male and fema 1e, 
alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate: for 
too much of our history there was the same inertia in 
distinguishing between black and white. But that sort 
of stereotyped reaction may have no rational 
relationship--other than pure preludicial 
discrimination--to the stated purpose for which the 
classification is being made." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 
U.S. 495, 520-521 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omit ted) • 
5/ Indeed, the very attempt to define with precision a 
bineficiary's qualifying racial characteristics is repugnant to 
our constitutional ideals. The so-calJed guidelines developed 
by the Economic Development Administration, see the Court's 
appendix, ante, at 47, are so general as to be fairly 
innocuous;-as-a consequence they are too vague to be useful. 
For example, it is unclear whether the firm described in n. 16, 
infra, would be eligible for the JO% set-aside. If the 
Nat1onal Government is to make a serious effort to 0efine 
racial classes by criteria that can be administered 
objectively, it must study precedents such as the Reichs 
Citizenship Law of November J4, 1935, trans1ate0 in 4 Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression 1417-PS, p.8-9 (1946): 
"On the basis of Article 3, Reichs Citizenship Law, of 15 Sept. 
1935 (RGBl. I, page 146) the following is ordered: 
* * * * * 
"Article 5 
"l. A Jew is anyone who descended from at 1east three 
grandparents who were racially full ~ews. Article 2, par. ?, 
second sentence will apply. 
"2. A Jew is also one who descended from two fu11 ~ewish 
parents, if: (a) he belonged to the Jewish religious community 
at the time this Jaw was issued, or who loined the community 
later; (b) he was married to a Jewish peq;oo, at the-t.i_me the 
law was issued, or married one subsequently: fc) he is the 
offspring from a marriage with a Jew, in the sense of Section 
1, which was contracted after the Law for the protection of 
German blood and German honor became effective (RGBl. I, page 
1146 of 15 Sept 1935); (d) he is the offspring of an 
extramarital relationship, with a Jew, acco~ding to Section 1, 
and will be born out of wedlock after July 31, 1936.". 
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Th s defined by the Act to inc,uoe 
"citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." 
All aliens and all non-members of the racial class are 
excluded. No economic, social_, geographic or historical 
criteria are relevant for exclusion or inclusion. ~here is not 
one word in the remainder of the Act or in the legislative 
history that explains why any Congressman or Senator favored 
this particular definition over any other or that i~enti~ies 
the common characteristics that every member of the preferred 
class was believed to share.~/ Nor does the Act or its 
history explain why JO% of the total appropriation was the 
proper amount to set aside for investors in each or the six 
racial subclasses.2 1 
--~~~~~----~--~~~------6/ In 1968, almost 10 years before the Act was passed, the 
Small Business Administration had oevelopeo a program to assist 
small business concerns owned or controlled by "socially or 
economically disadvantaged pe~sons." The Agency's description 
of persons eligible for such assistance stated that such 
"persons include, but are not limited to, black Americans, 
American Indians, Spanish-Americans, oriental Americans, 
Eskimos and Aleuts. " Ante, at 12. Evidently, this is 
the origin of the class at issue in this case. But the SBA's 
class of socially or economically disadvantaged persons neither 
included all persons in the racial class nor excluded all 
nonmembers of the racial class. Race was used as no more than 
a factor in identifying the class of disadvantaged. The 
difference between the statutory quota involved in this case 
and the SBA's 1968 description of those whose businesses were 
to be assisted under § 8(a) of the Small Business Act is thus 
at~t as the difference between the University of 
California's raci~l quota and the Harvaro admissions system 
that MR. JUSTICEVPOWELL regarded as critical in University of 
California v. Bakke, ·438 u.s. 265, 315-31~. ......,."'_ 
7/ It was noted that the va1ue of the federal contracrs 
awarded to minority business firms in prior years had amounted 
to less than 1% of the total~ since the statutory set asi~e of 
10% may be satisfied by subcontracts to minority business 
enterprises, it is possible that compliance with the statute 
would not change the 1% figure. 
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Four different, though somewhat interrelated, +~~­
 
justifications for the racial classifications in t~is Act have 
... -been advanced: first, that the 10% set aside is a form of 
reparation for past injuries to t~e entire membership of each 
of the six classes; second, that it is an appropriate remenv 
for past discrimination against minority business enterprisPs 
that have been denied access to public contracts; thiro, t~at 
the members of the favored classes have a specia l entit lement 
to "a piece of the action" when government is distri~uting 
benefits; and , fourth, t~at the program is an appropriate 
method of fostering greater minority participation in a 
competitive economy. Each of these a~serted iustifications 
merits separate scrutiny. 
7/ (continued) 
- The legislative history also revealed that minority 
business enterprises represented about 3 or 4% of a11 eligible 
firms; the history does not jndicate, however, w~ether the 10% 
figure was intended to provide the existing firms with three 
times as much business as they could expect to receive on a 
random basis or to encour age members of the class to acquire or 
form new firms. An EDA guideline arguably }mplies that new 
investments made in order to take anvantage or t~e 10% set 
aside would not be considered "bona fide." See ante, at 45. 
The 10% figure bears no special relationship to t~e 
relative size of the entire racial class, to any of the six 
subclasses, or to the population of any of them in the areas 
where they primar51y reside . The Aleuts and the Eskimos, for 
example , respectively represent less than 1% and 7% of the 
population of AJ ask a,· see The New rol umb i a f:ncyc l opediQ_ 
(Columbia University Press 1975), pp. 47, ~Q, 9q1, while 
Spanish-speaking or Negro citizens represent a maiority or 
almost a majority in a large number of urban areas . In the 
State of Hawaii, citizens of Japanese ancestry far outnumber 
the descendants of the native Hawaiians, yet the larger group 




Racial characteristics may serve to define a group of 
persons who have suffered a special wrong and who, thPrefore, 
are entitled to special reparations. Congress has rpcognizeA, 
for example, that the United States has treated some Tnd~an 
tribes unjustly and has created procenures for allowing members 
of the injured classes to obtain cJasswide relief . 
See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business Comm~ttee v. Weeks, 430 
U.S. 73. But as I have tormerly suggested, if Congress is to 
authorize a recovery for a class of similarly situated vict~ms 
of a past wrong, it has an obligation to distribute that 
recovery among the members of the injured class in an 
evenhanded way. See~ at 97-98 (S~EVENS, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, in such a case the amount of the aware should bear 
some rational reJationship to the extent of the harm it is 
intended to cure. 
In his eloquent separate opinion in University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 , 387, MR. JUS~Tr.E 
MARSHALL recounted the tragic class-based discrimination 




I assume that the wrong committed against the Negro ------class is both so serious and so pervasive that it would - -----
constitutionally just·ify an appropriate c~a~swide rec..o'i_ery 
measured by a sum certain for every member of the iniured 
class. Whether our resources are adequate to support a fair 





the authority nor the wisdom to aonress. But that serious 
classwioe wrong cannot in itself iustify the particular 
classification Congress has made in this Act. Racial 
-----------------------~~---------------------classifactions are simply too pernicious to permit any but t~e 
most exact connection between justification and 
classification. Quite obviously, the history of discrimination 
~
against black citizens jn America cannot iustiry a grant of 
privileges to Eskimos or Indians . 
Even jf we assume that each of the six racial subclasses 
has suffered its own special iniury at some time in our 
history , surely it does not necessarily follow that each of 
those subclasses suffered harm of identical magnitude . 
Although "the Negro was dragged to this country in chains to be 
solo in sJavery , " Bakk~ Opinion of MARSHALL , J. , supra, 43 8 
U.S. , at 387 , the "Spanish speaking" subclass came voluntarily , 
frequently without invitation , and the Indians, the Eskimos ann 
the Aleuts had an opportunity to exploit America ' s resources 
before most American citizens arrived . There is no reason to 
assume, and nothing in the Jegislative history suggests much 
less demonstrates, that each of these subclasses is equally 
entitled to reparations from the United States Government . ~/ 
Further, I believe it is unrealistic to regarn the 
statutory preference ·as a form of reparat~OD ror the...m~_mbers of 
the injured classes. For those who are the most aisanvantagen 
-a; Ironically , the Aleuts appear to have been ruthlessly 
exploited at some point in their history by Russian fur 
traders . See The New Columbia Encyclopedia, p . SQ . 
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within each class are the least likely to receive anv benefit 
from the special prjvjJege even though they are the persons 
most likely to be still suffering the consequences of the past 
wrong.~/ A random d}stribution to a favored few is a poor 
form of compensation for an injurv share~ bv manv. 
My principal objection to the reparation iustification for 
this legislation, however, cuts more deeply than mv concern 
about its inequitable character . We can never either erase or -
ignore MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL has recounted . 
But if that history can justify such a random d}stribution of 
benefjts on racial lines as that embodied in this statutory 
scheme , it will serve not merely as a basis for remedial 
legislation, but rather as a permanent source of iustification ~i) 
~ -------~ 
for grants of special privileges . For i f there is no ~u~v to 
attempt either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to 
distribute that recovery within the iniured class in an 
~or a similar reason, t'f-Je discdmination against males 
c~ndemned in Califano v . Goldfarb, 430 U.S . 199 , caul~ not be 
justified as a remedy for past o1scrimination against females . 
That case involved a statutory provision which relieved wi0ows 
from the obligation of proving dependency on their 0eceased 
spouse in order to obtain benefits , but did not simil iar 
relieve widowers . 
"The widows who benefit from the disparate treatment are 
those who were sufficiently successful in the ~ob market to 
become nondependent on their husbands . Such a wi0ow is the 
least likely to need special benefits. ~he wi~ow most in 
need is the one who js 'suddenly forced into a ~ob mar~et 
with which she is· unfamiliar, and in '.'Jhich, beca\.l.S~_ of her 
former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to 
of fer . ' r Kahn v . she v i n , 4 16 u . S . 3 5 1_ , 1 3 5 4 . To accept 
the Kahn justTficatlon we must presume that rongress 
deliberately gave a special benefit to those females least 
likely to have been victims of the historic discrimination 
discussed in Kahn . " 430 u.s., at 221 (S~EVENS , ,f. , 




evenhanded way, our history will adequatelv support a 
legislative preference for almost any ~thnic, religious, or 
racial group with the political strength to negotiate "a piece 
of the action" for its members. 
Although I do not dispute the validity of the assumption 
that each of the subclasses identified in the Act has suffere0 
a severe wrong at some time in the past, I cannot accept this 
slapdash statute as a legitimate method of provi~ing c1ass-wi0e 
relief. 
II 
The Act may also be viewed as a much narrower. remedial 
measure--one designed to grant relief to the specific minoritv 
business enterprises that have been oenied access to public 
contracts by discriminatory practices. 
The legislative history of the Act does not te11 us when, 
or how often, any minority business enterprise was denieA such 
access. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer that the 
number of such incidents has been re1atjvely small in recent 
years. For, as noted by the Solicitor General, in the last 
twenty years Congress has enacted numerous statutes 0esigned to 
eUminate discrimination and its effects ~r9m feoeraJ.l'¥_ func1e0 
programs. 101 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1qh4 
10/ "The statute with the most comprehensive coverage is 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1Q64, 42 u.s.r. 20000 
et seq., wh5ch broadly prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin in any program or 
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unequivocalJy ana comprehensively p r ohibits disc~imination on 
the basis of race in any program or activity receivjng fe0era1 
financial assistance. In vjew of the scarcitv of litigated 
claims on behalf of mjnority busine s s enterprjses during t~is 
period, ana the lack of any contrary evinence in the 
legislative record, it is appropriate to presume t~at t~e law 
has generally been obeyed . 
Assuming, however, that some firms have been denied public 
business for racial reasons , the instant statutory remedy is 
nevertheless demonstrably much broader than is necessary to 
'-- ---- - -...._---....,_ -.../ right any such past wrong . For the statute grants the special 
preference to a class that includes (l) those minority owned 
firms that have successfully obtained business in the past on a 
free competitive basis ana undoubtedly are capable of doing so 
in the future as we l.l; ( 2 ) firms that have nevet' at tempted to 
obtain any public business in the past; (3 ) firms t~at were 
initjally formed after the Act was passed , including t~ose that 
may have been organized simply to take advantage of its 
provisions;~/ (4) firms that have tried to obtain public 
lQ./ (continued) 
activity receiving federal financial assistance . Since the 
passage of Title VI, many other specific federal grant 
statutes have contained similar prohibitions against 
discrimination in particular funded activities. See , e.g., 
State ana Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976, 31 
U.S . C. 1242; Energy Conservation ana Pro0uction Act, 42 
U.S.C. 6870 ; Housing ana Community Deye}opment A~ .. _of 1q74, 
42 U.S.C. 5309; Comprehensive Employment ana Training Act 
of 1973, 29 u.s.c. 991." Brief for Respondent 21 , n.7 . 
11/ Although the plain language of the statute appears to 
include such firms, as I have already noted supra, at , n.7, 
the EDA guidelines may consider such newly formed firms 
ineligible for the statutory set-aside . 
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business but were unsuccessful for reasons that are unrelater 
to the racial characteristics of their stockholders; and (5) 
those firms that were victimized by racial discrimination. 
Since there is no reason to believe that any of the firms 
in the first four categories had been wrongfully exclu0ed from 
the market for public contracts, the statutory preference for 
those firms cannot be justified as a remedial measure. And 
since a judicial remedy was already available for the firms in 
the fifth category,~/ it seems inappropriate to regard the 
preference as a remedy designed to redress any specif ic 
wrongs.!ll In any event, since it is highly unlikely that 
the composition of the fifth category is at a11 representative 
of the entire class of firms to which the statute grants a 
valuable preference, it is ill-fitting to characterize this as 
a "narrowly tailored" remedial measure.2.!1 
12/ See University of California Reg e nts v. Bakke, supra, 438 
~S., at 418-421 (Opinion of STEVENS, J.). See also~ ?07fo) 
of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment 
Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 999, 1007-1008. 
13/ I recognize that the EDA has issued a technical bulletin, 
relied on heavily by the Court, ante, at 18-20, which 
distinguishes between higher bids quoted by minority 
subcontractors which are attributable to the effects of 
disadvantage or discrimination and those which are not. That 
is, according to the bulletin, if it is determined that a 
subcontractor's uncompetitive high price is not attributable to 
the effects of discrimination, a contractor may be entit1e0 to 
relief from the 10% set-aside requirement. But even assuming 
that the technical bulletin accurately reflects rongress' 
jntent in enacting the . set-aside, it is not, ~asy to e~~?ion 
_how one could realistically demonstrate with any 0egree of 
precision, if at all, th~ extent to which a bid has been 
inflated by the effects of disadvantage or past 
discrimination. Consequently, while the Court's opinion 
describes the set-aside as a remedia 1 measure, it plainly 
operates as a flat quota. 
14/ See the Court's opinion, ante, at 28 . 
. ~ . 
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TII 
The legislative history of the Act discloses that there is 
a group of legislators in Congress identified as the "Black 
Caucus" and that members of that group argued that if the ...___ 
Federal Government was going to p r ovide $4,000,000,000 of new 
public contract business, their constituents were entitlen to 
"a piece of the action." 
It is neither unusual nor reprehensible for rongressmen to 
promote the authorization of public construction in thei~ 
districts. The flow of capital and employment into a district 
inevitably has both direct and indirect consequences that are 
beneficial. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN noted in Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, however, the award of such contracts may become a 
form of poJitical patronage that is dispensed by the party in --- ~- .....___...,___ --- --------------power.~/ AJthough the practice of awarding such contracts -to political allies may be as much a part of our history as the 
employment practices condemned in Elrod, it wou~d surely be 
unconstitutional for the legislature to specify that all, or a 
certain portion, of the contracts authorized by a specific 
statute must be given to businesses controlled by members of 
one political party or another. ~hat would be true even if the 
legislative majodty 'Was convinced that a _. djsproport,i.QQ_ate 
share had been awarded to the opposite party in previous years . 
15/ "Non-officeholders may be the beneficiaries of lucrative 
government contracts for highway construction, buildings, ann 
supplies." 427 u.s., at 353. 
... . 
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In the short run our political processes might benef;t from 
legislation that enhanced the ability of representatives of 
minority groups to disseminate patronage to their political 
backers. But jn the long run any rule that authorized the 
award of public busjness on a racial basis would be iust as 
objectionable as one that awarded such business on a purely 
partisan basis. 
The legislators' interest in provjding their constituents 
with favored access to benefits distributed by the Fe0eral 
Government ]s, in my opinion, a plainly impermissible 
justification for this racjal classification. 
IV 
The interest in facilitat]ng and encouraging the 
participation by minority business enterprises in the economy 
is unquestionably legitimate. Any barrier to such entrv and 
growth--whether grounded in the law or in irrational 
prejudice--should be vigorously and thoroughly removed. 
Equality of economic and investment opportunity is a goal of no 
less importance than equality of employment opportunity. ~his 
statute, however, is not designed to remove any barriers to 
entry. Nor does its sparse leg;slative history aeta il anv 
insuperabJe or even significant obstacles _. ts> entry iR.t9. the 
competjt]ve market . 
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Three difficulties encountered by minority business 
enterprises ·jn seeking government business on a competitive 
basis are identified in the legislative history. The~e were 
references to (1) unfamiliarity with bidding procedures 
fo1lowed by procurement officers, (2) difficulties in obtaining 
financing and (3) past discrjmination in the construction 
industry. 
The first concern is no doubt a real problem for all 
businesses seeking access to the public contract market for the 
first time . It justifies a thorough review of bjdding 
practices to make sure that they are intelligible and 
accessible to all . It by no means 4ustifies an assumption that 
minority business enterprises are any Jess able to p~epare and 
submit bids in proper form than are any other businessmen. 
Consequently , that concern does not 4ustify a statutory 
classification on racjaJ grounds . 
The second concern wouJd justify legislation prohjbiting 
private d5scrimination in lending practices or authorizing 
special public financing for firms that have been or are unable 
to borrow money for reasons unrelated to their credit rating . 
It would not be an adequate justification for a requirement 
that a fixed percentage of all loans made by national banks 
must be made to Eskimos or Orientals regar~. l~ss of th~r.__ 
ability to repay the loans . Nor , it seems to me, does it 
provide a sufficient justification for granting a p~efe~ence to 





credit problem~/ and at the other extreme, firms whose 
credit rating will prevent them from taking anvantage of the 
statutory preference even though they are othe~wise qualifier 
to do the work. At best, the preference for minority business 
enterprises is a crude and inadequate response to the evils 
that flow from discriminatory lending practices. 
The question whether the history of past discrimination has 
created barriers that can only be overcome by an unusual 
measure of this kind is more difficult to evaluate. In 
analyzing this question, I think it is essential to draw a 
distinction between obstacles placed in the path of minority 
business enterprises by others and characteristics of those 
firms that may impair their ability to compete. 
16/ An example of such a firm was disclosen in the record of a 
recent case involving a claimed preference for a firm 
controlled by Indian shareholders: 
"Based on the facts that were developed in the District rourt, 
. the Indian community in general does not benefit from the 
rBureau of Indian Affairs'l interp~etation of rthe Buy Indian 
Act] • 
The facts that were developed in the District rourt show 
that the beneficiaries of this interpretation were the owners 
of Indian Nations Construction Company. The president of the 
company is a one-fourth degree Indian who is an administrative 
law judge for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
by occupation. The vice president of that company was a 
one-quarter blood Choctaw who is a self-employed rancher and 
who states his net worth at just under a half mi11io~~?11ars. 
__ The treasurer and general manager of that . corporat5on ,sa 
non-Indian and he states his net worth at $1.3 million." 
Tr. of Oral Arg. in Andrus v. Glover ~onstruction Co., 0.~. 
1979, No. 79-84, p.2b=2~ · 
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It is unfortunately but unquestionably true that ir~ationa 1 
racial prejudice persists today and continues to obstruct 
minority participation in a variety of economic pursuits, 
presumably incJuding the construction industry. But there are 
two reasons why this legjslation will not eliminate, or even 
tend to eliminate, such prejudice. First, prejudice is 1 ess 
likely to be a significant factor in the public sector of the 
economy than in the private sector because both feoeral and 
state laws have prohibited oiscrimination in the awar0 of 
public contracts for many years . Second , and of greate~ 
importance , an absolute preference that is unre1ate0 to a 
minority firm's abjlity to perform a contract inevitably will 
engender resentment on the part of competitors excluded f~om 
the market for a purely raciaJ reason . It thus seems clear to 
\ me that this statute cannot be defended as an appropriate 
J method of reducing racial prejudice . 
The argument that our history of discrimination has left 
the entire membership of each of the six racial classes 
identified in the Act Jess able to compete in a free market 
than others is more easily stated than proved . The reduction 
in prejudice that has occurred during the 1ast generation has 
accomplished much less than was anticipated; but it 
nevertheless remains true that increased opportunities have 
produced an ever incr.easing number of oemsm:?trations.....t~.at 





of competing on an equal basis, but also of exce 11 ing in t~e 
most demanding professions. But, even though it is not t~e 
actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of t~is kin~ 
inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption 
that those who are granted this special preference are less 
qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their 
race. Because that perception--especially when fosteren by the 
Congress of the United States can only exacerbate rather. than 
reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when race wi1 1 
become a truly irrelevant , or at least insignificant, factor. 
Unless Congress clearly articu1.ates the need for racia l 
classifications that are narrowly drawn, the Court should not 
uphold this kind of statute. 
This statute has a fundamentally different character t~an a -
carefully tailored remedial measure like the Voting Rights Act -
of 1965. A consideration of some of t~e dramatic difference~ 
between these two legislative responses to racia l iniustice 
reveals not merely a difference in legis1ative craftsmanship 
but a difference of constitutional significance. (/!)reas t~e 
enactment of the Voti~Eights Act was preceded by exhaustive 
legislative hearings and debates concerning discriminatory 
denial of access to the electoral process, and became effective 
in specific States only after specific findings were made, t~is 
statute authodzes an ·automatic nationwide: p_reference......£2r a11 
members of a diverse racial class regardless of their possible 
interest in the area where the pub1ic contract is to be 
performed. Just why a wealthy Negro or Spanish-speaking 
investor should have a preferred status in bidding on a 
78-1007 
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construction contract in Alaska--or a citize n of Eskimo 
ancestry should have a preference in Miami or Detroit--is 
difficult to understand in light of both the asserted remedial 
character of the set-aside and the more basic purposes of the 
public works legislation. 
The Voting Rights Act addressed the problem of 0enia1 of 
access to the electoral process. By outlawing specific 
practices, such as poll taxes and special tests, the statute 
removed old barriers to equal access: by requiring preclearance 
of changes in voting practices in covered States, it precluded 
the erection of new barriers. The Act before us to0ay does not 
outlaw existing barriers to access to the economic market and 
does nothing to prevent the erection of new barriers. On the 
contrary, it adopts the fundamenta11y different approach of 
creating a new set of barriers of its own. 
A comparable approach in the electoral context would 
support a rule requiring that at least 10 percent of t~e 
candidates eJected to the legislature be members of specified 
racial minorities. Surely that would be an effective wav of 
ensuring black citizens the representation t~at has long been 
their due. Quite obviously, however, such a measure would ' 
merely create the kind of inequality that an impartial 
sovereign cannot tolerate. Yet that is p:,egisely th~~_inn of 
"remedy" that this Act authorizes. In both political and 
economic contexts, we have a legitimate interest in seeing that 
those who were disadvantaged 
78-1007 
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in the past may succeed in the future. But neit~er an election 
nor a market can be equally accessible to all if race provioes 
a basis for placing a special value on votes or oo 1 1ars. 
The ultimate goal must be to eliminate entirely from 
governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human 
being's race. The removal of barriers to access to po1itica 1 
and economic processes serves that goal .~1 But the creation 
of new barriers can only frustrate true progress. For as MR. 
JUSTICE POWELL~/ and Mr. Justice DougJas~1 have 
perceptively observed, such protective barriers reinforce 
habitual ways of thinking in terms of classes instead of 
individuals. Preferences based on characteristics acquiren at 
birth inevitably foster intolerance and antagonism against the 
entire membership of the favored classes.lQ1 For this 
reason, I am firmly convinced that this "temporary measure" 
will disserve the goal of equal opportunity. 
177 "The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of 
racial barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our 
theory as to how society ought to be organized." DeFunis v. 
Ode g a a r a , 416 u . s . 3 1 2 , 3 4 2 (Doug 1 as , J . , a ; sse n t i n g ) . 
18/ See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 298 (Opinion of POWELL, J.). 
19/ DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 u.s. 312, 343 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
£Q/ In his Bakke opinion, supra, MR. JUSTICE POWELL ~ated: 
-· "It is far tooiate to argue that the guatantee of equ~-1 
protection to all persons permits the recognition of special 
wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that 
accorded others." 438 u.s., at 295 . 




A judge's opinion that a statute reflects a profoundly 
unwise policy determination is an insufficient reason for 
concluding that it is unconstitutional_. ~ongress has hroao 
power to spend money to provide for the "general Welfare of the 
United States," to "regulate Commerce among the several 
States," to enforce the provisions of the CiviJ War Amendments, 
and to djscriminate between aliens and citizens. See Hampton 
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 u.s. 88, 101-102, n. 21.2 11 But the 
exercise of these broad powers is sublect to the constraints 
imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amenoment. ~hat 
Clause has both substantive and procedural components~ it 
performs the off5ce of both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in requiring 
that the federal sovereign act impartially. 
Unlike MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, ante, 
at , however, I am not convinced that the Clause contains an 
20/ (continued) 
In support of that proposition he quoted Professor Bickel's 
comment on the self-contradiction of that argument: 
"'The Jesson of the great decisions of the Supreme rourt and 
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same fo~ at 
Jeast a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is 
illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, ano 
destructive of democratic society."Ibid, ~-~35. -....,._ 
21/ This preferential set-aside specifically discriminates in 





absolute prohibition against any statutory classification based 
~
on race. I am persuaded, however, that it does impose a 
J 1 • 1 bl' t · t · · n 1 Lspec1a o 1ga 10n o scrutJn1ze any governmenta 
decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions 
between citizens on the basis of their race and incinenta11y 
also discriminates against nonc5tizens in the preferred racial 
classes.~/ For just as ~cedura1 safegua~re necessarv 
to guarantee impartial decision;aking in the -iudicial process, 
so can they play a vital part in preserving the impartial 
character of the legislative process. 23/ 
~/ "When the Federal Government asserts an overdoing 
national interest as justifiction for a discriminatory ru 1 e 
which would violate the EquaJ Protection Clause if adopted 
by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate 
basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to 
serve that interest." Hampton v. Mow Sun \~ong, supra, 426 
u.s., at 1.03. -----
* * * 
"It is perfectly clear that neither the rongress nor 
the President has ever required the Civil Service 
Commission to adopt the citizenship requirement as a 
condition of eligibility for employment in the federal 
civil service. On the other hand, in view of the fact that 
the policy has been in effect since the Commission was 
created in 1883, it is fair to infer that both the 
Legislature and the Executive have been aware of the policy 
and have acquiesced in it. In order to decide whether such 
acquiescence should give the Commission rule the same 
support as an express statutory or Presidential commano, it 
is appropriate to review the extent to which the policy has 
been given consideration by Congress or the Presioent, ann 
the nature of the authority specifically delegate0 to the 
Commissjon." Id., at 105. 
23/ See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 1q7, 
255 (1976) (hereinafter Linde): . _ _,.. 
"For the last few years have reawakened our appreciat];;n of the 
primacy of process over ·p~oduct in a free society, the 
knowledge that no ends can be better than the means of their 
achievement. 'The highest morality is almost always the 
morality of process,' Professor Bickel wrote about Watergate a 
few months before his untimely death. If this republic is 
remembered in the distant history of law, it is likely to be 




In both its substantive and proce nura 1 aspects t~is Act is 
markedly different from the normal p r oduct of t~e legislative 
decisionmaking process. ~he very fact that r.ongress for the 
first time in the Nation's history has created a broad 
legislative classification for entitlement to benefits ba s ed 
solely on racial characteristics identifies a dramatic 
difference between this Act and the thousands of statutes that 
preceded it. This dramatic point of departure is not even 
mentioned in the statement of purpose of the Act or in the 
reports of either the House or the Senate rommittee that 
processed the legislation,~/ and was not the 
m (continued) 
processes, not for its perfection of unique principles of 
justice and certainly not for the rationality of its laws. 
This recognition now may wel_l take our attention beyond t~e 
processes of adiudication and of executive government to a new 
concern with the due process of lawmaking." (Footnote omitted.' 
24/ The only reference to any minority business enterprises in 
the Senate Report was a suggestion that Indians had been 
receiving too great a share of the public contracts. ~~e 
Report stated: 
"Some concern was expressed that Indians--with exceptionally 
high structural unemployment levels- - were awarded proiects at a 
per capita vaJue far in excess of non-Indian communities." 
S. Rep. No. 95-38, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3 (1Q77L 
The Court quotes three paragraphs from a lengthy report 
issued by the House Committee on small business in 1Q77, ante, 
at 13, implying that the contents of that report were 
considered by Congress when it enacted the 10% minority set 
aside. But that report was not mentioned by anyone during the 
very brief discussion of the set-aside amendment. When one 
considers the vast quantity of written material turned out by 
the hundreds of congressional committees and subcommittees 
these days, it is unrealistic to assume that a significant 
number of Jegis1ators read, or even were ?WQ.re of, t4...a~. 
- report. Even if they ~id, the report does not contain an 
explanation of this lO% ·set-aside for six racial subclasses. 
Indeed, the broad racial classification in this Act is 
totally unexplained. Although the legislative history 





subject of any testimony or inquiry in any legislative hearing 
on the bill that was enacted. It is true that there was a verv 
brief discussion on the floor of the House as we11 as in the 
Senate on two different days, but only a handful of legislators 
spoke and there was virtually no debate. ~his kino of 
perfunctory consideration of an unprecedenter policy 0ecision 
of profound constitutional importance to the Nation is 
comparable to the accidental malfunction of the legislative 
process that led to what I regarded as a totally un~ustifier 
discrimination in Delaware ~ribal Busjness rommittee v. Weeks, 
supra, 430 u.s., at 97. 
Although it is traditional for judges to accord the same 
presumption of regularjty to the legislative process no matter 
how obvious it may be that a busy Congress has acted 
precipitately, I see no reason why the character of their 
procedures may not be considered relevant to the decision 
whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of 
liberty or property without due process of 1aw.~/ Whenever 
Congress creates a classification that would be subiect to 
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protectjon rlause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment if it had been fashioned bv a State 
24/ (continued) 
Negro citizens are included within the preferred c1ass, there 
is no absolutely discussi_on of why Spanish speaking, Orienta 1 s, 
Indians, Eskimos, and .Aleuts were a1so included. See_o.fi, . ~ ~ -_supra. 
25/ "It is not a new thought that 'to guarantee the democratic 
legitimacy of poJiticaJ decisions by establishing essential 
rules for the political process' is the central function of 
judicial review, as Dean Rostow and Professor Strong, among 




legislature, jt seems to me that judicial review should inc1uoe 
a consideration of the procedural character of the 
decisionmaking process. A holding that the c 1 assification was 
not adequately preceded by a consideration of less drastic 
alternatives or adequately explained by a s tatement of 
legislative purpose would be far less intrusive than a final 
determination whether the substance of the decision is 
"narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." Cf. the 
Court's opinion, ante, at 28.l§/ If the general 1 anguage of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment authorizes this 
Court to review acts of Congress under the standards of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment--a clause 
that cannot be found in the Fifth Amendment--there can be no 
separation of powers objection to a more tentative holding of 
unconstitutionality based on a failure to follow p~oce0ures 
that guarantee the kind of de 1 iberation that a fundamental 
constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits. 271 
26/ "Fear of legislative resentment at iudicial interference is 
not borne out by experience where procedural review exists, any 
more than it was after the Supreme Court told Congress that it 
had used faulty procedure in unseating Representative Anam 
Clayton Powell. It is far more cause for resentment to 
invalidate the substance of a policy that the politically 
accountable branches and their constitutents support than to 
invalidate a lawmaking procedure that can be repeated 
correctly, yet we take substantive judicial review for 
granted. Strikingly, the reverse view of propriety prevails in 
a number of nations where courts have never been empowered to 
set aside policies legitimately enacted i~tQ law but~Q. have 
-· power to test the process of legitimate enactment." Linde, 
supra, 55 Neb. L. Rev., ·at 243 (footnotes omitted). 
27/ The conclusion to the Court's opinion states: ---~ 
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In all events, before taking the firm and final position 
expressed in MR. JUS'I'ICE S'I'EWART'S dissenting opinion, T would 
hold this statute unconstitutional on a narrower ground: it 
cannot fairly be characterized as a "narrowly tailored" racial 
clu~sification because it simply raises too many serious 
questions that Congress faiJed to answer or even to address in 
a responsible way.~.!!/ The risk that habitual attitudes 
toward classes of persons, rather than analysis of the relevant 
characteristics of the class, will serve a~ a basis for a 
legislative classification is present when benefits are 
distributed as well as when burdens are imposed. 1n the past, 
traditional attjtudes too often provided the only explanation 
27/ (continued) 
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must 
necessarily receive a most searching examination to make 
sure that it does not conflict with const1tutiona1 
guarantees." Ante, at 39 (emphasis added). 
I agree with this statement but it seems to me that due process 
requires that the "most search~mination" be connucted in 
the f~e by Congress~-~-~_:/ than by a federal court. 
28/ For example, why were these six racial classifications, and 
no others, included in the preferred class? Why are aliens 
excluded from the preference although they are not otherwise 
ineligible for public contracts? What percentage of Oriental 
blood or what degree of Spanish-speaking skill is requireo for 
membership in the preferred class? How does the legacy of 
slavery and the history of discrimination against the 
descendants of its victims support a preference for 
Spanish-speaking citizens who 
may be directly competing with black citizens in some 
overpopulated communities? Why is a preference given on 1 v to 
owners of business enterpr5ses and why is that preference 
unaccompanied by any requirement concerning the emp 1 oyment of 
disadvantaged persons? Is the preference . ljmited to~ subc lass 
of persons who can prove that tl-Jey are sub-iect to a sp~·cial 
disability caused by vast discrimination, as the rourt's 
opinion indicates? Or is every member of the racial class 
entitled to a preference as the statutory language seems 
plainly to indicate? Are businesses formed -iust to take 
advantage of the preference eligible? 
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for discrimination against women, aliens, illegitimates, ann 
blnck citizens. Today there is a · danger that awareness of past 
injustice will lead to automatic acceptance of new 
classifications that are not in fact ~ustifieo by attributes 
characteristic of the class as a whole. 
When Congress creates a special p~eference, or a special 
disability, for a class of persons, it should identify the 
characteristic that justifies the special treatment.~/ When 
the classification is defined in racial ter.ms, I believe that 
such particular identification is imperative. 
32_1 "Even if the Court rejects this analysis, it should 
not uphold a statutory discrimination against a 1 iens, as a 
class, without expressly identifying the group 
characteristic that justifies the discrimination. If the 
unarticulated characteristic is concern about possible 
disloyalty, it must equally disqualify aliens from the 
practice of law; yet the Court does not question the 
continuing vitality of its decision in r1n ~el Griffithsr, 
413 u.s. 717]. Or if that cha~acteristic ~s the fact that 
aliens do not participate jn our democratic cecisionmaking 
process, it is irrelevant to eljgibility for this category 
of public service. If there is no group characteristic 
that expJains the discriminat5on, one can only conclude 
that it is without any justifjcation that has not alreanv 
been rejected by the court." Foley v. ronnelie, 435 u.s. 
291, 311-312 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
"Of course, a general rule may not define the 
benefitted class by reference to a distinction which 
irrationaJly differentiates between identically situated 
persons. Differences in race, religion, or political 
affiliation could not rationally justify a difference in 
eligibility for social security benefits, for such 
differences are tot a l1 y i r r e 1 evant to : tbe quest i ~,._whether 
one person is economically dependent on anothe~. But a 
distinction between ·married persons and unmarried persons 






In this case, only two conceivable bases for 
differentiating the preferred classes from society as a whole 
have occurred to me: (l) that they were the victims of unfair 
treatment in the past and (2) that they are less ab1e to 
compete in the future. Although the first of these factors 
would justify an appropriate remedy for past wrongs, for 
reasons that I have already stated, this statute is not such a 
remedial measure. The second factor is simply not true. 
Nothing in the record of this case, the 1egis1ative history o~ 
the act, or experience that we may notice iudicia11y prov;des 
any support for such a proposition. It is up to r.ongress to 
demonstrate that jts unique statutory preference is ;ustifieo 
by a relevant characteristic that is shared by the members of 
the preferred class. In my opinion, because it has ~ailed to 
make that demonstration, it has also failed to discharge its 
duty to govern jmpartjaJly embodied in the Fi_fth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 




In other words, two requirements must be met. 
First, the governmental body that attempts to 
impose a race conscious remedy must have the 
authority to act in response to identified 
discrimination. Cf. Hampton · v; · Mow - sun ·wonq, 426 
u.s. 88, 103 (1976). Second, there must be 
findings by such a body that demonstrate the 
existence of a constitutional or statutory 
violation. In Bakke, I concluded that the Reqents 
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only 
with educational functions, and they conceded that 
there had been no past discrimination. Thus, no 
~~ 
compelling governmental was present to justify the 
1 
use of a racial quota in medical school admissions. 
Bakke, 438 u.s., at 309-310. 
lfp/ss 2/29/80 
, this court held that Congress had the power to 
prohibit racial discrimination in public 
restaurants on the basis of its "finding that [such 
discrimination] had a direct and adverse effect on 
the free flow of interstate commerce" in violation 
of the Commerce Clause. 
Jon: I have reframed the above sentence 
to make it fit more neatly into the two steps 
analysis described in the preceding three 
paragraphs. 
lfp/ss 2/29/80 Rider A,_ p. ,H> ·· fn · 7 · ,(RevJ.sed 
draft) 
7. Although this record suffices to 
support the congressional judgment that minority 
contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, 
legislative and administrative bodies need not be 
content with findings that must constitutiuonal 
standards. Race conscious remedies, popularly 
referred to as affirmative action programs, almost 
inevitably affect some innocent persons. See 
infra, at Respect and support for law, 
especially in an area as sensitive as this, depend 
in large measure upon the public's perception of 
its fairness. See Bakke, 438 u.s. at 319 n. 53; J. 
Wilkinson, "From Brown to Bakke", 264-266 (1979); 
M. Perry, Modern · ~qual · protection: - ·A 
Conceptulization · and -Appraisal, Colum. L. Rev. 
1023, 1048-49 (1979). It therefore is important 
for the record upon which race conscious remedies 
are based to be well documented with evidence that 
satisfies fair minded people with the justness of 
such remedies. 
lfp/ss 2/29/80 Rider A; · pi - 11 - (Fullilove) 
This is not a case in which Conqress has 
employed a racial classification solely as a means 
to confer a racial preference. Such a purpose 
plainly would be unconstitutional. See Bakke, 438 
u.s., at 307, 310-311. Here the purpose souqht to 
be served was the compellinq state interest of 
redressinq racial discrimination. The question, 
therefore, is whether the remedy chosen is 
appropriate, having in mind that any effective 
remedy is likely to affect persons differently 
dependinq upon their race. See, e.q., Board of 
Education v; · Swann, 402 u.s. at 45-46. Althouqh a 
federal court may not properly approve, any more 
than it may order, remedies that exceed the scope 
of a constitutional violation, (add cites to the 
three cases referred to on paqe 12), this Court has 
not required that remedial plans be limited the to 
least restrictive means of implementation. We have 
recognized, where the purpose is to redress 
discrimination, that the choice of a remedy by the 
court is "a balancinq process left, within an 
appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to 
the sound discretion of the trial court". (pick up 
cite on paqe 12). Similarly, in reviewinq a remedy 
2. 
chosen by a legislative or administrative body, 
courts should recognize the deference usually 
accorded the exercise of discretion by such a body. 
Jon: One rereading IV-A, and 
particularly the first paraqraph commencing at the 
bottom of page 11, it seems to me that we have not 
phrased it quite a feliticiously as we should. You 
have undertaken some editing, and I have dictated 
the above revision. I am not satisfied with 
either, and suggest that you put your hand to this 
- bearing in mind the need for clarification that 
both your editing and mine have pointed up. This 
is quite a critical paragraph, and not an easy one 
to write - especially in view of the paucity of 
authority. Maybe we are trying to analyze in steps 
that are two refined. Do you think we should try 
to generalize to a greater degree? 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
lfp/ss 2/29/80 Rider · A; · p; - 17 - (falliloye) 
In view of the numerically limited and widely 
dispersed effect of the set asides, I cannot say 
that congressional choice of this remedy was 
inequitable.15 
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No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Memorandum of Mr. Justice Powell. 
I write to apply the analysis set forth in my opinion 
in University of California Y..:... Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 {1978), to 
the issue presented in this case. We are asked to decide 
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is 
violated by the requirement in§ 103{f)(2) of the Public Works 
1 Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for 
local public works projects funded by the Act be set-aside for 
minority business enterprises. I conclude that this set- as ide 
enacted by Congress is justifiable as a remedy that serves the 
compel! ing governmental interest in eradicating the continuing 
effects of past identifiable discrimination. 
I 
Section 103 (f)(2) employs a racial classification that 
is constitutionally prohibited unless its use is a necessary 
means of advancing a ·compelling state interest. University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 291 1 
.• ,·~ l 
(1978)(opinion of Powell, J .)(hereinafter Bakke)~ see In~ 







FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK a 
Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 ( 1973) ; Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
196 (1964). Racial preference does not constitute such an 
interest. "'Distinctions between citizens solely because of 
their ancestory' [are] 'odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the set-aside 
merely expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or 
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal pro-
tection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 
(1954) . 
The Government does have a legitimate interest in amelio-
rating the disabling effects of identified discrimination. 
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District 
No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 
39, 41 (1971); Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 
437-438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination jus-
tifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful ... dis-
crimination.'' Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 
405, 418 (1975) . A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether 
§ 103 (f) (2) was enacted as a means of redressing such dis-
crimination. But this Court has never approved race-con-
scious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or legislative 
findings of constitutional or statutory violation. Bakke, 438 
U. S .. at 307; see, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 367-376 (1977); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 
430 U. S. 144, 155- 159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.); South 
Caroli11a v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-315 (1966). 
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action 
and impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of 
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a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest 
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless 
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such 
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements 
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to 
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to 
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the gov-
ernmental body must make findings that demonstrate the 
existenc<' of illPgal discrimination. In Bakke, the Regents 
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with 
educational functions, and they made no findings of past dis-
crimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was 
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school 
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S .. at 309-310. 
Our past cases also establish that even if the government 
proffprs a compelling interest to support reliance upon a sus-
pect classification , the means selected must be narrowly drawn 
to fulfill the govPrmnC'ntal purpose. In re Griffiths. 413 U. S., 
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did 
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse stu-
dent body. But the method selected to achieve that end, 
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not an appropriate 
llH'ans. The Reg<>nt's quota system eliminated some non-
minority applicants from all consideration for a specified num-
ber of seats in the entering class, although it allowed minority 
applicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S, at 
275- 276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes 
race as a factor, but not the sole factor, in assessing an ap-
plicant'~:~ qualifications serves the University's interest in di-
versity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and 
competitive consideration. !d., at 317-318. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f) (2) , we must 
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findings-
of uniawful discrimination; (ii} if so, whether sufficient find-. 
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ings have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination 
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and 
(iii) whether the lOo/o set-aside is a permissible means for 
redressing identifiable past discrimination. None of these 
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that 
we are reviewing an Act of Congress. 
II 
The history of this Court's review of congressional action 
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature 
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations. 
Unlike the Regents of the University of California, Congress 
properly may-and indeed must-address directly the prob-
lems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this 
Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce 
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants 
on the basis of its "findings that [such discrimination] had a 
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate 
commerce." 
Similarly, after hea.ring 11overwhelming" evidence of private 
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 88.-914, pt. 2, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963), Congress enacted Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order "to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina-
tory practices and devices which have fostered racially strati-
fied job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested 
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that 
" 'persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the 
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored 
to a position where they would have been were it not for the 
unlawful discrimination.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976),' quoting Section-by-Section : 
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Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec. 
7166, 7168 (1972). 
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitu-
tional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 2 At an 
early date, the Court stated that "[i]t is the power of Con-
gress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions 
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U. S. 339, 345 (1879). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968), the Court recognized Congress' 
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the 
right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimi-
nation forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subse-
quently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179 
(1976), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial 
discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v. 
Sante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-296 (1976); 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460 
(1975). 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court 
considered whether § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave 
Congress the power to enact § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b)(e). Section 4 (e) pro-
vides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied 
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write 
the English language. The Court held that Congress was 
empowered to enact § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination 
2 Set:tion 2 of the Thirteenth Ameuclmeut, whit:h aboli~hed ~lavery, pro-
vides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation ." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to 
(lnforce the provisions of those Amendments, 
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against the Puerto Rican community. I d., at 652-653. Im-
plicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had 
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this 
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination. 
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of 
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases con-
struing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966), 
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for viola-
tions of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress 
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding 
"ster[n] and ... elabora.te" measures. Id., at 309. Most 
relevant to our present inquiry was the Court's express ap-
proval of Congress' decision to "prescrib[ e] remedies for vot-
ing discrimination which go into effect without the need for 
prior adjudication." I d., at 328.3 
It ia beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the 
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to 
8 Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some 
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa 
et seq ., temporarily banned the use of literacy tests in all jurisdictions. 
In 01·egon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), this Court, speaking through 
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exer-
cise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. See-
id., at 117 (Black, J.) ; id., at 135 (Douglas, J.); id., at 152 (Harlan, 
J.) ; id ., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ; id., at 281 
(STEWART, J., with whom BURGER, C. J ., and BLACKMUN, J ., concurred) . 
MR. JusTICE STEWART said that : 
"Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concern-
ing .. . actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access 
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint 
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself' 
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon 
individual records. . . . The findings that Congress made when it enacted' 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide QaOI 
on literacy tests." I d., at 284 (citation omjtted} . 
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prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradi~ 
cate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether 
Congress has made findings adequate to support its 




The petitioners contend that the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f) (2) reflects no congressional finding of statutory or 
constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the 
assertion that a reviewing court may not look beyond the 
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Con-
gress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination. 
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial barrier to 
full understanding of the legislative process. 
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve 
specifi0 disputes between competing adversaries. Its consti-
tutional role is to be representative rather than impartial, to 
make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law. 
The petitioners contention that this Court should treat the 
debates on § 103 (f)(2) as the complete "record" of con-
gressional decisionmaking underlying that statute is essentially 
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court. 
But 0 ongress is not expected to act as though it were duty 
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. · The crea-
tion of national rules for the governance of our ~ociety simply 
does uot entail the same concept of recordmaking that is 
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Con-
gress ljas no rrsponsibility to confine its vision to the facts and 
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special 
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to 
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that mny be 
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate 
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires 
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. 
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_After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national 
concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the 
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congres& 
again considers action in that area. 
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress 
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legisla-
tive action. Such a requirement would mark an unprece-
dented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordi-
nate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor 
our democratic tradition warrants such a constraint on the 
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not con-
fined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f) (2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the 
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with 
the problems of racial discrimination against minority business 
enterprises. 
B 
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f) (2) demon-
5trates that Congress reasonably concluded that private and 
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible 
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors. 4 
The opinion of the Court provides a careful overview of the 
• I rannot accept the sugge~tion ot' the Court of Appeal:s that § lOG (f) 
(2) mu~t be viewed w; ~erving a compelling state intere:;t if the reviewing 
court can "perceive a ba:;i~'' fur legi:;lative aetion. 588 F. 2d 600, 5Q4-
605 (CA2 1978) , quoting Kutmtbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S., at 656. The 
"perceive a basis" ~tanclard rrfers to congre~::;ionul authority to net, not 
to the di:;tinct que::;tion whether that action violate:; the Due Precess 
Clnu~e of the Fifth AmendmPnt. See text, at pp. 1-2, supra. 
In my view, a court should uphold a rea~onable congres::;iomtl findin.g; / 
of di:;crimination. A mot•e ~t ringeut :;tandard of review would impinge 
npon Congr<'~"' ahilit.\· to addrr"'' prob!Pm;,: vi' cl i:<('rimination, off' pp . 5-8, 
supra; a/ ~tandnrd n'4uirinl! a eourt to ·'percciw H ba:;is" is c:-;:,;entiall~· 
nH·aningle~~ in this ('Ontext. That sta.ndarcl might allow a court to ju::>tify 
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relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to which only 
a few words need be added. 
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced 
on the floor of the House of Representatives by Representa-
tive Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal 
Government was already operating a set-aside program under 
§ 8 (a) of the Small BusinesR Administration Act of 1958. 15 
U. 8. C'. ~ 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensi-
ble way for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for 
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result being that 
we are goi11g to eventually be able to ... end certain pro-
grams which are merely support survival programs for people 
which do not contribute to th(' <'conomy." 123 Cong. Rec. 
H1436- H1437 (daily ecl. Feb. 24. 1977) ." Senator Brooke, 
who introduced a similar measure i11 tlw Senate. reminded 
the Senate of the SI>PCial provisions previously enacted iu to 
§ 8 (a) of the SBA Act ami the Railroad Revitalization Act 
of 1076. 49 F. S. C. § 1657a. which, he statecl, demonstrated 
the validity of his amendment. 123 Cong. Rec. , '3909-10 
(daily rd. March 10. Hl77). 
Section 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Busi-
ness Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal 
Government and subcontract them out to small businesses. 
The Small Business Adruinistration has been directed by 
Executive Order to employ § 8 (a) to aid socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons. Ante, at 12.6 The opera-
5 Duriug sub~equent debate in the House, Rrpre~enta.tive Conyers em-
pha::;izPd that minority busine::;~e::; "through no fault of their own ;;imply 
have not been able to get their foot in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H1440 
(dail~· rd. Feh. 2-( , Hl77); ,-pp ibid. (n•marb of Hc•p. Biaggi). 
u In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the Pre::;ident is.~ued Executive Orders direet-
ing fedrntl aid for minority hu,.:irH·,;s enterpri>ic:>. See Exee. Order 11458, 
34 Fed. H('g. 4\l;~7 (1969) ; Exec . OrdPr 1151~, :35 Fed. Hc·g . ..(f);~g (Hl70); 
Exee. Order llt5:!5, :w Frd. Ht·g . 19907 (1971) . Thr l're,;idPnt nott>d 
that "lllC'lllUE'r" of ec•rtain minority group,.: through no fault of thPir own 
have bee11 denied the full opportunity to participate in the free eutcrpri 'o 
.. 
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tion of the § 8 (a) program was reviewed by congressional 
committees between 1972 and 1977. In 1972. the House Sub-
committee on Minority Small Business Enterprise found 
that minority businessnwn face economic difficulties that "are 
the result of past social standards which linger as characteris-
tics of minorities as a group." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d 
Con g .. 2d Sess .. 3 ( 1972). In 1975, the House Subcommittee 
on RBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise concluded that 
11 [t]he effect of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice 
have not remained in the past," and that low participation by 
minorities in the ecollomy was the result of "past discrimina-
tory systems." H. R. Rep. Xo. 94-468. 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1-2 (1975). In 1977, the House Committee ou Small Business 
found that 
"over the years, there has developed a business system 
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority 
participation. In the past more than the present, this 
system of conducting business transactions overtly pre-
cluded minority input. Currently, we more often en-
counter a business system which is racially neutral on its 
face, but because of past overt social and economic dis-
crimination is presently opera.ting, in effect. to perpetuate 
these past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th 
Coug., 2d Sess., 124 (1977). 
The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less 
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced 
§ 103 (f) (2) into the House of Representatives.7 
s~·stem," ExPc. Order 11518, supra, at. 4940, and I ha I I he "opportunity 
for full participation iu our frrc cntrrpri;;c ~y::;tem by ::;ocially and eco-
nomically cli~advantagPd Jl<'l'~ons i::; p~:;ential if WP are to obtain ~ocial and 
economie ju;;tieP." Exec. Ord('r 1 Hi25, supra, al 1!:.1967. A:;,;i:;tauce to 
minority businP:-;~ cnterpri:;l'>' through thP § 8 (a) program has been de-
signed to promot<' tiJP goals of the:,;c Ex<·cutive OrdPr>'. Ray Baillie 'l'msh 
Hauling. luc. v. Kleppe, .t47 F . 2d G9G, 70G (CA5 Hl7:3) , rert. denied, 415 
U.S. 914 (1974) . 
1 Two ·ections of the Railroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congress' · 
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In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of 
legislative history contained in the Court's opinion, l believe 
that a court must accept as established the conclusion that 
purposeful discrimination contributed significantly to the 
small percentage of federal contracting funds that minority 
business enterprises have received. Refusals to subcontract 
work to minority contractors may, depending upon the iden-
tity of the discriminating party, violate Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. R. C. § 2000d, or 42 U.S. C. ~ 1981, 
or the Fourteenth Anwnclment. Although the discriminatory 
activities were not identified with the exactitude PXJwcted in 
judicial or administrativP adjudication, it must be remembered 
that "Congress may paint with a much broader brush than 
may this Court .... " Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284 
(1970) (STBWAH'l', J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).8 
recognition of the need for remedial ~teps on brhalf of minority businesses .. 
Srction 80:3, .J.5 U. S. C. § 803 prohibit~ discrimination in any aetivity 
fuudl•d b~· tlw Ac·t, and § 906, .J.9 lT. S.C. § 1657:t p:.;tabli:.;hp,.: a :\finority 
R<·:.;ource Center to a:;~i:.;t miuority busiri!:'>'SilH'Il obtain rontratl::-: an 
businrs:.; opportunitiPii rclatPd to the maintenaneP and rehabilitation of 
railroad,.;. The provi ~<ion;; wen' enacted b~· a. Congreiis that recognized the 
"e,-tahli~hrd national policy, l'<iner nt lea,.;f tlw pa.~,.:a ge of the Civil Rights 
Ad of 1964, to l'nc·ouragr and a:.;,.;i:;t in the clc•velopmmt of minority bu~i­
nc~,: entcrpri~c . " S. Hrp. No. Q4--Hl9, 94th Conf., 1~t Se:.;s., 44 (1975)' 
(CommercE> Comrnittc•e). In January 1977, tlw Drpartmt>nf of Transpor-
tation i:;;;m•d n•gulation;; pur:.;uant to 45 U. S. C. § 40:3 that require con-
tractor:; to forrmrlatP affirmative action program~ to en~ure that minority 
bu~ines.;e~ n·eeive a. fair proportion of contraet opportunitie,.;. S(•e 42 Fed. 
Rc·g. 4290-4:201 (Hli7) (codlfied aL 49 CFH. Part 265). Sec abo pp. 17-
19, 1111. 11 and 1:2, infra . 
s Although thi~ record ;;uffice:, to wUpporL the congre~;;ional judgment 
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress· 
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional stand-
ards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action 
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at 
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensi-
tive as this, depend in large measure upon ·the public's perception of· 
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IV 
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classifica-
tion is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As 
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classi-
fication only when necessary to accomplish a compelling 
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U.S., at 305. The con-
clusion that Congress found a compelling governmental inter-
est in redressing identified discrimination against minority 
contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10% 
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving 
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually 
impossible to satisfy. 011ly two of this Court's modern cases 
have held tlw usc of racial classifications to he constitutional. 
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 F. S. 214 (1944); Hira-
bayshi v. United States, 320 lT. S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the fail-
ure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some 
to wonder whether our reYiew of racial classifications has been 
strict in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme 
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972). 
A 
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an 
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue. 
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial 
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference. 
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra, 
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious 
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a non-
fairne:::s. Sre Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53; J . H. Wilkiu,;on III, From 
Brown to Bakke, 204-266 (1979) ; M. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: 
A Conceptualization and Appmi~al, 79 Colum. L . Hev. 1023, 1048--1049 
(1979) . IL therE> fore is important that the l egi~lative record supporting 
race-conscious renwdi~ contuin evidence that sa,ti.Jie::; fair minded people 
that the congressional action is just. 
.. 
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racial means should be ava.ilable to further the legitimate 
govemmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311. 
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compel-
ling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination. 
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any 
affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely 
to affect persons differently depending upon their race. See, 
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Al-
though federal courts may not order or approve remedies that 
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 ( 1977) ; Dayton v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S 406 (1977); Austin Independent School District v. 
United States, 429 U.S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J. , concurring), 
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the 
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recog-
nized that the choice of remedies to redress racial 
discrimination is 11a balancing process left, within appropriate 
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of 
the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure 
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of 
racial discrimination. The legislative history of § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator 
Howard, who was a member of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction and who introduced the Amendment into the Senate, 
described § 5 as 11a direct affirmative delegation of power to 
Congress to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees' t 
of § 1 of the Amendment. Coug. Globe, 39th Coug., 1st Sess., 
2766 ( 1866) . Furthenuor<', he stated that § 5 
11casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to 
it, for the future , that all sections of the amendment are 
Cfl.rried out in good faith , and that no State infringes the 
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rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause 
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon 
the Congress this power and this duty." /d., ttt 2768. 
Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congres-
sional action to effectuate the goa.Is of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was echoed by other Members of Congress. 
Representative Stevens, also a member of the Reconstruc-
tion Committrc, said that the Fourteenth Amenclnwnt "allows 
Congress to corrrct the u11just legislation of the Sta.tes." id., at 
2459. and Senator Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the 
power of Congress to enforce priuciples lying at the very 
foundation of all republican govemment. ... " Id., at 2961. 
See id., at 2512 -2513 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); id., at 2511 
(Rrp. Miller). Sec also E-:r parte Virg1:nia, 100 lT. S .. at 345.0 
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may 
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal 
courts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the 
Fourteeuth Amendment. see C. Fairman. History of the 
Supreme Court of the Uuited States: Reconstruction aud 
Reunion. pt. 1, 1295, 1296 (1971). they did not believe that 
cougressional action would be umeviewable by this Court. 
SevPral Members of Congress mnphasized that a primary pur-
pose of tlw Fourteenth Anwndment was to place the provi-
sions of the Civil Rights of 1866 "in the eternal firmament of 
the Constitution." Cong. Globe. a9th Cong .. 1st Sess .. 2462 
(1866) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See id., at 2459 (remarks 
of Rep. Stephens); id., at 2462 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id., 
at 24!18 (remarks of Rep. Broomall). By 1866. Members of 
Congress fully understood that judicial review was the means 
by which action of thr Legislative and Executive Branches 
would be required to conform to the Constitution. See, e. g., 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 737 (1803). 
9 See also Jon es v. Alfred Mayer & Co., 392 U. S., at 440--441 , quoting 
Con g. Globe, 39th Con g., bt Se~s., 322 (1866 ) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull 
on Congre~s' authority under the Thirteenth Ameudment) . 
.. 
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I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Con-
gress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance 
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of dis-
crimination. But that authority must be exercised in a man-
ner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments. 
The Judicial Branch has the special responsibility to make a 
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a race-
conscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility 
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state 
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of 
a remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected 
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of iden-
tified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to 
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safe-
guard of judicial review of racial classifications. 
B 
men reviewing the selection by Congress of a race ... 
conscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon 
which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous 
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious 
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative 
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974); 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387, 
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy. 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d, at 
399; United States v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46, 
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939 
(1973), (iii) the relationship between the percentage of mi-
nority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority 
group members in the relevant population or work force, 
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d 
306, 311 (CA2 1979); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 
F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CA11974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 910 
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(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service 
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CAS) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the 
availahility of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be 
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F. 
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). 
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew 
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of 
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although 
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legis-
lation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination 
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority 
businesses, the fact remained that minority contractors were 
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong. 
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threat-
ened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f) 
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the 
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new 
public construction. Since the emergency public construc-
tion funds were to be distributed quickly,t0 any remedial provi-
sion designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past 
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover, 
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had 
to provide minority contractors the experience necessary for 
continued success without federal assistance.11 And Congress 
10 The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA) provided that 
federal monies be committed to state and liJcal grantees by September 30, 
1977. 42 U.S. C. A.§ 6707 (h) (1) (Supp. 1978) . Action on applications 
for funds was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application, 
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90 days of 
project approval, id., § 6705 (d) . 
11 In 1972, a congressional oversight committ·ee addressed the "complex 
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of 
tacial bias." See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (Select 
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knew that the ability of minority group members to gain 
experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering 
the construction trades.12 The set-aside program adopted 
Committee on Small Business). The committee explained how the effects 
of discrimination translate into economic barriers: 
"In attempting to increase their participation as entrepeneurs in our 
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major prob-
lems. There problems, which are economic in nature, are the result of 
past social standards which linger as characteristics of minorities as a group. 
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the 
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs. 
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts 
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to 
obtain 1 he needed capital. Lending firms require substantial security and 
a track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority business-
men usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is 
often turned down. 
"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any 
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor 
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could 
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also· the internal 
functions of management." !d., at 3-4. 
12 When Senator Brooke introduced the PWEA set-aside in the Senate, 
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate prob-
lems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment dis-
crimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the 
"Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated · by the 
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contractors to use 
hiring goals in order to redress past ·discrimination. See Contractors 
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 
159, 163 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854 (1971). The House of 
Representatives refused to adopt an amendment to an appropriations 
bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor Department's 
order. 115 Cong. Rec. 40921 (1969) . · The Senate, which had approved 
such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position. 115 Cong. 
Rec . 40749 (1969). 
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that implementa-
tiOn of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ens.ure equal opport,unity. 
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-tts part of this emergency legislation served each of these 
,concerns because it took effect as soon as funds were expended 
under PWEA and because it provided minority contractore 
with experience that could enable them to compete without 
governmental assistance. 
The § 103 (f) (2) set-aside is not a permanent part of fed-
eral contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program 
, concludes, this set-aside program ends. The temporary nature 
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not 
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to 
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine 
the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or 
re-enacts § 103 (f)(2). 
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope 
of congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have ap-
proved temporary hiring remedies insuring that the percent-
age of minority group workers in a business or governmental 
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minor-
ity group members in the relevant population. Boston 
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport 
Guard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are mem-
bers of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d 
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members con-
stitute about 170jo of the national population, see Contractors 
Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978). 
See 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ; id., at 40741 (remarks 
of Sen. Griffith); id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh) . Senator Percy 
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacks 
in the construction industry. !d., at 40742-40743. The day following the 
Senate Yote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted 
"exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades. 
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should 
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of 
minorities." !d., at 41072. 
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The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway 
between the present percentage of minority contractors and 
the percentage of minority group members in the Nation. 
Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its 
effect might be unfair if it were applied rigidly in areas of the 
country where minority group members constitute a small per-
centage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress 
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f) (2). The factors 
governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qual-
ified minority contractors in a particular geographic area, the 
size of the locale's minority population, and the efforts made 
to find minority contractors. Department of Commerce, 
Guidelines for 10% Minority Business Participation LPW 
Grants, App. 165a-167a. We have been told that 1261 
waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. Brief for 
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37. 
c 
A race-conscious remedy should not be approved without 
consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of 
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U. S., at 374-375. In this case, the peti-
tioners contend with some force that they have been asked 
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are in-
nocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, that their 
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved. 
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors 
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the 
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion 
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that 
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors. 
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would 
reserve about .25 o/o of all the funds expended yearly on con-
struction work in the United States for approximately 4% 
of the Nation's contractors who are lnembers of a tniuority 
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group. 584 F. 2d., at 607-608. The set-aside would have 
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors 
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view, 
the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed 
that its use is consistent with fundamental fairness.13 
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the set-
aside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the com-
pelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination 
that affects minority contractors. Nor is any marginal 
unfairness to innocent nonminority contractors sufficiently sig-
nificant-or sufficiently indentifiable-to outweight the gov-
ernmental interest served by § 103 (f) (2). When Congress 
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise dis-
cretion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary to 
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that 
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the 
set-aside in this case. a 
13 Although I believe that the burden placed upon nonminority contrac-
tors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrele-
vant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no set-
aside and provided S400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce 
argues that "[n]onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation 
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the 
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ 
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional 
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not 
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976) 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) 
(''To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does 
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment"). 
Similarly, I cannot accept the ;.:uggr~tion that the set-aside should be 
considerrd a "t echniqne to induce governments and private parties to 
cooperate voluntarily with federal policy." Ante, at 22. The petitioners, 
contractors who wi,;h to compete for all federal fund::;, certainly have not 
accepted voluntarily the adoption or the implementation of the set-aside. 
14 Petitioners have suggested a variety of alternative programs that could 
be used in order to aid minority business enterprises in the construction 
industry. My view that this set-aside is within the discretion of Con-
.. 
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In tLe history of this Court and this country, few questions 
have been more divisive than those arising from governmental 
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions 
played no small part in the tragic legacy of government-
sanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.) 
( 1857). At least since the decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court has been resolute 
in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution envi-
sions a Nation where race is irrelevant. The bne cannot 
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based 
upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin. 
But in our quest to achieve a society free from ra.c;al classi-
fication , we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer 
from the effects of identifiable discrimination. 
Dist.inguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from 
racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made 
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When 
we first confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that 
the Regents of the University of California were not com-
petent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold 
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my 
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of racial classifica-
tions, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a 
democratic society implicit in the D1·e Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve tran-
sient social or political goals, however worthy they may be. 
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power, 
r;rcss docs not imply that other methods are unaYailable to Congress. Nor 
do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropria te remed:v 
•'I that the selection of a set-aside by any other p:O\·ernmrntnl bod~· wou!d 
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., a t 300- 310. The degree of 
sp ('cificity required in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of 
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and 
authcrity of a governmental body . 
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ttnd Congress has been given a unique constitutional role 
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In 
this case, where Congress acted on the basis of its determina-
tion that minority contractors were victims of purposeful 
discrimination and where Congress chose a reasonably necee .. 
sary means to effectuate its purpose, I find ng constitutionfil 
reason to invalidate § 103 (f) (2)/~ 
15 Petitioners a.lso contend the § 103 (f) (2) violates Title VI of the Civil 
Hights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d et seq. Because I believe that the 
1'-Ct-r.sidc is constitutional, I also conclude that the program does not violate 
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.); id., at 
3~8-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, Wlil'l'E1 MARSliALL1 and BLACKMUN1 JJ.). 
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FN. The dissent of Mr. Justice Marshall asserts 
that the Court's opinion satisfies the 
"intermediate" standard of review propsed by 
Justices Brennan, Wihite, Marshall and Blackmun in 
Bakke. That assertion is surely correct. Any 
legislative enactment that satisfies strict 
scrutiny must also pass muster under a more lenient 
standard of review. 
Mr. Justice Marshall also asserts, I 
believe incorrectly, that the Court's opinion 
rejects the "strict scrutiny" standard. It is hard 
for me to understand how this contention can be 
made in light of the Court's explicit statement 
that 
[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most 
searching examination to make sure that it 
does not conflict with constitutional 
guarentees. Some have characterized such 
an examination as a "test:" it is not 
essential that these standards of review 
be characterized as one degree or another 
in the hierachy of judicial analysis. What 
is essential is that any enactment of 
Congress which [sic] employs racial or 
ethnic criteria receives probing 
examination. 
Ante, at 39. 
It may seem that disagreement over the 
appropriate standard of review for racial 
classifications is sterile so long as majority of 
2. 
the Members of this Court agree that§ 103(f)(2) is 
constitutional. But such a view overlooks this 
Court's role in providing guidance to federal and 
state courts who are forced to confront complex 
questions of constitutional law. The Equal 
Protection Clause, and the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, means that any classification among 
groups must be justifiable. Different standards of 
review applied to different sorts of 
classifications simply recognize that some 
classifications are less likely to be justifiable 
than others. Racial classifications must be 
assessed under the most stringent level of review 
because immutable characteristics that bear no 
relation to individual merit are necessarily 
irrelevant to virtually every kind of governmental 
decision. 
While racial classifications demand strict 
scrutiny, I cannot agree that the Constitution 
absolutely prohibits any racial classification. Mr. 
Justice Stewart recognizes the correct principle: 
"Under our Constitution, any official action that 
3. 
treats a person differently on account of his race 
or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and 
presumptively invalid." Post at 2. But, in rare 
and narrowly defined circumstances, that 
presumption may be rebutted. 
In my view, Mr. Justice Stewart's view 
would create an additional anamoly. The dissenters 
state unequivocally that "[u]nder our Constitution, 
the government may never act to the detriment of a 
person solely because of that person's race." Post 
at 2. But the dissenters recognize that 
irreconciliable principle that federal courts, 
surely a part of our government, "may take race 
into account in devising a remedial decree to undo 
a violation of a law prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of race." Post at 13 n.4. So long as race 
may be noted in devising a remedy, and so long as 
Congress is an appropriate body to devise a remedy, 
then it must be that some legislative acts that 
mass strict judicial scrutiny can enact race-
conscious remedies. 
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Mr. Justice Powell, concurring • 
. ~~ 
Although I would place greater emphasis than the ~f 
=J~~ on the need to articulate judicial 
~h.Lt'a.-) ,-J~ 
in conventional terms, I view · opinion 
standards of review 
as substantially in 
accord with my own views. Accordingly, I join thaTU#f@f 
.~d§ C'• opinion and write separately to apply the analysis set 
forth in my opinion in University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978)(hereinafter Bakke). 
The question in this case is whether Congress may enact 
the requirement in § 103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public 
work projects funded by the Act be set aside for minority 
business enterprises. Section 103(f)(2) employs a racial 
classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is 
a necessary means of advancing a compelling state interest. 
Bakke at 299, 305; see In re Griffths, 413 u.s. 717, 721-722 
( 1 9 7 3 ) ; Lovin c; v ~ Vir g in i a , 3 8 8 U • S • 1 , 1 1 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; M c Laugh 1 in v ~ 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). For the reasons stated in my 
Bakke opinion, I consider adherence to this standard as 
important and consistent with precedent. 
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
demand/ that any classification among groups must be 
) 
2. 
justifiable. Different standards of review applied to different 
sorts of classifications simply illustrate the principle that 
some classifications are less likely to be legitimate than 
others. Racial classifications must be assessed under the most 
stringent level of review because immutable characteristics, 
which bear no relation to individual merit or need, are 
irrelevant to almost every legitimate governmental decision. See 
e~g., Anderson~ Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-404 (1964). In this 
case, however, I believe that § 103(f) (2) is justifiable as a 
remedy that serves the compelling state interest in eradicating 
the continuing effects of the past discrimination identified by 
Congress.l 
. . 















recognizes the principle that I 
our Constitution, any official 
believe is applicable: 
action that treats a 
"Under 
person 
differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2. But, 
in narrowly defined circumstances, that presumption may be 
rebutted. Cf. Lee v~ Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)(Black, 
Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring). 
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In these school desrgregaiion cases we dealt with the 
authority of a federal court 1o formulate a remedy for uncon-
stit.utional ra('.ial discrimination. However, the authority of 
a court to inc;orporate racial criteria into a remrdial deeree 
also extends to statutory violations. ·where fed('ral anti-
discriminR1.io.n laws have Leen Yiolaied, Rn (~quitable r<:>medy 
may in the appropriate case inc:ludr a rRcial or e1.Jmic factor. 
Fmnks v. Bowman Transpurln.f1·on Co., 424 U. S. 74 7 (J 976); 
see lnf.crno.Uonnl Brotherhood of Te.omslers Y. United St.otes, 
431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. Y. ltfoody, 422 
U. S. 405 (1975). In anotl1er sett.ing, we have held t.hat a 
state may employ racial criteria that are reasonably nece~sary 
to assure compliance with federal Yot.ing rigl1ts legi slation , 
even though the state a.ction does not entail the remedy of a 
constitutional violation. United Jewish Oryo11i:zotions of 
TFillia.msburyh, Inc. v. Co.rey, 430 U. S. 144, 147-165 (1977) 
(opinion of YfHJTE, J., joined by BHE:!'J'\~AN, BLAC:KMUN, and 
SrEY:t::!'\'S_. JJ.); id., at 180-187 (Bl' RG:t:R, C. J., dissenting on 
otl1er grounds). 
·yv·hen we have discussed the remedial po"·ers of a federal 
court, ·we have been alert to the limitation that "[t]he power 
of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and 
state governmental ent.ities is not plenary. . . . '[A] federal 
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit tl1e 
nature and ext.ent of the ... violat.ion." Dayton Board of 
Education Y. Brink1oa.n, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quot-
jng -~fillikcn Y. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717. 73S (1974), and Swann 
v. · Clwrlott.e-ltf eckl.enbu.rq Board o Educ:.otion_. supra, 402 
U. S., at l G). .Jo.s we_ .rJo .=. 
• 
Here we deal not ·with the limited remedial po"·ers of a 
federal court. but with the broad remedial powers of Congress. 
It is funclamenial that in no organ of goH•rnment . .--.o-e-·s __ _, ;i./2 "" -Da.{ 
.) 
ihere repose a more comprehensiYe rc:>meclial power than 
jn the Congress, expressly d1arged by the Constitution with 
competence and aut-hority 1,o adn~.I)~Q 1hQ general 'Xelfare ~ 
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~ to enforce Pqunl proi.edion guarantees. Congress not 
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance "·ith 
existing federal statut.ory or constit.u1.ionnl antidis<'.rimination 
provisions, but nlso, where (',ongrcss has nutJJOrity 1o clc·l'h.re 
certain conduct. unl:ndul, jt may, ns here, anthorize :md A. · 
induce state action to avoid SlH.:h COJJuuct. Supra, at~----:1.-~-....... ] 
'(2) 
A more specific clHlllenge to t.he J\1BE program js the 
charge that it. impermissibly deprives nonminoniy bDsinesses 
of Bccess to at least some portion of the govemment con-
tracting opporf.lJnit.ies generated by the Act. It. must. be eon-
cecJed that by its objective of remedying tl1e J1ist.orical imp3ir-
ment of acc:ess, tl1e JdBE provision can have the effect. of 
aiYanJing some contracts to J\1BEs which ot.herwise might. be 
awarded t.o o1l1er businesses, wl1o may themselves be inlJoeent 
of any prior discriminatory artions. B ... t ne no 1' 7ic r 'o1~ 
~i 1 P*ion3l r;gl2t 1o l?o ?' 1 ·ardc'txl a ]sul;J:e 11 c . L .. ::: - ~· ·e# Fail-
ure of nonminorit.y firms to rec·.eive certain eontrtJcts is, of 
course, an incidental c.onsequrncc of the program, not part 
of its objective; similarly, past impairment. of minority-firm 
al':c·.css 1.o public cont.ract.ing opportunities may l1ave bC>r.n an 
jnciclenta] r.onsequenc.e of "bu~iness- as-us113l" by public con-
tracting agencies and among prime (·ont.rad.ors. 
It js not a constit.Dtional defect in this program tl1at 
it may disappoint t.he expectations of nonminority firms. 
\Vhen effectDating a limited and properly tailored remedy 
t.o cure the effects of ]1rjor discrimin3iion, suc.h "a sharing· 
of the burc:len" by innocent parties is not impermissible. 
Franks, supra .. at. 77; see A lurmwrle Paper Co., S?lpra.; Un·ited 
J eu:ish Orucwiza.tion, supra. The act uaJ "burden" sJJOulclered· 
by nonminority firms is relatiYely · light .. in t])is connection 
wben we consider the scope of this pDblie works progTaJD as· 
compared with 0\'erall construction contraci.ing opport.uni-: 
-- · - ~ - ,r 
.. . 
-· • ---- ") ..... 
' .... -. 
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This clors not. mrRn that thr c·lnim of on·riru:lusi\'C'llt·ss 
is <·ntitl .. tl tu no con!-:idPr.Ation )n ll1r> pn.'l'Pilf l':lse. TJ1c 
hi!'lury of gon•fllllK'Ilf.'l] tolPr:llwe of prnrfi<·.r~ using ra.cia] or 
c1Jn,ic: <:rilt:ria for the purpo~t· or wit.h the c•ffc-ci of imposing 
!lll inYiriious cii ~< · rin1inn tion must slt•rt tiS 1.0 the clc!lr.krious 
Plfrct ~ of r.Yl'll lwnign r:H·iu] ur <'tlllliC' l'lR!"~ifit·IJt .ion~ when 
tht·y ~I rny frolll Mr .JTO\\' renwrlisl jw:f ifit:I:Jf .ions. EY«'ll in the· 
<·onfc ·xf of .A f:1cial l'h :.lll<·llgC' Stlclr ns i!-= pr<'St' Jlf•·u in this <.:ns e, 
the :\JBE prc!\·is ior1 1':1llllOt. p3 s~ 111U.'::kr unles~. " ·ith due ac-
<·ou,.t for it .c:: .Ar!mini !" trnlive prugr~m. if prO\·in .. s n l'P.Il!'O lJ<Jb]e 
n ~~ ·JrflJH·.e fhHt nppli< ·fltion of nH·inl or ethnic· <'rifc·r·ia wilJ be 
Jimik<J to arc·omplishing t.hr. n •nwcli.Al obj ec:tin'S of Cm,gress 
:l))d lklt mis:1ppli<:ations of the pro~ram will he prL•Jllp1ly 
:md :Hll:'Cjll:ltc:Jy I'CIIH.'rlie<) tlrlmini:-:tnJ(jye)y. 
It j-:- =:: ig nifil'nnt flJ!.lt flw ~nmi11istn~tiYe ~c ·hpnw pr ·oyitJes for 
"·njq~ r :md e;-.;cmpfion. T"'o fullrL.lnH·ntal c·oJJgrc·:::sional as-
!'JJJilJ•li<JJlS \JIHI<·r)ic· L]Jr• :\JBE prugralll: (l) thAt. 11H• prPSPJJt 
f'lf•·t · 1~ 11f Jl ;'\St di ~rTilllinatiolJ ]J:t\'t ' imp:~in·cl 1lll' <·OJlljJ1'1itivr. 
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73/ The MBE provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (f) (2) 
(1976 ed. Supp. I), classifies as a minority business 
enterprise any "business at least 50 per centum of 
which is owned by minority group members or, in the 
case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per 
centum of the stock of which is owned by minority 
group members." Minority group members aie defined 
as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and 
Aleuts." The administrative definitions are set out 
in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 3. These 
categories also are classified as minorities in the 
regulations implementing the nondiscrimination 
requirements of the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 45 u.s.c. § 803, see 
42 Fed. Reg. 4285, 4288 (1977), on which Congress 
relied as precedent for the MBE provision. See 123 
Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). The House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and 
Minority Enterprise, whose activities played a 
significant part in the legislative history of the 
MBE provision, also recognized that these categories 
were included within the Federal Government's 
definition of "minority business enterprise." H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 20-21 (1975). The specific 
inclusion of these groups in the MBE provision 
demonstrates that Congress concluded they were 
victims of discrimination. Petitioners did not press 
any challenge to Congress' classification categories 
in the Court of Appeals; there is no reason for this 
Court to pass upon the issue at this time. 
No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
The question in this case is whether Congress 
constitutionally may enact the requirement in§ 103(f)(2) of the 
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), 1 that 10% of federal 
grants for local public work projects funded by the Act be set 
aside for minority business enterprises. For the reasons stated 
in Part III-A of the Court's opinion, I agree that Congress has 
the legislative authority to enact the set-aside. Because I 
agree that enactment of the set-aside does not violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, I also join all but 
subsections (1) & (4) of Part III-B of the Court's opinion. 
I 
Section 103(f) (2) employs a racial classification that 
is constitutionally prohibited unless it is a necessary means of 
advancing a compelling state interest. University of California 
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299, 305 (1978)(opinion of 
Powell, J.)(hereinafter Bakke): see In re Griffths, 413 U.S. 
717, 721-722 (1973): Loving~ Virginia, 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967): 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 3 79 U.S. 184, 196 ( 1964) • I consider 
adherence to this standard, which demands strict judicial 
scrutiny of racial classifications, as important as well as 
required by precedent. At times, debate over the proper standard 
,;. . 
2. 
of judicial review of equal protection claims may seem sterile 
and less important than the outcome of any particular 
controversy. But I have though that the enunciation of standards 
is a crucial part of this Court's responsibility to provide 
guidance to state and federal courts that must decide complex 
questions of constitutional law. 
The Equal Protect ion Clause, and the equal protect ion 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
demands that any classification among groups must be 
justifiable. Different standards of review applied to different 
sorts of classifications simply illustrate the principle that 
some classifications are less likely to be legitimate than 
others. Racial classifications must be assessed under the most 
stringent level of review because immutable characteristics, 
which bear no relation to individual merit or need, are 
irrelevant to virtually every legitimate governmental decision. 
See e.g., Anderson~ Martin, 375 u.s. 399, 402-404 (1964). 
This is the first case since University of California 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), to present the issue whether a 
government may establish a racial classification favoring 
members of minority groups. I believe that § 103(f) (2) is 
justifiable as a remedy that serves the compelling state 
interest in eradicating the continuing effects of the past 
discrimination identified by Congress. Although the Court's 
opinion does not explicitly adopt a standard for judicial review 
. . 
3. 
of racial classifications, I am satisfied that its analysis is 
essentially consistent with the traditional standard discussed 
in my Bakke opinion. See 438 u.s., at 287-299. It is on this 
understanding that I join the Court's opinion. 
Nevertheless, I recognize that the several opinions 
that join in the opinion of the Court are not of a single mind 
on the proper standard for review of racial classifications. The 
opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall joins the Court opinion only on 
the understanding that it is consistent with the "intermediate" 
level of scrutiny adopted in the separate opinion of Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun in Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
324-379. Of course, any legislation that survives the strict 
scrutiny test will, by definition, pass any less stringent 
standard of review. 
But Mr. Justice Marshall insists that the Court "does 
not evaluate the set-aside provision under the conventional 
'strict scrutiny' standard." Ante, at 6. I read the Court's 
opinion quite differently. In my view, the reasoning and 
language of the Court's opinion demonstrates that § 103 (f) ( 2) 
has been subjected to the exacting examination that is required 
of a racial classification. 
The Court recognizes "the need for careful judicial 
evaluation to assure" that a racial classification is "narrowly 
tailored" to 
discrimination." 
remedy "the present effects of past 




preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily 
receive a most searching examination." "What is essential," the 
Court concludes, "is that any enactment of Congress which 
employs racial or ethnic criteria receives probing examination." 
Ante, at 39. 
In the absence of an explicit rejection of the 
"conventional" standard of review, I see no basis for Mr. 
Justice Marshall's conclusion that the Court today, for the 
first time, has subjected a racial classification to less than 
strict scrutiny. Accordingly, I merely echo the Court in 
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2. Although racial classifications require strict 
the Constitution scrutiny, I do not agree that 
any rae ial classification. Mr. Justice Stewart 
recognizes the correct principle: "Under our Constitution, any 
official action that treats a person differently on account of 
his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and 
presumptively invalid." Post at 2. But, in rare and narrowly 
defined circumstances, that presumption may be rebutted. Cf. Lee 
v. Washington, 390 u.s. 333, 334 (1968)(Black, . Harlan, and 
Stewart, JJ., concurring). 
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Stewart takes a contrary 
view. His dissent states unequivocally that governmental action 
may never be based upon race. Post at 2. But the dissenting 
opinion also recognize the irreconciliable principle that 
federal courts, surely a part of our government, "may take race 
into account in devising a remedial decree to undo a violation 
of a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race." ~ 
at 13 n.4. So long as race may be noted in devising a remedy for 
identified racial discrimination, and so long as Congress is an 
appropriate body to devise a remedy, then it must be that 
congressional legislation that passes strict judicial scrutiny 
can include race-conscious remedies. 
,' 
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Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
Although I would place greater emphasis than the Chief 
Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review 
in conventional terms, I view his opinion as substantially in 
accord with my own views. Accordingly, I join the Chief 
Justice's opinion and write separately to apply the analysis set 
forth in my opinion in University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978)(hereinafter Bakke). 
The question in this case is whether Congress may enact 
the requirement in § 103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public 
work projects funded by the Act be set aside for minority 
business enterprises. Section 103(f)(2) employs a racial 
classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is 
a necessary means of advancing a compelling state interest. 
Bakke at 299, 305; see In ~ Griffths, 413 u.s. 717, 721-722 
(1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). For the reasons stated in my 
Bakke opinion, I consider adherence to this standard as 
important and consistent with precedent. 
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
demand that any classification among groups must be justifiable. 
2. 
Different standards of review applied to different sorts of 
classifications simply illustrate the principle that some 
classifications are less likely to be legitimate than others. 
Racial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent 
level of review because immutable characteristics, which bear no 
relation to individual merit or need, are irrelevant to almost 
every legitimate governmental decision. See e.g., Anderson ~ 
Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-404 (1964). In this case, however, I 
believe that§ 103(f)(2) is justifiable as a remedy that serves 
the compelling state interest in eradicating the continuing 














recognizes the principle that I believe is applicable: "Under 
our Constitution, any official action that treats a person 
differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2. But, 
in narrowly defined circumstances, that presumption may be 
rebutted. Cf. Lee~ Washington, 390 u.s. 333, 334 (1968)(Black, 
Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring). 
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Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
Although I would place greater emphasis than The Chief 
Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review 
in conventional terms, I view his opinion announcing the 
judgment as substantially in accord with my own views. 
Accordingly, I join that opinion and write separately to apply 
the analysis set forth by my opinion in University of California 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (hereinafter Bakke). 
The question in this case is whether Congress may enact 
the requirement in § 103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public 
work projects funded by the Act be set aside for minority 
business enterprises. Section 103(f)(2) employs a racial 
classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is 
a necessary means of advancing a compelling governmental 
interest. Bakke, at 299, 305; see In~ Griffths, 413 u.s. 717, 
721-722 ( 1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 ( 1967); 
McLaughlin~ Florida, 379 u.s. 184, 196 (1964). For the reasons 
stated in my Bakke opinion, I consider adherence to this 
standard as important and consistent with precedent. 
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection 





demand that any governmental distinction among groups must be 
justifiable. Different standards of review applied to different 
sorts of classifications simply illustrate the principle that 
some classifications are less likely to be legitimate than 
others. Racial classifications must be assessed under the most 
stringent level of review because immutable characteristics, 
which bear no relation to individual merit or need, are 
irrelevant to almost every governmental decision. See, ~' 
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-404 (1964). In this case, 
however, I believe that § 103(f)(2) is justified as a remedy 
that serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating 

















recognizes the principle that I believe is applicable: "Under 
our Constitution, any official action that treats a person 
differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2. But, 
in narrowly defined circumstances, that presumption may be 
rebutted. Cf. Lee~ Washington, 390 u.s. 333, 334 (1968)(Black, 
Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring). 
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~ Altihough I eonettP Ifi ----·~-~-e-- -t"'t- I wnte 
9 ~ttl tttely to apply the analysis set forth by my opinion 
in University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978) 1 
to the issue presented in this case. We are asked to decide 
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
is violated by the requirement in § 103 (f)(2) of the Public 
Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), 42 U. S. C. A. 
§ 6705 (f) (2) (Supp. ~978), that 10% of federal grants for 
local public works projects funded by that Act be set aside 
for minority business enterprises. I conclude that this set-
aside enacted by Congress is justifiable as a remedy that 
serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating 
the continuing effects of past identifiable discrimination. 
I 
Review of the constitutionality of this set-aside involves 
two distinct inquiries: (i) Did Congress have the authority 
to enact § 103 (f) (2), and (ii) Do the terms of § 103 (f) (2) 
violate the equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I regard the answer to the 
first question as relatively easy. As the opinion of the Court 
demonstrates, this leg· slative act can be justified by several 
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the analysis of the Court. It does not address explicitly the 
s.econd, and in my view the most important, question raised 
this case. 
The Court's opinion fails to apply traditional equal protec-
n and due process analysis to decide whether this racial 
c assification comports with constitutional requirements. To 
be sure, isolated passages in the opinion rely on language from 
our cases that have reviewed the use of racial classifications. 
See, e. g., ante, at 28, 37, 38. But the recitation of general 
language untied to any constitutional provision is not illumi-
nating in this case.1 
Section 103 (f) (2) employs a racial classification that is 
constitutionally prohibited unless its use is a necessary means 
of advancing a compelling governmental interest. University 
of Caltfornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 305 (1978~ ~ 
(opinion of PowELL, J.) (hereinafter Bakke); see In r~ 
1 One cnnnrt identify the st::mdard of review applied in the Court's 
opinion. It is possible that-for the first time in the jurisprudence of 
this Court~a racial claEsification has been reviewed under the "rational 
basis" test. Ne'lr the end of its opinion the Court quotes Mr. Ju tice 
Jackson's discussion of judicial review. Ante, at 38. But the Court does 
not recrgnize that the situations described by him were very different 
from this case. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote: "After the forces of con-
servatism and liberali~m. of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of 
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process and averaged and 
come to rest in some compromise measure such as the Missouri Compm- yO (V\ 
'{()'{'~\ mise, theN. R. A., the A. A. A., a min;mum-wage law, or some other legis-
lative policu, a decision striking it down closes an area of comprnmise in 
which conflicts have actually, if only temporarily, been comprsed." R. H. 
Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 321 (1941) (emphasis 
added). The analvsis of tho~e ca~es reviewing the enactment of economic 
legislation, see United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), is simply 
not applicable to review of thi~ racial clao-sification. 
Nor do I ngrcc that Lau v. Nirhols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), is instrurtive. 
In that case "the 'preference' approved did not result in the denial of 
the relevant benefi~'meaningful opportunity to participate in the educa-
tional program'-to anyone else." University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265,304 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, i.). ~ 
78-1007-CONCUR 
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Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
196 (1964). Racial preference does not constitute such an 
interest. "'Distinctions between citizens solely because of 
their ancestory; [are] 'odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the set-aside 
merely expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or 
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal pro-
tection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 
(1954). 
The Government does have a legitimate interest in amelio-
rating the disabling effects of identified discrimination. 
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District 
No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 (1973) (PowELL, i., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 
39, 41 (1971); Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 
437-438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination jus-
tifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful ... dis-
crimination." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 
405, 418 (1975). A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether 
§ 103 (f)(2) was enacted as a means of redressing such dis-
crimination. But this Court has never approved race-con-
scious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or leg:slative 
findings of constitutional or statutory violation. Bakke , 438 
U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 367-376 (1977); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 
430 U. S. 144, 155- 159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.); South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-315 (1966). 
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action 
and impermissible racial preference rests on the existenc/ 
78-1007-CONCUR 
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a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest 
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless 
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such 
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements 
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to 
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to 
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the gov-
ernmental body must make findings that demonstrate the 
existence of illegal discrimination. In Bakke, the R egents 
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with 
educational functions, and they made no findings of past dis-
crimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was 
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school 
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309- 310. 
Our past cases also establish that even if the government 
proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a sus-
pect clai'sification, the means selected must be narrowly dra.wn . 0 
to fulfill the governmental purpose. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., ·,to-X 
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did 
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse stu-
dent body. But the method selected to achieve that end, 
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not an appropriate 
means. The Regent's quota system eliminated some non-
minority applicants from all consideration for a specified num-
ber of seats in the entering class, although it allowed minority 
applicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S, at 
275- 276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes 
race as a factor , but not the sole factor, in assessing an ap-
plicant's qualifications serves the University's interest in di-
versity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and 
competitive consideration. I d., a.t 317-318. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f) (2), we must 
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findings 
of unlawful discrimination; (ii) if so, whether sufficient find-' 
78-1007-CONCUR 
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ings have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination 
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and 
(iii) whether the lOo/o set-aside is a permissible means for 
redressing identifiable past discrimination. None of these 
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that 
we are reviewing an Act of Congress. 
II 
'The history of this Court's review of congressional action 
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature 
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations. 
Unlike the Regents of the University of Californ!a, Congress 
properly may-and indeed must-address directly the prob-
lems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this 
Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce 
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants 
on the basis of its "findings that [such discrimination] had a 
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate 
commerce." 
Similarly, after hearing "overwhelming" evidence of private 
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 8&--914, pt. 2, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess, 26 (1963), Congress enacted Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order "to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina-
tory practices and devices which have fostered racially strati-
fied job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested 
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that 
" 'persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the 
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored 
to a position where they would have been were it not for the 
unlawful discrimination.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976), quoting Section-by-Section 
' 
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Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec. 
7166, 7168 (1972). 
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitu-
tional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.2 At an 
early date, the Court stated that "[i]t is the power of Con-
gress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions 
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U. S. 339, 345 (1879). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968), the Court recognized Congress' 
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the 
right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimi-
nation forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subse-
quently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179 
(1976), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial 
discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v. 
Sante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-296 (1976); 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460 
(1975). 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court 
considered whether § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave 
Congress the power to enact § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b) (e). Section 4 (e) pro-
vides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied 
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write 
the English language. The Court held that Congress was 
empowered to enact § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination 
2 Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, pro-
vides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to 
enforce the provisions of those Amendments. 
78-1007-CONCUR 
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against the Puerto Rican community. !d., at 652-653. Im-
plicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had 
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this 
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination. 
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of 
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases con.: 
struing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966), 
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for viola-
tions of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress 
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding 
"ster[n] and ... elaborate" measures. !d., at 309. Most 
relevant to our present inquiry was the Court's express ap-
proval of Congress' decision to "prescrib[ e] remedies for .vot-
ing discrimination which go into effect without the need for 
prior adjudication." !d., at 328.8 
It i3 beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the 
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to 
8 Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some 
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa 
et seq., temporarily banned the use of lit,eracy tests in all jurisdictions. 
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), this Court, speaking through 
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exer-
cise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. See 
id., at 117 (Black, J.); id., at 135 (Douglas, J.); id., at 152 (Harlan, 
J.); id., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); id., at 281 
(STEWART, J., with whom BuRGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, J., concurred). 
MR. JusTICE STEWART said that: 
"Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concern-
ing ... actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access 
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint 
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself 
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon 
individual records. . . . The findings that Congress made when it enacted 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide ban 
on literacy tests." I d., at 284 (citation omitted). 
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prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradi-
cate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether 
Congress has made findings adequate to support its 




The petitioners contend that the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f)(2) reflects no congressional finding of statutory or 
constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the 
assertion that a reviewin~ court may not look beyond the 
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Con-
gress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination. 
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial barrier to 
full understanding of the legislative process. 
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve 
specifi0 dispt1tes between competing adversaries. Its consti-
tutionul role is to be representative rather than impartial, to 
make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law. 
The petitioners contention that this Court should treat the 
deb3tes on § 103 (f) (2) as the complete "record" of con-
gressional decisionmaking underlving that statute is essentially 
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court. 
But Congress is not expected to act as thou~h it were duty 
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. The crea-
tion of national rules for the governance of our society simply 
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is 
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Con-
grel"s has no responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and 
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special 
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to 
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be 
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate 
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires 
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. 
' . ' 
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After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national 
concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the 
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress 
again considers action in that area. 
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress 
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legisla-
tive action. Such a requirement would mark an unprece-
dented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordi-
nate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor 
our democratic tradition warrants such a ·constraint on the 
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not con-
fined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f) (2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the 
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with 
the problems of racial discrimination against minority business 
enterprises. 
B 
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f)(2) demon-
strates that Cong~ess reasonably concluded that private and 
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible 
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors. 4 
The opinion of the Court provides a careful overview of the 
4 I cannot accept suggestion of the Court of Appeals that § 103 (f) 
(2) must be viewed as serving a compelling state interest if the reviewing 
court .... can1perceive a basi3" for legislative action. 588 F. 2d 600, 604-
605 (CA2 1978), quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S., at 656. The 
"perceive a basis" standard refers to congre~:sional authority to act, not 
to the distinct question whether that action violates the Due Precess 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See text, at supm. 
:!JeattJ ti8 tcpcat the Ooatt of Appeals' ePFer. Oce ante, at 26-. 
In my view, a court should uphold a reasonab!e congressional finding 
of discrimination. A more stringent standard cf review would impinge 
'WOn Congress' ability to address problems of discrimination, see , 
~ supra; a standard requirirg a court to "perceive a bas's" is eso:en-
\ tially meaningless in this context. That standard might allow a court to 
justify legislative action even in the absence of affirmative evidence of 
congressional findings. 
111 ~l Re.<:. 
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relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to which only 
a few words need be added. 
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced 
on the floor of the House of Represcnta.tives by Representa-
tive Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal 
Government was already operating a set-aside pro ram under 
§ 8 (a) of the Small Business Administration Ac 15 U. S. C. 
§ 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensible 
~ for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for 
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result bein · that 
""We are going to eventually be able to end certain programs for 
people which do not contribute to the economy." 123 Cong. 
Rec. H1436-H1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977).5 Senator 
Brooke, who introduced a similar measure in the Senate, re-
minded the Senate of the special provisions previously enacted 
--f---.4-~ § 8 (a.) of the SBA Act and the Railroad Revitalization 
Ac , 4 U. S. C. § 1657a, which, he stated, demonstrated the 
v;t idity o IS amen men . 
. S J <} D<t ~ I 0 
(Jd,/1 eA.. ~till! 
lo~ l9~9) 
ectwn 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Busi-
ness Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal 
Government and subcontract them out to small businesses.-4l 
5 During subsequent debate in the House, Representative Conyers em-
phasized that minority businessrs "throu~h no fault . of their own sim11ly 
have not been able to 14et their foot in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H1440 
..,...(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977)j ;tee ~ ~ )(}~~8 Hlf (remarks of Rep. 
( 
Biaggi). ~ 
6 In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the President issued Executive Orders direct-
ing federal aid for minority business cntcrprisjls. See Exec~ Order 
11458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (~1969); Exec~ Order 11518, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 4939 (~1. ~ 1970); Exec~ Order 11625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19967 
~ 1971). The President noted that "members of certain minority 
groups through no fault of their own have been denied the full opportu-
nity to participate in the free enterprise rsystcm," Exe~ Order 11518, 
supra, at 4940, and that the "opportunity for full participation in our 
free enterprise system by socially and economically disadvantaged persons 




Tk SVVI~ CSu.o1~ /J~,JA,s'0a.fi~ h~ ~ kedi:J Jxr 14uufr()(· tJr-~ 
ii Wf/1 f~ (r;.) t J SOC/4 tWi)_ eau.ft1111~ tLJufl.M~rJ ptAfcflUJ. 
/Jt4.1i J JJ . b 
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The oper ion of the § 8 (a) program was reviewed by con-
gressional committees between 1972 and 1977. In 1972, the 
'---'""+_..,_o_u_se'""" ~ommittee on Small Business found that mmor-
ity businessmen face economic difficulties that "are the resu t 
of past social standards which linger as characteristics of 
minorities as a group." . H. R. Rep. No. 92- 1615 3 (1972). 
In 1975, the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversig t an 
Minority · · concluded that "[t]he effect of past in-
equities stemming from racial prejudice have not remained in 
the past," and that low participation by minorities in the 
economy was the result of "past discriminatory systems( 
H. R. Rep. No. 94- 1- 2 (1975). In 1977, the House Com-
mittee on Small Business found that 
"over the years, there has developed a business system 
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority 
participation. In the past more than the present, this 
stem of conducting business transactions overtly pre-
uded minority input. Currently, more often encounter 
business system which is racially neutral on its face, 
ut because of past overt social and economic discriminar 
)qz~ ~J) 2J1 
Sc..ss. ) 
46il 'fl/-& ~j . 
1st rt4() . .> 
on is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate these 
· past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791L124 (1977). ~ ~·J li. ~·j 
The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less 
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced 
§ 103 (f) (2) into the House of Representatives.7 -------
Order 11625, supra, at 1996'r! Assistance to minority business enterprises 
through the § 8 (a) program has been designed to promote the goals of 
these Executive Orders. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 447 
F. 2d 696, 706 (CAS 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 914 (1974). ~ 
.._7 Two sections of the Railroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congres~ 
recognition of the need for remedial steps on behalf of minority businesses. 
45 U. S. C. § 803 prohibits discrimination in any activity funded by the 
Act, and U. S. C. § 1657a establishes a Minority Resource Center to 
assist mmority businessmen obtain contracts and other business oppor-
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In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of 
legislative history contained in the Court's opinion, I believe 
that a court must accept as established the conclusion that 
purposeful discrimination contributed significantly to the 
small percentage of federal contracting funds that minority 
business enterprises have received. Refusals to subcontract 
work to minority contractors may, depending upon the iden-
tity of the discriminating party, violate Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, or the Fourteenth 
mendment. t ough the discriminatory activities were not 
i,!dentificd with the exactitude expected in judicial or admin-
istrative adjudication, it must be remembered that "Congress 
gress may paint with a much broader brush than may this 
Court .... " Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284 (1970) 
(STEWART, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).8 
provisions were enacted by a Congress that recrgnizod the "established 
national policy, since at least the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
to encourage and assist in the development of minority business enter-
prise ." S. Rep. No. 94-499 (Commerce Committee). In January 
1977, the Department of Transportation issued regulations pursuant to 
45 U. S. C. § 403 that require contractors to formulate affirmative action 
programs to en8tue that minority businesses receive a fair proportion of 
contract opportunities. See 42 Fed. Reg. 4290-4291 (1977 . See also 
( 
I 
pp· 11-l<i) nn. 11 and 12, infra. 
8 Although this record suffices to support the congres ional judgment 
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress 
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional stand-
ards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action 
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at 
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensi- ~ 
tive as this, depend in large measure upon the public's perception of~ 
fairness. St>e Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53; J . H .. Wilkinson III, From 
Bmwn to Bakke, 264-266 (1979); M. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: 
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1048-1049 
(1979). It therefore is important that the legislative record supporting 
race-conscious remedies contain evidence that satisfies fair minded people 
that the congressional action is just . 
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IV 
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classifica-
.tion is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As 
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classi-
fication only when necessary to accomplish a compelling 
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 305. The con-
clusion that Congress found a compelling governmental inter-
est in redressing identified discrimination against minority 
contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10% 
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving 
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually 
Impossible to satisfy. A& I nofled in BBlcl.,e, 438 U. ~ . , at ~gs, 
~R. 2'7,1 _£nly two of this Court's modern cases have held the 
use of racial classifications to be constitutional. See Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Hirabayshi 
v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the failure of 
legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some to 
wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been 
strfct in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme 
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972). 
A 
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an 
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue. 
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial 
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference. 
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra, 
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious ~ 
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a non~ 
racial means should be available to further the legitimate 
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311. 
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compel-
ling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination. 
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any 
,, 
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affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely 
to affect persons differently depending upon their r3ice. See, 
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Al-
though federal courts may not order or approve remedies that 
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 (1977); Dayton v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S 406 (1977); Austin Independent School District v. 
United States, 429 U.S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring), 
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the 
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recog-
nized that the choice of remedies to redress racial 
discrimination is ua balancing process left, within appropriate 
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of 
the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure 
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of 
racia.l discrimination. The legielative history of § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator 
Howard, who was a member of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction and who introduced the Amendment into the Senate, 
described § 5 as "a direct affirmative delegation of power to A J aJ 
-Congress to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees " oP § J ~ ~ 111t.4l 111 • 
..... , r~Qntai!'lBQ in SliiQti9H One] .r Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st 
&.lis., 2766 (1866). Furthermore, he stated that§ 5 
"casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to 
it, for the future, that all sections of the amendment are ~ 
carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes th~ 
rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause 
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon 
the Congress this power and this duty." I d., at 2768. 
Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congres-
sional action to effectuate the goals of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment was echoed by other Members of Congress. 
Representative Stevens, also a member of h Reconstruc-' 
tion Committee, said that "allows Congress to correct 
the unjust legislation of the tates," id., at 2459, and Senator 
Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the power of Congress 
to enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all re-
publican government .... " !d., at 2961. See id., at 2512-
513 (remarks of ReplQi!eJ;,J,ta±iw/ Raymond); id., at 2511 
(R ep~en:ta,ti?el Miller). See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U. S., at 345.9 
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may 
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal 
courts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the 
--------. .,..-F.ourteenth Amendment, see C. Fairman, The OliveF Wsn:deH 
I( t.c.dlA siftuc t d'k 
tWJl. Reon16Yt...) 
pt. / 
Holmgil Devi:!!e History of the Supreme Court of the United J 
t States: 1295 1296 (1971), they did not 
believe that congressional action would be unreviewable by 
this Court. Several Members of Congress emphasized that a 
primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to place 
I the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "in the eternal 
firm fl ment of the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 
1st Sess. 2462 1866) (remarks of Repr~tative Ga.rfield). _ti(Md.llkoSJ 
See id., at 24 epFt~tlttive Steohe~s); id., at 2462 ~ep. x.: ....___ _ 
.J:eeerrttt.tiv~ Thayer); id., at 2498 ~ep~esen+ativ~Broomall) . J;.MtYtk.S DF' 
By 1866, Members of Congress fully understood that judicial l~ 
review was the means by which action of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches would be required to conform to the 
Constitution. See, e. g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 737 -----
(1 03). -----
I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Con-
9 See also Jones v. Alfred Mayer & Co., 392 U. S., at 440-441, quoting 
Con g. Globe, 39th Con g., 1st Sess ., 322 (1866) (rema.rks of Sen. Trumbull 
on Cong<e$ ' outhority undec the Thirteenth Amendment). ~ 
... 
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gress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance 
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of dis-
crimination. But that authority must be exercised in a man-
ner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments. 
The Judicial Branch has the special responsibility to make a 
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a race-
conscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility 
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state 
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of 
a remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected 
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of iden-
tified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to 
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safe-
guard of judicial review of racial classifications. 
B 
When reviewing the selection by Congress of a race-
conscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon 
which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous 
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious 
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative 
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974); 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387, 
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy. 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d, at 
399; United States v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46, 
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939 
(1973), (iii) the relationship between the percentage of mi-
nority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority 
group members in the relevant population or work force, 
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d 
306, 311 (CA2 1979) ; Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 50~ __-
F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CA11974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910____.--
(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service 
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421 
tJ. S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CA8) 
,, . 
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(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the 
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be 
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F. 
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). 
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew 
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of 
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although 
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legis-
iation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination 
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority 
businesses, the fact remained that minority contractors were 
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong. 
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threat~ 
ened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f) 
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the 
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new 
public construction. Since the emergency public construc-
tion funds were to be distributed quickly/0 any remedial provi-
sion designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past 
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover, 
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had 
to provide minority contractors the experience necessary for -----
continued success without federal assistance.11 And Congres~ 
10 The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA) provided that 
federal monies be committed to state and local grantees by September 30, 
1977. 42 U.S. C. A,§ 6707 (h) (1) (Supp, 1978). Action on applications 
for funds was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application, 
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90 days of 
project approval, id., § 6705 (d). 
11 In 1972, a congressional oversight commiUee addressed the "complex 
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of ~ 
racial bias." See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (Selec~ 
Committee on Small Business). The committee explained how the effects 
of discrimination translate into economic barriers: 
"In attempting to increase their participation as entrepeneurs in our 
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major prob-
•i-". 
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knew that the ability of minority group members to gain 
experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering _____-
the construction trades.12 The set-aside program adopted ~ 
!ems. There problems, which are economic in nature, are the result of 
past social standards which linger as characteristics of minorities as a group. 
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the 
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs. 
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts 
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to 
obtain the needed capital. Lending firms require substantial security and 
a track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority business-
men usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is 
often turned down. 
"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any 
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor 
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could 
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also the internal 
functions of management." !d., at 3-4. 
12 When Senator Brooke introduced the PWEA set~aside in the Senate, 
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate prob-
lems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment dis-
crimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the 
"Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated by the 
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contractors to use 
hiring goals in order to redress past discrimination. See Contractors 
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 
159, 163 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854 (1971). The House of 
Representatives refused to adopt an amendment to an appropriations 
bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor Department's 
order. 115 Cong. Rec. 40921 (1969). The Senate, which had approved 
such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position. 115 Cong. 
Rec. 40749 (1969). ~ 
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that implementa-
tion of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ensure equal opportunity. 
See 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott); id., at 40741 (remarks 
of Sen. Griffith); id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). Senator Percy 
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacks 
in the construction industry. !d., at 40742-40743. The day following the 
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as part of this emergency legislation served each of these 
concerns because it took effect as soon as funds were expended 
under PWEA and because it provided minority 'Contractors 
with experience that could enable them to compete without 
governmental assistance. 
Th~ § 103 (f) (2) set-aside is not a permanent part of fed-
eral contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program 
concludes, this set-aside program ends. The temporary nature 
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not 
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to 
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine 
the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or 
re-enacts § 103 (f)(2). 
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope 
of congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have ap-
proved temporary hiring remedies insuring that the percent-
age of minority group workers in a business or governmental 
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minor-
ity group members in the relevant population. Boston 
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport 
Guard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are mem-
bers of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d 
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members con-
stitute about 17% of the national population, see Contractors 
Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. --------
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978)~ 
The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway 
between the present percentage of minority contractors and 
the percentage of minority group members in the Nation. 
Senate Yote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted 
''exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades. 
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should 
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of 
minorities." /d., at 41072. 
.. 
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Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its 
effect might be unfair if it were applied rigidly in areas of the 
country where minority group members constitute a small per-
centage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress 
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f) (2). The factors 
governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qual-
ified minority contractors in a particular geographic area, the 
size of the locale's minority population, and the efforts made 
to find minority contractors. Department of Commerce, 
Guidelines for 10% Minority Business Participation LPW 
Grants, App. 165a-167a. We have been told that 1261 
waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. Brief for 
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37. 
c 
A race-conscious remedy should not be approved without 
consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of 
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U. S., at 374-375. In this case, the peti-
tioners contend with some force that they have been asked 
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are in-
nocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, that their 
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved: 
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors 
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the 
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion 
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that 
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors. 
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would 
reserve about .25% of all the funds expended yearly on con-
struction work in the United States for approximately 4% ------
of the Nation's contractors who are members of a minority~ 
group. 584 F. 2d., at 607-608. The set-aside would have 
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors 
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view, 
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the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed 
that its use is consistent with fundamental fairness.13 
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the set-
·aside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the com-
pelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination 
'that affects minority contractors. Nor is any marginal 
unfairness to innocent nonminority contractors sufficiently sig-
nificant-or sufficiently indentifiable-to outweight the gov-
ernmental interest served by § 103 (f) (2). When Congress 
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise dis-
cretion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary to 
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that 
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the 
set-aside in this ca.se.14' 
13 Although I believe that the burden placed upon nonminority contrac• 
tors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrele-
vant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no set-
aside and provided $400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce 
argues that "[n]onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation 
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the 
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ 
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional 
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not 
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976) 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971) 
(';To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does 
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment"). 
Similarly, I cannot accept the suggestion that the set-aside should be 
considered a "technique to induce governments and private parties to 
cooperate voluntarily with f.edcral policy." Ante, at 22. The petitioners, 
contractors who wish to compete for all federal funds, certainly have not 
accepted voluntarily the adoption or the implementation of the set-aside. 
14 Petitioners have suggested a variety of alternative programs that couf~ 
be used in order to aid minority business enterprises in the construction 
industry. My view that this set-aside is withln the discretion of Con-
gress does not imply that other methods are unavailable to Congress. Nor 
do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropriate remedy 
or that the selection of a set-aside by any other governmental body would 
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In the history of this Court and this country, few questions 
have been more divisive than those arising from governmental 
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions 
played no small part in the tragic legacy of government-
sanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.) 
(1857). At lea.st since the decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court ha.s been resolute 
in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution envi-
sions a Nat:on where race is irrelevant. The t~me cannot 
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based 
npon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin. 
B'· t in our quest to achieve a society free from racial classi-
fication, we cannot irrnore the cla.ims of those who still suffer 
from the effects of iden t' fia ble discrimination. 
Dist-inguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from 
racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made 
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When 
we firt:t confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that 
the Regents of the University of California were not com-
petent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold 
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my 
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of ra.cial classifica-
tions, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a 
democratic society implicit in the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve tran-
sient social or political goals, however worthy they may be. ~ 
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power~ 
and Congress has been given a unique constitutional role 
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In 
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310. The degree of 
specificity required in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of 
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature anc! 
authority of a governmental body. 
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this case, where Congress acted on the basis of its determina-
tion that minority contractors were victims of purposeful 
discrimination and where Congress chose a reasonably neces-
sary means to effectuate its purpose, I find no constitutional 
reason to invalidate § 103 (f) (2).15 
15 Petitioners also contend the § 103 (f) (2) violates Title VI of the Civil 
l{ights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. Because I believe that the 
~et-aside is constitutional, I also conclude that the program does not Yiolate 
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.); id.,T~~ ~ 
348-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MAHSHALL, and BLACKMUN, J/ 
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL. 
I write to apply the analysis set forth by my opm10n 
in University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), 
to the issue presented in this case. We are asked to decide 
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
is violated by the requirement in § 103 (f) (2) of the Public 
Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), 42 U. S. C. A. 
§ 6705 (f)(2) (Supp. 1978), that 10% of federal grants for 
local public works projects funded by that Act be set aside 
for minority business enterprises. I conclude that this set-
aside enacted by Congress is justifiable as a remedy that 
serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating 
the continuing effects of past identifiable discrimination. 
I 
Review of the constitutionality of this set-aside involves 
two 9.is~inet~nquiries: (i) Did Congress have the authority 
to enact § 103 (f) (2) , and (ii) Do the terms of § 103 (f) (2) 
violate the equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I regard the answer to the 
:first question as relatively easy. As the opinion of the Court 
demonstrates, this legislative act can be justified by several 
explicit grants of power to Congress. I cannot, however, join 
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the analysis of the Court. It does not address explicitly tha 
second, and in my view the most importa11t, question raised by 
this case. The Court's opinion fails to apply traditional equal 
protection and due process analysis to decide whether this racial 
classification comports with constitutional requirements.' To 
be sure, isolated passages in the opinion rely on language from 
our cases that have reviewed the use of racial classifications. 
See, e. g., ante, at 28, 37, 38. But the recitation of general 
language untied to any constitutional provision is not illumi~ 
nating in this case.1 
Section 103 (f) (2) employs a racial classification that is 
constitutionally prohibited unless its use is a necessary means 
of advancing a compelling governmental interest. University 
of Caltfornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 291, 305 (1978) 
(opinion of PowELL, J.) (hereinafter Bakke); see In re 
1 One cannot identify the standard of review applied in the Court's 
opinion. It is possible that-for the first time in the jurisprudence of 
this Court-a racial classification has been reviewed under the "rational 
basis" test. Near the end of its opinion the Court quotes Mr. Justice 
Jackson's discussion of judicial review. Ante, at 38. But the Court does 
not recognize that the situations described by him were very diff~rent 
from this case. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote: "After the forces of con-
servatism and liberalism, of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of 
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process and averaged and 
come to rest in some compromise measure such as the Missouri Compro-
mise, theN. R. A., the A. A. A., a minimum-wage law, or some other legis-
lative policy, a decision striking it down closes an area of compromise in 
which conflicts have actually, if only temporarily, been composed." R. H. 
Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 321 ( 1941) (emphasis 
added). The analysis of those cases reviewing the enactment of economic 
legislation, see United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), is simply 
not applicable to review of this racial classification. 
Nor do I agree that Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), is instructive. 
In that case "the 'preference' approved did not result in the denial of 
the relevant benefit-'meaningful opportunity to participate in the educa-
tional program'-to anyone else." University of California v. Bakke, 438; 
U. S. 2f:i5, 304 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, J.), 
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Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721- 722 (1973) ; Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 
196 (1964) . Racial preference does not constitute such an 
interest. " 'Distinctions between citizens solely because of 
their ancestory' [are] 'odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the set-aside 
merely expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or 
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal pro-
tection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 
(1954) . 
The Government does have a legitimate interest in amelio-
rating the disabling effects of identified discrimination. 
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District 
No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 
39, 41 (1971) ; Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 
437- 438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination jus-
tifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful . . . dis-
crimination." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 
405, 418 (1975) . A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether 
§ 103 (f) (2) was enacted as a means of redressing such dis-
crimination. ~ this Court has never approved race-con-
scious remedies abs~nt judicial, administrative, or legislative 
findings of constitutional or statutory violation. Bakke, 438 
U. S. , at 307; see, e. g. , Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 367- 376 (1977) ; United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 
430 U.S. 144, 155- 159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.); South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-315 (1966). 
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action 
and impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of 
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a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest 
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless 
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such 
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements 
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to 
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to 
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the gov-
ernmental body must make findings that demonstrate the 
existence of illegal discrimination. In Bakke, the Regents 
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with 
educational functions, and they made no findings of past dis-
crimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was 
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school 
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310. 
Our past cases also establish that even if the government 
proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a sus-
pect classification, the means selected must be narrowly drawn 
to fulfill the governmental purpose. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., 
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did 
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse stu-
dent body. But the method selected to achieve that end, 
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not an appropriate 
means. The Regent's quota system eliminated some non-. 
minority applicants from all consideration for a specified num-
ber of seats in the entering class, a1though it allowed minority 
applicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S., at 
275-276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes 
race as a factor, but not the sole factor, in assessing an ap-
plicant's qualifications serves the University's interest in di-
versity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and 
competitive consideration. I d., at 317-318. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f) (2), we must 
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findings 
of unlawful discrimination; (ii} if so, whether sufficient find-. 
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lngs have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination 
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and 
(iii) whether the 10% set-aside is a permissible means for 
redressing identifiable past discriminatiOn. None of these 
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that 
we are reviewing an Act of Congress. 
II 
The history of this Court's review of congressional action 
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature 
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations. 
Unlike the Regents of the University of California, Congress 
properly may-and indeed must--address directly the prob-
lems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this· 
Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce 
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants 
op the basis of its ''findings that [such discrimination] had a 
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate 
epmmerce." 
Similarly, after hearing 11overwhelming" evidence of private 
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963) , Congress enacted Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order 11to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina-
tory practices and devices which have fostered racially strati-
fied job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) . 
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested 
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that 
" 'persons aggrieved by the consequences and · effects of the 
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored 
to a position where they would have been were it not for the 
unlawful discrimination.' " Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
f).o ., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976) ,' quoting Section-by-Section : 
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Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec. 
7166, 7168 (1972). 
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitu-
tional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.2 At an 
early date, the Court stated that "[i]t is the power of Con-
gress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions 
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U. S. 339, 345 (1879). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968) , the Court recognized Congress' 
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the 
right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimi-
nation forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subse-
quently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179 
( 1976), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial 
discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v. 
Sante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-296 (1976); 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460 
(1975) . 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court 
considered whether § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave 
Congress the power to enact § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b)(e). Section 4 (e) pro-
vides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied 
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write 
the English language. The Court held that Congress was 
empowered to enact § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination 
2 Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment , which abolished slavery, pro~ 
vides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to 
· t~nforce the provisions of those Amendments. 
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·against the Puerto Rican community. ld., at 652-653. Im-
plicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had 
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this 
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination. 
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of 
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases con-
struing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), 
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for viola-
tions of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress 
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding 
"ster[n] and .. . elaborate" measures. ld., at 309. Most 
relevant to our present inquiry was the Court's express ap-
proval of Congress' decision to "prescrib [ e] remedies for vot-
ing discrimination which go into effect without the need for 
prior adjudication." I d., at 328.8 
It is beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the 
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to 
8 Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some 
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa 
et seq., temporarily banned the use of literacy tests in all jurisdictions. 
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), this Court, speaking through 
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exer-
eise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. Se& 
id., at 117 (Black, J .) ; id., at 135 (Douglas, J.) ; id., at 152 (Harlan, 
J .) ; id., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ; id., at 281 
{STEWART, J ., with whom BURGER, C. J ., and BLACKMUN, J ., concurred) . 
J,1R. JusTICE STEWART said that : 
"Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concern-
ing . .. actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access 
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint 
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself' 
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon 
individual records. . . . The findings that Congress made when it enacted 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide b.an 
qn literacy tests." ld., at 284 (citation omittedl. 
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prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradi~ 
cate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether 
Congress has made findings adequate to support its 




The petitioners contend that the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f)(2) reflects no ·congressional finding of statutory or 
constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the 
assertion that a reviewing court may not look beyond the 
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Con-
gress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination. 
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial barrier to 
full understanding of the legislative process. 
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve 
specifiJ disputes between competing adversaries. Its consti-
tutionui role is to be representative rather than impartial, to 
make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law. 
The petitioners contention that this Court should treat the 
debates on § 103 (f) (2) as the complete "record" of con-
gressional dccisionmaking underlying that statute is essentially 
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court. 
But Congress is not expected to act as though it were duty 
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. · The crea-
tion of national rules for the governance of our society simply 
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is 
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Con-
gress l1as no responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and 
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special 
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to 
investigate and consider all facts and opinions ·that may be 
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate 
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires 
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. 
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After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national 
concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the 
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congrest'l 
again considers action in that area. 
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress 
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legisla-
tive action. Such a requirement would mark an unprece-
dented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordi-
nate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor 
our democratic tradition warrants such a ·constraint on the 
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not con-
fined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f)(2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the 
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with 
the problems of racial discrimination against minority business 
enterprises. 
B 
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f)(2) demon-
etrates that Congress reasonably concluded that private and 
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible 
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors.4 
The opinion of the Court provides a careful overview of the 
4 I cannot accept the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that § 103 (f) 
(2) must be viewed as serving a compelling state interest if the reviewing 
court can "perceive a ba~Sis" for legislative action. 588 F . 2d 600, ti0'4-
605 (CA2 1978) , quoting Katzenbach v. M01·gan, 384 U. S., at 656 . The 
"perceive a ba~is" standarrl refers to congre.::t:~ ional authority to act, not 
to the di~ tinct, que~Stion whether that action violates the Due Precess 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment . See text, at pp. 1- 2, supm. 
In my view, a court should uphold a reasonable congressional finding 
of discrimination. A more stringent standard of review would impinge 
upon C01;,g_re~;s' abili1 y to addre;;;; problems of discrimination , oee pp . 5-8, n/ 
supr-a ; af'standard requiring a court to "perceive a basis" i:o e;;sentially 7 
meaningles~ in this context. That standard might allow a court to justify 
legislative action even in the absence of affirmative evidence of congres-
sional findin gs . 
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relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to which only 
a few words need be added. 
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced 
on the floor of the House of Representatives by Representa ... 
tive Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal 
Government was already operating a set-aside program under 
§ 8 (a) of the Small Business Administration Act of 1958, 15 
U.S. C. § 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensi-
ble way for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for 
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result being that 
we are going to eventually be able to ... end certain pro-. 
grams which are merely support survival programs for people 
which do not contribute to the economy." 123 Cong. Rec. 
H1436- H1437 (daily ecl. Feb. 24, 1977).5 Senator Brooke, 
who introduced a similar measure in the Senate, reminded 
the Senate of the special provisions previously enacted into 
§ 8 (a) of the SBA Act and the Railroad Revitalization Act 
of 1976, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a, which, he stated, demonstrated 
the validity of his amendment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3909-10 
(daily ed. March 10, 1977) . 
Section 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Busi-
ness Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal 
Government and subcontract them out to small businesees. 
The Small Business Administration has been directed by 
Executive Order to employ § 8 (a) to aid socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons. Ante, at 12.fl The opera-
3 During subsequent debate in the House, Repre:sentative Conyers em-
phasized that minority busine::;::;es "through no fault of their own simply 
have not been able to get their foot in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H1440 
(daily eel. FPb. 24, 1977); see ibid. (re!TUlt'k:s of Rep. Biaggi). 
6 In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the President issued Executive Orders direct-
ing federal aid for minority busine::;s enterprises. See Exec. Order 11458, 
34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969) ; Exec. Ordf'r 11518, 35 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1970) ~ 
Exec. Order 11625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19967 (1971) . The President noted 
that "mPmbers of certain minority groups through no fault of their own 
pave !Jeen denied the full opportunity to participate in the free enterpriilll' 
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tion of tl1e 8 (a) program was reviewed by congressional 
committPes between 1972 and 1977. In 1972, the House Sub-
committee on Minority Small Business Enterprise found 
that miuority businessmen face ecouomic difficulties that "are 
the result of past social standards which linger as characteris-
tics of minorities as a group." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d 
Gong., 2d Sess., 3 (1972). In 1975, the House Subcommittee 
on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise concluded that 
' 1[t]he eft'ect of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice 
have not remained in the past," and that low participation by 
minorities in the economy was the result of "past discrimina-
tory systems." H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1-2 (1975). In 1977, the House Committee on Small Business 
found that 
"over the years, there has developed a business system 
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority 
participation. In the past more than the present, this 
system of conducting business transactions overtly pre-
cluded minority input. Currently, we more often en-
counter a business system which is racially neutral on its 
face, but because of past overt social and economic dis-
crimination is presently opera.ting, in eft'ect, to perpetuate 
these past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th 
Coug., 2d Sess., 124 (1977). 
The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less 
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced 
§ 103 (f)(2) into the House of Representatives.7 
ay~tem," Exec. Order 11518, supra, aL 4940, and that the "opportunity 
for full participation iu our free enterpri~e system by socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons is e..."'tiential if we are to obtain social and 
economic justice." Exec. Order 11625, supra., al 19967. Assi8tance to 
minority busine:s:s enterpri8es through the § 8 (a) program ha8 been de-
@igned to promote the goals of these ExPcutive Order~. Ray Baillie Trash 
Hauling, htc. v. Kleppe, 447 F . 2cl 696, 706 (CAS 1973) , cert. denied, 415 
U S. 914 (1974) . 
r Two sections of the Railroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congress' ' 
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In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of 
legislative history contained in the Court's opinion, I believe 
that a court must accept as established the conclusion that 
purposeful discrimination contributed significantly to the 
small pereentage of federal contracting funds that minority 
business enterprises have received. Refusals to subcontract 
work to minority contractors may, depending upon the iden-
tity of the discriminating party, violate· Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, or 42 U.S. C. § 1981, 
or the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the discriminatory 
activities were not identified with the exactitude expected in 
j udwial or· administrative adJudication, it must be remembered 
that "Congress may paint with a much broader brush than 
may this Court .... " Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284 
(1970) (Sn:WART, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).8 
recognition of the need for remedial steps on behalf of minority businesses. 
Section 803, 45 U. S. C. § 803 prohibits discrimination in any activity 
funded by the Act, and § 906, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a establishes a Minorit 
Re:,;ource Center to assist minority businessmen o tam contracts and 
but:~iness opportunities related to the maintenance and rehabilitation of 
railroads. The provisions were enacted by a Congress that recognized the· 
"et:~tablished national policy, since at least the passage of the Civil Rights 
Aet of 1964, to encourage and ass1st in the development of minorit busi-
ne;>.'".l enterprise." S. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Con ., st Sess., 44 (1 5)· 
(Commerce Committee) . In January 1977, the Department of Transpor-
tation issued regulations pursuant to 45 U. S. C. § 403 that require con-
t ractor~ to formulate affirmative action programs to ensure that minority 
bwsine&~e::; receive a fair proportion of contract opportunities. See 42 Fed. 
Reg. 4290-4291 (1977) (codified at 49 CFR Part 265). See also pp. 17-
19, rm. 11 and 12, infra. 
8 Although this record suffices to support the congre.;sional judgment 
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress· 
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional stand-
ards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action 
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at 
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensi-
tive as this, depend in ·large measure upon :the public's perception . of· 
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IV 
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classifica-
tion is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny!'\ As 
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classi-
fication only when necessary to accomplish a compelling 
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 305. The con-
clusion that Congress found a compelling governmental inter-
est in redressing identified discrimination against minority 
_contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10% 
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving 
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually 
impossible to satisfy. Only two of this Court's modern cases 
have held the use of racial classifications to be constitutional. 
See Korerna.tsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Hira-
b(Jyshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the fa.il-
ure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some 
to wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been 
strict in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme 
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972). 
A 
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an 
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue. 
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial 
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference. 
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra, 
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious 
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a non-
fairness. See Bakke, 438 U.S., at 319, n. 53; J. H. Wilkinson III, From 
Brown to Bakke, 264-266 (1979); M. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: 
A Conceptualization and Apprallial, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1048-1049 
(1979) . It therefore is important that the legislative record supporting 
race-conscious remedies contain evidence that satisfies fair minded people 
that the congressional action is just. 
78-1007-MEMO 
14 FULIJLOVE v. KLUTZNICK 
racial means should be available to further the legitimate 
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311. 
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compel-
ling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination. 
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any 
affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely 
to affect persons differently depending upon their race. See, 
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Al-
though federal courts may not order or approve remedies that 
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 (1977); Dayton v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S 406 (1977); Austin Independent School District v. 
United States, 429 U. S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring), 
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the 
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recog-
nized that the choice of remedies to redress racial 
discrimination is "a balancing process left, within appropriate 
eonstitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of 
the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J ., concurring in part and dis-
tenting in part). 
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure 
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of 
racial discrimination. The legislative history of § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator 
Howard, who was a member of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction and who introduced the Amendment into the Senate, 
described § 5 as "a direct affirmative delegation of power to 
Congress to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees'~ 
of § 1 of the Amendment. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 
2766 ( 1866) . Furthermore, he stated that § 5 
"casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to 
it, for the future, that all sections of the amendment are 
cttrried out in good faith , and that no State infringes the· 
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right8 of persons or property. I look upon this clause 
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon 
the Congress this power and this duty." I d., at 2768. 
Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congres-
sional action to effectuate the goals of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was echoed by other Members of Congress. 
Representative Stevens, also a member of the Reconstruc-
tion Committee, sa.id that the Fourteenth Amendment "allows 
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States," id., at 
2459, and Senator Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the 
power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very 
foundation of all republican government .... " !d., at 2961. 
See id., at 2512-2513 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); id., at 2511 
(Rep. Miller) . See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 345.9 
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may 
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal 
courts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see C. Fairman, History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and 
Reunion, pt. 1, 1295, 1296 (1971), they did not believe that 
congressional action would be unreviewable by this Court. 
Several Members of Congress emphasized that a primary pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to place the provi-
sions of the Civil Rights of 1866 "in the eternal firmament of 
the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2462 
(1866) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See id., at 2459 (remarks 
of Rep. Stephens); id., at 2462 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id., 
at 2498 (remarks of Rep. Broomall). By 1866. Members of 
Cougre~s fully understood that judicial review was the means 
by which action of the Legislative and Executive Branches 
would be required to conform to the Constitution. See, e. g., 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 737 (1803). 
9 See also Jones v, Alfred Mayer & Co., 392 U. S., at 440-441, quoting 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull 
on Cong:ress' authority under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
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I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Con-
gress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance 
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of dis., 
crimination. But that authority must be exercised in a man-
ner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments. 
The Judicial Bra,nch has ~he special responsibility to make a 
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a race-
ilonscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility 
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state 
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of 
& remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected 
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of iden-
tified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to 
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safe-
'uard of judicial review of racial classifications. 
B 
When reviewing the selection by Congress of a race-. 
conscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon 
·which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous 
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious 
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative 
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974); 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387, 
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy, 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d, at 
399; United States v. ·wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local1,.6, 
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939 
(1973) , (iii) the relationship between the percentage of mi-
nority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority 
· group members in the relevant population or work force, 
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d 
306, 311 (CA2 1979) ; Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 
F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CAl 1974) , cert, denied, 421 U. S. 910' 
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(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service 
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421 
U. S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CAS) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the 
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be 
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F. 
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). 
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew 
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of 
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although 
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legis-
lation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination 
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority 
businesses, the fact remained that minority contractors were 
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong. 
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threat-
ened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f) 
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the 
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new 
public construction. Since the emergency public construc-
tion funds were to be distributed quickly, 10 any remedial provi-
sion designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past 
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover, 
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had 
to provide minority contractors the experience necessary for 
continued success without federal assistance.11 And Congress 
10 The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA) provided that 
federal monies be committed to state and local grantees by September 30, 
1977. 42 U. S. C. A. § 6707 (h) (1) (Supp. 1978) . Action on applications 
for funds was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application, 
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90 days of 
project approval, id., §6705 (d) . 
11 In 1972, a congressional oversight committee addressed the "complex 
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of 
tacia.l hias." See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (Select 
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knew that the ability of minority group members to ga.in 
experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering 
the construction trades.12 The set-aside program adopted 
Committee on Small Business) . The committee explained how the effects 
of discrimination translate into economic barriers : 
"In attempting to increase their participation as ·entrepeneurs in our 
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major prob-
lems. There problems, which are economic in nature, are the .result of 
past social standards which linger as characteristics o'f minorities as a group. 
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the 
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs. 
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts 
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to 
obtain the needed capital. Lending firms require ·substantial security and 
s track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority business-
men usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is 
often turned down. 
"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any 
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor 
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could 
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also· the internal 
functions of management." !d., at 3-4. 
12 When Senator Brooke introduced the PWEA set-aside in the Senate, 
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate prob-
lems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment ·dis-
crimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the 
"Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated · by the 
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contra.ctors to use 
hiring goals in order to redress past ·discrimination. See Contractors 
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F . 2d 
159, 163 (CA3), cert. denied , 404 U. S. 854 (1971) . · The House of 
Representatives refused to adopt an amendment to an appropriations 
bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor Department's 
order. 115 Cong. Rec. 40921 (1969) . · The Senate, which had approved 
such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position. U5 Cong. 
Rec. 40749 (1969) . 
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that . implementa-
tion of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ens.ure equal oppor~unity. 
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-1LB part of this emergency legislation served each of these 
~ oncerns because it took effect as soon as funds were expended 
under PWEA and because it provided minority contractore 
with experience that could enable ·them to compete without 
.governmental assistance. 
The § 103 (f)(2) set-aside is not a permanent part of fed-
. eral contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program 
, concludes, this set-aside program ends. ·The temporary nature 
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not 
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to 
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine 
the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or 
re-enacts § 103 (f)(2). 
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope 
of congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have ap-
proved temporary hiring remedies insuring that the peroent-
-age of minority group workers in a business or governmental 
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minor-
ity group members in the relevant population. Boston 
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport 
.(]uard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are mem-
bers of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d 
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members con-
etitute about 17% of the national population, see Contractor8 
Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978). 
flee 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ; id., at 40741 (remarks 
of Sen. Griffith); id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh) . Senator Percy 
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacq 
in the construction industry. Id., at 40742-40743. The day following the 
Senate Yote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted 
''exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades. 
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should 
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of' 
.minorities." Id., at 41072. 
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The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway 
between the present percentage of minority contractors and 
the percentage of minority group members in the Nation. 
Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its 
effect might be unfair if i,t were applied rigidly in areas of the 
country where minority group members constitute a small per-
centage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress 
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f) (2) . The factors 
governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qual-
ified minority contractors in a particular geographic area, the 
size of the locale's minority population, and the efforts made 
to find minority contractors. Department of Commerce, 
Guidelines for 10% Minority Business Participation LPW 
Grants, App. 165a- 167a. We have been told that 1261 
" waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. :-Brief,.for 
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37. 
c 
A race-conscious remedy should not be approved without 
consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of 
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U. S. , at 374-375. In this case, the peti-
tioners contend with some force that they have been asked 
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are in-
nocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, that their 
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved. 
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors 
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the 
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion 
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that 
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors. 
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would 
reserve about .25% of all the funds expended yearly on con-
struction work in the United States for approximately 4% 
of the Nation's contractors who are members of a minority 
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·group. 584 F. 2d., at 607-608. The set-aside would have 
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors 
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view, 
the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed 
that its use is consistent with fundamental fairness.18 
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the set-
aside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the com-
pelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination 
that affects minority contractors. Nor is any marginal 
unfairness to innocent nonminority contractors sufficiently sig-
nificant-or sufficiently indentifiable-to outweight the gov-
ernmental interest served by § 103 (f)(2). When Congress 
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise dis-
cretion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary ·to 
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that 
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the 
eet-aside in this case.a 
ts Although I believe that the burden placed upon nonminority contrac-
tors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrele-
vant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no set-
aside and provided $400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce 
argues that "[n)onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation 
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the 
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ 
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional 
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not 
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976) 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971) 
(''To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does 
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment"). 
Similarly, I cannot accept the suggestion that the set-aside should be 
considered a " technique to induce governments and private parties to 
cooperate voluntarily with federal policy." Ante, at 22. The petitioners, 
contractors who wish to compete for all federal funds, certainly have not 
accepted voluntarily the adoption or the implementation of the set-aside. 
14 Petitioners have suggested a variety of alternative programs that could 
be Used in order to aid minority business eP.terprises in the construction 
industry. My view that this set-aside is within the discretion of Con• 
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In the history of this Court and this country, few questions 
have been more divisive than those arising from governmental 
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions 
played no small part in the tragic legacy of government-
sanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.) 
(1857). At least since the decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court has been resolute 
in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution envi-
sions a Nation where race is irrelevant. The t:me cannot 
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based 
upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin. 
But in our quest to achieve a society free from racial classi-
fication, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer 
from the effects of identifiable discrimination. 
Dist.inguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from 
racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made 
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When 
we first confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that 
the Regents of the University of California were not com-
petent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold 
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my 
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of ra.cial classifica-
tions, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a 
democratic society implicit in the Due Process and Equal' 
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve tran-
sient social or political goals, however worthy they may be. 
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power; 
r,ress does not imply that other methods are unavailable to Congress. Nor 
·do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropriate remedy 
PI that the selection of a set-aside by any other p:overnmental body would 
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310. The degree of 
specificity required in the findings of discrimination and · the breadth of 
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and · 
authcrity of a governmental body. 
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ttnd Congress has been given a unique constitutional role 
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In 
this case, where Congress acted on the basis of its determina-
tion that minority contractors were victims of purposeful 
discrimination and where Congress chose a reasonably necee .. 
sary means to effectuate its purpose, I find no constitutionfil 
reason to invalidat-e § 103 (f) (2),1~ 
15 Petitioners also contend the § 103 (f) (2) violates Title VI of the Civil· 
Hights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d et seq. Because I believe that the 
P.ct-r.side is constitutional, I also conclude that the program does not violate 
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. 8., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.); id., at 
348-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, WliiTF.l, MARSliALL, and BLACKMVN1 JJ.). 
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MH. Jvt;nn: PuwJn .. L, concurri11g. 
Although r would p]aC(' grt>atrr cmphai>iS than THE CHH~F 
JllsTICE on th!:' IH:•t>d to articulate judicial standards of review 
in conventional terms. I view hiR opinion announcing the judg-
ment as substantially i11 accord 'vvith my own views. Accord-
ingly. I join that opinion and write sPparately to apply the 
analysis set forth by my opinion in UniverS'ity of California v. 
Bakke, 438 r. fl. :205 (HI78) (hereinafter Bakke). 
The questio11 i11 this case is whether Congress may enact 
the requireme11t in ~ 103 (f) (:2) of the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977 (PWE.\.). that 10!{ of federal grauts for 
local public work projPcts funded by tht> .-\.ct be set aside fur 
minority busi11ess euterprises. Section lOa (f) (2) employs a 
racial classifieation that is constitutionally prohibitPd u11less 
it is a necessary means of advancing a compelling govermneu-
tal interest. Bakke, at 2!:)9, 305; see In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 
717. 7:21- 7:22 (1!:)73); Loving v. l"irg·inia, 388 F. R. 1. H 
(HH17); McLa'Ughlin '. Florida, 379 F. S. 184. 196 (1964). 
For the reasons stated in my Ra.kke opinion. I consider ad-
herence to this standard as important and consistent with 
prececlen t. 
The Equal Protection C'lause. and thP equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, demand that any governmental distinction among 
,, 
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groups must be justifiable. Different stm1dards of review 
applied to differeut sorts of classificatious simply illustrate 
the principle that some classifications are less likely to be 
legitimate than others. Racial classifications must be as-
sessed under the most stringent level of review because im-
mutable characteristics, which bear no relation to individual 
merit or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental 
decision. See, e. g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399, 402-
404 (1964). In this case. however. I believe that § 103 (f) 
(2) is justified as a remedy that serves the compelling gov-
ernmental interest in eradicating the continuing effects of 
past discrimination identified by Congress.1 
I 
Racial preference never call coustitute a compelling state 
interest. "(Distinctions between citizens solely because of 
their ancestory' [are] todious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the .set-aside 
merely expresses a congressional desire _to prefer one racial or 
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal pro-
tection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth_ 
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. · 497, 499 
(1954). 
The Government does have a legitimate interest in amelio-
Tating the disabling effeete of identified discrimination. 
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District 
1 Although racial cla s~ifications require strict judicial ;scrutiny, I do 
not agrep that. thP Con~titution prohibits all racwl clas~ification. Mn . 
.TUiS'l'JCE S·mWAH'J' recognizes thr principlP that. 1 urli(•yp i~ applicable: 
"Under our Con:,:titution, any official action that treat:s a l>rr:;on differ-
ently on ateount of hi~ nu.' (' or (•thnie origin i:,; inherent!~· HUlSpect and 
pre::;umptiVl'ly. invalid." Pu&t, at. 2. But, in narrowly defined circum-
stall('('S, that pre,;umption may UP rebut!Pd. Cf. Lee v. Washington , 390 
U. S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan , and STEWAHT, JJ., concurring). 
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No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 ( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 
39, 41 (1971); Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 
437-438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination jus-
tifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful . .. dis-
crimination." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 
405, 418 (1975). A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether 
§ 103 (f) (2) was enacted as a means of redressing such dis-
crimination. But this Court has never approved race-con-
scious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or legislative 
findi11gs of constitutional or statutory violations. Bakke, 438 
U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 367-376 (1977) ; United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 
430 U.S. 144, 155-159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.); South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , 308-315 (1966). 
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action 
and impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of 
a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest 
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless 
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such 
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements 
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to 
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to 
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the gov-
ernmental body must make findings that demonstrate the 
existence of illegal discrimination. In Bakke, the Regents 
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with 
educational functions, and they made no findings of past dis-
crimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was 
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school 
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S. , at 309-310. 
Our past cases also establish that even if the government 
,, 
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proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a sus. 
pect classification, the means selected must be narrowly drawn 
to fulfill the governmental purpose. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., 
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did 
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse stu-
dent body. But the method selected to achieve that end, 
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not appropriate. 
The Regent's quota system eliminated some nonminority 
applicants from all consideration for a specified number of 
seats in the entering class, although it allowed minority ap-
plicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S., at 275-
276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes 
race as a factor, but not the sole factor, in assessing an ap-
plicant's qualifications serves the University's interest in di· 
versity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and 
competitive consideration. I d., at 317-318. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f)(2), we must 
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findings 
of unlawful discrimination; (ii) if so, whether sufficient find-
ings have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination 
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and 
(iii) whether the 10% set-aside is a permissible means for 
redressing identifiable past discrimination. None of these 
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that 
we are reviewing an Act of Congress. 
II 
The history of this Court's review of congressional action 
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature 
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations. 
Unlike the Regents of the University of California, Congress 
properly . may-and indeed mustr-address directly the prob· 
lems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzen-
b'ach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this 
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,Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants 
on the basis of its 11findings that [such discrimination] had a 
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate 
commerce." 
Similarly, after hearing 11overwhelming" evidence of private 
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963), Congress enacted Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order 11to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina-
tory practices and devices which have fostered racially strati-
fied job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested 
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that 
11 1persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the 
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored 
to a position where they would have been were it not for the 
unlawful discrimination.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976), quoting Section-by-Section 
Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec. 
7166, 7168 (1972) . 
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitu-
tional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.2 At an 
early date, the Court stated that 11 [i]t is the power of Con-
gress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions 
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 345 (1879) .. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968), the Court recognized Congress' 
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the 
2 Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, pro-
vides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to 
enforce the provisions of those Amendments. 
6 
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right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimi~ 
nation forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subse-
quently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the . Thirteenth Amend-
ment, see Runyon v. McCrary, .42.7 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179 
( 19~6), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial 
.discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v. 
Bante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-::296 (1976); 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460 
(1975). 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court 
considered whether § 5 of -the Fourteenth Amendment gave 
Congress the power to enact .§ 4 (e) of .the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b)(e). Section4 (e) pro-
vides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied 
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write 
the English language. . The Court held that Congress was 
empowered to enact- § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination 
against the Puerto Rican community. Id., at 652-653. Im-
plicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had 
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this 
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination. 
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of 
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases con-
struing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966), 
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for viola-
tions of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress 
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding 
"ster[n] and ... elaborate" measures. Id., at ·309. Most 
relevant to our present inquiry was -the Court's express ap-
proval of Congress' decision to "prescrib[e] remedies for vot-
.. ing discrimination which go into effect without the need for 
-prior adjudication." Id., at 328.3 
8 Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 38S 
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It is beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the 
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to 
prohibit those practices, and to. prescribe remedies to eradi-
cate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether 
Congress has made findings adequate to support its 




The petitioners contend that the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f)(2) reflects no congressional finding of statutory or 
constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the 
assertion that a reviewing court may not look beyond the 
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Con-
gress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination. 
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial ·barrier to 
full understanding of the legislative process. 
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve 
specifi\1 disputes between competing adversaries. Its consti-
tutional role is to be representative rather than impartial, to 
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some 
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa 
et seq., temporarily banned the use of lit·eracy tests in all jurisdictions. 
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 ( 1970), this Court, speaking through 
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exer-
cise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. See 
id., at 117 (Black, J.) ; id., at 13'5 (Douglas, J.) ; id., at 1'52 (Harlan, 
J .) ; id., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ; id., at 281 
(STEWART, J ., with whom BURGER, C. J ., and BLACKMUN1 J ., concurred). 
·MR. JusTICE STEWART said that : 
"Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concern-
ing . . . actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access 
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint 
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself 
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon 
individual records. . . • The findings that Congress made when it enacted 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide ban 
on literacy tests." / d., at 284 (citation omitted) . 
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make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law. 
The petitioners' contention that this Court should treat the 
debates on § 103 (f) (2) as the complete "record" of con-
gressional decisionmaking underlying that statute is essentially 
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court. 
But Congress is not expected to act as though it were duty 
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. The crea-
tion of national rules for the governance of our society simply 
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is 
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Con-
gress has no responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and 
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special 
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to 
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be 
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate 
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires 
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. 
After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national 
_concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the 
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress 
again considers action in that area. 
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress 
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legisla-
tive action. Such a requirement would mark an unprece-
·dented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordi-
nate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor 
·our democratic tradition warrants such a constraint on the 
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not con-. 
fined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of 
§ 103 (f)(2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the 
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with 
the problems of racial discrimination against minority businese 
enterprises. 
I B 
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f) (2) demon-
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.strates that Cong~:ess reasonably concluded that private and 
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible 
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors.4 
rrhe opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE provides a careful over- I 
view of the relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to 
which only a few words need be added. 
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced 
on the floor of the House of Representa.tives by Representa-
tive Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal 
Government was already operating a set-aside program under 
§ 8 (a) of the Small Business Administration Act of 1958, 15 
U.S. C.§ 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensi-
ble way for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for 
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result being that 
we are going to eventually be able to ... end certain pro-
gr-ams which are merely support survival programs for people 
which do not contribute to the economy." 123 Cong. Rec. 
Hl436-H1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977).5 Senator Brooke, 
who introduced a similar measure in the Senate, reminded 
the Senate of the special provisions previously enacted into 
4 I cannot accept the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that § 103 (f) 
(2) must be viewed as serving a compelling state interest if the reviewing 
court can "perceive a basis" for legislative acticn. 588 F. 2d 600, 6Q4-
605 (CA2 1978), quoting Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384 U. 8., at 656. The 
''perceive a basis" standard refers to congressional authority to act, not 
to the distinct question whether that action violates the Due ProeesB J 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [ 
In my view, a court should uphold a reasonable congressional tl.ndlng 
of discrimination. A more stringent standard of review would impinge 
upon Congress' ability to address problems of discrimination, see pp. 5-8, 
supm; a standard requiring a court to "perceive a basis" is essentially 
meaningless in this context. Such a test might allow a court to justify 
legislative action even in the absence of affirmatiYe eYidence of congres-
sional findings. 
~During subsequent debate in the House, Representative Conyers em~ • 
phasized that minority businesses "through no fault of their own simply 
have not been able to get their foot in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H144() 
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) ; see ibid. (retnarks of Rep. Biaggi), 
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§ 8 (a) of the SBA Act and the Ra.ilroad Revitalization Act 
of 1976, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a, which, he stated, demonstrated 
the validity of his amendment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3909-10 
,(daily ed. March 10, 1977). 
Section 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Busi-
ness Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal 
Government and subcontract them out to sma.Il businesses. 
The Small Business Administration has been directed by 
Executive Order to employ § 8 (a) to aid socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons. Ante, at 12.6 The opera-
tion of the § 8 (a) program was reviewed by congressional 
committees between 1972 and 1977. In 1972, the House Sub-
committee on Minority Small Business Enterprise found 
that minority businessmen fa.ce economic difficulties that "are 
the result of past social standards which linger as characteris-
tics of minorities as a group." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1972). In 1975, the House Subcommittee 
on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise concluded that 
"[t]he effect of past inequities stemming from ra.cial prejudice 
have not remained in the past," and that low participation by 
minorities in the economy was the result of "past discrimina-
tory systems." H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
8 In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the President issued Executive Orders direct-
ing federal aid for minority business enterprises. See Exec. Order 11458, 
34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969); Exec. Order 11518, 35 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1970); 
Exec. Order 11625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19967 (1971) . The President noted 
that "members of certain minority groups through no fault of their own 
have been denied the full opportunity to participate in the free enterprise 
system," Exec. Order 11518, supra, at 4940, and that the "opportunity 
for full participation in our free enterprise system. by socia.lly and eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons is essential if we are to obtain social and 
economic justice." Exec. Order 11625, supra, at 19967. Assistance to 
minority business enterprises through the § 8 (a) program has been de-
·signed to promote the goals of these Executive Orders. Ray Baillie Trash 
Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 447 F . 2d 696, 706 (CA5 1973), cert, denied, 415 
,u.s. 914 (1974). 0 
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'1-2 (1975). In 1977, the House Committee on Small Business 
found that 
"over the years, there has develOped a business system 
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority 
participation. In the past more than the present, this 
system of conducting business transactions overtly pre-
cluded minority input. Currently, we more often en-
counter a business system which is racially neutral on its 
face, but because of past overt social and economic dis-
crimination is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate 
these past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 ( 1977). 
The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less 
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced 
§ 103 (f) (2) into the House of Representatives. 7 
In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of 
legislative history contained in THE CHIEF JusTICE's opinion, 
I believe that a court must accept as established the conclu-
sion that purposeful discrimination contributed significantly 
to the small percentage of federal contracting funds that 
minority business enterprises have received. Refusals to sub-
7 Two sections of the Railroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congress' 
recognition of the need for remedial steps on behalf of minority businesses. 
Section 803, 45 U. S. C. § 803 prohibits discrimination in any activity 
funded by the Act, and § 906, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a establishes a Minority 
Resource Center to assi~t minority busine::;smen to obtain contracts anp 
business opportunities related to the maintenance and rehabilitation of 
railroads. The provisions were enacted by a Congress that recognized the 
"established national policy, since at least the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, to encourage and assist in the development of minority busi-
ness enterprise." S. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Conf., 1st Sess., 44 (197~) 
(Commerce Committee). In January 1977, the Department of Transpor-
tation issued regulations pursuant to 45 U. S. C. § 403 that reqvire con-
tractors to formulate affirmative action programs to ensure .that minority 
businesses receive a fair proportion of contract opportunities. See 42 Fed. 
Reg. 4290-4291 (1977) (codified at 49 CFR Part 265). See alflo pp, 17 ... 
19, nn. 11 and l2, infra. 
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contract work to minority contractors may. depending upon 
the identity of the discriminating party. violate Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U. R. C. § 2000cl. or 42 
U. S. C. § 1981 , or the Fourteenth Amendment. Although 
the discriminatory activities were not identified with the 
exactitude expected in judicial or administrative adjudication, 
it must be remembered that "Congress may paint with a 
much broader brush than may this Court .... " Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284 (1970) (8'l'EWAR.1', J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).8 
IV 
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classifica-
tion is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As 
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classi-
fication only when necessary to accomplish a compelling 
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 305. The con-
clusion that Congress found a compelling governmental inter-
est in redressing identified discrimination against minority 
contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10% 
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving 
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually 
impossible to satisfy. Only two of this Court's modern cases 
have held the use of racial classifications to be constitutional. 
1 Although this record suffices to support the congressional judgment 
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress 
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional stand-
ards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action 
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at 
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensi-
tive as this, depend in large measure upon the public's perception of 
fairness . See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53 ; J . H. Wilkinson III, From 
Brown to Bakke, 264-266 (1979) ; M. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: 
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1048-1049 
(1979) . It therefore is important that the legislative record supporting 
race-conscious remedies contain evidence that satisfies fair minded people 
that the congressional action is just. 
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See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Hira-
baysh-i v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the fail-
ure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some 
to wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been 
!trict in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme 
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrjne 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) . 
A 
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an 
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue. 
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial 
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference. 
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra, 
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious 
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a non-
racial means should be ava.ilable to further the legitimate 
,governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311. 
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compel-
ling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination. 
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any 
affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely 
to affect persons differently depending upon their race. See, 
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Al-
though federal courts may not order or approve remedies that 
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 ( 1977) ; Dayton v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S. 406 (1977) ; Austin Independent School District v. 
United States, 429 U. S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring) , 
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the 
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recog-
nized that the choice of remedies to redress racial 
,discrimination is "a balancing process left, within appropriate 
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound qiscretion of 
;the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 4.24 . . 
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U.S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dis-
sen ting in part) . 
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure 
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of 
racial discrimination. The legislative history of § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator 
Howard, the member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion who introduced the Amendment into the Senate, described 
§ 5 as "a direct a.ffirmative delegation of power to Congress 
to carry out all the principles of all [the] guarantees" of § 1 
of the Amendment. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766 
( 1866). Furthermore, he stated that § 5 
"casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to 
it, for the future, that all sections of the amendment are 
carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes the 
rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause 
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon 
the Congress this power and this duty." /d., at 2768. 
Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congres-
sional action to effectuate the goa.Js of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was echoed by other. Members of Congress. 
Representative Stevens, also a member of the Reconstruc-
tion Committee, said that the Fourteenth Amendment "allows 
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the Sta.tes," id., at 
2459, and Senator Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the 
power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very 
foundation of all republican government .... " !d., at 2961. 
See id., at 2512-2513 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); id., at 2511 
(Rep. Eliot); Ex parte Virrrinia, 100 U. S., at 345.9 
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may 
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal 
9 See also Jones v. Alfred Mayer & Co., 392 U. S., at 440-441, quoting 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull 
·on Congress' authority under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
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eourts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see C. Fairman, History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and 
Reunion, pt. 1, 1295, 1296 (1971), they did not believe that 
congressional action would be unreviewable by this Court. 
Several Members of Congress emphasized that a primary pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to place the provi-
sions of the Civil Rights of 1866 "in the eternal firmament of 
the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2462 
(1866) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See id., at 2459 (remarks 
of Rep. Stephens); id., at 2462 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id., 
at 2498 (remarks of Rep. Broomall). By 1866, Members of 
Congress fully understood tha.t judicial review was the means 
by which action of the Legislative and Executive Branches 
would be required to conform to the Constitution. See, e. g., 
Marbury v. Madison, 7 Cranch (5 U. S.) 737 (1803) . 
I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Con-
gress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance 
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of dis-
crimination. But that authority must be exercised in a man-
ner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments. 
The Judicial Branch has the special responsibility to make a 
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a race-
conscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility 
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state 
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of 
a remedy should be uphf'ld, however, if the means selected 
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of iden-
tified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to 
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safe-
guard of judicial review of racial classifications. 
B 
When reviewing the selection by Congress of a race-
<;onscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon · 
~ ' 
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which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous 
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious 
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative 
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974); 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387, 
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy. 
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d, at 
399; United States v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46, 
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939 
(1973), (iii) the relationship between the percentage of mi-
nority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority 
group members in the relevant population or work force, 
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d 
306, 311 (CA2 1979); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 
F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CAl 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 
(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service 
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CAS) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the 
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be 
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F. 
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). 
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew 
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of 
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although 
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legis-
lation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination 
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority 
businesses, the fact remained tha.t minority contractors were 
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong. 
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threat-
ened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f) 
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the 
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new 
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' 
public construction. Since the emergency public construc-
tion funds were to be distributed quickly.' 0 any remedial provi-
sion designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past 
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover, 
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had 
to. provide minority contractors the experience necessary for 
continued success without federal assistauce.' 1 And Congress 
knew that the ability of minority group members to gain 
experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering 
10 The Public Works Employmrnt Act of 19ii (PWEA) provid~ that 
federal monies be committed to state and local grantees by September 30, 
1977. 42 U.S. C. A. § 6707 (h) (1) (Supp. 1978). Action on applications 
for funcis was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application, 
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90. days of 
project approval, id., § 6705 (d) . 
11 In 1972, a congn':s.~ioual ovcr,;ight committee addre:s:sed the "complex 
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of 
racial bias." See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d Cong.l 2d Sess., 3 (Select 
Committee on Small Business). ·. The committee explained how the effects 
of discrimination translate into economic barriers : 
. "In attempting to increase their participation as entrepeneurs in our 
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major prob-
lems. These problems, which are economic in nature, are the result of 
past social standards which linger as characteristics o'f minorities as a group. 
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the 
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs. 
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts 
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to 
obtain the needed capital. Lending firms require substantial security and 
s track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority business-
men usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is 
often turned down. 
"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any 
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor 
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could 
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also the internal 
functions of management." /d., at 3-4. 
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the ronstruction tradC'S. 1 ~ The set-aside program adopted 
as part of this emergency legislation serves each of these 
concerns because it takes effect as soon as funds are expended 
under PWEA and because it provides minority contractors 
with experience that could enable them to compete without 
governmental assistance. 
The § 103 (f) (2) set-aside is not a permanent part of fed-
eral contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program 
concludes, this set-aside program ends. The temporary nature 
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not 
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to 
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine 
12 Whrn Srnator Brookr introclurt>d the PWEA l"e t-n~ide in the Senate, 
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate prob-
lems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment dis-
crimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the 
~'Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated by the 
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contractors to use 
hiring goals in order to redress past discrimination. See Contractors 
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 
11\9, 163 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) . Later that year, the 
House of Repre::;entative::; refu::;ed to adopt an amendment to an appro-
priations bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor 
Department's order. 115 Coug. Rec. 40921 (1969). The Senate, which 
lmd approved such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position. 
115 Cong. Rec. 40749 (1969). 
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that implementa-
tiOn of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ensure equal opportunity. 
See 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ; id., at 40741 (remarks 
of Sen. Griffith) ; id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh) . Senator Percy 
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacks 
in the construction industry. /d., at 40742-40743. The day following the 
Senate ,·ote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted· 
''exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades. 
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should: 
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of· 
U'linorities." Id., at 41072. 
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the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or 
·re-enacts § 103 (f) (2). 
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope 
<>f congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have ap-
proved tempo;rary hiring remedies insuring that the percent-
age of minority group workers in a business or governmental 
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minor-
ity group members in the relevant population. Boston 
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport 
Guard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gal-
' lagher, 452 F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are mem-
bers of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d 
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members con-
stitute about 17% of the national population, see Contractors 
Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978). 
The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway 
between the present percentage of minority contractors and 
'the percentage of minority group members in the Nation. 
Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its 
~•effect might be unfair if it were applied rigidly in areas of the 
country where minority group members constitute a small per-
... centage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress 
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f)(2). The factors 
·~governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qual-
ified minority contractors in.!a particular geographic area, the 
size of the locale's mi'nority populatio~, and the efforts made 
to find minority contractors. Department .of Commerce, 
<;;uidelines for 10% Minority Bu~iness Participation LPW 
Grants, App. 165a-f67a. We haye been told th"at 1261 
waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. Brief for 
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37. 
c 
A race-conscious remedy should. n~t be. approved. without 
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consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of 
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U. S., at 374-375. In this case, the peti-
tioners contend with some force that they have been asked 
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are in-
nocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, tha.t their 
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved. 
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors 
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the 
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion 
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that 
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors. 
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would 
reserve about .25% of all the funds expended yearly on con-
struction work in the United States for approximately 4% 
of the Nation's contractors who are members of a minority 
group. 584 F. 2d. , at 607-608. The set-aside would have 
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors 
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view, 
the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed 
that its usP. is consistent with fundamental faimess. 13 
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the set-
aside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the com-
pelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination 
13 Although I h(·lil'vr fhaf 11H· hunlf'n pla(·ptJ upon nonminority contrac-
tors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrele-
vant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no set-
aside and provided $400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce 
argues that "[n]onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation 
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the 
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ 
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional 
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not 
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976) 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.) ; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) 
f'To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does 
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment"). 
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that affects minority contractors. Any marginal unfairness 
to innocent nonminority contractors is not sufficiently sig-
nificant-or sufficiently identifiable-to outweigh the gov-
~rnmental interest served by § 103 (f) (2). When Congress 
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise dis-
~retion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary to 
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that 
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the 
set-aside in this case.11 
v 
In the history of this Court and this country, few questions 
~ave been more divisive than those arising from governmental 
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions 
played no small part in the tragic legacy of government-
sanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.) 
(1857). At least since the decision in Brown v. Board of. 
E,ducation, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court has been resolute 
i~ its ded.ication to the principle that the Constitution envi-
sions a Nation where race is irrelevant. The time cannot 
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based 
upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin. 
But in our quest to achieve a society free from radal classi-
:fipation, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer 
from the effects of identifiable discrimination. 
Distinguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from 
11 P.rtitionrr..: hnvr ~~~~gr~t('(l n vnriPt~· of alternntivr prognum thnt could 
be used in order to aid minority business enterprises in the construction 
industry. My view that this set-aside is within the discretion of Con-
gress does not imply that other methods are unavailable to Congress. Nor 
do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropriate remedy 
Ill that the selection of a set-aside by any other governmental body would 
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310. The degree of 
specificity required in the findings of discrimjna,tion and the breadth of 
dis.rretiofl . in the choic{l of r~medies may .varY, with· the nature .(,a.nd, • 
authority of a governmental body. 
:, t, ~ I ) 
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racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made 
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When 
we first confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that 
the Regents of the University of California were not com-
petent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold 
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my 
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of racial classifica-
tions, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a 
democratic society implicit in the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve tran-
sient social or political goals, however worthy they may be. 
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power, 
and Congress has been given a uniqne constitutional role 
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In 
this case, "·here Congress determined that minority contrac-
tors were victims of purposeful discrimination and where 
Congress chose a reasonably necessary means to effectuate 
its purpose, I find no conetitutional reason to inv~lidate 
i 103 (f) ( 2) • J G 
13 Petitioners abo contenq I hnt § 103 (f) (2) violate:; Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. Because I bcJie,·e that the 
~et-aside is constitutional, l11lso conclude that the program docs not 'iolate 
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.) ; id., at 
.'348-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MAHSHALL, and BLACKMON, JJ.). 
